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Title: Institutions, board structure, and corporate performance: Evidence from Chinese firms
Authors: Chen, Jonas Tao
Keywords: Corporate performance
Corporate governance
Property rights
Board size
Board composition
Issue Date: 2015
Source: Chen, T. (2015). Institutions, board structure, and corporate performance: Evidence from Chinese firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 32, 217-237.
Series/Report no.: Journal of Corporate Finance
Abstract: This paper investigates how institutional environment like property rights protection influences the size and composition of corporate boards, and further, how board structure impacts firm performance in China. Using a World Bank survey of 2400 public and private firms across 18 Chinese cities, I find robust evidence that weaker helping hand from the government is associated with a higher number and proportion of outsiders on the board, after controlling for the effects of firm complexity, growth opportunities, CEO characteristics, ownership, and the potential endogeneity concern. Furthermore, the results show that when firms are operating in a weak property rights environment, more outsiders improve corporate performance.
ISSN: 0929-1199
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.009
Schools: Nanyang Business School 
Rights: © 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier B.V. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [].
Fulltext Permission: open
Fulltext Availability: With Fulltext
Appears in Collections:NBS Journal Articles

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