Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/84096
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dc.contributor.authorSkowron, Piotren
dc.contributor.authorRzadca, Krzysztofen
dc.contributor.authorDatta, Anwitamanen
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-21T03:23:23Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T15:38:16Z-
dc.date.available2017-07-21T03:23:23Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T15:38:16Z-
dc.date.issued2017en
dc.identifier.citationSkowron, P., Rzadca, K., & Datta, A. (2017). Cooperation and Competition When Bidding for Complex Projects: Centralized and Decentralized Perspectives. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 32(1), 17-23.en
dc.identifier.issn1541-1672en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/84096-
dc.description.abstractTo successfully complete a complex project, agents (companies or individuals) must form a team with the required competencies and resources. A team can be formed either by the project issuer based on individual agents' offers (centralized formation) or by the agents themselves (decentralized formation) bidding for a project as a consortium. The authors investigate rational strategies for agents, propose concepts to characterize the stability of winning teams and study computational complexity of finding these concepts of stability.en
dc.format.extent13 p.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIEEE Intelligent Systemsen
dc.rights© 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MIS.2017.4].en
dc.subjectGame Theoryen
dc.subjectCooperative Game Theoryen
dc.titleCooperation and Competition When Bidding for Complex Projects: Centralized and Decentralized Perspectivesen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Science and Engineeringen
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/MIS.2017.4en
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
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