Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/84602
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dc.contributor.authorAn, Boen
dc.contributor.authorGatti, Nicolaen
dc.contributor.authorLesser, Victoren
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-16T08:13:51Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T15:48:07Z-
dc.date.available2016-12-16T08:13:51Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T15:48:07Z-
dc.date.issued2016en
dc.identifier.citationAn, B., Gatti, N., & Lesser, V. (2016). Alternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settings. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 77(1), 67-103.en
dc.identifier.issn1012-2443en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/84602-
dc.description.abstractAutomating negotiations in markets where multiple buyers and sellers operate is a scientific challenge of extraordinary importance. One-to-one negotiations are classically studied as bilateral bargaining problems, while one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations are studied as auctioning problems. This paper aims at bridging together these two approaches, analyzing agents’ strategic behavior in one-to-many and many-to-many negotiations when agents follow the alternating-offers bargaining protocol (Rubinstein Econometrica 50(1), 97–109, 33). First, we extend this protocol, proposing a novel mechanism that captures the peculiarities of these settings. Then, we analyze agents’ equilibrium strategies in complete information bargaining and we find that for a large subset of the space of the parameters, the equilibrium outcome depends on the values of a narrow number of parameters. Finally, we study incomplete information bargaining with one-sided uncertainty regarding agents’ reserve prices and we provide an algorithm based on the combination of game theoretic analysis and search techniques which finds agents’ equilibrium in pure strategies when they exist.en
dc.format.extent38 p.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAnnals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligenceen
dc.rights© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland. This is the author created version of a work that has been peer reviewed and accepted for publication by Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, Springer International Publishing Switzerland. It incorporates referee’s comments but changes resulting from the publishing process, such as copyediting, structural formatting, may not be reflected in this document. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10472-016-9506-x].en
dc.subjectAutomated negotiationen
dc.subjectEquilibrium strategyen
dc.titleAlternating-offers bargaining in one-to-many and many-to-many settingsen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Science and Engineeringen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10472-016-9506-xen
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen
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