Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/85301
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dc.contributor.authorChen, Chung-Anen
dc.date.accessioned2019-07-09T04:09:40Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T16:01:07Z-
dc.date.available2019-07-09T04:09:40Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T16:01:07Z-
dc.date.issued2018en
dc.identifier.citationChen, C.-A. (2018). “A Little Is Better Than Zero” or “Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All”? Evidence on the Size of Pay-for-Performance Across the Sectors. Public Personnel Management, 47(2), 119-143. doi:10.1177/0091026017747298en
dc.identifier.issn0091-0260en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/85301-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/49196en
dc.description.abstractRegarding the effect of pay-for-performance (PFP), standard economic reasoning suggests that “a little is better than zero,” meaning that even small performance payments can improve employees’ work morale. An alternative view, “pay enough or don’t pay at all,” suggests that paying too little may instead erode employees’ work morale. Using the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) data, the present study finds evidence that the two views actually complement each other: Small payments can improve employees’ work effort (e.g., working hours), but can also potentially compromise their work attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction). In addition, employees in different working sectors may have different understanding of what “small size” really means. Findings are followed by theoretical and practical implications.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPublic Personnel Managementen
dc.rights© 2017 The Author(s). All rights reserved.en
dc.subjectPerformance Payen
dc.subjectPay Sizeen
dc.subjectSocial sciences::Generalen
dc.title“A little is better than zero” or “pay enough or don’t pay at all”? evidence on the size of pay-for-performance across the sectorsen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Social Sciencesen
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0091026017747298en
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
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