Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90109
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dc.contributor.authorTian, Jueen
dc.contributor.authorTan, Ruien
dc.contributor.authorGuan, Xiaohongen
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Tingen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-28T08:32:14Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T17:40:51Z-
dc.date.available2019-05-28T08:32:14Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T17:40:51Z-
dc.date.issued2019en
dc.identifier.citationTian, J., Tan, R., Guan, X., & Liu, T. (2019). Enhanced Hidden Moving Target Defense in Smart Grids. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 10(2), 2208-2223. doi:10.1109/TSG.2018.2791512en
dc.identifier.issn1949-3053en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/90109-
dc.description.abstractRecent research has proposed a moving target defense (MTD) approach that actively changes transmission line susceptance to preclude stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against the state estimation of a smart grid. However, existing studies were often conducted under a weak adversarial setting, in that they ignore the possibility that alert attackers can also try to detect the activation of MTD before they launch the FDI attacks. We call this new threat as parameter confirming-first (PCF) FDI. To improve the stealthiness of MTD, we propose a hidden MTD approach that cannot be detected by the attackers and prove its equivalence to an MTD that maintains the power flows of the whole grid. Moreover, we analyze the completeness of MTD and show that any hidden MTD is incomplete in that FDI attacks may bypass the hidden MTD opportunistically. This result suggests that the stealthiness and completeness are two conflicting goals in MTD design. Finally, we propose an approach to enhancing the hidden MTD against a class of highly structured FDI attacks. We also discuss the MTD's operational costs under the dc and ac models. We conduct simulations to show the effectiveness of the hidden MTD against PCF-FDI attacks under realistic settings.en
dc.format.extent15 p.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIEEE Transactions on Smart Griden
dc.rights© 2018 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2018.2791512.en
dc.subjectDRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineeringen
dc.subjectFalse Data Injection Attacken
dc.subjectMoving Target Defenseen
dc.titleEnhanced hidden moving target defense in smart gridsen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Science and Engineeringen
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TSG.2018.2791512en
dc.description.versionAccepted versionen
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