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|Title:||Actualism doesn’t have control issues : a reply to Cohen and Timmerman||Authors:||Forcehimes, Andrew T.
|Keywords:||DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy||Issue Date:||2018||Source:||Forcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2019). Actualism doesn’t have control issues: a reply to Cohen and Timmerman. Philosophia, 47(1), 271-277. doi:10.1007/s11406-018-9957-x||Series/Report no.:||Philosophia||Abstract:||Recently, Cohen and Timmerman (Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, 10(3), 1–18, 2016) argue that actualism has control issues. The view should be rejected, they claim, as it recognizes a morally irrelevant distinction between counterfactuals over which agents exercise the same kind of control. Here we reply on behalf of actualism.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90121
|ISSN:||0048-3893||DOI:||10.1007/s11406-018-9957-x||Rights:||© 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature. All rights reserved.||Fulltext Permission:||none||Fulltext Availability:||No Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SoH Journal Articles|
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