Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90163
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dc.contributor.authorForcehimes, Andrew T.en
dc.contributor.authorSemrau, Lukeen
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-29T03:16:50Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T17:42:09Z-
dc.date.available2019-05-29T03:16:50Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T17:42:09Z-
dc.date.issued2018en
dc.identifier.citationForcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2018). Are there distinctively moral reasons?. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), 699-717. doi:10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1en
dc.identifier.issn1386-2820en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/90163-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/48438en
dc.description.abstractA dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesEthical Theory and Moral Practiceen
dc.rights© 2018 Springer Nature B.V. All rights reserved.en
dc.subjectSocial practicesen
dc.subjectDRNTU::Humanities::Philosophyen
dc.subjectReasonsen
dc.titleAre there distinctively moral reasons?en
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Humanitiesen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1en
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextnone-
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