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|Title:||Beneﬁcence : does agglomeration matter?||Authors:||Forcehimes, Andrew T.
|Keywords:||DRNTU::Humanities::Philosophy||Issue Date:||2017||Source:||Forcehimes, A. T., & Semrau, L. (2019). Beneﬁcence : does agglomeration matter? . Journal of Applied Philosophy, 36(1), 17-33. doi:10.1111/japp.12276||Journal:||Journal of Applied Philosophy||Series/Report no.:||Journal of Applied Philosophy||Abstract:||When it comes to the duty of beneficence, a formidable class of moderate positions holds that morally significant considerations emerge when one's actions are seen as part of a larger series. Agglomeration, according to these moderates, limits the demands of beneficence, thereby avoiding the extremely demanding view forcefully defended by Peter Singer. This idea has much appeal. What morality can demand of people is, it seems, appropriately modulated by how much they have already done or will do. Here we examine a number of recent proposals that appeal to agglomeration. None of them, we argue, succeeds.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/10356/90184
|ISSN:||0264-3758||DOI:||10.1111/japp.12276||Rights:||© 2017 Society for Applied Philosophy (Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd). All rights reserved.||Fulltext Permission:||none||Fulltext Availability:||No Fulltext|
|Appears in Collections:||SoH Journal Articles|
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