Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in post - Mao China : functions, warfare, arms, and organization

Abstract

This paper examines the major changes regarding the Chinese Navy (PLAN, or the

People’s Liberation Army Navy) between the pre-1985 period and the post-1985 period. It

shows that major conceptual changes have taken place to the PLAN’s functions, warfare,

arms, and organization since 1985. On functions, rather than the pre-1985 emphasis on

protecting continental territory through resisting aggression by a singular adversary

against China’s coastlines, the new emphasis has been placed on defending maritime

territory and interests against multiple potential adversaries away from China’s shore. On

warfare, instead of the pre-1985 stress on the defensive counter-amphibious landing

operations, the new emphasis has been placed on capturing and sustaining sea control for

the offensive amphibious landing operations. On naval arms, rather than the old stress on

the defensive, short range, and more numerous light ships, new emphasis has been placed

on developing fewer but better quality, longer range, and multi-role capital ships capable

of offensive operations. On organization, unlike the old focus on the land-based command

and control, manpower, and dispersion, the new stress has shifted to ship-based command

and control and technology-based integration. In the meantime, major obstacles still exist

for the new concepts to be fully translated into reality.