Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/91297
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dc.contributor.authorRzadca, Krzysztofen
dc.contributor.authorDatta, Anwitamanen
dc.contributor.authorBuchegger, Sonjaen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-21T01:32:05Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T18:03:09Z-
dc.date.available2010-12-21T01:32:05Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T18:03:09Z-
dc.date.copyright2010en
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/91297-
dc.description.abstractIn peer-to-peer storage systems, peers replicate each others’ data in order to increase availability. If the matching is done centrally, the algorithm can optimize data availability in an equitable manner for all participants. However, if matching is decentralized, the peers’ selfishness can greatly alter the results, leading to performance inequities that can render the system unreliable and thus ultimately unusable. We analyze the problem using both theoretical approaches (complexity analysis for the centralized system, game theory for the decentralized one) and simulation. We prove that the problem of optimizing availability in a centralized system is NP-hard. In decentralized settings, we show that the rational behavior of selfish peers will be to replicate only with similarly-available peers. Compared to the socially-optimal solution, highly available peers have their data availability increased at the expense of decreased data availability for less available peers. The price of anarchy is high: unbounded in one model, and linear with the number of time slots in the second model.en
dc.format.extent12 p.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.rights© 2010 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE. This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. http://www.ieee.org/portal/site This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.en
dc.subjectDRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Theory of computation::Analysis of algorithms and problem complexityen
dc.subjectDRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering::Computing methodologies::Simulation and modelingen
dc.titleReplica placement in P2P storage : complexity and game theoretic analysesen
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Engineeringen
dc.contributor.conferenceIEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (30th : 2010 : Genoa, Italy)en
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ICDCS.2010.67en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
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