Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/92440
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dc.contributor.authorLuo, Jun.en
dc.contributor.authorPanagiotis Papadimitratos.en
dc.contributor.authorHubaux, Jean-Pierre.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-04T03:02:22Zen
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-06T18:23:19Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-04T03:02:22Zen
dc.date.available2019-12-06T18:23:19Z-
dc.date.copyright2010en
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.identifier.citationLuo, J., Panagiotis P., & Hubaux, J. P. (2010). A randomized countermeasure against parasitic adversaries in wireless sensor networks. IEEE Journal on selected areas in communications, 1-10.en
dc.identifier.issn0733-8716en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10356/92440-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10220/6842en
dc.description.abstractDue to their limited capabilities, wireless sensor nodes are subject to physical attacks that are hard to defend against. In this paper, we first identify a typical attacker, called parasitic adversary, who seeks to exploit sensor networks by obtaining measurements in an unauthorized way. As a countermeasure, we first employ a randomized key refreshing: with low communication cost, it aims at confining (but not eliminating) the effects of the adversary. Moreover, our low-complexity solution, GossiCrypt, leverages on the large scale of sensor networks to protect data confidentiality, efficiently and effectively. GossiCrypt applies symmetric key encryption to data at their source nodes; and it applies re-encryption at a randomly chosen subset of nodes en route to the sink. The combination of randomized key refreshing and GossiCrypt protects data confidentiality with a probability of almost 1; we show this analytically and with simulations. In addition, the energy consumption of GossiCrypt is lower than a public-key based solution by several orders of magnitude.en
dc.format.extent10 p.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIEEE Journal on selected areas in communicationsen
dc.rights© 2010 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted component of this work in other works must be obtained from the IEEE. This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. http://www.ieee.org/portal/site This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. In most cases, these works may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright holder.en
dc.subjectDRNTU::Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering::Wireless communication systemsen
dc.titleA randomized countermeasure against parasitic adversaries in wireless sensor networksen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.contributor.schoolSchool of Computer Engineeringen
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2010.100908en
dc.description.versionPublished versionen
dc.identifier.rims150563en
item.grantfulltextopen-
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