Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games

Abstract

Weighted voting games (WVG) are coalitional games in which an agent’s contribution to a coalition is given by his weight, and a coalition wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given quota. These games model decision-making in political bodies as well as collaboration and surplus division in multiagent domains. The computational complexity of various solution concepts for weighted voting games received a lot of attention in recent years. In particular, Elkind et al.(2007) studied the complexity of stability related solution concepts in WVGs, namely, of the core, the least core, and the nucleolus. While they have completely characterized the algorithmic complexity of the core and the least core, for the nucleolus they have only provided an NP-hardness result. In

this paper, we solve an open problem posed by Elkind et al. by

showing that the nucleolus of WVGs, and, more generally, kvector

weighted voting games with fixed k, can be computed in

pseudopolynomial time, i.e., there exists an algorithm that correctly

computes the nucleolus and runs in time polynomial in the number

of players n and the maximum weight W. In doing so, we propose

a general framework for computing the nucleolus, which may be

applicable to a wider of class of games.