

Community security: human security at 21

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The concept of human security has come a long way since its introduction in the UNDP Human Development Report in 1994. There are now a number of global and regional initiatives aimed at promoting human security issues. However, the achievements over the last two decades may be less impressive when one starts to explicate the progress of each of the key elements subsumed under the broad concept of human security. This paper will examine the extent to which community security, as one of the elements of human security, has been advanced through the security discourses and practices in the international arena. Using ASEAN as a case study, the paper argues that the massive gaps in human development, security and democracy hinder progress in promoting community security. The paper further argues that in developing states, community security is still very much the domain of the state.

Keywords: human security; human development; R2P; Civilian Protection; ASEAN; ASEAN Political and Security Community

1. Introduction

Much has changed since the concept of human security has been articulated in many parts of the globe over the last two decades. In Asia, ever since this concept gained resonance in the mid-1990s, and particularly after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, human security appears to have taken a momentum of its own. The concept has become part of the security lexicon in the region, and some regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have started to adopt this concept in their official statements. More importantly, human security has also been used to frame many of the complex security issues confronting the region, particularly non-traditional security (NTS) issues like climate change, food security, health security, resource scarcity, and migration.

These developments are indeed very significant, especially if one looks back to the kind of climate that prevailed in the region when the human security concept was first introduced in 1994. States in Asia such as China and certain states in Southeast Asia were suspicious of the motivations behind the promotion of the concept, especially when viewed against the way the West had adopted human security as part of their foreign policy agenda. This controversy was best captured in the ‘freedom from fear’ versus ‘freedom from want’ debate that divided the international community.

Countries that promoted human security in their foreign policy agenda, like Canada, had maintained a distinctive focus on the ‘freedom from fear’ thrust of human security with its

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focus on people's rights and safety, and in doing so had not ruled out the collective use of force and/or sanctions to guarantee human security (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, n.d.). In contrast, many Asian countries preferred the 'freedom from want' approach to human security that recognized the development threats to human well-being and security, a point best captured by Japan. In Japan's view, 'so long as its objectives are to ensure the survival and dignity of individuals as human beings, it is necessary to go beyond thinking of human security solely in terms of protecting human life in conflict situations' (Yukio, 2000). The differences in approaches, unfortunately, only resulted in an atmosphere of suspicion among those countries that regarded the policy instruments on human security as a Trojan horse for intervention in the internal affairs of states.¹ The practices associated with the 'freedom from fear' approach were thought run counter to the norm of non-interference prevalent in Asia. Scholars have also observed that some Asian governments view the introduction of human security as yet 'another attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions on non-Western societies' (Acharya, 2001, pp. 442–460; Caballero-Anthony, 2002, pp. 18–29).

What a difference two decades make. Today, human security has found traction in the academic and policy communities, notably in Asia. Part of this change is explained by the structural changes – both economic and political – that have occurred in parts of the region over the years that had more or less engendered a more accommodating stance toward human security. This is certainly true in the case of Southeast Asia where human security through the concept of 'NTS' found its way into the region's security agenda with the adoption of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in 2003. The ASC later became the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) in 2009. It is in the APSC and the components outlined in the APSC Blueprint where the most ambitious vision of a security community in Southeast Asia was spelt out, wherein member states 'live at peace with one another and with the world at large, in a just, democratic and harmonious environment' (Vientiane Action Programme, 2004–2010).²

The APSC is one of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community envisioned to come into full being in 2015, the others being the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. This 3-pillared approach to realising the ASEAN's Community is significant in that it draws on the inextricable linkages between achieving an ASEAN Economic Community that envisions as a prosperous, inclusive regional community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community which is built on the foundations of a caring and sharing community. Thus, ASEAN's three-pillared Community approach essentially brings together an ambitious agenda of security and development that arguably aligns with human security's 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'.

However, while human security has certainly achieved broad recognition, the achievements over the last two decades may be less impressive when one starts to explicate the progress of each of the key elements subsumed under the concept.³ This paper will examine the extent to which community security, as one of the elements of human security, has been advanced through the security discourses and practices in the international arena. In assessing the progress, the paper will focus on Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia as a case study where much of the so-called Asian debate on reconceptualising security and envisioning human security took place during the late 1990s and early 2000.

In terms of community security, the ASEAN region is one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the world. Indonesia, the largest ASEAN state, is home to 240 million people that come from around 300 ethnic groups. The smallest state, Singapore, with a population of 5 million, is home to three major ethnic groups and four other ethnic communities. More significantly, it was in post-colonial Southeast Asia that there are marked histories of racial riots (Malaysia and Singapore) that have shaped current state-society relations, and where some of the worst violence happened. The genocide in Cambodia during the rule of the Khmer Rouge (1975–1979) killed about 1.7 million, about a quarter of its population; and the anti-communist riots in

Indonesia in the mid-1960s during the transition from the rule of President Sukarno to Suharto claimed about 400,000 lives. Ethnic and separatist tensions are also ongoing in Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, with continuing outbreaks of armed conflict that in turn threaten the security of certain communities. These patterns persist despite the region's impressive economic growth and progress in political liberalization.

ASEAN's adoption of the APSC offers a useful measure to assess how much community security as defined in the UNDP's 1994 Report has been advanced through official policy responses at the national level, and through the types of regional institutions and mechanisms that ASEAN had established over the years. The paper argues that despite efforts at establishing a political and security community that is defined by the principles and norms of justice, tolerance and democracy, Southeast Asia remains a critical region of community insecurity (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, 2009). The paper further argues that the sorry state of community insecurity is not only unique to the region, but to many parts of the developing world where massive gaps in human development, security and democracy persist.

This makes the challenge of addressing and achieving community security inherently complex. It involves navigating through issues of power and identity, state sovereignty, human development, security and democracy. The daunting task of ensuring community security therefore requires no less than a human security approach which compels a range of multi-dimensional responses from the political, security, economic to social spheres.

2. Defining community security: finding clarity and convergence from different framings

The key tenets of the human security concept are the broadening of the meaning of security and the focus on the individual/people as the referent object of security. Community security as a subset of human security is defined as protection against the breakdown of communities, as a result of loss of traditional relationships and values, and from sectarian and ethnic violence (UNDP, 1994, pp. 31–32). The UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report specifically looks at the security of ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. Threats to community security can come from several factors. These include: discrimination, exclusion, violence from other groups, and threats from the state. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs also defines community security in terms of threats, particularly, 'inter-ethnic, religious and other identity based tensions' (UNOCHA, 2009, p. 7).

The more recent 2009 UNDP publication, *Community security and social cohesion: Towards a UNDP approach* provides a more expanded notion of community security which combines both group and personal security, while focusing largely on freedom from fear. Threats to personal and group security can include: 'threats from the state' (physical torture), threats from other states in the case of war, threats from other groups of people (ethnic tension), threats from individual or gangs, threats directed against women (rape, domestic violence), threats directed at children (child abuse), and threats to self (suicide, drug use) (UNDP, 2009, pp. 13–14). One observes that the latest UNDP definition of community security is no longer just confined to ethnic minorities but also to women and children who are considered among the most vulnerable groups. And, while the emphasis of community security is on 'freedom from fear', there is also recognition of the importance of responding to a wider range of social issues that influence communities' 'freedom from want' (UNDP, 2009, p. 14). The expanded notion of community security is said to provide for a rather flexible framework for responding to varying contexts and cultures, while bridging the state-centred and individual-centred conception of security. The aim is to develop 'effective states that are accountable to citizens for the effective delivery of services' and focuses on developing 'inclusive political processes' (UNDP, 2009).

2.1. *Community security vis-à-vis societal security*

The security studies literature offers definitions similar to those under 'community security', but uses other descriptors like 'societal security'. The Copenhagen School refers to societal security as 'the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom' (Buzan, 1991, p. 19). Barry Buzan notes that societal threats are enmeshed with the political and military threats that occur within states. This internal character of societal threats endangers social identities critical in state and nation building – in terms of 'delicate ethnic balances that can lead to systematic political discrimination and even civil war' (1991, pp. 122–123).

Other scholars equate community security with simply the protection of one's identity. Waever (1995, p. 67) puts identity as the ultimate criterion of societal security. According to Waever, societal insecurity arises in 'situations in which significant groups within a society feel threatened, feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves' (1995, p. 67). This is further expounded by Theiler (2003, p. 251) through the social identity theory which posits that ensuring societal security involves both the 'preservation of language and customs' as well as ensuring the 'community's survival as a locus of identification for its members'. Social identity theory claims that societal security is not cultural security but rather the sustaining value attributed by people to the culture that serves their 'basic cognitive and emotional needs' (Theiler, 2003, p. 267). Social identity theory shows that 'people defend their group boundaries because they have an innate need for groupness – to maintain self- and other-categorizations – and to protect their groups as sources of positive self-evaluations' (Theiler, 2003, p. 268).

Studies on ethnic violence also problematizes societal security, defining it as the 'maintenance of significant ethno-national and religious groups', wherein the security of these groups may 'coincide with that of the state' ('state and society are coterminous') or be in 'opposition to the state' ('strong ethno-national identities challenge the desired unitary character of the state') (Roe, 2005, p. 46). A range of threats to societal security are identified (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998 cited in Roe, 2005, pp. 49–50), including:

- Migration: 'the host society is changed by the influx of those from outside: by a shift in the composition of the population'.
- Horizontal competition: 'groups have to change their ways because of the overriding linguistic/cultural influence from another'.
- Vertical competition: 'either due to integration or disintegration, groups are pushed towards either wider or narrower identities'.
- Military: 'depopulation: where enough members of the society are killed (or sometimes deported) to either hinder or prevent identity from being transmitted from one generation to the next'.
- Political: 'most likely to come from their own government, usually in the form of suppression of the country's minorities'.
- Economic: 'the capitalist system can undermine cultural distinctiveness by generating global products, attitudes, and style, thereby replacing traditional identities with contemporary consumer ones' and 'the free market can also cause economic depression and unemployment, which might hinder societies from enjoying their traditional way of life'.
- Environmental: occurs 'when identity is tied to a particular territory, when certain types of threats to the landscape can threaten the existence of culture and sometimes the people themselves'.

Meanwhile, other studies provide mono-causal and determinist argument to explain roots of violence and internal conflict. One such strand refers to the economic roots of conflict with particular focus on the political economy of resources and intra-state armed conflict (Le Billon, 2009).

The brief review above of the different definitions of community security points to at least three key features in understanding and addressing the challenges of community security from a human security lens:

- Community security is about the ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ of particular groups. The most salient of these are ethnic minorities and indigenous group. By ensuring that these communities are free from fear and from want, their identity(ies) is secured. Communities may also refer to groups vulnerable to exclusion and discrimination such as women and children.
- Threats to security community can come from various forces, including the state. While the state provides security to its people, the people may also require protection from the arbitrary power of the state.
- By identifying a range of threats to community security, the approaches to achieving community security would necessarily have to be multi-faceted, underscoring the close linkages between human security and human development, peace and democracy.

3. Addressing community (in) security

The state of community insecurity varies in different parts of the world. Nonetheless, there are several notable trends. According to the Human Security Research Group (2012, p. 152), while state-based conflicts have declined after the Cold War, there has been an increase in non-state conflicts from 2004–2008, with the slight decrease in 2009. Some of the deadliest non-state conflicts between 1989 and 2009 were those fought between informally organized communal groups.

From 2001 to 2010, the most common type of non-state conflict was conflict between ethnic or religious communities. Of the 221 non-state conflicts during this period, 133 were fought between such groups (SIPRI, 2013). One further notes that between 1989 and 2009, governments were responsible for 83% of global deaths from one-sided violence (or the organized use of armed force directed at civilians by a government or a formally organized group that results in at least 25 reported deaths in a year) (Human Security Research Group, 2012, p. 204) (Table 1).

Since the inception of human security, there have a number of significant policy initiatives/responses and instruments that have evolved at the global and regional level to address human security issues like community security. However, given the broad and perhaps contested notion of community security, it is often difficult to identify specific policies undertaken by the international community that can be regarded specifically as community security measures. Nonetheless, some global initiatives are noteworthy.

Table 1. Organized violence, global and East and Southeast Asia.

	Global		Asia and Oceania	
	No. of conflicts 2003–2012	Conflict fatalities 2012	No. of conflicts 2012	Conflict fatalities 2012
State-based conflicts	76	38,000	10	11,815
Non-state conflicts	231	4900	10	796
One-sided violence	128 (actors)	2985	39 (actors)	755

Source: Themnér and Wallensteen (2014).

3.1. *Responsibility to protect*

At the global level, the United Nations has played a critical role in promoting normative frameworks to address issues of community security. One of the most controversial initiatives is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), introduced in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and later endorsed by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit.

R2P, often described as an emerging norm, essentially demands that states: (1) protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; (2) encourage and assist others to fulfil their responsibility; and (3) take timely and decisive action when necessary to and in accordance with the UN Charter to protect populations from these crimes. R2P is premised on the idea that state sovereignty is not to be taken as a right, but as a responsibility, with the understanding that the most basic responsibility ‘for the protection of its people lies with the state itself’ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 7). R2P has also been described as a contemporary way of framing humanitarian intervention and an innovative framework for the protection of human beings/communities from the abuse of state power and/or its failure to protect.

The endorsement of the R2P at the 2005 World Summit reflects a cautious, yet in-principle acceptance of its basic principles: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. While ultimately sanctioning the use of military interventions in the case of grave abuses of human rights that met its designated ‘threshold’, the R2P that emerged from the World Summit placed more emphasis on the importance of promoting a culture of prevention than previous conceptualizations of the principle (A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, 2004). The subsequent UN General Assembly debate on the R2P further revealed the preference of the international community for pillars 1 and 2 of the R2P which call for preventive measures and international assistance. There has yet to emerge a clear consensus on the third pillar which focuses on timely and decisive (military) response, largely due to concern about the implications of humanitarian intervention. In particular, a common issue raised by governments is R2P’s application which could be based on unfair selectivity within the Security Council. The veto power of the Permanent 5 (P5) was central to these concerns. In Singapore’s words, ‘the success of R2P fundamentally depends on the Security Council being a “neutral arbiter”’ (Menon, 2009).

3.2. *International Criminal Court*

The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in July 2002 can also be regarded as part of the international mechanisms that could address issues of community security. Although not part of the UN system, the ICC is an international institution ‘with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern’ (Article 1, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002). These crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The ICC is designed as a ‘court of last resort’ that is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions, in that it can only exercise its jurisdiction when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute crimes.

Assessments of the ICC have been mixed. Some scholars see the ICC as important in promoting international justice and preventing serious crimes, but its efficacy is constrained by structural and political factors such as limited resources, institutional restrictions and manipulation by states (Ainley, 2001; Gegout, 2013; Simmons & Danner, 2010). The selection of cases has been controversial and perceived as influenced by powerful states – resembling almost as a neo-colonial project rather than an impartial organ of justice (Ainley, 2001). Capacity constraints have resulted in the limited number of cases investigated and the lack of meaningful compensation for victims

of egregious crimes. The ICC's lack of outreach has further resulted in misunderstanding and resistance to trials (Glasius, 2009). For the ICC to make significant inroads in the face these challenges, it would need to improve its institutional capacity and receive a wider and stronger support from the international community, including international and local NGOs and civil society groups.

3.3. *Protection of civilians*

Since 1999, the theme of protection of civilians (POCs) in armed conflict has been the subject of open debate in the UN Security Council twice every year and of a report of the UN Secretary General every 18 months. The Security Council's first thematic resolution on POC was Resolution 1265, which noted that civilians account for the majority of casualties in armed conflicts and are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements; that only by addressing the causes of armed conflict in a comprehensive manner, through promoting economic growth, poverty reduction, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and respect for and protection of human rights, would civilians be protected in the long-term; and that implementing appropriate preventive measures to resolve conflicts was of upmost importance (UN Security Council, 1999). Since the theme of POC became part of the UN agenda, the concept has understandably become closely linked with the notion of UN peace-keeping operations. Indeed, the UN's understanding of the POC as a norm that is applicable to situations of armed conflict reflects an understanding of the concept that is grounded in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols and has as its basis international humanitarian law, human rights law, and refugee law. For the UN, the POC concept is relative and it essentially derives its meaning from the distinction between combatants and non-combatants (civilians).

However, conflict manifests in various ways in different regions of the world. From situations of armed conflict, to political violence, religious extremism, and communal violence, the human security of communities and individuals are gravely affected. A broad POC approach must not be limited to situations of armed conflict. The interrelated nature of many human security threats and the manner in which one particular threat can exacerbate the other provides even further rationale for approaching the POCs broadly.

This is what is emphasized by what might be seen as a second school of thought on POC in relation to community security. The focus is on a more normative, rather than necessarily legalistic, approach to the protection of human rights. Within this interpretation, the POC is seen as a broader norm that involves 'proactive protection', the active intervention by third parties in certain circumstances to protect civilians/communities through efforts to prevent violent conflicts, engage in post-conflict reconstruction and respond to violations (Deschamp, 2010, p. 13).

Ultimately, a broad POC agenda for the international community must be cognizant of the various forms of human security threats facing people in the region. It should encourage the development of the capacity of a state's to protect their populations, including through international assistance, in areas such as security sector reform (SSR), judicial reform, human rights training, building the capacity of police, early warning, enhancing the role of women, and so on.

It can be observed from the above global initiatives that community security – in its broadest interpretation – are clearly targeted at providing not just a normative framework but also generating multilateral actions to promote human security. In this regard, the UN and its agencies such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), now merged into UN Women,

have played a critical role in advancing protection of vulnerable communities: refugees, women and children.

But while much of the policy initiatives are pitched at the international arena, what matters most in advancing community security are the kinds of policies that are being advanced and implemented at the national and local levels. The 2009 UNDP report on *Community security and social cohesion: Towards a UNDP approach* is an example of translating and localising much of the norms that had been promoted for human security.

3.4. Community security through social cohesion

An interesting point in the 2009 UNDP paper is the linkage drawn between community security and social cohesion (CSSC). Social cohesion refers to the ‘tolerance of, and respect for, diversity (in terms of religion, ethnicity, economic situation, political preferences, sexuality, gender and age) both institutionally and individually’ (UNDP, 2009, p. 14). Social cohesion has two dimensions: (1) ‘the reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion’ through engaging excluded groups’; and (2) the strengthening of social capital (UNDP, 2009, p. 14). The latter is regarded as the ‘glue that keeps the society together even in difficult and stressful times’ and involves strategies that supports social networks which bring groups together, builds trust, fosters respect, encourages participation and engagement by people of different background, and developing a common sense of belonging and a shared future vision (UNDP, 2009, p. 15). Essentially, social cohesion is viewed as a means to ensure community security. Both concepts are therefore mutually reinforcing in that communities that are secure are more likely to act in a more cohesive way.

In highlighting the importance of social cohesion for community security, the UNDP advances a CSSC approach which integrates security and development interventions in order to identify the range of issues that causes insecurity, and at the same time develop coordinated and multi-sectoral responses to insecurities at the community level and facilitate an enabling environment at the national level (UNDP, 2009, p. 17). The range of responses outlined in the CSSC include a combination of traditional conflict reduction strategies such as conflict prevention, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, SSRs and small arms control with gender, governance and rule of law. Emphasis is also placed on addressing issues of social exclusion which are often the cause of community insecurity. The UNDP’s CSSC approach is one of the many pathways to community security that can be easily adopted at different levels – from the global to national contexts. One can argue, however, that the approach is not necessarily new since other scholars and practitioners have presented similar modalities to promote community security, underscoring the close linkage between security and development.

3.5. Security and development

Aside from a number of existing studies that discuss the interrelationship between security and development, current studies stress the dangers and destabilising effect of underdevelopment. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy went so far as to state that ‘conflict in the periphery was the result of and resulted in development malaise’ with external dimensions that encompass ‘export of new threats, such as the migration of the unemployed and poor, diseases such as HIV/AIDS and SARS, drug trafficking and criminality to more affluent societies’ (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007). Beswick and Jackson (2011) provided an update of the current conflicts that has endured well after the end of the Cold War and that has resulted in the pervasive poverty in failed or failing states that are subject to repeated cycles of violence. They also look at the underlying themes of conflicts today where resources, political institutions, social structures and access to resources interact. They devote significant discussion on several consequences of conflict, such

as the influx of refugees and internally displaced people, as well as the politics of development actors and humanitarian aid in conflict, and highlighting among others, the importance of justice and the justice sector as key to restoring faith in a state in the process of post-conflict peace-building.

Most recently, the World Bank's 2011 *World development report on conflict, security and development* underscores the strong linkage between security and development reflected in its main message: 'strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to provide citizen security, justice and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence'. The report further supported this with two main arguments: (1) 'Twenty-first century conflict and violence are a development problem that does not fit the 20th century mold'; and (2) 'Vicious cycles of conflict are created when security, justice, and employment stresses meet weak institutions' (World Bank, 2011). The report emphasizes confidence building, a concept rarely used in the development community but that is a key factor in conflict resolution and post-conflict peace-building and its importance for the transformation of institutions that provide citizen security, justice and jobs as well as the 'role of regional and international action to contain external stresses' and the 'specialised nature of external support needed' (World Bank, 2011).

Despite the range of approaches that had evolved over the years to promote the security of communities, there appears to be more cases of failures than success in attaining both security and development. There also remains the intractable challenge of addressing the vicious cycle of underdevelopment and conflicts that often affect many communities, particularly ethnic minorities. What is unfortunate is the fact this trend persists even in regions of the world that are working toward building security communities. ASEAN's move toward an APSC is a good case in point. Despite the peace that has prevailed in the region over the last 40 years, and efforts over the last decade to adopt an ASEAN Charter that spells out the norms of inter-state and intra-state conduct, and that promotes the values of democracy, conflict prevention and peace-building, there remains significant pockets of insecure communities within states that face discrimination and persecution. And, despite efforts at ending conflicts through peace agreements, deep-seated issues of exclusion and threats to identity remain. Moreover, in spite of the emphases on building a community of caring and sharing societies, there is a range of evidence of societal faultlines and lack of social cohesion that aggravate the insecurities of certain communities in ASEAN. This is discussed in the next section.

4. Community security and ASEAN's security community: regional initiatives as 'gateways'?

The adoption of the APSC is indicative of the desire by member states of ASEAN to promote peace and security in the region. As indicated above, much of the security elements outlined in the APSC Blueprint mirrors the wide-ranging agenda of human security, including community security broadly defined. Aside from the APSC, there are also the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights, and the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children. Arguably, these regional institutions present opportunities for the promotion of human security, by embedding among others a human rights culture, developing conflict prevention norms in the region, as well as encouraging the development of the capacity of States to prevent and respond to the various protection concerns that might affect security community. This section will only discuss the APSC.

The APSC outline a number of measures that, although not directly addressing community security, could be regarded as part of the overall framework to build upon the conflict prevention culture in the region but provide for capacity building measures that could eventually enhance the will and capacity of states to promote community security. The Blueprint sets out five strategic thrusts aimed at bringing ASEAN's political and security cooperation to a 'higher plane' and

Table 2. The displacement of people as a result of conflict in Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand.

	Internally displaced people	Refugees and Asylum seekers	Stateless people
Myanmar (as of September 2014)	467,400	500,364 (from Myanmar)	1,090,000
Philippines (Haiyan and Mindanao) (as of September 2014)	5,000,620	291	6040 (at risk of statelessness, from Indonesia)
Indonesia (as of August 2014)	84,000	9581 (from Indonesia)	No data
Thailand	35,000 (as of April 2014)	132,000 (from Myanmar as of September 2014)	506,000 (as of 2011)

Sources: UNHCR, Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, Country Operations Fact Sheets, September 2014. <http://www.unhcr.org/531dd2159.html>, accessed 29 November 2014. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Figures – Thailand, as of April 2014, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>, accessed 29 November 2014. Global Figures – Indonesia, as of August 2014, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures>, accessed 29 November 2014.

to ensure that the peoples and states of ASEAN live in peace with one another. These are conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace-building, political development and norm shaping and sharing.

A close look at the measures outlined in the Blueprint indicate that the APSC is more than just an instrument of security cooperation, but is essentially a political project, designed to shape the region according to the norms of democracy, rule of law, transparency, good governance and respect for human rights. In this sense, the APSC is also an attempt to stretch regional cooperation from the mere functional to the normative and can be seen to advance three key themes: democracy, human rights, and popular participation. As a political project, the APSC envisions an ASEAN Community that promises to be more receptive to – and capable of ensuring – the protection of people and communities.

Against the kinds of measures outlined in the APSC that are aimed at promoting community security, ASEAN’s scorecard remains mixed. Post-ASEAN Charter, there continues to be a number of communities that suffer acute insecurities as a result of conflicts (see Table 2 for displacements as a result of conflict).

Insecure communities in ASEAN’s Security Community: The tale of two communities.

The following cases of community (in)security in Southeast Asia offer insights on the challenges faced by states in balancing security and development.

4.1. Elusive peace in Muslim Philippines and enduring insecurity of Muslim minorities

The roots of the current conflict in Mindanao dates back to the late 1960s with the resettlement of Christians to Mindanao, as well as the implementation of national development projects (logging and mining). Such policies led to the loss of ancestral land, displacements, and the marginalization and neglect of the indigenous Muslim communities, and sparked a conflict between secessionists and the government that has endured for decades.

The conflict has had a high cost on Muslim communities in Mindanao. In 2012, the incidence of poverty in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, or ARMM, was twice (46.9%) the national estimate (National Statistical Coordination Board, 2013). The 2009 Human Development Index (HDI), which measures life expectancy, education and income, reports that among the worst performers are the ARMM provinces of Lanao del Sur, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and Sulu (Human Development Network, 2013, p. 73). These provinces also demonstrate the largest losses in HDI due to inequalities (Human Development Network, 2013, p. 86).

In terms of the direct impacts of the fighting, the Commission on Human Rights in the ARMM estimates that the decades of conflict have caused more than 60,000 deaths, 2 million refugees, 535 mosques destroyed, 200 schools demolished and 35 towns damaged (Lingao, 2012). Survey data from 2000 to 2010 show that more than 40% of families in Mindanao were displaced at least once, while 1 in 10 was displaced 5 times or more, and 30% were displaced for more than a year (World Bank and UN World Food Program, 2011). Displaced families and communities confront problems of pessimism, food insecurity and income poverty due to loss of livelihood and very poor access to services (World Bank and UN World Food Program, 2011).

4.1.1. *State responses: peace processes and community grievances*

State responses to Muslim secessionist movements since the 1950s have mostly been in the form of military force, with efforts to resolve the conflict through peace talks. Peace talks were however largely ineffective. A peace agreement in 1976 with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that provided for the establishment of an Autonomous Region in Mindanao broke down due to disagreements over implementation. Another peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996 also faltered, due to failure to address the root causes of the conflict, including control over natural resources and the limits of the Philippine Constitution as the framework for conflict resolution (Jubair, 2007, pp. 14–15). Failure in each instance led to renewed fighting. In 2000, that caused the President Joseph Estrada to declare an all-out war against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway of the MNLF.

The 2001 Tripoli Agreement of Peace broadened the agenda to include security, relief and rehabilitation, and ancestral domain (Jubair, 2007, p. 36). However, peace talks again stalemated when a military offensive was launched by the government (Jubair, 2007, p. 38). Another attempt, the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) with the MILF – which defined the boundaries of the ancestral domain, and envisioned a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity with authority to govern the area – was declared unconstitutional by the Philippine Supreme Court (Kraft, 2013, p. 7).

More recent efforts have taken a more comprehensive approach. The 2012 Framework Agreement of the Bangsamoro (FAB) between the government and the MILF covers the establishment of the Bangsamoro (region); a basic law; powers; revenue generation and wealth sharing; territory; basic rights; transition and implementation; normalization (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the MILF); and a non-unilateral implementation clause (Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2012).

The Sajahatra Bangsamoro (Peace Bangsamoro), a development programme, was also signed in April 2013. To be jointly implemented by the government and the MILF, the programme aims to ‘develop the health, education, and livelihood conditions of Bangsamoro communities’ (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2013). In terms of protecting the Bangsamoro’s cultural identity, the FAB recognizes the ‘Bangsamoro identity’ (Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2012). The FAB process also aims at addressing issues of arms control through the ‘rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the Bangsamoro’ and programmes to ‘address the needs of MILF combatants, internally displaced persons and poverty-stricken communities’ (Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, 2012).

4.1.2. *Policy challenges: key gaps in crafting the path to peace*

There remains, however, a number of gaps. One is in governance. While the existing legal framework and institutional design of the ARMM may have power-sharing and power-dividing mechanisms for minority groups, those are ‘not fully functional’ or supported with ‘resources and

actual powers' (Coronel-Ferrer, 2012, p. 2100). The culture of corruption and patronage that plagues the region is another hurdle. This culture could hinder the effectiveness of 'participatory, representative, protective and distributive mechanisms for smaller minorities within the minority region' (Coronel-Ferrer, 2012, p. 2100).

Another potential problem is the heterogenous character of the Bangsamoro population. MILF leaders and members come from different ethnic groups, including the Maguindanaoan, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan and Kalagan, among others (Taya, 2010, p. 30). Such heterogeneity could lead to the creation of new minorities with the granting of autonomy to a Bangsamoro region (Coronel-Ferrer, 2012, p. 2108). This is despite the fact that the MILF has sought to converge a mixture of ethnic groups into a broader 'political coalition with a common politico-religious creed transcending specific claims and identifications' (Taya, 2010, p. 30). Also, the 'decommissioning' of former MILF combatants could be a murky process. In particular, reintegration strategies for those child soldiers who had been more 'active agents' than 'helpless victims of coercion' would be difficult (Ozerdem, Podder, & Quitariano, 2010, p. 317).

Another issue that could derail the process is the difficulty of dealing with re-emerging separatist movements that are not satisfied with the peace process and are coalescing with possible terrorist organizations. There are some possible spoilers to the process. One is the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), which launched an armed attack on soldiers in Central Mindanao in 2013 (Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 2013). A possible alliance of the BIFF with the MNLF has also been reported; former leaders of the MNLF hardening in their opposition to any progress on the Bangsamoro MILF-led agenda (Fernandez, 2013).

4.2. *The 'lost' community of the Rohingyas in Myanmar*

The Rohingya are a Muslim minority group living in three townships in Myanmar's Rakhine State adjacent to Bangladesh. The Rohingya have long faced insecurity due to their lack of citizenship status in Myanmar. Successive Myanmar governments have openly positioned the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.

Central to the plight of the Rohingyas is Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law, which requires them to provide conclusive evidence that their ancestors settled in Myanmar before independence in 1948, a difficult if not impossible task for most. As non-citizens, Rohingyas are deprived of many fundamental rights, including freedom of movement, education, marriage and employment. They are also exposed to human rights violations such as arbitrary detention, forced labour, rape, torture and forcible relocation.

The insecurities faced by the Rohingya community set the stage for a serious spate of violence in Rakhine State in 2012. The rape and murder of a Buddhist woman by Muslim men that year triggered communal violence between Buddhist Rakhines and Muslim Rohingyas (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Dozens were killed, hundreds of houses burned, and 75,000 mostly Rohingya displaced.

4.2.1. *State responses*

One of the first things that the Thein Sein administration did was to impose curfews to ensure the physical safety of the conflicting parties and maintain order (Associated Press, 2013). A state of emergency was later declared, which effectively allowed the military to take over the administrative functions of Rakhine State. These measures did not however stem the tide of violence although it did manage to reduce its scale.

On 12 July 2013, President Thein Sein disbanded the notorious Nasaka border security force, which had been accused of serious human rights abuses, imposition of forced labour and extortion (Ferrie, 2013).

The government also formed the Rakhine Investigation Commission in August 2012 (Linn, 2012). The commission had the broad mandate of looking into issues such as the causes of the violence, the official response, how to resolve the situation, suggestions for reconciliation and socio-economic development of the area (Rakhine Commission of Inquiry, 2013a). Rohingya organizations⁴ have however been mostly critical of the commission, pointing to the absence of Rohingya representatives; the continued depiction of the Rohingya as ‘Bengalis’ and illegal immigrants; and the failure to call for a review of the 1982 Citizenship Law, among others (Rakhine Commission of Inquiry, 2013b). The organizations did applaud some of the recommendations as ‘forward-thinking’, including the call to address the humanitarian situation in Muslim displacement camps provided that they were ‘truly, humanely, immediately and timely [sic] implemented’ (Rakhine Commission of Inquiry, 2013b).

4.2.2. *Continuing exclusion of Rohingyas*

There appears to be a consensus among the general public and also ethnic Rakhines in Myanmar that Rohingyas are not Myanmar citizens and should not be granted citizenship. This was underlined by President Thein Sein when he commented in 2012 that the solution was refugee camps or deportation (AFP, 2012). He further noted that ‘we will take responsibility for our ethnic people but it is impossible to accept the illegally entered Rohingyas, who are not our ethnicity’ (AFP, 2012).

The president’s statement continues to be invoked by Rakhine community leaders who view the expulsion of Rohingyas as the only appropriate solution. This reflects the insecurity felt by the ethnic Rakhines themselves. Interviews by Human Rights Watch in 2013 reveal that ethnic Rakhines overwhelmingly rejected the suggestion of citizenship for the Rohingyas (Human Rights Watch, 2013). They fear losing their cultural and ethnic identity to the Rohingya community. The number of Rohingyas, it is argued, is growing rapidly due to the high birth rates in the community. This is compounded by fears that the 300,000 Rohingyas in refugee camps in Bangladesh, and those dispersed throughout Southeast Asia, most notably in Malaysia and Thailand, would return if citizenship is given (Refugee International, 2011).

Such fears of being overwhelmed by Rohingyas prompted authorities in Rakhine to introduce a local regulation in May 2013 setting a two-child limit on Rohingya families and banning polygamy (Radio Free Asia, 2013). This regulation was largely supported by Rakhines and has been endorsed, explicitly or implicitly, at the highest levels by individuals such as the Minister of Immigration and Population Khin Yi. Although Aung San Suu Kyi criticized the policy, Rakhine members of her National League for Democracy party decried her argument that the policy violated human rights.

The insecurity of the Rohingyas has also been exacerbated by, ironically, greater openness in Myanmar. A freer media has contributed to the growing viciousness and rise in sectarian sentiments against the community. There has been a spike in online hate speeches; the Internet and social media have been used by extremists to drum up suspicion, fear and hatred and the Myanmar government has been helpless to control it (Wong, 2013).

The Rohingya citizenship question is thus unlikely be settled anytime soon. Rohingyas may in the meantime be issued with Temporary Registration Cards (TRCs). Some TRCs were issued to them to vote in the 2010 elections (Kalandan Press Network, 2009). However, the TRC does not mention a place of birth and therefore cannot serve as official evidence of birth in Myanmar and cannot be used to claim citizenship.

5. Conclusion

This paper has examined community security since the introduction of the UNDP Report in 1994. The discussion has shown that despite the progress seen in advancing human security,

the picture is less promising if brought to the level of specific issues such as community security. And while notable developments can be seen in regional initiatives such as the case of Southeast Asia's APSC, the lack of progress in addressing cases of community security indicate that unless human security norms are observed at the national level, regional initiatives are ineffective.

Thus, while the concept of human security may have made significant inroads in informing the discourse and language of security over the last 20 years, its success in practice remains indeterminate. This certainly is the case in Southeast Asia despite its APSC which embodies the many iterations of advancing human security. In fact, two of the most significant developments of the APSC have been the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 2012. These are indeed significant milestones in ASEAN's history. Arguably the establishment of these institutions present ASEAN with the opportunities for the anchoring human security, by embedding, among others, a human rights culture in the region, developing conflict prevention norms as well as encouraging the development of the capacity of states to prevent and respond to the various protection concerns that might affect the security of individuals and communities in the ASEAN. The APSC, after all is meant to put individuals and communities at the centre of all political and security frameworks and policies. Yet, serious challenges remain, particularly in addressing the acute insecurities faced by marginalized communities.

As we follow the progress of human security globally, the Southeast Asian experience reveals salient trends. First, is that protecting human rights and advancing human development are integral to the process of attaining human security. In the context of protecting communities, there can be no security without development, nor development without human rights. While this statement is not new, realising all three remain elusive for many states, notably in the developing world. It is no surprise then that as the global community prepares to craft a post-2015 MDG framework, the current thinking is to infuse a new approach to sustainable development that recognizes the critical importance of peace, security, governance and the rule of law. As argued by Mary Robinson, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'the world can no longer pretend that development and prosperity can be achieved without progress in these areas' (Robinson, 2014).

Second, is the continued salience of states as the main provider of security. Although the role played by non-state actors, both domestic and international, are equally critical in providing security, the state still bears the main responsibility for guaranteeing the overall security of its citizens. Thus, for human security 20 years hence, Theda Skocpol's argument still holds great prescience in that despite the increasingly borderless world, in the face of the difficult circumstances brought on by changes in the global environment, one (still) needs to 'bring the state back in' (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1985).

Finally, while the arguments for adopting a human security approach to attaining community security become more compelling, given the many complex challenges faced by vulnerable communities, realising such goals require no less than a solid commitment by states to do so. As this paper has shown, and at least in the context of ASEAN's APSC, human security has now gone beyond being a 'new' alternative concept of security to one defining the areas of security cooperation in the region. Yet, unless serious efforts are being made to address the fears of the vulnerable communities, human security remains elusive.

Disclosure statement

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Notes

1. The differences in approaches between 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' to human security stem largely from the preference of those who advocate for the latter to adopt a much broader approach to include all threats and vulnerabilities to human freedom and dignity, whilst the former adopts a more narrow definition and focused mainly on threats of violence. The narrower focus also emphasizes more 'immediate necessity for intervention capability rather than long-term strategic planning and investing for sustainable and secure development' (see Liotta & Owen, 2006, p. 43).
2. Italics added for emphasis.
3. There are seven components of human security, based on the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. These are: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, political security, personal security and community security.
4. The organizations are: the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO), Burmese Rohingya Organisation United Kingdom (BROUK), Burmese Rohingya Association Japan (BRAJ), Burmese Rohingya Community in Australia (BRCA), Burmese Rohingya Association Deutschland (BRAD), Burmese Rohingya Community in Denmark (BRCD), Burmese Rohingya Community in Netherlands (BRCNL), Burmese Rohingya Association in Thailand (BRAT), Rohingya Community in Norway (RCN), and Rohingya Society Malaysia (RSM).

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