Moral Companion (*You* 友) and Moral Relish: Comments on Chenyang Li's Discussion of Friendship

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1.

Professor Chenyang Li's *Reshaping Confucianism* reconstructs Confucian philosophical views on a wide range of interesting and important topics. In this article, I will focus on Li's discussion of friendship in Chapter 6 of his book.

Li attempts to draw on resources from Confucian philosophy to address the fungibility problem in philosophy of friendship. The fungibility problem in the contemporary literature on friendship is formulated as follows:

> The fungibility problem […] raises the question of what justifies our love for another and what might happen if we have the possibility of trading up from our current beloved to someone else whom we would be, in some sense, more justified in loving. (Helm 2010: 180)

Although the fungibility problem is an important problem in philosophy of friendship, when we delve deeper, it is unclear if the fungibility problem arises for the Confucian conception of friendship. Li discusses two kinds of fungibility problem and offers two lines of Confucian response, which lead to the conclusion that friends are not fungible. The first kind of fungibility problem discussed by Li concerns "fungibility on common virtues" (p. 149). It is about whether one is justified to replace a friend with another person of the same set of virtues without loss. Li's response is that Confucian virtues are particularized virtues (pp. 137-143). Once a person Y has particularized the virtues in a characteristically Y-way, it is not possible for another person Z to come along with the same set of traits. Even if Z is also benevolent and courteous, Z is only benevolent and courteous in a characteristically Z-way. Note that although Li here offers us his view on fungibility, his response is one that gets close to denying that there is a problem. Since we are not considering another person who could in theory replicate or duplicate the same relevant set of properties as the properties of one's existing friend, we are not considering whether the two people are *fungible*. Granted Li's view that virtuous people particularize their virtues in their unique ways, then in both theory and practice, it is not possible to have another person Z to instantiate the same relevant set of properties as Y. This would amount to denying that there is a *problem* about fungibility to

begin with because the necessary condition that sets up the fungibility problem, namely, Y and Z are in theory fungible, does not obtain.[1]

The second, or "more radical," kind of fungibility problem that Li discusses "is about whether friends are fungible irrespective of the basis of friendship, virtue-based or not" (pp. 148-149). Li's response is that for the Confucian thinkers, friends are like family (pp. 143-147). Li appeals to the etymology of "*you* 友," which is often translated into English as "friends" or "friendship." Based on research evidence that "you" was primarily used in relation to kinship, Li argues that friends are like family on the Confucian view. And since Li takes for granted that family members are not fungible, Li argues that friends, like family, are also not fungible. I do not dispute with Li's view that the Confucian thinkers consider *you* as family. However, it is not clear it can serve as a response to the fungibility problem. When Li discusses the radical form of the fungibility problem, it seems that his worry is not so much about whether X can replace Y with Z (who has the same relevant set of properties as Y) but about whether X can trade Y and Z like commodities (pp. 149-150). This directs our attention away from the fungibility problem to the problem of tradability. Something can be non-fungible but tradable. A precious copy of *Hamlet* and a bowl of rice are not relevantly similar. But if I am starving and I do not have any food, I may trade my precious copy of *Hamlet* for a bowl of rice. This does not mean that the precious copy of *Hamlet* and the bowl of rice are fungible. I might forever suffer some loss from giving up my precious copy of *Hamlet*. It only means that I could be justified in trading my precious copy of *Hamlet* for a bowl of rice. Thus, even if X for whatever reason trade Y as a friend for Z as a friend (assuming that it is possible), it does not mean that Y and Z are fungible. It seems that when Li discusses the radical problem, he is in effect raising a different problem—a problem about tradability of friends—which is different from the problem about fungibility of friends.

We could agree with Li that friends are not fungible in the Confucian account, but this alone does not solve the fungibility problem. We may read Li's first response as denying that there is a *problem* and his second response as moving away from the issue of *fungibility*. Li himself has not dismissed the fungibility problem. Here, I will take the opportunity here to spell out why the fungibility problem does not arise, at least not for Mengzi's conception of *you*.

Philosophers throughout history and across traditions define "friendship" differently. Our everyday usages of the word "friend" and our understanding of what a friend is also evolve. We can stipulate that "you" is what the Confucian thinkers mean by "friend" and investigate the Confucian conception of friendship. The difficult question is not whether "you" can be translated as "friend." The difficult question is whether *you* means "friend" in the sense that motivates the fungibility problem of friendship. Henceforth, by "fungibility problem," I mean the problem that is generated by the tension between justification for love and the intuition that we are supposed to love Y for who she is. If one's love for Y can be justified by appealing to a set of properties that Y has, this raises the question whether one can switch one's love for Y to someone else who also has the same, or an even superior, relevant set of properties without loss.

[1] See Helm pp. 179-180 for a discussion of Nozick's view, which is similar to Li's view on particularizing virtues.

To get the fungibility problem up and running, one has to at least think that friends love each other, and more precisely, love each other for who they are. Even if we can argue that *you* necessarily have mutual affection for each other, it is unclear from the early texts that *you* have the kind of love that drives the fungibility problem. Moreover, while Mengzi is explicit that father and son should not demand goodness because that will cause alienation (4A:18; 4B:30) and supposedly hurt the intimacy or affection (*qin* 親) that characterizes the father-son relationship (3A:4; 7A:15), Mengzi does not seem to have the worry that demanding goodness will hurt the affection of *you* as it does for the father-son relationship. Mengzi thinks that demanding goodness is the way of *peng you*. If the early Confucian thinkers do not share the intuition that one loves one's friend for who they are, then the fungibility problem does not arise. This is not to say that *you* are therefore fungible. The point is that whatever our view on the fungibility of *you* is, the view does not face the problem of undermining our contemporary intuition about love.

Below, I will try out one way in which we may further develop Mengzi's view on *you*. I will show that, for Mengzi, *you* is a relationship in which the participants relish what is to the heart/mind's taste. It is not a relationship that is defined by love.

2.

"You" can be used as a noun to mean the person who is a *you*, as a verb to mean the action of making *you*, or as a adverb to mean the state of being *you*. In the early Confucian texts, "you" is often used together with "peng 朋."[2] Mengzi lists *peng* and *you* alongside the other four key relationships when he discusses the ethical attributes that characterize these five relationships: father and son, sovereign and minster, husband and wife, the old and the young, *peng* and *you* (*Mengzi* 3A:4). According to Mengzi, the ethical attribute that characterizes *peng* and *you* is *xin* 信 (truthful, trustworthy).

While both *peng* and *you* have the connotations of companion or peers, it seems that *peng* refers to peers who are connected by circumstances such as one's study mates or associates at work;[3] *you* refers to companions who are connected by ethical attributes.[4] It is unclear whether Mengzi is drawing a fine distinction between *peng* and *you*. Nevertheless, we can focus on his discussion of *you* and extract some insights.

For Mengzi, *you* should be formed on the basis of *de* 德 (moral quality/virtue). When Wang Zhang asked Mengzi about *you*, Mengzi's immediate reply is:

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[2] *Peng* and *you* are regarded as important human relationships by other Confucians e.g. *Analects* 1.4, 1.7.

[3] This is according to Bao Xian's commentary to the *Analects* and Zheng Xuan's commentary to *Zhouli* 10 discussed in Roetz 1993, Chapter 9 n. 21. This is compatible with Li's reading *peng* as "one of the same kind" or one who can assist (Li 2024, Chapter 6, n. 16).

[4] This is compatible with scholarly studies that suggest the term "you" was primarily used in relation to kinship and studies that suggest that *you* are those who are connected by a common purpose or goals. See Li 2024 Chapter 6 n. 17 and Roetz 1993, Chapter 9 n. 21.

> Do not tuck age, nobility, or brothers under your arm and *you*. To have someone as *you* is to *you* one's *de* (moral quality/virtue). One cannot tuck something under one's arm. (5B:3)
>
> 不挾長，不挾貴，不挾兄弟而友。友也者，友其德也，不可以有挾也。

It is interesting to note Mengzi's immediate response to the question. To our modern ears, it would be more natural if Mengzi had said something along the following line: "Do not befriend someone because of their age, nobility, or family connections." It is a common thought now that one should not befriend someone because of their social status. However, Mengzi here is not talking about how X should not befriend Y because of Y's social status. Mengzi is talking about how X should not befriend Y with X's own social status "tucked under X's arm." What does "tucking under X's arm (*xie* 挾)" mean? It might be tempting to take Mengzi to be saying that X should not rely on his social status to manipulate or coerce Y into befriending him. But in Mengzi's cultural context, it is normally known to Y what age, what social rank, and from which family X is. Suppose it is widely known that X is the younger brother of a high-ranked minster at the court, even if X himself does not mention this family connection nor flaunt his social status, there might be someone who wants to befriend X because of X's social status. X cannot help but being of a certain age, a certain nobility, and a certain family. Mengzi is probably not saying that X should not reveal or mention his social status when X befriends Y.

It is also tempting to take Mengzi to mean that *you* should see and treat each other as equals. But this reading is not plausible. We know Mengzi does not mean equal social status. In 5B:3, he clearly has in mind instances when two people are not and do not see each other as equals by social status but can still interact as *you*. One example is that when Duke Ping of Jin visited Hai Tang. When Hai Tang said, "Enter," the Duke entered. When Hai Tang said, "Sit down," the Duke sat down. When Hai Tang said, "Eat," even if the food was coarse and simple, the Duke "did not dare to not eat until he is full." Another example is King Yao and Shun. Even though Shun is King Yao's son-in-law, Yao allows himself to be entertained at Shun's house as a guest. Mengzi said this is an example of the Son of Heaven *you* a common person (是天子而友匹夫也). These examples suggest that, in Mengzi's view, it is possible to be *you* with someone who is not of equal social status and that both parties are aware that they are not of equal social status.

It is also difficult to read 5B:3 as talking about *you* should see each other as equals in terms of moral status. Even if we grant that moral status is something that is comparable and gradable, it is unclear that Mencius means X should see Y as of equal moral status when X *you* Y. When Yao visits Shun, Yao does not see Shun as his moral equal. Yao also does not see Shun as not his moral equal. It seems that the question whether Shun is of equal moral status does not feature in Yao's mind. Yao is not assessing his level of goodness against Shun's level of goodness. Rather, Yao simply *you* Shun's *de*.

On my reading, what it means for X to *you* Y's *de* is that X interacts with Y purely in their capacities as moral beings, not in other social capacities. Duke Ping clearly respects and appreciates Hai Tang, and yet Mengzi highlighted that his interaction with Hai Tang as *you* did not go beyond having the meal together (然終於此而已矣). Duke Ping did not share his

position with Hai Tang, nor appoint him to a position, nor give him emolument. If Duke Ping did these things, he would be interacting with Hai Tang as the Duke. His social position would seep into their relationship as *you*. By "not tucking something under one's arm," Mengzi is saying that one should not let one's social capacities seep into their interaction. We may infer from this Mengzi's view that *you* is a relationship in which the participants interact only in their capacities as moral beings.

Since considerations of equality are not applicable to *you*, and since "peers' might have the connotations of being equal or comparable, "peers" might not be a suitable translation. *You* are more like moral companions. But this is still somewhat obscure. What does it mean to say that *you* interact in their capacities as moral beings? Does X admire Y's moral qualities or virtues? Does X pursue the same moral goal or hold the same moral beliefs as Y? My reading is that for X and Y to be *you* is for them to relish goodness together, which is elaborated further in Section 4. But in order for the reader to see what I mean by "relish goodness," we need to first take a detour into an analysis of Mengzi means by taking delight in goodness in Section 3.

3.

Recall that Mengzi singles out "*xin* 信 (truthful)" as the attribute that characterizes *you* (3A:4). In another passage, it is elaborated that there is a way to be truthful with one's *you* — one has to take delight in serving one's parents (4A:12). On the face of it, there is no clear connection between being truthful with friends and taking delight in serving one's parents. It might be tempting to think that one's delight in serving parents has something to do with one's desire being satisfied. One might say that one is delighted because one's desire for serving one's parents is satisfied or because there is a harmony between what one desires and what one believes one should do. However, the kind of delight Mengzi has in mind seems different from desire satisfaction.[5] If by "desire" we just mean that one wants to or is motivated to do something, then this reading is too crude to capture the kind of delight Mengzi means here. Desire satisfaction implies that the object of a held desire obtains, whereas taking delight in something does not require an antecedently held state. Delight is a reaction to something that is happening or happened, whether one has desired it or not. For example: I desired to have some coffee but when I had the coffee, I did not take delight in drinking it; I had no desire for ice-cream but when the cabin crew offered me ice-cream on a flight, I took delight in having the ice-cream; I dreaded having to read a book, but I took delight in reading it. Given this difference, we need to be careful and not hastily assume that what Mengzi means by delight is the same as desire satisfaction.

[5] Mengzi himself draws a distinction between *yu* 欲, which refers to the desires of the senses, and the delight of the heart/mind. Here, I am assuming that some interpreters would want to explain the delight in terms of the desires of the heart/mind.

Note that Mengzi goes on to say that the way to take delight in serving one's parents requires one to be *cheng* 誠 (sincere, whole, true).[6] We may begin with the first layer of reading that if one is *cheng*, one does not have inner and outer conflicts. Suppose G accompanies his father on a grocery shopping trip. G is *insincere* if she accompanies her father when G in fact does not want to accompany him. But suppose G does desire to accompany her father, then she is not insincere. However, suppose G also desires to stay at home to finish her work. G deliberated and still decided to accompany her father. Although there is no discrepancy between G's action and G's desire to accompany her father, it may still be said that G is *divided* because there is a conflict between G's internal states (desire to stay at home vs. desire to accompany her father). But let us further suppose that G does have any conflicting desires and is not divided. G only desires to accompany her father and she does accompany her father. However, it is conceivable that G is not delighted to accompany her father. G does not dislike going with her father but she is also not delighted. I suspect G still does not count as being *cheng* in Mengzi's view.

A clue to what Mengzi means by delight is that Mengzi twice invokes taste analogies to explain the workings of the heart/mind. In 6A:7, Mengzi says that *yi* 義 (propriety) delights his/one's heart/mind just as meat delights his/one's mouth. In 6A:4, when Mengzi rebuts the view that *yi* is external, he said that our enjoyment of the meat roasted by someone from Qin is no different from our enjoyment of the meat roasted by ourselves. *Yi* is not external just like that our enjoyment of roast is not external. This observation suggests that the kind of delight Mengzi means in 4A:12 is similar to the enjoyment one gets from having tasty food. We may infer that the kind of delight one experiences in a state of *cheng* is explained by one's taste for goodness, not by one's desire being satisfied. Here, I am using "goodness" broadly to cover whatever actions or states that count as moral or being moral.

We still need to analyze the taste analogies further. There are at least three ways of understanding the role of "taste" in Mengzi's taste analogies: (a) taste in the sense of judging what is good (e.g., what people normally mean when they say someone has a good taste in wine), (b) taste in the gustatory sense (e.g. a salty taste), or (c) taste in the sense of liking for particular things (e.g., when one does not like the taste of broccoli even though one knows that it has health benefits). They are closely related but they will yield different readings of Mengzi's view. We may try to relate what Mengzi said about taste to his discussion of Gaozi in 2A:2, where Mengzi cautioned that one should not do violence to one's *qi* 無暴其氣 and that *qi* can be starved. Mengzi seems to suggest that Gaozi's regarding *yi* as external risks doing violence to his *qi*.[7] If we go by Mengzi's taste analogies, we get the impression that Gaozi's problem has something to do with his moral taste.[8] I will use the following example for analyzing what, in Mengzi's view, Gaozi's problem is.

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[6] Being *cheng* in turn requires one to understand (*ming* 明) goodness (*Mengzi* 4A:12). This passage involves many difficult terms such as *fan shen* 反身, *ming* 明, *dong* 動 and I do not have a settled reading of them yet.

[7] I have greatly benefited from discussing about 2A:2 with Jeffrey Riegel.

[8] Note that we are only interested in Mengzi's diagnosis of Gaozi's problem here. There could be other explanations for others' problems.

> A foodie G read from a famous food guide that food critics enthusiastically recommend a tomato dish from Three-Star Restaurant. What impressed the critics the most is the intense tomato flavor. G went to the restaurant, but G did not take delight in the dish.

How are we to understand the problem of G's not taking delight in the dish from a Mencian perspective?

On (a) the judgement sense of taste, G's not taking delight means that she does not agree with the expert's judgement that it is a good dish. If Mengzi means moral taste in the judgement sense, then Mengzi is saying that the heart/mind should be able to discern what is good. Then Mengzi's diagnosis of Gaozi's problem is that Gaozi has *moral disagreement* or *ignorance* about what is good. Gaozi's does not recognize what is in fact good as good.

We can rule out this possibility because Mengzi does not say that Gaozi has trouble judging the good acts as good. Moreover, this would allow for the view that there is some objective standard of what is good that the heart/mind should recognize. Then, it would be unclear what Mengzi's disagreement with Gaozi is. Gaozi could be saying that there is some objective moral standard, such as an objective moral standard that requires a younger person to respect an elderly person. It is because one's heart/mind recognizes the external standard that one feels respect. Gaozi does not deny that we have respectful feelings from the inside. He could just be saying that the attitude from the inside is aroused because of an objective, external moral standard.

On (b) the gustatory sense of taste, Mengzi would be saying something along the line that *yi* is a secondary quality. For example, without a taster, a spoonful of salt has the property sodium chloride. It is only when sodium chloride is being tasted that the property of saltiness emerges. There could be some variations in what that taste feels like for different individuals. It still is the case that human taste is underpinned by the same mechanism. We can still say that, under normal circumstances, an average human being should taste saltiness when they put NaCl in their mouth. The problem with G's not being delighted is either that her sense of taste was not functioning properly or that she literally did not taste it. Similarly, the human heart/mind is underpinned by the same mechanism (6A:7). When they encounter certain facts about the world, for example, a seventy-year-old person, under normal circumstances, one's heart/mind will be stimulated and respond with respect. If Gaozi does not "taste" it, then his problem is either his heart/mind is malfunctioning, or his act of respect bypasses his heart/mind's tasting.

Mengzi probably does not think that Gaozi's heart/mind is malfunctioning. He seems to compliment Gaozi for attaining the unmoved heart/mind earlier than him. If Gaozi's heart/mind is functioning properly, Gaozi's heart/mind should be sensing and responding as normal. Why, in Mengzi's view, would this be attacking Gaozi's energies (*qi* 氣) (2A:2)? The problem could be that Gaozi has acted in ways when certain things are not supposed to stimulate a functioning heart/mind in those ways. Then, Mengzi's diagnosis of Gaozi's problem is that Gaozi *morally imposes* on himself. Gaozi performs acts that he thinks he is required to perform even though his heart/mind is not stimulated. But if some of Gaozi's acts are uncalled for, they are not supposed to be acts of propriety at all. However, Mengzi does

not seem to think that the acts themselves are problematic. Hence, it is unlikely that Mengzi is talking about taste in the gustatory sense.

On (c) the liking sense of taste, G's "not being delighted by it" means that G does not enjoy it. G might be able to see why the food critics give it good a review. Or as a food critic herself, G might give the dish a high score because it ticks all the right boxes; but G herself does not like the tomato flavor. If Mengzi means moral taste in the liking sense, then Mengzi is saying that goodness is to the heart/mind's taste. For Mengzi, it is a brute fact about the heart/mind that it prefers goodness and relish goodness. This is similar to someone's eating broccoli because it is a brute fact that she likes the tase of broccoli, not because she tries to eat healthy food. The recurring use of terms such as *shi* 耆 (preference) (6A:4, 6A:7) and *yue* 悅 (delight) (6A:4, 6A:7) in Mengzi's rebuttal of the view that *yi* external and Mengzi's remark that one who enjoys *yi* is content (7A:9) further support this reading.

If Mengzi thinks that it is a brute fact of human beings that we simply like goodness, and if Mengzi thinks that Gaozi's heart/mind is functioning properly, then Gaozi's heart/mind should also like goodness. Then why is Gaozi not enjoying what he is doing? We may understand Mengzi's diagnosis of Gaozi's problem is that he is susceptible to *moral exhaustion*. Perhaps Gaozi is too eager to do too many good acts and overloaded himself. Even though his heart/mind naturally takes delight in doing good, when he does not have the right physiological conditions to support it, Gaozi might end up not being able to enjoy. This is similar to how even though one likes the taste of Yi Ya's food (6A:7), she still cannot have too much of it. Her inability to enjoy too much of Yi Ya's food is limited by her physiological conditions, rather than by her preference. If Gaozi does more good acts than what his *qi* can support, he would starve his *qi*. When his *qi* is starved, it might risk overwhelming the heart/mind, or worse, undermining the heart/mind as the ruler of the body.

The positive note is that it is possible for one to restore one's *qi*, but one needs to make sure that one does not repeatedly drains one's *qi* (6A:8). And unlike the senses (or the small body *xiao ti* 小體), which is limited by regular *qi*,[9] the heart/mind (or the great body *da ti* 大體) is able to generate "vast, flowing *qi* (*hao ran zhi qi* 浩然之氣), which is born out of accumulating *yi* acts (*ji yi* 集義), not out of doing *yi* acts repeatedly on a binge (*yi xi* 義襲) (6A:15, 2A:2).[10] By pacing oneself in doing *yi* acts, one can eventually build up one's vast, flowing *qi*, which increases one's moral stamina in doing more *yi* acts.[11]

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[9] Li (2024) Chapter 7, p. 159. Li calls the kind of regular *qi* that the small body relies on "blood-*qi*" and *hao ran zhi qi* "vast, flowing *qi*". The latter is also sometimes translated as "flood-like *qi*."

[10] I read *xi* 襲 in the sense of succession or repetition. My reading of *yi xi* 義襲 differs from traditional readings that take it to mean that one is not fully motivated by the heart/mind or *yi* is not derived from the heart/mind. I agree with Zhu Xi that Mengzi thinks that one should perform *yi* acts persistently but I think the problem with *yi xi* is not that one is doing *yi* acts sporadically but one overloads oneself with more *yi* acts than one can take. See Shun 1997 5.2.2. for a summary of the traditional commentaries of the contrast between *ji yi* and *yi xi*.

[11] Is there a difference between unmoved heart/mind that is supported by vast, flowing *qi* and an unmoved heart/mind that exhausts regular *qi*? In terms of what they do there is probably no difference. The difference lies in their statuses as moral beings. Mengzi could have assumed that to be a moral being is to like and enjoy goodness. If one is not in the state of enjoying but only performing good acts, one is not in the relevant state that a moral being is in. It is at least an indication that one is failing as a moral being in some way. If I help my friend but I did not enjoy it, does it make a

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Returning to Mengzi's view on *you*, my interpretation is that for one to be a *you*, one has to be *cheng*. *Cheng* is a state where one relishes what truly is to one's heart/mind's taste, namely, one's goodness. What it means for X and Y to be *you* is for them to relish goodness together. This makes *you* differ from the other relationships mentioned by Mengzi in 3A:4. In the relationships of father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, elder and younger, one might have to do good acts because of certain external requirements. A father might take care of his son because he is required by law to do so, even if he does not enjoy taking care of his child. But when *you* spend time together, they do so merely because they both enjoy each other's moral company.

Whether the moral companions themselves are aware or not, the interactions among *you* are good for their *qi*. They spend time together because their heart/mind like it, not because they are required by external standards to do so. Unlike a father who might be required to do a succession of acts that exceeds what their *qi* can support, *you* by definition are together to relish goodness. They do not "pull each other's seedlings" (2A:2). Instead, they provide each other a realm in which they can nourish their vast, flowing *qi* and in doing so, building up their moral stamina for doing more good acts.

One might raise the question as to why one not only relishes goodness alone but also likes to spend time with others who relish goodness. Is it because one also likes others who relish goodness or because one also likes others who are good? For Mengzi, there is no difference. Spending time with those who are good is part of relishing goodness. So, a person who relishes goodness relishes spending time with those who are good.[12] And a person who is good is one who relishes goodness.

5.

Although I have not shown that the relevant kind of love that motivates the fungibility problem is absent in Mengzi's conception of *you*, I hope my discussion here shows that the fungibility problem does not arise on the proposed reading of Mengzi's *you*. Recall that the fungibility problem, as it is formulated in Section 1, is generated by a tension between one's justification for loving someone and the possibility of replacing the person with another person with the same relevant set of properties. Even if love is present in *you*, it is not what defines *you*. What defines a *you* relationship is one in which the participants relish goodness together.

Li's chapter is densely packed with rich ideas about the Confucian conception of *you* and invites us to think about various problems about friendship that go beyond the fungibility problem. It is one of the very few English-language studies that inquire into the philosophical

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difference? The difference does not lie in my action or my motive, for my motive could very much be in the right place. But if one holds the view that what it is to be a friend is to enjoy the company of her friend, then my lack of enjoyment is at least an indication that I am failing in some way as a friend.

[12] This fits with Mengzi's view that a *you* is necessarily one who understands goodness (4A:12). It also fits with the view that one who is good is someone who can be desired (7B:25).

problems about friendship in Confucian thought. It motivates us to further investigate the Confucian conception of *you*, which is a relatively understudied yet important human relationship in Confucian thought. With a more extensive account of *you*, we can continue to investigate whether *you* are fungible and address other kinds of fungibility problems. We can also articulate philosophical issues about *you* that concern Confucian thinkers and raise new philosophical problems about friendship.

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