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**GENDER EQUALITY WITH DIFFERENCE:
A *YIJING YIN-YANG* APPROACH**

**ZHANG LILI
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**GENDER EQUALITY WITH DIFFERENCE:
A *YIJING YIN-YANG* APPROACH**

ZHANG LILI

School of Humanities

A thesis submitted to the Nanyang Technological University in partial
fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of
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
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Authorship Attribution Statement

This thesis contains material from 2 papers published in the following peer-reviewed journal where I was the first author.

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Zhang Lili

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SUMMARY

In this dissertation, I argue that gender equality should be premised on gender difference in the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm.

To support the thesis, I begin with a brief review of three representative sexist theories in mainstream feminism: (1) women are conceptual others, inferior to men; (2) women are “mutilated males,” possessing a degraded position; and (3) women’s experience is replaced by men’s. I argue that these sexist norms are part of “the one-sex model,” which is largely dominated by the exclusive dualistic thinking paradigm and its hierarchical evaluating system. Worse, this paradigm causes a dilemma of gender equality. This dilemma is the incompatibility between equality in sameness and equality in difference. If feminists acknowledge an essential gender difference, women may face the risk of degradation because they are different from men; alternatively, women may lose their subjectivity, and the whole of feminism may lose its research target—women. Thus, I argue that under the exclusive dualistic model feminists cannot resolve the dilemma of gender equality.

Further, I argue that the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm can resolve this dilemma by expanding its ground with a mutually inclusive model. To argue that the *yin-yang* model and the exclusive dualistic model are different in degree not in kind, I revisit different interpretations of correlative thinking. Joseph Needham and A.C. Graham disagree as to whether correlative thinking is unique to the Chinese or if it is a universal model. Through citing textual evidence from David Hall, Roger Ames, and Robin Wang, I argue that correlative thinking should be a universal model. This model has two forms: the exclusive dualistic thinking and the *yin-yang*

thinking, where the former focuses on establishing stable or fixed gender relations whereas the latter stresses the changeable relations. On basis of the *Yijing*, I further argue that the *yin-yang* thinking is a reciprocal, dynamic, and multi-dimensional based model, which provides a necessarily metaphysical ground for the argument: the *yin-yang* model can provide a different perspective to resolve the philosophical dilemma of gender equality.

To explicate this point, my next task is to present how the *Yijing yin-yang* model operates. I argue that the *yin-yang* model is a circulating, changeable, and self-activated one, which includes twofold *yin-yang dao*: broad-sense and narrow-sense. However, when previous scholars applying this *yin-yang* model emerged from ancient times to resolve modern gender equality problems, neither the naturalistic nor the humanistic approach is sufficient. This is because both of their interpretations mainly rely on the narrow-sense *yin-yang dao*. In contrast, I argue an in-between-ness way. It means, through *resonance*, humanistic and naturalistic approaches are involved in a circulated, interdependent, and changeable model. This dynamic model sheds lights on the issue of why *yin* and *yang* are full of rich diverse meaning but should be equally important, which indicates that the dilemma of gender equality is resolved at least on the metaphysical level.

Then, I argue that the *Yijing yin-yang* model suggests a harmonious relationship between men and women. Through comparing Jiyuan Yu's structural reading and Chenyang Li's deep reading of harmony (*he^a* 和), I argue that *he^a* should be a process of harmonization. The ideal of gender equality should be settled in the interdependent relations whereby "letting each get its due" (*gedeqisuo* 各得其所) grounds a changeable relationship between genders.

In sum, this dissertation revisits, reinterprets, and reconstructs the concept of gender equality in the *Yijing yin-yang* milieu, which provides the necessary grounds for my conclusion that gender equality should be premised on gender difference.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. Motive

Being unmarried at the age of 27 placed me in an incongruent position. This position gave me first-hand insight into the status of modern, highly educated Chinese women and motivated me to learn more about feminist theory. At that time, most people classified me as one of the “leftover women” (*shengnǚ* 剩女),¹ the most unpopular group in the marriage market. As a supposed leftover woman, I experienced gender inequality² since I was constructed as an object waiting to be chosen by a man. I never identified myself with the label of a leftover woman. Rather, I believed that my singleness made me a “victory woman” (*shengnǚ* 胜女)³ and reflected my free will, independence, and awareness of my ability for self-determination. I saw myself in

¹ Leftover women (*shengnǚ* 剩女) first appeared on the internet in 2006. In the same year, this word was recorded in the Report of Chinese Language and Life of 2006 中国语言生活报告 (2006) (Chinese Ministry of Education, 2007). Scholars have different interpretations of leftover women, e.g., “an urban, professional female in her later twenties or older who is still single” (Fincher, 2014:2); “urban professional women who are over 27 years old who have a high educational level, high salary, high intelligence, and attractive appearance, but... ‘left behind’ in the marriage market” (To, 2015:1). However, the major stance towards leftover women is a signal of gender inequality in contemporary China.

² To remind the reader, gender has a far-reaching history in feminism. Generally, the norm of gender is created by feminists as a replacement of the norm of sex to show where sexism emerges. Sex refers to biological male and female, while gender means social constructed masculinity and femininity, masculine and feminine, and social men and women. However, scholars have found *that the Chinese do not separate sex and gender as the Westerners’*. For the Chinese, sex difference has no difference with gender difference. I will discuss questions relevant to the concept of “gender” in this dissertation, including but not limit to: (1) why I use gender equality, gender difference, or gender inequality in Section Two and Three of this Chapter One respectively. (2) I will give a clear review of how feminists distinguish gender and sex in Chapter Two. To sum up, throughout this dissertation, the concept of gender has twofold dimensions. In feminist contexts, it refers to social constructed masculinity and femininity etc.; while in Chinese contexts, it refers to a unified and inseparable sex-gender (*xingbie* 性别).

³ Victory women (*shengnǚ* 胜女) is an alternative concept of leftover women to indicate women’s subjectivity, as most women believe that the term ‘leftover women’ indicates sexism. Modern single girls believe that they are winners in the marriage market, as they take the initiative to choose their spouses. They believe that they should enjoy equal treatment at the workplace and at home. Most of them narrate their life as one of an independent modern woman who can successfully balance work and home.

an active role, choosing to be single rather than being passively left behind. This belief created a gap between people's view of me and my self-perception. To discover the origin of this disparity, I sought to investigate the concept of "leftover women" to determine whether leftover women actually exist. According to the statistics on the ratio of single men to single women in China, supply and demand are unbalanced in the marriage market.⁴ The population of bachelors exceeds that of single females, which makes the actual situation the opposite of the social construction.

Then, through reading various feminist theories, arguments, and books, most of my puzzles about the phenomenon of leftover women in Mainland China are resolved. Leftover women may have no statistic basis or any factual evidence, but they remain very important in shaping modern urban women's imagery and social gender norms. My understanding of victory women does not get any social recognition, at least not being accepted by the majority of population. To some degree, the concept of leftover women indicates social expectations about what single women should do in modern China; it also reflects how these conceptual phrases reversely shaping women's self-evaluation and other people's impression of these single women.

According to liberal feminism, in particular the idea of equality, the concept of "leftover women" reinforces the traditional view that women should always bond to family at the expense of their own freedom or free will. Not one woman can simply opt out of the conventions of marriage. While, the radical feminists uncover another aspect of the phenomenon of "leftover women" with "social construction" theory. They argue that the majority of sexist phrases (e.g., leftover women) are influenced by social constructions. The concept of "leftover women" is just

⁴ Statistics are cited from the National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国国家统计局: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201701/t20170120_1455942.html, accessed by 10-Feb-2018.

a kind of sexual symbol,⁵ which aims to force modern women to follow the man-made social rules, satisfy social expectations, and surrender to the hierarchical gender relations. In contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, feminist epistemology is a growing area. On basis of their explanations of sexuality, which means women's self-cognition and self-identity, I realize that my recognition of my status of victory women is more or less different from (1) the so-called man-made "leftover" status, (2) other single women's recognitions, and (3) other married women's recognitions. Such a discovery shocks me because the overwhelmed feminist theories tell me the "truth" that women's degrading status result from patriarchy society (where men play dominant roles in and benefit a lot from this hierarchical system). Feminists have tried their best to fight against any form of sexist oppression, in particular, the oppression that comes from men. However, I found that actual situations are more complex than I have learnt from all feminist theories. My pressures come not only from the patriarchal social conventions and gender norms but also come from some other women's suggestions, comments, and evaluations, although the latter should stay in the same stance with me.

Thus, I find that feminist theories cannot unify their stance in explaining the phenomenon of leftover women in Mainland China. They cannot provide me any coherent reason that can persuade me to believe that modern urban single women should commit to or not to those out-of-date gender norms (such as the unchangeable fate of get married). Instead, these recognitions motivate me to explore how to change the conventional social gender norms. What I should do, at least I believe that I should do, is to create new criteria (i.e., victory women) or concepts that can bring some insightful ideas to current feminist research. Even though feminism is an on-

⁵ Sexual symbol refers to women's specific features that are not from their biological genes but from social conceptual constructions.

going area, there are rich diverse theories (including some opposite positions) in it, but they still try to draw a picture that “how our sexual desires, feelings, and activities might change if they were no longer shaped by these unequal relations” (Stone, 2007: 87). My aim echoes to feminist assumptions, which is to explore new criteria to reconstruct gender norms.

In this regard, I will revisit how scholars explain the phenomenon of leftover women, which aims to see whether they provide any new or different criterion from the unequal conventional gender norms. Some argue that the concept of leftover women is not an *empirical fact* but merely a *conceptual fact* that is present in popular discourse (Zuo and Xia, 2008; Chen and Lü, 2011; Liu and Zhang, 2013; Zhou and Zhang, 2014). To support this argument, scholars borrow the theory of “social construction” to detach the conceptual world from the empirical world. From their perspective, the empirical world describes the actual situation of modern Chinese single women, whereas the conceptual world exhibits a *man-made* situation.⁶ They do not believe women should occupy an inferior social status in the empirical world, and, hence, they classify the gender-biased concept of leftover women in the conceptual world. In this *man-made* conceptual world, women are placed at a disadvantaged position regardless of their actual situation. They believe that the label of leftover women is a trick used by men to pressure single women to follow the traditional patriarchal culture—“women must get married” (Hong, 2000; To, 2015: 14). They further analyze that this label stigmatizes modern independent Chinese single women while allowing men to retain their dominant position (Turner, 1982; Xu, 2014). As women’s voices cannot be heard in this *man-made* conceptualization, the concept of “leftover women” indicates “the resurgence of gender inequality in China” (Fincher, 2014).

⁶ The concept of “*man-made*” here aims to show such an awful situation of modern Chinese single women are constructed by men, patriarchal culture, and tradition of patriarchal history. It does not refer to any specific person, but is an abstract concept using to generate all possible dominations from patriarchy.

Although these scholars make efforts to free modern Chinese single women from the sexist label (e.g., conventional social norms), they do not provide anything different from radical feminist theories. When they detach the conceptual world from the empirical world, they are totally in line with radical feminist “social construction” theory. Because their explanations can neither satisfy my academic assumption—creating new criteria for gender norms—nor provide solutions to resolve gender inequality in China, I will point out their three problems in argumentation and then put forth my own propositions. First and foremost, when they claim that “leftover women” is a purely socially constructed concept, they ignore the substantial gender inequality in the empirical world. As my case shows, no matter how I value myself, I do experience being treated unequal in my real life. What is important should be both digging out the root cause of unequal gender relations and providing new criteria for constructing equal ones. Second, they ignore the fact that not all single women treat themselves as leftover women; at least my case shows that some single women treat their single statuses as a silent war to fight against conventional unequal relations. When they put their own need at a prior place and marriage to the second, they in somehow are attempting to against conventional gender criteria. Third, they use the theory of “social construction” to explain the phenomenon of gender inequality, which is a wrong application of this theory. The term proposes that, through active social interaction, people can create concepts that gradually become given realities (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Newman, 1995).⁷ Contemporary feminists use this theory to change women’s degrading position by reconstructing concepts and reality, in particular, reconstructing the social

⁷ Initially, Michel Foucault (1926-1984) claimed that sexuality was created by social construction in his representative work *The History of Sexuality*. Thus, sexuality is not a constant concept but is a concept that is changeable over time. Foucault’s interpretation is based on his theory of language. Later, this theory was applied to various feminist theories, such as “situated knowledge,” or the “feminist standpoint theory” (Nancy Hartsock, 1983; Sandra Harding, 1986).

gender norms or criteria.

I take Judith Butler's usage of this theory as an example to show how "social construction" works in reconstructing gender norms or criteria. Her first step is to destroy the foundations of the traditional patriarchy and exclusive logic by rejecting preconceived notions such as the stereotypes that men are rational and women irrational. She believes that stereotypical gender sequence has its roots in the ontological substances. However, one accidentally possesses masculinity or femininity, which indicates that there is no ontological necessity of actual gender difference (Butler, 1990). She then explains the actual differences among genders with the theory of "social construction." Butler argues that "gender reality is performative which means, quite simply, that it is real only to the extent that it is performed" (Butler, 1988: 527). Her point is that the binary concepts of men and women are based on people's performance. Through the repetition of gender performance, one gradually becomes a man or a woman in reality. As masculine and feminine have no inherent hierarchical essences, Butler's theory of performativity establishes the basis of ontological gender equality.

Thus, I disagree with these scholars' approach of using radical feminist theory of "social construction" directly to analyze Chinese phenomenon of leftover women, and argue against their conclusion that leftover women should unavoidably lead to the result of gender inequality. Three reasons can support my claim. First and foremost, the term of "reality" is used on different levels in Chinese and radical feminist milieus, respectively. The norm of reality has a specific meaning in Butler's theory; it is used to refer to a world constructed by language. This linguistic world is rarely found in Chinese classical contexts. Due to the lack of cultural background, the theory moves in a totally contradictory direction when it encounters leftover women. Thus, I am curious about a question—what does it make the transplantation of the theory of "social

construction” to explain the phenomenon of “leftover women” unsuccessful? I assume that few feminist scholars have claimed and realized that gender rules might vary across cultures. It is until recently when feminists launch a movement of trans-national studies; they gradually admit the fact that there are richly diverse types of women (including their desires or political goals) and gender norms within current feminism. This improvement is benefited a lot from black women’s feminist theories. However, Chinese women’s statues (past and present) are much less discussed and let alone being involved in modern feminist discourses.

Second, scholars pay less attention to develop the concept of “victory women,” which indicates that (1) they ignore women’s own voice of aspiring to be treated equally, and (2) they neglect people’s understandings of the phenomenon of “leftover women” are richly diverse. Some may argue against (1) and (2), as they believe that my voice cannot represent all Chinese single women. There is no unified voice among Chinese women on the issue of “leftover women.” However, their refutation cannot challenge my stance. Their questions emerge from the past, while my assumption faces the future. My aim is to make Chinese women’s voice heard. Additionally, what I am doing is a kind of escape from the influence of traditional gender norms and its criteria.

Third, in observing these differences, I believe that radical feminist theories cannot directly apply to explain the phenomenon of single women in Mainland China. This indicates that scholars should notice that gender norms might vary across cultures, nations, or classes. Even feminists themselves cannot unify their stances to some basic philosophical problems (such as the definitions of sex, gender, sexual difference, or sexuality). However, because of the same goal of “ending sexist oppression,” I shift my focus to the issue of how to reconstruct some criteria of gender norms (for example, gender equality and gender difference). In the following, I

will argue that the root cause of feminists' heated debate on the issue of what gender equality means lies in that feminists want to create some new criteria to re-evaluate both genders.

2. Three Major Feminist Interpretations of Gender Equality and Their Problems

Throughout the history of feminism, scholars have provided diverse interpretations of gender equality, for which some stances are directly opposite to others. For example, classical-liberal feminists believe that equality means men and women should be the same in all respects, while socialist feminists stress that sameness in all dimensions between both genders is a kind of *gender inequality* (Mitchell, 1987; Jaggar, 1990; Kourany et al., 1992; Ma, 2007; Jenainati and Groves, 2010; Pang-White, 2016). Additionally, scholars have found that there is a “tension between the ideal of [gender] equality and the apparent reality of [gender] difference” (Jaggar, 1990: 239).⁸ Thus, if women are required to do exactly the same amount of work as men do in reality, this requirement may cause inequality. There are two reasons to support this hypothesis: (1) the same amount of work may be a burden for a woman, if her strength is less than that of a man; and (2) the criteria for this requirement retain men's dominant position in the relationship between both genders (Cornell, 1987; Mackinnon, 1989; Young, 1990; Jiang, 2000). This dissertation will not elaborate and discuss the reason (1); rather, it will focus on the reason (2). In other words, I intend to discuss a kind of gender equality, which aims to immune to unequal relation.

My dissertation will focus on the issue of how to change the criteria to make relationship between both genders no longer restrict to one single form—men play dominant roles. My

⁸ Other scholars, such as Friedrich Hayek, Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, and Robert Nozick, have similar ideas. Take Hayek as an example; he writes that “it is just not true that humans are born equal; ... if we treat them equally, the result must be inequality in their actual position.” (cited from Steven Pinker, 2002: 151). For more discussion, see Steven Pinker, 2002, *The Blank Slate the Modern Denial of Human Nature*. New York: Penguin Books.

narrative of feminist views on gender equality is confined to a specific theme rather than to survey all relevant topics. Considering the tension between ideal equality and actual inequality has its roots in how to balance the relationship between sameness and difference,⁹ I determine that the specific theme of this dissertation should be how to resolve the tension between gender equality and gender difference in feminist gender studies. Apart from previous scholars' enlightenments, there are three reasons for me to choose this theme rather than other topics.

First and foremost, although feminists have not unified their voice on what gender equality is, if forced to define it broadly, they assert that it is to end any form of sexism. Among the different causes of sexism, gender differences occupy a central position. Accordingly, the majority of feminists have recognized that gender differences are man-made concepts. For a long period of time, philosophers have a prejudice that men's value is higher than that of women's, because men and women have different inborn essences. Men are led by reason while women are led by emotion. Premised on this gender difference—emphasizing different essences and worth, scholars believe that women should subordinate to men, just like emotion should be governed by reason.

Second, feminists have tried to prove that gender difference is not the root cause of sexism. Accordingly, gender difference “has gradually become important—even problematizing the universal categories of ‘women’ and ‘men’” (Zinn and Dill, 1996: 322). Thus, the term of gender difference deserves my attention, if I want to reconstruct gender equality in modern society. On the one hand, I should distinguish the normative difference from the descriptive difference. Feminists used to misunderstand that normative difference (rational men and

⁹ These scholars include but not limit to Alison M. Jaggar, Anne Phillips, Moira Gatens, Maxine Zinn, and Bonnie Thornton Dill.

irrational women) leads to women's degrading position, for they believe that biological difference will not influence social gender norms. On the other hand, as the development of feminist epistemology, differences have transcend its research scope from merely biological and social conceptions and move deeper to people's different recognitions of themselves. A typical example is transgender or trans-sex people. Regardless of their biological genes, their psyches seem to have intrinsic tendency to opposite to their biological belongs. Thus, gender difference has expanded its scope from merely conventional negative norms of rational men and emotional women to modern neutral (or even positive) norms of inter-related biological, social, and psychological differences.¹⁰ If so, the relationship between gender equality and gender difference deserves to be revisited.

Third, I choose the word of *gender* because I want to limit my discussion to the contemporary context, as gender studies is a core theme of contemporary feminism. I have learned that the term of *gender* is extremely important for radical feminists, as they use this word to construct ontological foundation of equality. In other words, radical feminists believe that *gender* is a social constructed concept, which is different from the concept of *sex*. As a term used to describe biological qualities of human beings, sex difference is insufficient to explain sexism.¹¹ However, I use the term of *gender* in a different way. To remind the reader, when I use the word *gender* in front of equality and difference, I emphasize that my narrative is under cross-culture studies and is in the contemporary time. I believe that *gender*, in cross-cultural context, means a unity of biological, social-constructed, symbolical, and psychological characters of all human beings. Thus, in the following three parts—equality in sameness, equality in difference,

¹⁰ More discussions about the inter-related gender differences can refer to Alison Stone, 2007, *An Introduction to Feminist Philosophy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹¹ I will further discuss why I choose the concept of gender in Chapter Two.

and equality in diversity, I will briefly review how gender equality interacts with gender difference.

2.1 Equality in Sameness

Stimulated by classical liberalism, the capacity to reason occupies a central place in understanding feminists' initial construction of gender equality.¹² Take Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) as an example. In his world-renowned work, *Emile*, he provided sources from which gender inequality emerges. He identifies gender inequality as a natural inequality,¹³ which refers to an inequality not caused by "prejudice but of reason" (Rousseau, 1979: 361). Rousseau follows the traditional idea that men are born with reason whereas women are born with emotion. Under this condition, feminists argue that "women's reasoning capacity is at least equal to men" (Jaggar, 1990: 240). Women's degraded social position is a result of their lack of equal treatment as men, and is not a result of their lack of capacity of reasoning. Thus, they require equal educational rights, employing rights, and political participating rights etc., as they believe that both men and women as human beings are identical. If so, women should receive equal opportunities of education to develop their capacities of reasoning. It is unfair to exclude women from the public sphere on the sexist premise of women's shortage of reasoning capacity.

However, there are pros and cons of this reading of gender equality, where equality means sameness or identity. In the early period of the feminist movement, this method was adopted to fight for women's equal rights before the law. Additionally, it challenges traditional

¹² In Alison M. Jaggar's paper, "sexual difference and sexual equality," she provides evidence to show that feminists' initial goal was not to pursue gender equality. She then illustrates that feminists' demand of equal treatment emerges from the legal system, where feminists require a sex-blind law. This law should strictly apply to everyone equally.

¹³ According to Rousseau, there is a difference between social inequality and natural inequality. Social inequality is an inequality of "ranks, or of wealth, [which] are socially instituted and therefore unjust," whereas, the nature of inequality is like "gender difference in nature." This "inequality is not a human institution-or, at least, it is the work not of prejudice but of reason" (see Catherine Larrère. 2011. Jean-Jacques Rousseau on women and citizenship. *History of European Ideas*. P. 218-222).

gender labor division, where the husband works outside and the wife works inside (Cohen, 1976; Fei, 1998; Zang, 2003). It opens up new opportunities for women to enter the public sphere. However, a typical objection to this reading is the tension between ideal gender equality and actual sexual difference. In other words, the claim of treating men and women the same is not always beneficial to women. There are two additional possible results that women cannot afford. First, formal equality might be a veil that covers de facto inequality. Some feminists have argued that identical standards in the employment market are unfair to women, as women have the ability “to become pregnant and to give birth” (Jaggar, 1990: 241). If employers apply the same criterion to both men and a pregnant woman, it results in a substantial inequality. This means gender equality should not omit biological difference. Second, when feminists claim that they possess the same capacity of reasoning, they situate themselves in a man-made trap. This is because the concept of reasoning is not gender-neutral. In traditional gender norms, the reasoning capacity represents masculinity. Thus, women may lose their unique femininity when they claim to have a reasoning capacity that is identical to that of men. If women cannot accept the criteria of gender equality that are made by and made for men, they should create some new criteria to reflect their appeal for what gender equality is.

2.2 Equality in Difference

To some extent, feminists have realized their own problem when they pursue sameness/identical equality between men and women (in particular reason capacity). The biggest mistake is their ignorance of gender difference. Thus, no matter how sophisticated their constructions are, it is an unreachable equality that is beyond reality. Betty Friedan (1921-2006) puts forth the principle of recognition of gender difference in *the Feminine Mystique*. By attacking the previous approach of using men’s social experience as a universal standard, Friedan argues that women’s unique

features are wiped out in this sameness conceptualization.¹⁴ To explain her new approach, she emphasizes that “women first and foremost are human beings, who ... must have the chance to develop their fullest human potential” (Friedan, 2013: xvii). Other scholars show similar tendencies such as Okin and Natalie Harris Bluestone. I treat them as a turning point in the history of feminist development, at which feminists gradually pay more attention to gender difference. They do not rely on conventional criteria of gender norms that are likely established in accordance with men’s experience; instead, they have tried to explore theories that are based on women’s own or unique experience.

Some may doubt why I place difference and equality side by side. In various feminist theories, gender difference always goes hand in hand with gender inequality. For example, Shulamith Firestone argues that biological difference between men and women is the foundation of patriarchal culture. She claims that “the end goal of feminist revolution must be, unlike of the first feminist movement, not just the elimination of male privilege but of the sex distinction itself” (Firestone, 1970: 11). This leads to the appearances of “androgyny” and “cyborgs” in the later period of the second feminist movement, which will be discussed in 2.3. Here, I should clarify to what the concept of “equality in difference” refers. I differentiate my understanding of biological/gender differences from those who believe that difference plays a crucial role in gender inequality. My aim is not to say that gender difference is more important than gender equality; rather, I emphasize two points: (1) gender difference is different from biological/sexual difference, where the former is a philosophical concept and the latter is a descriptive/nominative

¹⁴ I further elaborate upon this point in Chapter Two.

fact;¹⁵ and (2) when feminists construct the theory of gender equality, they recognize the gender difference and give women priority over men. Thus, gender difference has both positive and negative influences. In terms of the bad aspect, women's privilege, in some situations, is indeed an inequality to men. This indicates that feminist prioritarianism cannot resolve the tension between equality and difference. However, from the aspect of the positive side, I believe that gender equality should be premised on the recognition of gender differences as articulated by the second wave feminism. As an increasing number of scholars have shifted their focus to this important yet unsolved problem, feminists encounter another challenge—what should the new criteria for reconstructing gender equality look like.

2.3 Equality in Diversity

To resolve the dilemma of gender equality in the second feminist movement, namely, co-existence of sameness and difference, post-modernist feminists put forth the idea of gender diversity. They argue that gender difference should not only refer to a binary concept of men and women, but it also means diversity within the same gender. In addition to our familiar concepts of men and women, feminists have shown that there are other types of people. They include individuals who are identified as bisexual, neuter, the third sex, hermaphrodites, and homosexual. Take “androgyny” as an example. I will borrow Wendy Martin's interpretation to show how equality and difference coexist in this concept. Martin argues that

If we are to build a more enlightened human community, we must blur the sharp

¹⁵ Biological difference emphasizes a cluster of features or essences that determines a person's identity. However, it is still debatable that genes of men and women are really different or not. Thus, feminists put forth the concept of sexual difference, which means that symbolic men and women are different (e.g., when we say the word men or women, we classify them in binary genders). Given that this dissertation not aim to distinguish different kinds of differences, I just claim my use of gender difference that is relevant yet different from conventional feminists' usage. On the one hand, gender difference is a concept borrowed from radical feminists, which aims to argue against essentializing thinking mode. On the other hand, gender difference is different from radical feminists' usage, where it refers to a unity of biological, social, symbolical, and psychological differences.

distinction between masculine and feminine; androgyny represents an effort to eliminate this false dichotomy (Martin, 1974: 266).

Her point here is to emphasize that women can fully cultivate themselves as human beings. The so-called binary concept of gender, i.e., men and women, is constructed by patriarchal society. It deserves little or no attention as it causes gender discrimination. With the attempt to eliminate the socially constructed masculine and feminine, feminists destroy the foundations of patriarchal society. Then, gender equality is guaranteed in the construction of gender-neutrality. Here, gender-neutral refers that “androgynous people could remain biologically male and female ... they would no longer be masculine and feminine” (Jaggar, 1983: 87).¹⁶ Thus, everyone is different from one another however, but all of us have equal opportunities to fully develop potential to be a complete human being. The ideal sameness and actual difference coexist in the construction of androgynous people.

This attempt separates gender difference (masculinity and femininity) from biological difference, which avoids the tension between ideal sameness and apparent physical difference. It changes the meaning of gender difference from the unchangeable pre-determinations to the changeable social concepts (Cixous, 1988). However, this approach adds more complexity to resolve the incompatible between gender equality and gender difference. There are various objections to this gender-blinded or gender-neutral approach;¹⁷ scholars have argued that the gender-neutral way is another type of sexism. The process of unisex is identical to the process of

¹⁶ This idea can be traced back to Plato, and in the *Symposium*, Aristophanes has mentioned the androgynous sex. Later, Carl Gustav Jung has argued men have anima (femininity) and women have animus (masculinity).

¹⁷ More discussions can see, Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi, 1974, “The Politics of Androgyny.” June Singer, 1976, *Androgyny: The Opposites Within* and 1977, *Androgyny: Toward a New Theory of Sexuality*. Mary Daly, 1973 *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation* and 1978, *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*. Mary Vetterling-Braggin, “Femininity,” “Masculinity,” and “Androgyny”: A Modern Philosophical Discussion. Elizabeth Lane Beardsley, Is Androgyny the Answer to Sexual Stereotyping?

sameness, where differences are extirpated. Take Donna Haraway as an example. Her theory of “cyborg” is a refutation of both biological and psychological differences. In terms of this, though the invention of *androgynous* initially stresses complementary of masculinity and femininity (co-existence of gender difference and equality), it turns out to be a substantial gender inequality.

To sum, I classify the above three interpretations to two camps. First is the essentialist feminism, where scholars believe that binary genders are pre-determined properties. For them, ideal gender equality is identical to sameness. But the substantial gender equality should give women priorities in social labor division. Second is the anti-essentialist feminism, where scholars believe that genders are artificial norms. Gender equality then means gender-neutral. If so, the essentialist feminism should avoid the mistake that biological determinists made, which means avoiding the belief that there are pre-fixed properties of both genders. While the anti-essentialist feminism should find a unified aim of all women, as the concept of gender difference has challenge the legitimacy of a universal concept of women. Otherwise, feminists will lose their foundations and targets. In this regard, the next section will give a brief review of how Chinese philosophy engages in feminist discourses of gender equality and gender difference.

3. Chinese Philosophy Encounters Feminist Theory of Equality

Chinese philosophy (Confucianism in particular) has been under attack by feminists for its sexist thought, such as “men superiority/women inferiority” (*nanzun nǚbei* 男尊女卑), “men’s function is external/women internal” (*nanzhuwai, nǚzhunei* 男主外女主内), and “men and women are different” (*nannǚ youbie* 男女有别). In response to feminist critiques, scholars have reexamined Chinese canonical text from a feminist perspective and given various new interpretations of these texts (Pang-White, 2016; Zhang, 2018). In the process of feminist critiques and Chinese defenses, recent conversations between feminism and Chinese philosophy aim at cross-fertilizing. Thus,

the following three sections summarize and evaluate current research achievements on the issue of how Chinese philosophy engages in feminist discourses of gender equality.

3.1 Chinese Women in Western Feminists' Eyes: Slaves versus Queens

It is undeniable that the Chinese have a troubled history of “sexual discrimination against women” (Li, 2012: 63; Pang-White, 2016: 2). Terry Woo has pointed out that “feminists [have criticized] the status and treatment of women determined by *Confucianism*” for almost one and a half centuries (Woo, 1999: 100). Considering that for long periods of time feminist movements were alien to the Chinese, I am curious about how feminists studies Chinese women. Among their various voices, opposing narratives of the state of Chinese women deserve attention. Scholars such as Simon de Beauvoir, Mary Gaunt, and R. L. McNabb believe that Chinese women’s status is equivalent to that of *slaves*. Gaunt even claims, “Chinese women are Chinese men’s favorite slaves” (Gaunt, 1914: 384). McNabb also writes,

The Chinese women, whether her home be a thatch-roofed mud hut or gilded palace, knows nothing of the freedom and little of the comfort that her *Western sisters enjoy*; for she is *a slave girl*, a plodding laborer, or a tinsel plaything in the house of her lord. *Her home is her prison, and her husband is the prison master* (McNabb, 1907: 70 italic edited)

McNabb believes that Chinese men dominate Chinese women and that Chinese women do not have the freedoms that their Western sisters enjoy. In this light, Chinese women’s slave status is exemplary of gender inequality and must be eliminated.¹⁸ To rescue these enslaved Chinese

¹⁸ I use the term gender equality in the Chinese context for two reasons: to match the theme of modern times and because men and women are socialized concepts in China. The Chinese take it for granted that sex and gender are intertwined, interfused, and intermingled. Thus, in the rest of this dissertation, unless otherwise indicated, gender difference is a concept that refers to the mutually inclusive sex-gender relations of the Chinese context.

women, white middle-class women seek to export their rationality, values, and culture to China (Tong, 1998: 212), including the concept of gender equality.

Julia Kristeva, Roland Barthes, and Philippe Sollers disagree with this view. Kristeva, for instance, argues that Chinese matriarchal tradition positions Chinese women as masters or queens rather than slaves (Kristeva, 2000). She believes that the Chinese followed this matriarchal tradition from ancient times to the present day; although women lost their public authority during the domination of Confucianism, they maintained their *domestic power*. Thus, the Chinese provide an image of the ideal woman that is the opposite of that described by McNabb: *a woman who has authority to govern the family and the state*. However, there are three problems with Kristeva's interpretation: (1) Kristeva misinterprets Chinese women as queens, for her construction is divorced from the reality in which most women are oppressed by men (Spivak, 1994); (2) Kristeva confuses ancient and contemporary China, as she believes that China is a matriarchal society throughout its history (Lowe, 1991); and (3) she treats China as a utopia in which women live an ideal life (Chow, 1991). Thus, the fundamental problem with Kristeva's idea is her employment of a white middle-class ideal to inform her construct of Chinese women, which cannot reflect the real status of Chinese women.

I believe that neither of the representations presented above reflects the real status of Chinese women, as both fail to account for contextual differences. Those who use Western feminist criteria to appraise Chinese conditions make the same mistake as people who wrongly identify me as a leftover woman. Thus, Chinese women constructed as "others" by feminists may be drastically different from actual Chinese women who exist as subjects. Some scholars have pointed out that there is a consensus among second-wave feminists that "the First World [W]omen and their model is the sole source to provide a unified solution to solve women's issues

once and for all” (Pang-White, 2016:3). Influenced by deconstructionism and postmodernism, contemporary feminists argue that this stance is a kind of inequality or oppression. They believe that the labels “First World Women” and “Third World Women” signal neo-colonialism, because “Third World Women” (including Chinese women) are constructed as “a singular monolithic subject in some [Western] feminist texts” (Mohanty, 1988: 61; Mohanty, 1984; Rosenlee, 2006). If this is indeed true, “First World Women” betray their original intention, which is “ending sexist oppression” (Spivak, 1994; Tong, 1998; Jenainati and Groves, 2010; Rosenlee, 2006). Thus, when “First World Women” export their theories, thoughts, and reasons to where their “Third World Sisters” live, they are practicing sexist oppression (Pang-White, 2016). Thus, the next point revolves around how Chinese scholars respond to feminist one-sided constructions.

3.2 Defending Chinese Philosophy

To refute the above unfair feminist evaluations of Chinese women, defenders have argued that “Chinese philosophy” is richly diverse; if Confucianism is unfriendly to women, other traditions in Chinese philosophy might be feminist-friendly. Daoism, for example, is traditionally understood as a philosophy respecting *yin* and degrading *yang* (*chongyinyiyang* 崇阴抑阳), which may imply, in theory, that women possessed a higher position than men. Some even argue that the *Dao* 道 in the *Daodejing* 道德经 is “a philosophy in feminine” (Ma, 2016: 246). Additionally, defenders of Confucianism have argued that there was no unified voice among Confucians on the position of women. Scholars have noticed that Chinese women’s authority will increase if her family status changes from “daughters-in-law to mothers and mothers-in-law” (Wolf, 1972; Ebrey, 1991; Hsiung, 2005; Herr, 2016). With two newly publications of *Feminist Encounters with Confucius*, and *the Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and*

Gender, cross-cultural feminist studies have reached a new stage. Thus, I summarize three key points—Chinese women in Chinese philosophy, the unique phenomenon of Chinese women, and similar feminist appeals between feminism and Chinese philosophy—to argue a view that Chinese approaches to resolve the tension between gender equality and gender difference should not blindly follow current feminist models.

3.2.1 Chinese Women in Confucianism: Beyond Sexism

For a long period of time, feminists have blamed Chinese culture especially Confucianism as the root reason of women's degrading social positions. Some scholars have attempted to prove that Daoism and Buddhism are friendly to women. An increasing number of research has noted that the *yin-yang* theory in Daoism has a great influence on understanding how Chinese philosophy celebrates feminism (Wang, 2016; Patt-Shamir, 2016; Ma, 2016; Miller, 2017). I take Susan Scheibler's work, "Daoism and the LGBT Community," as an example to show how Daoist *yin-yang* theory can resolve a contemporary feminist critique. This critique is that, if *yin* and *yang* refer to forms of women and men respectively, homosexuality may leads to metaphysical conflicts between *yang* and *yang* or *yin* and *yin*. This is because the ideal form of homosexuality should be a complementary relation between *yin* and *yang*, as *yang* over *yang* or *yin* over *yin* may result in an ontological disharmony. To resolve this metaphysical problem Scheibler argues that "things contain both *yin* and *yang*," where *yin-yang* is a "basic structure of change and transformation" (Scheibler, 2016: 302). Thus, from the Daoist position, Scheibler attempts to resolve the metaphysical problem of homosexuality in modern China. Additionally, some scholars have revisit Buddhist texts and argue that "[Buddhism] is a philosophy beyond

sex/gender issues” (Zhang, 2017: 298).¹⁹ As Buddhism claims to be friendly to all things, scholars believe that Buddhists may concern a wider range of equality (Wawrytko, 2016). Thus, Confucianism gradually becomes feminists’ major attack target.

Feminists criticize Confucianism for its view that men are superior and women inferior (*nanzun nǚbei* 男尊女卑). Indeed there is a rich diversity in Confucian views on Chinese women’s status. The reason is that “Confucianism” is also a richly diverse tradition, for example, Chenyang Li writes,

The Chinese term often used in similar contexts in “*Rujia* 儒家,” literally the “family of the literati” or the “school of the literati.” ... The term has also been used to include its later developments. Scholars sometimes divide this tradition into several periods, such as classic *Rujia* 原始儒家, *Han Ru* 汉儒, and *Song-Ming Ru* 宋明儒 (宋明理学) (Li, 2000: 2).

Among these different forms of Confucianism, both gender inequality and gender equality can be found. Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (195-115 BCE), a *Han Ru* scholar, favored an unequal relationship between the two genders, writing, “the husband is *yang* even if he is from a humble family, and the wife is *yin* even if she is from a noble family” (Bk. 11, section 43; Li, 2000: 5).²⁰ As this statement affirms the superiority of the husband/*yang* and the inferiority of the wife/*yin*, it provides a basis for the well-known sexist-oppressive stance of “men superior versus women inferior.” However, this view is not unified in Confucianism. Wu Genyou 吴根友, for example, in examining the theory of Lü Kun 吕坤 (1536-1618), a *Ming Ru* scholar, argues that Lü’s theory

¹⁹ More discussions see Sandra A. Wawrytko “non-dualism,” Ann Pang-White “no-self,” and Lu Hwei-Syin and Hu Hsiao-Lan’s interpretation in Pang-White ed. *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender*.

²⁰ 丈夫虽贱皆为阳,妇人虽贵皆为阴. Quoted from Chenyang Li (2000) p. 4.

provides the necessary grounds for the moral equality of husband and wife.²¹ Li Cunshan 李存山 explains that Tang Zhen 唐甄 (1630-1704), a *Qing Ru* scholar, was in favor of degrading the honorable (*yizun* 抑尊).²² Tang's degradation of *zun* can be treated as an attempt to achieve gender equality in Confucianism. Thus, it is unfair to say the whole of Confucianism is unfriendly to women, but is fair to say some Confucians place women in a degrading social position. Even so, it is still hard to determine whether these Confucian scholars support sexism, as a purely gender inequality is rarely seen in Confucian contexts.²³

Another feminist critique lies in a Confucian phrase that limits men and women to external and internal spheres respectively. Scholars argue against this view by showing that Chinese dichotomy of *nei* 内 (internal) and *wai* 外 (external) is different from feminist distinction of private and public. In her work *Confucianism and Women*, Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee revisits the distinction between *nei* and *wai* in canonical Chinese texts, and finds that the *nei-wai* distinction is different from distinctions between family and state in the West. She then points out that “the *nei* is the locus of public virtue” in China, which is incomprehensible to radical feminists (Rosenlee, 2006: 85). Additionally, I find that there is another type of husband-wife *nei-wai* relation in ancient China. In the *Six Virtues* (*Liu de* 六德), it states, “the internal positions are the father, son, and husband; the external positions are the ruler, minister, and wife”

²¹ Wu's idea was introduced in his conference paper entitled, “On Feminist Thoughts of Lǚ Kun” 吕坤的女性思想简论, presented at the “Body, Gender, and Philosophy East and West” 身体, 性别和东西方哲学 conference organized by Peking University in 2014.

²² Li's work is “On Historical Restriction of ‘Men are Superior and Women are Inferior’ of Confucian Ritual” 儒家礼制中“男尊女卑”的历史局限. See http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4a08990101000674.html, accessed on 20-Feb-2018.

²³ Robin R. Wang and Brook Ziporyn believe that Dong Zhongshu's claim of “men superior versus women inferior” is mainly due to political factors instead of gender factors (Wang, 2016).

(Cook, 2012: 786 &791).²⁴ Thus, *women, as a public social position*, belong to the external. Arguing that the *nei-wai* relation does not map well onto the private-public dichotomy, scholars believe that there is a continuity of *nei* and *wai* in Chinese contexts, which blurs boundary and destroys the rigid dichotomy between the public and private (Pang-White, 2016b; Zhang, 2019).

In general, the *Han* Confucian idea that “men are superior and women are inferior” debases women and reinforces gender inequality in China. Scholars believe that in order to move forward, this outdated idea must be abandoned. The *nei-wai* division is fluid in Chinese contexts, in contrast to the unchanging nature of public and private space. There is no clear line between the family and the state, as exemplified by the Empress Lǚ (吕后), who was one of the most renowned Chinese politicians of the early Han dynasty and an adherent of the Legalist school of political philosophy. Lǚ can freely shift her role between the family and state, as China has a traditional idea that governing state and managing family are congruent (*jiaguotonggou* 家国同构). To break feminist stereotypes of Chinese women, George Wrisley and Samantha Wrisley distinguish two types of oppression, i.e., *intrinsic intersectional oppression* (hereafter *IIO*), and *mixed intersectional oppression* (hereafter *MIO*). The *IIO* means a set of domestic oppressions, while *MIO* refers to cross-cultural oppression. They think that “sexism can manifest in forms that are unidentifiable as a pure form.” But it must be fused with other forms of oppressions like “racism, classism, ageism, heterosexism, and cissexism” (Wrisley and Wrisley, 2016: 87). To sum, this defense aims to show Chinese women’s actual situations are beyond feminists’ constructions. To support this argument, the next part will present some unique phenomenon of Chinese women both in the past and in the contemporary era.

²⁴ 内位父、子、夫也；外位君、臣、妇也。

3.2.2 Unique Phenomenon of Chinese Women: Tiger Mothering and Independent Thinkers

Since I have used the above part to refute the view that Chinese women are slaves, this part aims to show why Chinese women should not be treated as queens in China. I discover two unique phenomena that are relevant to this issue, i.e., tiger mothering (*huma* 虎妈) in modern society and independent thinkers recorded in the *Four Books for Women* (*nǚsishu* 女四书) in ancient times. Tiger mothering describes modern mothers' absolute control over their kids. In order to nourish "stereotypically successful kids," modern tiger mothers restrict children's self-development and self-cultivation (Herr, 2016: 40). Tiger mothering is a typical example of the *IIO*, where sexism and ageism are interfused. Women gradually upgrade their positions in the hierarchical social system as they become mothers or mothers-in-law. Kids become subordinated to their parents (mothers included). However, this model is incongruent with the Confucian philosophy of mother, as some scholars have noticed, the true spirit of Confucian mothering is to motivate children's self-cultivation to be a moral person (Herr, 2016). Together, close mother-children relationship "can bring joy and complications" to develop a kid's moral agency (Lai, 2016: 123). Thus, modern tiger mothering is not an indication of Chinese matriarchy, rather, it reflects a feminists' confusion of Chinese women in the past and modern mothers.

Additionally, as is recorded in the *Four Books for Women*, ancient Chinese women are not merely passive victims of oppression but also can be "independent thinkers" (Pang-White, 2016b: 37). In her work "Confucius and the Four Books for Women," Pang-White cites Madame Liu's words "a wise woman is better than a man" to show Liu is an independent thinker. Accordingly, Liu believes that wives have wisdom to educate their husbands, if her husband is

not as talented as she.²⁵ Besides Liu's example, Pang-White finds a great numbers of examples in both the *Teachings for the Inner Court* (*Neixun* 内训) and the *Short Records of Models for Women* (*Nǚfan Jielu* 女范捷录), where ancient Chinese women can intervene in "external" affairs regardless of their internal positions.²⁶ For example, the *Neixun* reads, "women assist the nation from the inside" (妇人内助于国家). Pang-White then explains that women's ability to approach public affairs lies in the "continuity of the inner and outer" in ancient China. Such continuity blurs the boundary and destroys the rigid dichotomy between the public and the private. The Chinese concept of "continuity of the inner and outer" predicts Western feminists' challenge and "critique of the public/private dichotomy" (Okin, 1989:111).²⁷

3.2.3 Similar Feminist Appeals between Feminism and Chinese Philosophy

Scholars have uncovered some similar feminist appeals shared by modern feminism and ancient Chinese theories. These similarities include but are not limit to: (1) Confucian ethics and feminist care ethics, (2) feminist epistemology and Confucian knowledge of selfhood, and (3) Chinese philosophy and the LGBT communities. On basis of these uncovering, some scholars believe that Chinese philosophy is compatible with feminist theories, especially sharing the same goal with modern radical feminism. Considering my aim of this part is consistent with previous, namely, responding to feminist critiques, I will briefly introduce these three themes and then analyze their relations with gender equality or gender difference.

²⁵ Examples can refer the *Short Records of Models for Women* (*Nǚfan Jielu* 女范捷录) chapter 2&3.

²⁶ For example, in *Neixun* 内训, chapter 8, 10, 13, and 17 support my assumption. "The foundation of a country always relies on the virtue of the inner helpmate" (国家肇基, 皆有内助之德). "Regarding the flourishing and the decline of a nation, there had never been a case that it is not due to whether or not a woman is virtuous" (国家废兴, 未有不由妇之贤否与). "One can infer from this, inner harmony brings outer harmony. The harmony of family brings the harmony of country. The harmony of country brings the harmony of the world. How can one not weigh it heavily" (由是推之, 内和而外和。一家和而一国和。一国和而天下和矣。不可重哉).

²⁷ Chinese proposals are put forth in the period of Ming dynasty ranging from 1368 to 1644, while Okin's theory is established in 1989.

Possible Support of Gender Difference: Confucian Ethics and Care Ethics

Diverging from previous scholars who focus on the difference between feminist theory and Chinese situation, through his article “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care,” Chenyang Li has opened a new avenue for comparative feminist studies. That is to compare similarities and differences between both traditions. Other scholars, such as Lijun Yuan, Daniel Star, Julia Tao, Andrew Lambert, Ellie Hua Wang, Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, and Sarah A. Mattice, have gradually involved in the debate of whether *ren* 仁 (benevolence) and care share some core values. Some scholars raise a thorny doubt that care as social-role-based requirements in Confucianism might not be the real care as people’s need-based concern in feminist ethics (Star, 2002). To defend Li’s proposal, Ellie Hua Wang uses Xunzi 荀子 and his theory as textual evidence to show Confucian inner-sense-for-others care and feminist outer-concern-to-others care are different in degree not in kind (Wang, 2016). I present these two opposite stances for two purposes. First, Chinese philosophy (Confucianism in particular) is not incompatible with feminism. Further conversations between both traditions should aim at mutual benefit for each other. Second, this theme echoes to gender difference. In her renowned book, *in a Different Voice*, Carol Gilligan has shown that men and women have totally different psychological structures. Men’s psychology develops to a justice ethics and women’s to a care ethics. Thus, if Confucian *ren* is in favor of care ethics, it indirectly supports gender difference.

Possible Support of Gender Diversity: Feminist Epistemology and Confucian Knowledge of Selfhood

Recently, a newly emergent approach to cross-cultural feminist studies is the relationship between feminist epistemology and Confucian selfhood. Karyn Lai, Andrew Komasinski, Stephanie Midori Komashin, and Kevin Delapp have discussed one question—how does this

new approach rearrange the debate between Confucianism and feminism? I take Lai's work as an example to show how both traditions can share the same grounding. In her work, "Confucian Reliability and Epistemic Agency: Engagements with Feminist," Lai argues that Confucian knowledge and feminist situated-knowledge are compatible. She believes that, on one version of feminist epistemology, feminist "knowledge is situated [and] is bound up with the issue of epistemic agency" (situated-knowledge) (Lai, 2016: 104). Feminist knowledge is acquired in practice/ situation, which is akin to that of Confucian knowledge. Then, she classifies two ways (individuals and communities) in which Confucian knowledge is produced. Lai draws the readers' attention to her view that "the distinction between the two layers is only theoretical" (ibid: 104). Then, she presents that listening (*wen* 闻), reading (*du* 读), inquiring (*wen* 问), observing (*guan* 观), and performing (*xi* 习) are different kinds of practice (ibid: 108-10). Her aim of listing these norms is to establish a new way of understanding "knowledge" in Confucianism. Thus, Confucian knowledge is situation-based knowledge, which shares the same ground (inter-subjective agencies) with feminist situated-knowledge. Though this theme discusses neither equality nor difference directly, I believe that it relates to gender diversity. First, the idea of situation-knowledge emphasizes each person's different experience. Here, knowledge is no longer universal truth, it always retains "the knowers' particular situation" (Delapp, 2016: 128). As gender diversity's proposal—everyone is different from each other—is congruent with situated-knowledge, this approach has the potential for a new method of cross-cultural feminist studies, i.e., using Confucian thoughts to resolve thorny feminist problems.

Deconstruction of Binary Genders: Chinese Philosophy and the LGBT Communities

As I want to bring Chinese philosophy into modern feminist cross-cultural dialogue, I cannot ignore the question—whether Chinese philosophy is compatible with the LGBT community.

Some may give negative answers, because they find a conflict between Confucians' emphasizing of having children and that homosexual couples cannot have heirs. In Confucian contexts, having no heirs means being un-filial to parents. While, Chan Sin-Yee argues that bisexuality in Confucianism can resolve this conflict, for they can have both men and women as bedmates. However, as a strategy for solving the no heirs' problem of homosexual couples, bisexuality may deeply hurt women or men. Take women's case as an example, if a man marries a woman and treats her just as a fertility tool, the woman will become a producing machine rather than a subjective moral agent. I believe it is too quick to say Chinese philosophy is compatible with the LGBT communities, as there are two noteworthy points. First, scholars should not confuse ancient China and present China. LGBT communities are modern gender issues, which is quite new for the Chinese people. Thus, scholars need some time to see their deeper relations. Second, scholars should not confuse the Chinese feminist issue and the Western feminist issue. Though some Chinese theories can provide a metaphysical ground for the existence of homosexuality or other genders, Chinese approach to the LGBT communities is largely different from that of modern feminism.

To sum up, the above brief review of the short history of how Chinese philosophy encounters feminist theories and criticisms aims to give readers a scenario—traditional Chinese culture indeed had gender norms of subordinating women in the past. This is why some feminist scholars have argued that the modern phenomenon of leftover women is a kind of echo to the conventional social norms (e.g., degrading women). However, there are richly diverse resources in Chinese ancient texts or canons that shed lights on something different from current feminist research, for example, the *yin-yang* theory. It is too ambitious if I try to survey all the possible ways to see what Chinese classical texts can contribute something new or different from current

feminist academia. Thus, what this dissertation aims to do is to provide a new perspective or new criterion to reconstruct the concept of gender equality in modern society.

4. Chinese Philosophical Contribution: A *Yijing Yin-Yang* Harmonious Approach

Previous two sections have presented how Chinese philosophy engages in feminist discussions of the tension between “gender equality” and “gender difference.” By reviewing the interactive discourses between Chinese philosophy and feminism, I propose that (1) neither of feminist interpretations of gender equality—equality in sameness, equality in difference, and equality in diversity—is satisfactory from a Chinese perspective; (2) as a philosophy beyond sexism, Chinese philosophy should contribute their own stance to resolve the tension between gender equality and gender difference; and (3) if Chinese philosophy can provide any solution to the issue of gender equality, it primarily should be a theoretical approach. This section aims to reinterpret classical Chinese texts and to bring them into modern feminist discourses of gender issues. In previous sections, I have discussed a failed attempt in cross-cultural feminist studies, i.e., applying the radical feminist theories “social construction” theory directly to interpreting Chinese leftover women phenomena. Thus, this section and the following two chapters explore what Chinese philosophy can contribute to feminist discourses of gender equality and gender difference. As my argument is that gender equality should be premised on gender difference with a *Yijing yin-yang* approach, this section aims to show pros and cons of relevant scholarly achievements in this regard.

4.1 Diversity Interpretations of *Yin* and *Yang*

In cross-cultural feminist studies, a great number of scholars use *yin-yang* theory to explain Chinese gender relations, including but not limited to gender equality, gender difference, gender

hierarchy, and gender inequality.²⁸ I share with them the belief that *yin* 阴 and *yang* 阳 are roots or foundations of Chinese gender philosophy, and that it provides a complementary-based paradigm between men and women. Although scholars generally agree on the original meaning of *yin* and *yang*, as north side and south side of a mountain, they disagree on the symbolic meaning of these paired terms. Four interpretations of *yin* and *yang* especially deserve our attention: (1) as two sides of one thing, (2) as two entities, (3) as a co-relative thinking, and (4) as two basic symbols: -- (*yin*) and — (*yang*) with countless possibilities (Wawrytko, 1976; Raphals, 1998; Li, 2000; Rosenlee, 2006; Wang, 2012; Pang-White, 2016; Nelson, 2016; Scheibler, 2016).²⁹ Scholars have come to recognition of the fact that *yin* and *yang* do not necessarily refer to women and men. Rather, they represent a way of thinking and can shed lights on the relationships between both genders.

Scholars may not agree on a precise definition of correlative thinking. I take it to be a relation-based thinking model, in which things are always considered in relation. In this sense, correlative thinking may not be able to end sexism in China; it could be even compatible with it. In any event, men dominating women is also a kind of relation. What I am arguing here is not to refute correlative thinking's research value, but rather, to show a reinterpretation of it on the basis of *yin-yang* philosophy. I interpret the symbolic meaning of *yin-yang* as correlative thinking, and bring this interpretation to feminist discourses of gender equality and gender

²⁸ There are so many scholars discuss this issue. Considering the limited space, I will list some influential scholars and their works here. Sandra A. Wawrytko (1976) *The Undercurrent of Feminine Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought*. Harley Alison Black (1989) "Gender and Cosmology in Chinese Correlative Thinking." Richard W. Guisso and Stanley Johannesen eds. (1981) *Women in China*. Lisa Raphals (1998) *Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China*. Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee (2006) *Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Hans-Georg Moeller (2006) *The Philosophy of the Daodejing*. Robin R. Wang (2012) *Yinyang: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture*.

²⁹ Two newly publications, *Feminist Encounters with Confucius*, and *the Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender*, have fully discussed these issue. They provide up-to-date research opinions to this pair of *yin* and *yang*.

difference, and show how gender equality and gender difference co-exist in this thinking paradigm (Chapter Three of this dissertation will discuss this).

4.2 The *Yijing*, the *Yin-Yang* Thinking Paradigm, and Eco-feminism

Although, for the long period of time, scholars have noticed the importance of *Yijing* 易经 (aka the *Book of Changes*)³⁰ and its relation with *yin-yang* thinking paradigm, few of them take it as the basis for the main argument in their work on gender. Recently, scholars have begun to bring the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm to engage in modern eco-feminist discourses. For example, in their work “The *Yijing*, Gender, and the Ethics of Nature,” Eric S. Nelson and Liu Yang argue for a view that *yin* and *yang* in the *Yijing* are open to infinite possibilities and obtaining meanings only in specific context, which “offers significant ways of engaging and transforming our

³⁰ Romanization of the *Yijing* 易经, also known as *the Book of Changes*, in the West are inconsistent. For example, in terms of the title, there are at least five versions. The first two, *The Yi King* (Legge, 1899) and *(The) I Ching* (Wilhel and Baynes, 1950; Shaughnessy, 1996) belong to the Wade-Giles system, while another three, *The Yijing* (Smith, 2008), *The Zhouyi* (Gu, 2005) or the *Zhou Changes* (Simth, 2012) use the *pinyin* system. Compared with these word-to-word translations, some scholars employ mind-to-mind translations, for example, *The Book of Change(s)* (Waley, 1933; Mindford, 2014), *The Classic of Changes* (Lynn, 1994). It is undeniable that the *Yi* 易 (Changes) has had different annotations in ancient times. For example, in the *Zhou Li* 周礼 (*Rites of Zhou*), “[太卜] 掌三易之法一曰连山二曰归藏三曰周易 (the great diviner) is in charge of the methods of the three Changes; the first is called *Lian shan* [Linked Mountains], the second is called *Gui cang* [Returning to Be Stored], and the third is called *Zhou Yi* [Zhou Changes]” (*Zhou li zhushu*, 24.164; Shaughnessy, 2014: 144). However, considering the fact that *Zhou Yi* is the generic version and is saved by the history, all the previous seven translations are referring this book. According to Richard J. Smith’s viewpoint, the *Zhou Changes* (136 BCE) is the *Classic of Changes* or *Yijing* (one of the Six Classics 六经) in Confucian scholarship (Smith, 2012: 48-74). *Yijing* contains two parts, the *Ten Wings* and the basic text of the *Changes*. This interpretation is widely accepted by the Western scholarship, and nowadays, scholars make use of the *Classic of Changes* or *Yijing* to refer the *Zhou Changes*. However, the Chinese employ another interpreting system. In the Chinese scholarship, there is a difference between *Jing* 经 (Classics) and *Zhuan* 传 (Commentaries). *Jing* refers to sixty-four hexagrams, their hexagram statements (*guaci* 卦辞), and their line statements (*yaoci* 爻辞), while *Zhuan* refers to *Ten Wings*. In Chinese history, sometimes, *Jing* is separated to *Zhuan*; sometimes, *Jing* is combined with *Zhuan*. For the sake of argument, this dissertation will follow Richard J. Smith’s approach. There two reasons for this option: 1) it satisfies the requirement of comparative philosophy, and 2) it indicates that this book belongs to Confucianism. To sum up, this dissertation will use *Yijing* to refer the *Book of Changes*, the *Classic of Changes*, *Zhou Changes*, *Zhou Yi*, *Yi King* and *I Ching*. It will employ *Ten Wings* (aka *Yizhuan*) to indicate the earliest Confucian commentaries. Hereafter, I will use the *Yijing* directly. Additionally, I use *the Yijing as a representative work of Confucianism*. Further discussions of whether the *Yijing* is a Confucian work or Daoist work can see Chen Guying 陈鼓应 eds. *Studies of Daoism* 道家文化研究, vol. 5. Chen Lai 陈来, 1994, the *Mawangdui I Ching* and Its Commentaries and *Yijing Studies in Confucianism* 马王堆帛书易传与孔门易学, in *Philosophy and Culture* 哲学与文化, vol.2.

experiences, expressions, and understanding of gender” (Nelson and Liu, 2016: 283). Their point, here, is to defend the concept of changing and transforming. They believe that the *yin-yang* thinking in the *Yijing* destroys fixed identity of anything, such as nature, ecology, human beings. Thus, with the alternation of responsiveness (*ying* 应) and resonance (*gan* 感), an environmental justice can be achieved. This justice is the “continuity of heaven and person” (*tian ren he yi* 天人合一).

Taine Duncan and Nicholas S. Brasovan, in their paper “Contemporary Ecofeminism and Confucian Cosmology,” express similar appeals. They argue that both eco-feminists and Confucians want to destroy the traditional dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity (*zhu ke er fen* 主客二分),³¹ and want to pursue the “continuity of heaven and person.” Based on the *Yijing*, which records the “trinity of the heaven, earth, and person,” Duncan and Brasovan argue that the human is not central to the cosmos. He or she is merely one cosmic creative force among others. Based on these fluid *yin-yang* thinking paradigm, Robin R. Wang concludes that “*yin-yang* gender identity is not normative ideal, but rather a descriptive feature of experience, a lived body” (Wang, 2016: 223).

There are at least two important contributions of these works. First and foremost, when scholars discuss the *Yijing yin-yang* relations in eco-feminism, they understand the position of women in light of a more expansive cosmic dimension of the self. This is a contemporary way to redefine feminine and femininity. Second, they identify a same attack target shared by both eco-feminists and the *Yijing*, which they call “the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity.” In other places, it is called “either-or” logic or dualistic thinking. However, I discover an

³¹ In his work, “Metaphysics and Methodology in a Cross-Cultural Context,” Franklin Perkins has discussed this issue, also.

interesting phenomenon in their works, that is, scholars combine the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking with the anti-essentialist feminism. This is because they both share the same goal of breaking through the essential gender norms, like rational men and emotional women. However, as the bisexual case in the section of “deconstruction of binary genders: Chinese philosophy and the LGBT communities” shows, Chinese philosophy cannot always give satisfactory answers to feminist critiques. Although bisexuality is a solution to resolve the conflict between Confucian requirement of having children and homosexual couples’ without heirs, it seems like a joke in modern society. Thus, I believe it is too quick to combine the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm to the up-to-date radical feminist theories, as scholars should not ignore the verified gender norms across cultures. If the *Yijing yin-yang* theory jumps over this step, it cannot provide different or new criteria for reconstructing gender equality.

4.3 Chinese Gender Harmony: Making Women Subordinate to Men

Considering I argue that gender equality should be premised on gender difference, and that this argument has its roots in a harmonious relation, I should also revisit the concept of harmony. Some scholar have argued harmony is the root cause of Chinese women’s subordination (Needham, 1956; Hinsch,1995;). Even though I will discuss harmony in Chapter Four in details, here, I briefly introduce the main argument of this idea and its problem. Some hold that harmony is sameness, which requires people to sacrifice themselves to agree with or listen to others. When this understanding is applied to husband-wife relations; and harmony is taken as equivalent to asking wives to subordinate to their husbands. However, harmony can mean different things to different people. Scholars, like Martha Nussbaum, Chenyang Li, Jiyuan Yu, and Chung-ying Cheng, have present diverse interpretations of harmony. It can be a Greek numeral harmony, Plato’s structural harmony, or Confucian harmony that is different from sameness (*he er bu tong*

和而不同). Thus, it is unfair to say gender inequality has its roots in harmony. With the perspective of the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking, I will redefine the norm of harmony. I argue that harmony should be achieved in the process of heterogenization and homogenization in a dynamic form of harmonization; and will provide a new criterion of gender harmony that is for gender equality.³²

5. Methodology

Given that this dissertation aims to resolve the issue of how to make gender equality and gender difference compatible in a *Yijing yin-yang* model, I will follow neither strictly the Sinologists' philological method nor the analytic conceptual method. Most of the time, when scholars do comparative philosophy, the popular way is to compare both philosophies or cultures similarities or difference. My aim is beyond the goal of presenting their pros and cons, and it focuses on the point of how the *Yijing yin-yang* model can provide some new gender norms or new criteria to tackle current dilemma of gender equality. The dilemma is equality in sameness versus equality in difference. Even though most of the time this essay applies philosophical conceptual constructions to discuss the compatibility between gender equality and gender difference, it sometimes also does reality check. Feminists in different times have reinvented the content of gender equality in accordance with their social and actual political needs.

This dissertation attempts to integrate the *Yijing yin-yang* model as a methodology. But this does not mean that I am strictly in line with the exegesis (*xungu* 训诂) of Chinese ancient texts. I argue that the *Yijing yin-yang* model is a spontaneous, self-activated, and self-developed mode. Annotations or other comments of the sixty-four hexagrams and the *Ten Wings* (*shiyi* 十

³² I will redefine harmony in Chapter Four. Chapter Five will give a specific argument of what gender equality in harmony means.

翼) have gradually involved in the developing a broad-sense *yin-yang dao*. Thus, I might sometimes cite words from pre-Qin era yet sometimes provide textual evidence from other dynasties for interpretive reasons. I believe that the variation of the meanings of the *Yijing* in different times reflects how the *yin-yang* model operates over history. Considering that I believe there is consistency within the development of the *Yijing yin-yang* paradigm, my job is to disclose its the inner logic or deep connections. This method might appear jumping back and forth across texts and cultures in different times, but to show how the fluid, changeable, and unceasing circulating system operates. In the end, my aim is to argue that in this paradigm the *yin-yang* model might present a different perspective or solution to feminist dilemma of gender equality.

CHAPTER TWO: GENDER EQUALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EXCLUSIVE DUALISTIC THINKING—A DILEMMA

1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on three major issues: (1) why women need gender equality, (2) the cause of gender inequality, and (3) the dilemma of gender equality and its solution under Anglo-American feminism. I provide two responses to the first issue. In Section 2, as a first response, I explain that sex difference itself has little or no relation with sexist oppression. To support this claim, I review Simon de Beauvoir's and Gayle Rubin's definitions of the concepts of sex and gender. This discussion reveals that "biological differences [i.e., sex differences] in themselves bear no responsibility for the second-class status to which women have been relegated through most of history" (Warnke, 2011: 4). For them, sexism has its roots in conceptualized gender difference; thus, ending sexist oppression means achieving gender equality. The second reason why feminists need gender equality is explained in Section 3 of this chapter. Based on Thomas Laqueur's, Genevieve Lloyd's and Diemut Bubeck's arguments, I classify sexist oppression into three categories: the one-sex model, the imperfection model, and the "secondary other" model. I use these models to establish that, under the gender-biased or male-centered paradigm, women possess an inferior position. To pursue equal treatment of the genders, feminists have sought to identify the fundamental problem of sexist oppression. In Section 4, I use Karen J. Warren's, Sally Haslanger's, and Ann A. Pang-White's theories to support my argument, namely sexist oppression has its roots in *exclusive dualistic thinking*. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss the dilemma of gender equality under exclusive dualistic logic. In seeking to resolve this dilemma,

Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler disagree on whether there is an ontological difference between men and women. Both of them reach a crisis under the exclusive dualistic approach. Irigaray acknowledges an essential difference between the two genders on the ontological level in her early work; her stance may reinforce the negative stereotypical idea of women's dependent role and result in sexism. In comparison, Butler holds a view that there is no essential difference between men and women on the ontological level; her theory may produce a loss of the universal concept of 'women.' I argue that, if scholars insist on using exclusive dualistic thinking, they cannot resolve the conflict between gender equality and gender difference.

2. Why Gender Equality

The concept of *gender* has a far-reaching history in the history of feminism. However, scholars have found that the Chinese classical texts lack of separating biological difference, psychological difference, and political difference between men and women. The concept of gender has a twofold meaning. In radical feminist context, it refers to social constructed human features that are different from biological sex; in Chinese context, it means an inseparable *xingbie* 性别 (sex-gender). This *xingbie* normatively means biological properties and social constructed features are indivisible in China. I further argue that gender should be a cluster concept that includes biological, social, symbolical, and psychological features.

Thus, I begin my discussion with Simon de Beauvoir's annotation. In her renowned book, *The Second Sex*, Simon de Beauvoir claims that "one is not born, but rather becomes a woman" (Beauvoir, 1949: 281). This statement represents a feminist milestone in the distinction between sex and gender. Georgia Warnke calls Beauvoir's statement an implicit definition, noting that it "at the very least suggests a distinction between a female sex with which one is born and a feminine gender that one acquires" (Warnke, 2011: 5). This distinction is made with the aim of

identifying the origins of sexist oppression. As an existentialist, Beauvoir believes that gender is a human construct rather than a fixed natural law or something predetermined by God's will. Thus, gender has little or no relation to and can be detached from biological sex. However, Beauvoir notes an exception: women's activities of giving birth to and taking care of children make their gender character inseparable from their body (i.e., sex). This results in an indivisible relation between gender and sex. To reduce the impact of the sex that one is born with and to increase that of the gender that one has acquired, Beauvoir reinterprets the concept of penis envy proposed by Sigmund Freud. Freud assumes that girls have a psychological desire to possess a penis, which is described by Beauvoir as "a symbol of autonomy, of transcendence, of power" (Beauvoir, 1949: 292). Beauvoir believes that to "give a nickname to the little boy's sex, speaking to him of it as of a small person" grants boys subjectivity (ibid: 285). In contrast, "the little girl cuddles her doll and dresses her up as she dreams of being," rendering girls objects (ibid: 293). Thus, creative power is the domain of men, as they have independent subjectivity. Beauvoir believes that "it was men who built up Greece, the Roman Empire, France, and all other nations ... it is that through the eyes of men the little girl discovers the world and reads therein her destiny" (ibid: 303). If so, the world is created by men, and women lose their subjectivity and become objects. In Beauvoir's own words, "women may fail to lay claim to the status of subject ... because she is often very well pleased with her role as the *Other*" (ibid: 1). Beauvoir thus acknowledges the existence of sexist oppression, which has its roots in gender rather than sex.

If Beauvoir's is an implicit explanation, Gayle Rubin's interpretation, according to Warnke, is an explicit explanation. Warnke believes that Rubin's understanding of sex and gender is based on the dichotomy between being and becoming. Sex is the unchangeable

biological “raw material,” while gender is the changeable social role or function (Rubin, 1975: 32). When discussing Lévi-Strauss’s *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* and “The Family,” Rubin notes that gender varies from culture to culture:

Although every society has some sort of division of tasks by sex, the assignment of any particular task to one sex or the other varies enormously. In some groups, agriculture is the work of women, among others, the work of men. Women carry the heavy burdens in some societies, men in others. There are even examples of female hunters and warriors, and of men performing child-care tasks. Lévi-Strauss concludes from a survey of the division of labor of sex that it is not a biological specialization, but must have some other purpose. This purpose, he argues, is to insure the union of men and women by making the smallest viable economic unit contain at least one man and one woman (Rubin, 1975: 178).

Additionally, Rubin believes that sexism is a general phenomenon that exists in the social division of labor between men and women. For example, the construction of “domesticated women” is a type of sexism. As she believes that no natural law is adequate to explain the connection between sex/female and gender/women, Rubin argues that sexist oppression “is not a product of sex but, instead, of gender” (Warnke, 2011: 4). Clearly, sexist oppression, according to Rubin, lacks biological foundations. For her, the dominance of men over women lies in unequal social and economic constructions. To free women from their traditional inferior role and domestic functions, Rubin believes that the current unequal gender system should be changed.

In summary, scholars such as Beauvoir and Rubin use the distinction between sex and gender to explore or interpret sexism, and the consensus is that “biological differences [i.e., sex

differences] in themselves bear no responsibility for the second-class status to which women have been relegated through most of the history” (Warnke, 2011:4). According to feminists such as Beauvoir and Rubin, sexist oppression has its roots in the concept of gender, which is acquired or expressed in *changeable social functions*. Irigaray’s approach to sex difference challenges this view of gender; thus, I shall take up this issue again in Section V of this chapter. As sexist oppression has its roots in conceptualized gender difference, ending sexist oppression is more or less assumed as achieving gender equality.

3. Three Models of Sexist Oppression: One Sex, Imperfection, and Secondary Other

In the previous section, I discussed the view that sexist oppression has little or no relation to biological sex but is to a large extent related to social gender. This is a feminist argument that is used to destroy the foundations of patriarchal tradition through the reconstruction of concepts. As I discussed in Chapter One, feminists use the theory of social construction to reinterpret and reconstruct discursive reality. To achieve this goal, scholars have studied canonical ancient texts, seeking the origins of sexism. This section will argue that these sexist norms are part of “the one-sex model,” which includes three different types. I am not aiming to investigate all aspects of sexist oppression in the present and the past; rather, I focus on two feminists’ interpretations, Thomas Laqueur and Genevieve Lloyd, and analyze the consistency between their interpretations of the relationship between sex difference and gender difference.

3.1 One Sex Model

Let us begin with Laqueur and Warnke, who give a clear overview of pre-modern and early modern discussions of sex differences. Laqueur reports that men and women were thought to be the same sex form and to have the same organs, with the sexes being distinguished by the bodily

location of these similar organs. I draw readers' attention that it is not Laqueur himself who holds these beliefs, but that Laqueur was merely reporting on beliefs held by people in the past. Warnke has detailed Laqueur's observation, "the same organs that are on the outside of male bodies are on the inside of female bodies" (Warnke, 2011: 30). To further explain previous scholars' understanding of biological difference between the men and women, Warnke cites Laqueur's interpretation to describe the menstruation of men,

Redefined out of the blood[,] it passed to the brain; from the brain it made its way back through the spinal marrow, the kidneys, the testicles, and into the penis (Warnke, 2011:30).

Warnke then explains the theory behind women's occasional inability to menstruate: (1) pregnant women have no extra nutrition, and (2) their child absorbs the leftover nutrition. On the basis of Laqueur's studies, Warnke suggests that there are no essential differences between male and female reproductive processes, perhaps because of the "overall level of fluids in the body [being] at an appropriate level" (Warnke, 2011: 30). Warnke notes that the functional difference between men and women lies in their temperature and humidity; specifically, men are dry and hot and women are moist and cold. Women lack sufficient heat to force the penis outside the body, rendering them "imperfect men" according to pre-modern thinkers. Aristotle, for instance, claimed that females are "mutilated males" (Aristotle, 737a 27). Warnke then explains the belief that even though both the genders share the same body, this body is ruled by only one of them:

Both sexes experienced a violent pleasure during intercourse that was intimately connected with successful generation; both generally emitted something; pleasure was due both to the qualities of the substance emitted and to its rapid propulsion by "ait"; the womb performed double duty in both emitting something...(Warnke, 2011: 31).

Warnke indicates that “if men and women shared a body, that body could perform in only one way. Whatever the male did, the female had to do as well” (Warnke, 2011: 31). This understanding of men and women as represented by Laqueur and Warnke can be designated as the *one sex model*. One sex is largely based men as the prototype.

3.2 Imperfection Model

Genevieve Lloyd’s influential *imperfection model* was introduced in her classic paper, “The Man of Reason.” As Miranda Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby have noted,

Lloyd’s central claim was the philosophers’ conceptions of reason have tended to be aligned with culture conceptions of masculinity, reason being conceived as contrasted with and superior to intuition and emotion which the cultural imagination has associated with femininity (Fricker and Hornsby, 2000: 2).

Lloyd cites Aristotle, who believes that women lack the “principle of the soul” (Aristotle, 737a25), suggesting that they therefore do not possess sufficient rationality to make a decision, as men do. She believes that the reason that women were considered “mutilated males” lies in this idea of their inferior rationality. Lloyd then moves to the distinction made by Augustine, who said, “there are two forces: one which is dominant because it deliberates and one which obeys because it is subject to such guidance” (Augustine: p. 344; Lloyd, 1979: 19). Through analyzing Augustine’s words, Lloyd presents an analogy between the dominant-passive mode and the male-female mode. She then discusses Charlotte de Brachart’s idea about men and women, in which the perfection of men is thrown into relief by the imperfection of women. In Lloyd’s own words, “the dignity, the perfection of man [is] a favorite theme of the age. For some, that meant the perfection of man alone” (Lloyd, 1979: 20); women, in comparison, are “imperfect animals” (ibid: 20). I will not discuss her historical analysis of the rational man and

the emotional woman further, as Fricker and Hornsby's statement will suffice. I name the philosophy Lloyd describes the *imperfection model* to indicate that there is value judgement within this model. Perfection is always better than imperfection, as reflected in men's superior and women's inferior positions.

3.3 Secondary Other Model

My form of the *secondary other* model is based on Diemut Bubeck's and Sally Haslanger's work. Bubeck discusses three differences in feminism: (1) women's difference from men, (2) social differences between women, and (3) theoretical differences between feminists (Buceck, 2000:185). She writes,

The first type is the critical discussion of 'malestream' political thought, both historical and contemporary. The focus in such critique is typically on male-biased conceptions and false generalizations. *Male-biased conceptions* are an interpretation of concepts—such as liberty, autonomy, equality, justice, democracy, rights—which derive from and capture men's experience in a gender-divided world, but not women's (ibid: 186).

Bubeck goes on to argue that women do not participate in or are not taken into consideration when discussing these political concepts, asserting that the original philosophical concepts are gender biased. Thus, when people or scholars use these concepts to judge specific situations, it is equivalent to employing a men/male/masculine perspective to judge everything. As Buceck writes,

Given that women have been excluded from politics and political thought, it is not surprising that political theory have thought only about men, mentioning women at most in discussions of the family, nor is it surprising that the focus of initial feminist interventions in political theory lay in the critique of such male bias (ibid: 186).

Diverging from the gender bias of political concepts, Sally Haslanger discusses gender bias at the metaphysical level. She believes that men are used as the standard at all levels, from the ontological level to the political level; I term this view the *secondary other* model.

In summary, I distinguish three types of sexist conceptions of the genders. This is not to suggest that they are independent of each other; rather they are intertwined in different situations. These three models can overlap, as the idea of the male-made other is applicable in all three. I introduce Laqueur's theory to show that sex difference and gender difference cannot be separated. John Money and Anke Ehrhardt may also agree with this argument, as they believe that sex is "the reproductive capacity of the sex organs," and gender is "the sameness, unity, and persistence of one's individuality as male, female, or ambivalent, in greater or less degree, especially as it is experienced in self-awareness and behavior" (Dreger, 1998: 150). The reason for highlighting gender equality rather than sex equality or other types of equality is based on the development of feminism and modern feminist concerns.

4. The Root of Sexism: Exclusive Dualistic Thinking Paradigm

By analyzing different scholars' interpretations of the concepts of sex and gender, I have explained why feminists need gender equality, namely, there is a consensus that biological difference will not lead to hierarchical relations between men and women. Rather, biased concepts, behaviors, and political principles all have their roots in social constructions of gender. Recall the three different definitions of sex and gender: (1) sex is what one is born with, while gender is acquired, (2) sex is unchangeable natural "raw material," while gender is expressed in changeable social roles or functions, and (3) sex is biological self-generation, while gender is self-awareness and self-identity. Additionally, I have described three types of sexist conceptions of the genders: (1) women are conceptual others that are inferior to men, (2) women are

“mutilated males” who possess an inferior position, and (3) women’s experience is ignored and replaced by men’s. These sexist gender norms have their roots in unequal gender relations and gender norms.

4.1 Appeal of a “New Starting Point”

In seeking to end these forms of sexism and achieve gender equality, scholars have asked one question—what is the cause of gender inequality? As I discussed in the previous section, based on philosophical theorizing, feminists argue that gender is a social construct. Feminists believe that men oppress women, causing women to occupy a subservient position in the male-dominated patriarchal society. They thus appeal for equal treatment, indicating that women should receive equal opportunities for education and work and political enfranchisement. In recent years, scholars have discussed different forms of degradation and have analyzed the underlying causes. For example, Sally Haslanger writes,

In many cases the feminist challenge to foundationalism is a request to reconsider the starting points of the author’s field, to ask whether these starting points are biased, and what purposes have been served by treating these assumptions as unquestionable ... In a social context in which sexist and racist views are widely held and institutionalized, there is a compelling need for theories that diagnose, explain, and replace the sexist and racist beliefs (Haslanger, 2000:115).

In challenging foundationalism, Haslanger appeals to “nature’s real structure” (ibid: 119). Her points here are that (1) she wants to establish a theory of equality, (2) she believes that the equal relation is manifested in the true structure of nature, (3) she wants to disclose what the true structure is, and (4) she wants to give a new starting point that has no bias. I do not want to be too ambitious to examine each of her points. I take her as an example because she aims to find

the “starting point.” I agree with her stance that if feminists can provide a new starting point that has no sexist or racist views, it will make a crucial contribution of modern gender equality.

In this regard, I take Karen J. Warren’s theory as a typical example for my argument: the new “starting point” should be a reconstruction of logics behind the sexist phenomenon. I choose Warren for two reasons, (1) as eco-feminists, her theory is based on a reflection of “nature’s real structure;” and (2) her analysis is a consensus in the academic circle to uncovering the logic of patriarchy. To be specific, Warren’s argument is based on the premise that “there are important connections—historical, experiential, symbolic, and theoretical—between the domination of women and the domination of nature” (Warren, 2012:157). She believes that nature’s absence from decision making is akin to women’s absence and silence in most public affairs. Though post-modern philosophers and deconstructionists seek to use language to construct a new conceptual framework, Warren reminds us that there are some conceptual frameworks that are full of oppressive ideas. She writes that “there are three significant features of the [patriarchal] oppressive conceptual framework: (1) value-hierarchical thinking, (2) value dualisms, and (3) logic of domination” (ibid: 158).

In line with Haslanger and Warren, Ann A. Pang-White argues that “the exclusive dualistic logic of ‘either-or,’ a common hypothesis of Western mainstream philosophy” is the root of sexist oppression (Pang-White, 2016: 2). Citing Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s criticisms of the label “First World Women,” Pang-White deems that the “either-or” logic is the foundation of any “form of systematic oppression” (ibid: 2). I believe that there are counterarguments, for example, scholars might believe that (1) there are scholars, who do not adopt the exclusive dualistic logic, hold view of sexism; and (2) there are scholars, who use the exclusive dualistic logic, support gender equality. For example, Hannah Arendt (1906-

1975), has discussed the negative dialectic. Her dialectic is one application of the exclusive dualistic logic, where she discusses how to unite the two contradictory sides. Yet, Arendt is a feminist who advocate gender equality. Thus, I believe that sexism does not have its root in the exclusive dualistic logic, but does have its root in the exclusive dualistic hierarchical evaluating system.

Is my aim to object to Pang-White's theories? The answer is negative. Rather, I agree with Pang-White on the view that the exclusive dualistic logic is the foundation of mainstream western philosophy. To briefly summarize, the exclusive dualistic thinking paradigm appeals to establishing stable or fixed gender relations. It is a kind of essentialist thinking mode. To some extent, I argue this model also plays a central role in feminism. In this regard, those scholars' doubt is not a challenge to the foundation of my argument, but sheds light on the applicable extension of the exclusive dualistic logic. I believe there are diverse voices within the history of Western philosophy, which is consistent with my view that there is no unified voices within feminism. In the next section, I will argue a paradox within the feminism caused by the exclusive dualistic logic. This argument is based on the fact that some feminists have also adopted the exclusive dualistic logic.

5. A Dilemma of Gender Equality Caused by Exclusive Dualistic Model

In this section, I argue that feminists' diverse interpretations of gender equality are caused by exclusive dualistic logic, which leads to internal contradictories within feminism. Given that, in Chapter One, I have provided literature review of feminists' interpretations of gender equality, my aim of mentioning them here is to show why feminists are dissatisfied with each other's interpretation. As I uncover the inner logic—exclusive dualistic thinking—of the tension between gender equality and gender difference, I put forth my question: to what extent, can

gender equality coexist with gender difference? I take Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler as representatives of the essentialist feminism and anti-essentialist feminism respectively. By simply introducing their core ideas, I explain the dilemma of gender equality in Anglo-American feminism. The dilemma of gender equality is that, if equality refers to sameness treatment to both genders, gender equality may lead to actual inequality; if equality refers to different treatment to both genders, it may reinforce the stereotype of women's degradation; and worse, if equality is equivalent to different treatment to each woman, feminists will lose their very foundation—the universal concept of women.

Let us begin with three major feminists interpretations of gender equality. Feminists, who believe that gender equality means men and women should be the same in all aspects and treated the same way, argue that women should have identical reasoning capacities as men. This is because, rationality is a necessary condition of being an independent individual. If women want to enjoy equal rights as men enjoy, they should primarily prove that women are identical political individuals. The idea of “equality in sameness” has brought women equal rights before the law; and it is also feminists' first attempt to challenge traditional gender norms. In the past, philosophers believed that there is a clear line between men and women, and reason and emotion. Men's essential property is reason and women's is emotion. Although feminists refute the exclusive dualistic logic and the hierarchical evaluating system, they have not successfully escaped from the limitation of exclusive dualistic logic. When feminists interpret equality as sameness, there is always a tension between ideal gender equality and apparent gender difference. This tension is caused by exclusive dualistic relations between ideal and reality, sameness and difference, and men and women. Worse, these dualistic relations result in the conflict between ideal equality and actual inequality, if feminists construct equality in sameness.

To resolve the tension between ideal equality and actual inequality, some feminists inquire the *recognition* of biological difference when they construct gender equality.¹ For them, gender equality means treating men and women differently and giving women the right of priority. However, under the exclusive dualistic logic, the proposal of “equality in difference” is also problematic. Other feminists criticize this approach to gender equality, as equal treatment is always conflicting with equal result. I take the “dilemma of difference”² as an example to elaborate why the invalidity of “equality of difference” has its roots in exclusive dualistic logic. The dilemma of difference means: if women enjoy the right of priority, it will reinforce negative stereotypes of women’s dependent role; if women emphasize their independent role and give up the right of priority, women’s special needs are neglected. For example, when women attend a job interview: (1) if they ask interviewers to give them prioritized opportunities because they are women, it results in unfairness to their male competitors and will raise people’s doubt about women’s abilities; (2) if they receive same opportunities as their male opponents have, the result is usually that women are not hired because they may become pregnant and give birth. Thus, the dilemma of difference is caused by the dichotomy of opportunities (as a condition) and outcomes.

To resolve the dilemma of difference, radical feminists propose to diversify gender types in the form of homosexuality and androgyny. They refuse to accept the exclusive dualistic logic, traditional metaphysics, and any form of universals. Diverging from ancient Greek philosophers, who pursue absolute sameness, modern radical feminists aim to providing the concept of

¹ More discussions on this issue can refer: (1) Elizabeth Grosz (1989), *Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists*. (2) Domna C. Stanton (1989), *Difference on Trial, A Critique of the Maternal Metaphon in Cixous*.

² More discussions can see Martha Minow’s discussion on the issue of “dilemma of difference,” which means equality of equal treatment is always conflicting with equality of result. In her renowned work, *Making All Difference*, Minow has provided an interesting example to discuss this. For a divorce woman, when distributing family properties, even distribution ignores woman’s special needs; but priority distribution reinforce women’s negative stereotypes of depending on men.

absolute difference.³ Diversity is an extension of difference. Thus in pursuing their goals of equality for sexual minorities, e.g., the LGBT communities, radical feminists deconstruct the concept of women. This deconstruction leads to a result that feminists cannot afford: there is not a universal concept of women. In this way, feminism lose their research target—women.

As discussed in Section 4 and Section 5, when feminists use the label “First-World Sisters” as contrast to women in the “Third-World,” it is already a form of sexist oppression. This is why I argue for a “new starting point” in cross-cultural feminist studies. The foundation of sexist oppression in traditional mainstream western philosophy is based on the exclusive dualistic thinking and its hierarchical evaluating system. Modern feminist constructions of gender equality, too, adopt the exclusive dualistic thinking. This adoption results in dilemma between equality in sameness and equality in difference and diversity.

This typical dilemma promotes further discussion in the literature on whether gender equality is compatible with gender difference, as scholars are convinced that gender inequality has its roots in gender difference. However, they disagree on the meaning of gender difference. For example, Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler, representatives of essentialist and anti-essentialist feminism, respectively, disagree on whether there is an ontological essential difference between men and women. Their discussions center on the extent to which Western mainstream feminism can accept gender difference and achieve gender equality. Essentialist feminists assume that there are pre-determined qualities that are essential to each gender, and for them, gender equality means giving women priority when dividing social duties (Shidrick, 1997; Jiang, 2000; Stone, 2004). Anti-essentialist feminists assume that gender differences are artificial social norms rather

³ See Emmanuel Levinas (1979), *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*.

than essential properties, and for them, gender equality is gender-neutral (Stone, 2006). Xiao Wei 肖巍 has pointed out that both types of feminism may have addressed questions of gender inequality under patriarchal logic (exclusive dualistic logic). Going with essentialism, women may again face the risk of subordination because they are different from men; if anti-essentialism prevails, women may lose their subjectivity. Worse, anti-essentialism may lead to a legitimacy crisis for the whole of feminism in the absence of its research target—women (Xiao, 2007: 19). These dilemmas are due to exclusive dualistic logic, which puts both genders in antagonistic, conflicting, and zero-sum relations.

CHAPTER THREE: THE FOUNDATION OF GENDER EQUALITY IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY—THE *YIN-YANG* THINKING PARADIGM

1. Introduction

As was discussed in the previous chapter, there is a dilemma in the Western feminist theoretical evolution of the concept of gender equality. This chapter will introduce a *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm, which aims to see whether such a different model can resolve the dilemma of gender equality. I argue that the *yin-yang* model and the exclusive dualistic model both belong to correlative thinking mode, where the former focuses on establishing stable or fixed gender relations whereas the latter stresses changeable relations. To support this argument, I revisit different interpretations of correlative thinking. Section 2 of this chapter will offer preliminary remarks about whether correlative thinking is unique to Chinese philosophy or is a universal model applicable to both traditions. I will introduce Joseph Needham's particular-based reading and then will discuss A. C. Graham's universal-based reading. Through pointing out their pros and cons, I argue that correlative thinking should be a universal model. I also introduce David L. Hall, Roger Ames, and Robin Wang's reading of correlative thinking in Section III and IV respectively. My aim is to uncover the relationship between the exclusive dualistic thinking model and the *yin-yang* model. In the last Section, I further argue that the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm is a reciprocal, dynamic, and multi-dimensional model, which provides necessary metaphysical or ontological ground for the argument: gender equality should be premised on gender difference.

2. Debate on Correlative Thinking: Particular versus Universal

Investigations of linguistic patterns suggest that the fundamental difference between Chinese and English lies in their different thinking paradigms. Marcel Granet is probably the first person to propose that the uniqueness of Chinese linguistics lies in correspondences. He argues that language in ancient China reflects that the Chinese thinking paradigm at that time was figurative and non-logical, the opposite of the Western modes of logic and causality (Schwartz, 1985). Recognizing that it is Eurocentric to label a thinking paradigm as non-logical, non-rational, and self-refuting, Granet proposes that the *Chinese Mind* is best characterized by *correspondences*, freeing the Chinese thinking mode from Western biases. According to Needham and Graham, the concept of correspondences is the origin of correlative thinking. Correlative thinking is important to understanding Chinese philosophy's logic and hence to demonstrating how the Chinese philosophical paradigm provides the basis for a different form of equality between the genders. There has been a variety of contradicting interpretations of the concept of correlative thinking.¹ Associated with these interpretations, two contradictory assertions warrant elaboration — correlative thinking is particular to China and correlative thinking is universal. With respect to which assertion is correct, Needham and Graham diverge.

2.1 Particular-Based Reading

Needham believes that correlative thinking is a typical and unique Chinese thinking paradigm distinct from Western dualistic thinking. In his *Science and Civilisation in China, Vol. 2: History*

¹ Michael Nylan has summarized five contradicting interpretations: “(1) whether correlative thinking is ‘primitive’ (or ‘premodern’), as Durkheim and Mauss believed, ‘inferior’ (as J. J. M. De Groot tried to prove), or characteristic of both premodern and modern societies (as Henderson insisted in one book, only to contradict himself in a second); (2) whether the ‘tangible world’ (or “reality”) provides the ultimate model for classifications, as Durkheim, Mauss, and Schwartz believed, or whether they are functions of language (Graham), or thinking (Hall and Ames), or texts (Wilhelm); (3) whether this mode of thinking is ‘unusual’ and particular to China (Saussy, Wang Aihe) or ‘universal’ (Durkheim, Mauss, Granet, Lévi-Strauss, Wilhelm); (4) when such modes of thought first appeared (was it the fourth century BCE, the ‘late third,’ or ‘by Han’ [i.e. by 206 BCE], or possibly later; and (5) what domains of culture or knowledge it pertained to (e.g. was it applied early on to notions of the body?)” (Nylan, 2010: 410).

of *Scientific Thought*, Needham gives a clear definition of correlative thinking:

In [correlative] thinking, conceptions are *not subsumed under one another, but placed side by side in a pattern*, and things influence one another not by acts of mechanical causation, but by a kind of ‘inductance.’ ... The key-word in Chinese thought is *Order* and above all *Pattern* (and, if I may whisper it for the first time, *Organism*). The symbolic correlations or correspondences all formed part of one colossal pattern. Things behaved in particular ways not necessarily because of prior actions or impulsions of other things, but because their position in the ever-moving cyclical universe was such that they were endowed with intrinsic nature which made that behavior inevitable for them (Needham, 1956: 280-1 italic edited).

He employs theories of the *Yin-Yang* school (*yinyangjia* 阴阳家) and naturalistic doctrines from the Han dynasty to interpret this unceasing movement between one thing and the other. Similar to most ancient Chinese philosophers’ observations, the movement of the sun and moon (*riyue* 日月) is a typical order for this thinking mode. Two opposite terms are equally important and have no hierarchical distinction. As is indicated in the above paragraph, Needham believes that correlative thinking is a side-by-side pattern, which is different from dualistic thinking’s above-below model.

As a scientist, Needham wants to understand the value of correlative thinking. He poses one question: “What exactly did the Chinese contribute, in the various historical periods, ancient and medieval, to the development of Science, Scientific Thought and Technology” (Needham, 1954: prologue). After examining various ancient Chinese inventions, Needham is curious about why modern science, and mathematical hypotheses about nature in particular, were not discovered in ancient China (famously known as Needham’s Grand Question). He concludes that

it is probably because the Chinese attribute the ceaseless fluctuations between *yin* and *yang* to a “mysterious resonance” rather than any “mechanical impulsion[s]” (Needham, 1956: 281). With its figurative language, Chinese philosophy cannot express the concepts of abstraction, logic, and causality familiar to the West. Thus, correlative thinking is incompatible with Western dualistic thinking, and as the unique thinking mode of Chinese philosophy, it is best characterized as an intrinsic cyclical movement between two opposite terms.

2.2 Universal-Based Reading

Graham, however, disagrees with Needham’s conclusion, arguing, “all thinking is grounded in analogization” (Graham, 1992: 61). He claims that “what Granet saw as the difference between Chinese and Western thought may nowadays be seen as a transcultural difference between proto-science and modern science ... the correlative thinking used by everyone, which underlies the operations of language itself” (Graham, 1989: 319-20). His linguistic analysis is based on Roman Jakobson’s explanations of metaphoric relations (which fail to recognize similarity) and metonymic relations (which fail to recognize temporal connexity). Graham carefully analyzes Jakobson’s two patterns of recognition—the paradigmatic relation (similarity/contradiction) and the syntagmatic relation (contiguity/remoteness)—and summarizes two proportional logics: (1) $A_1:B_1::A_2: B_2$, and (2) $A_1:A_2::B_1:B_2$. For example, if day (A_1), night (A_2), sun (B_1), and moon (B_2) are employed for these logics, they will be (1) day:sun::night:moon, and (2) day:night::sun:moon (Graham, 1986: 19). The former is based on comparison with contiguity, while the latter is rooted in connection with metaphor. According to Graham, both sets of relations express holism, association, or oneness. Their difference is not caused by recognition but by convention. Thus, both the Chinese and Westerners adopt these two proportional logics in the process of recognition.

Then, Graham mentions the concept of semiology, where there is a conceptual scheme with various chains of opposite concepts waiting to be recognized, classified, and analyzed. He states,

The Chinese cosmology which assumed its lasting shape by the beginning of the Han is a vast system starting from chains of *pairs correlated with the Yin and the Yang*, branching out into fours and fives (Four seasons, Four Directions, Five Colors, Five Sounds, Five Tastes, Five Smells ...) correlated with the Five Processes, and down through successive divisions correlated with the Eight Trigrams and Sixty-Four Hexagrams of the *Yi*. This scheme, in which to explain and infer is to locate within the pattern, provides the organizing concepts of proto-sciences (Graham, 1986: 319-20 *italic edited*).

It can be inferred from this excerpt that (1) *yin* and *yang* are two fundamental elements of the vast Chinese system, (2) any Chinese pair of opposite concepts fits neatly into the *yin-yang* model, and (3) the dynamic relation between *yin* and *yang* is applicable to all the other concepts, including the four seasons, five colors, eight trigrams, and sixty-four hexagrams. Considering that the *yin-yang* model is suitable for certain types of Western paired concepts, such as sun and moon, but other contradicting terms (e.g., good and evil in the West) are ill-accommodated, Graham draws a distinction between two levels of thinking—the analytic logical level and the correlative pre-logical level, which are closely intertwined. Thus, correlative thinking is compatible with Western dualistic thinking.

Though there are additional scholars who favor one or the other standpoint, I single out Needham and Graham because they clearly describe how correlative thinking is incompatible or

compatible with dualistic thinking.² However, most of Needham's successors do not accept Graham's conclusion that correlative thinking is a pre-logical chain of oppositions. Fung Yiu-ming argues that opposing terms should have logical structures, content, or background information because oppositions only are helpful at the pre-logic level and for classification, and this level is inconsistent with logic. He further points out that context-free opposing terms, like *yin* and *yang*, do not make sense. For example, he writes,

When [Graham] uses some examples to illustrate the meaning of these sentential context-free terms or names, it indicates clearly that the terms' contents are more than the oppositions themselves. [Graham] says, for example, 'to be *yang* not *yin* is nothing else but to be light not dark, or male not female.' It is obvious that the example is not consistent with his 'no more content' thesis, because 'to be *yang* not *yin*' is not the same as 'to be A not B' or 'to be A not ~A'. In order to know the similarity between yang and light or male and the difference between each pair, we have to know some contents more than just oppositions (Fung, 2010: 301).

According to Fung, it is impossible to understand opposing terms without context. His analysis attempts to destroy the foundations of Graham's interpretation that correlative thinking is a shared basis of Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy. Chains of opposing pairs are inadequate to support Graham two distinct logical levels. Thus, if correlative thinking is merely a logic of opposites, it will be neither a universal principle for both traditions nor a thinking mode unique to Chinese philosophy. For this reason, Wang Aihe is in favor of Needham's particular-based reading; she believes that correlative thinking is "an immense system of correlation-building, based on interlaced pairs (correlated

² Further discussion can be found in Michael Nylan's work, "Yin-yang, Five Phases, and qi," 2010:410-11.

to *Yin-Yang*), fours (correlated to the four directions), fives (correlated to the Five Phases or *Wuxing*), eights (correlated to the Eight Trigrams), and so on” (Wang, 2000: 2). This thinking paradigm is incommensurable with Western dualistic logic. To argue against this conclusion, the next section will focus on Hall and Ames’s context-based reading of correlative thinking to show how correlative thinking renders Chinese *yin-yang* thinking commensurable with Western dualistic thinking.

3. Defending Universal Interpretation: Context-Based Reading and Its Problems

I disagree with those scholars’ criticisms and argue a universal-based reading. I believe that correlative thinking is applicable across cultures, but in different nations the forms may vary from one another. Thus, to defend Graham’s position, I introduce Hall and Ames’s context-based reading of correlative thinking, aiming to show how correlative thinking transcends the limitation of analogy logic and become universal cultural patterns. They first review the Western philosophical tradition, they summarize two “principal problematics [existing] at the recorded origins of [Western] culture” (Hall and Ames, 1995: 115), i.e., *the first problematic* and *the second problematic*:

What we have termed the first problematic is acosmological in the sense that it does not presume a single-ordered world. By contrast, the second problematic, from which our mainstream culture actually arose, affirms the existence of but one, single-ordered cosmos (Hall and Ames, 1995: 115).

As this quotation indicates, Hall and Ames agree with Graham that correlative thinking is a universal concept applicable to both cultures. Through the lens of another culture, according to Hall and Ames, we can see Western culture from a new perspective and then obtain a deeper understanding. Thus, the concept of “acosmological” does not mean a state of nothingness (*wu*

无); rather, it refers to a varied yet holistic world existing before cosmology. A vivid example given in their book, *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*, is Democritus's atomic theory, through which they show that *the first problematic* contains multiple world orders, while *the second problematic* is dominated by a single world order. They further assert that *the first problematic* is "correlative thinking" and *the second* should be characterized as "causal thinking."

To differentiate themselves from Graham, Hall and Ames assert that their definition is an "informal interpretation":

Rational or logical thinking, grounded in analytic, dialectical and analogical argumentation, stresses the explanatory power of physical causation. In contrast, Chinese thinking depends upon a species of analogy which may be called "correlative thinking." ... Correlative thinking is a species of *spontaneous thinking* grounded in *informal* and *ad hoc* analogical procedures presupposing both association and differentiation. The regulative element in this modality of thinking is shared patterns of culture and tradition rather than common assumptions about causal necessity (Fung, 2010: 302).

Hall and Ames dismiss the necessity of causality as a precondition for both traditions, which frees Chinese philosophy from Western pre-conception. By arguing for the existence of shared patterns, like in the approach to the relationship between association and differentiation, they bring Chinese philosophy back into dialogues with the West. They believe that the Chinese thinking mode shares a similarity with *the first problematic*, and this shared ground is correlative thinking. They further explain that "the art of contextualization" unites *the first problematic*, *yin-*

yang thinking, and correlative thinking.³

Is it possible that Hall and Ames seek to rethink and reinterpret *the first problematic* in the West through Chinese philosophical terms? Their answer is negative, as they believe “classical Chinese effectively resorted to something at least similar to those very interpretations which were either rejected or left undeveloped within [Western] culture” (ibid: 181). Their highlighting of *yin* and *yang* here is not to make *yin-yang* fit into Western categories but to show how Chinese philosophical resources enrich our understanding of the fundamental philosophical issues shared by both traditions. Hall and Ames find that even though “*yin-yang* thinking” is equivalent to correlative thinking, “the classical Chinese understanding of *yin* and *yang* as contrastive concepts cannot coherently lead to [inclusive] dualistic translations or interpretations. *Yin* is a becoming-*yang*; *yang* is a becoming-*yin*” (Hall and Ames, 1995: p261). They further point out that without context, *yin* and *yang* are meaningless. Their various relationships, such as “mutuality, interdependence, diversity, and creative efficacy of the dynamic relationships” (ibid: p261), are context-dependent. Hall and Ames therefore conclude that *yin* and *yang* should be employed in historical, social, and philosophical scholarship instead of being limited to analysis focused on linguistic oppositions. Thus, *yin-yang* thinking exhibits “the art of contextualization.”

Hall and Ames’s interpretation not only defends Graham’s position but also borrows some ideas from Needham. On the one hand, Hall and Ames agree with Needham’s “particular-based reading” that *yin-yang* thinking (detached from correlative thinking) is a unique feature of Chinese philosophy. On the other hand, they are in favor of Graham’s “universal-based reading,” which proposes that correlative thinking is a universal principle shared by both traditions. They

³ Hall and Ames claim that “‘*yin-yang* thinking’ is, then, another name for ‘correlative thinking.’ Both involve ‘the art of contextualization.’” Further discussion can be found in David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames. (1995). *Anticipating China*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

develop a “context-based reading,” which emphasizes that correlative thinking has multiple dimensions and different forms. They believe that ancient Western philosophy and Chinese philosophy both employ correlative thinking. However, because, when faced with two contradictory concepts, e.g., “*p*” and “*non-p*,” *yin-yang* logic is “both-and,” while the logic of modern philosophy is either-or, Chinese philosophy could not produce an analytic, causal, single-order modern system like Western philosophy. Hall and Ames’s context-based reading validate that *yin-yang* thinking approaches paired terms in a different way. For example, *yin* and *yang* can represent moon and sun, night and day, and darkness and brightness, respectively. According to Hall and Ames, it is “through a process of generalization that [female] and male gender traits are construed as predominantly *yin* and *yang* respectively” (ibid: 261). Thus, correlative thinking is not unique to the Chinese; rather, it is a shared concept that makes the two traditions commensurable. According to Hall and Ames, in the family of correlative thinking, *yin-yang* thinking is unique to Chinese culture. *Yin-yang* thinking approaches two opposing terms (e.g., men and women) from a different foundation or perspective than *the first problematic*. Thus, the claim that the *yin-yang* model can provide a different cultural, philosophical, and logical basis for gender relations is justified.

3.2 Problems of Context-Based Reading

Though Hall and Ames’s interpretation shows us a potential approach to solving the dilemma of gender equality, their interpretation invites further inquiry of correlative thinking. They found both *the first problematic* and *the second problematic* present in Democritus. According to Democritus’ atom theory, all homogenous atoms are different in essence and are unchangeable and indestructible; their relations and movements require a void (empty space) to make the universe a solid whole. Democritus then connects the primary motion and the secondary effects,

arguing that all changes in the phenomenal world (secondary) are rooted in atoms and a void (primary). Motions of atoms is explained by mechanical, and caused relations. This is the feature of the first problematic. This makes it appear that *the first problematic* and *the second problematic* are consistent in Democritus' interpretation.

However, *yin-yang* thinking, as correlative thinking, is inconsistent with *the second problematic*. Though Hall and Ames admit that *yin-yang* is defined by opposing relations, they say that “*yin* and *yang* are *ad hoc* explanatory categories that report on interactions among immediate concrete things of the world” (ibid: 261). This statement indicates that *yin-yang* thinking is not a linear system of opposite terms; rather, it is a spiral pattern of ceaseless alternations between two opposite concepts. In this sense, it is indeed inconsistent with *the second problematic*.

Correlative thinking is a relation-based thinking. In this model, *yin-yang* thinking and dualistic/causal thinking are different not in kind but in degree. One tends to emphasize the variable-sum relation of two contradicting philosophical terms, while another tends to perceive a zero-sum relation. To summarize the above discussions, there are four mainly difference between this two models: (1) one is an above-below mode and the other a side-by-side mode, (2) one is an either-or logic and the other a “both-and” logic, (3) one admits only a single world order and the other multiple world orders, and (4) one posits zero-sum relations and the other variable-sum relations. Because of these differences, it is appropriate to discuss the question of what both traditions can contribute to resolve fundamental philosophical issues (e.g., gender equality and gender difference) and to focus on the ways both traditions are enriched. Thus, the next section aims to introduce a common interpretation presented by Robin R. Wang. Her interpretation has a positive influence in the current academia and reveals the framework and patterns of the *yin-*

yang thinking paradigm and its relations to gender studies on the ontological level.

4. The Yin-Yang Thinking Paradigm: A Relation-Based Approach

As shown in previous discussions, there is a consensus that correlative thinking has twofold forms: the exclusive dualistic and the *yin-yang*. This section aims to uncover the structure of *yin-yang* model and further present how this mode can expand the ground of gender issues on the metaphysical level. Even though scholars have recognized the significance of *yin* and *yang*, they disagree on what *yin* and *yang* are and their connections to gender studies. In some early research (though rarely in more contemporary research), *yin* and *yang* are held as metaphors of woman and man, femininity and masculinity, or female and male. However, Chinese mainstream philosophy treats these two concepts as two fundamental forces or two kinds of *qi* 气 (vital forces) in the cosmos.⁴ Now more and more people accept that *yin* and *yang* do not necessarily refer to women and men or to any gendered characteristics; rather, they represent a way of thinking that serves as a basis for reconsidering gender relations. There are at least four inconsistent interpretations of the relationship between *yin* and *yang*: first, as two sides of the same thing (south or north side of a hill); second, as two interdependent entities/substances (sun and moon); third, as contradictory yet complementary relations; and finally, as two basic symbols --(*yin*) and —(*yang*) with countless possibilities (Raphals, 1998; Rosenlee, 2007; Pang-White, 2016).⁵ Considering the undeniable fact that these interpretations are all included in Robin R. Wang's relation-based reading, her interpretation should be carefully examined.

Wang believes that *yin-yang* as a thinking paradigm contains six relational forms. In her

⁴ From the Han dynasty to the present, scholars have believed that *yin* and *yang* are two vital forces in the universe. Among these scholars, Jing Fang 京房, Zheng Xuan 郑玄, Zhang Zai 张载, Zhu Xi 朱熹, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 agree with this interpretation.

⁵ For further discussion, see the Book Review by Zhang Lili, forthcoming in the *Dao*.

book, *Yinyang: The Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture*, Wang states that these six forms can include *all* possible relations between *yin* and *yang*. These six forms are “*maodun* 矛盾 (contradiction and opposition), *xiangyi* 相依 (interdependence), *huhuan* 互含 (mutual inclusion), *jiaogan* 交感 (interaction or resonance), *hubu* 互补 (mutual support or complementary), and *zhuanhua* 转化 (change and transformation)” (Wang, 2012: 10-2). In her argument, her textual evidence for these six forms comes from *Hanfeizi* 韩非子, *Gui Guzi* 鬼谷子, *Yijing*, *Taipingjing* 太平经, *Zhouli* 周礼, and *He Guanzi* 鶡冠子, respectively. Wang maps out a system of *yin-yang* relations with six dimensions. Wang maintains that *yin-yang* “always applies in particular and relative contexts” (Wang, 2012: 7). This view is aligned with Hall and Ames’ requirement of contextuality. To expand the scope of application, Wang uses textual evidence ranging from Confucianism to Daoism, from the Political Strategies to Legalism, and from the Military School to the Medical School. Hence, her classification of the six forms aims to describe the inner logic of the Chinese *yin-yang* thinking paradigm across many schools. Wang’s relation-based reading provides a good example of correlative thinking.

However, Wang’s interpretation does not duplicate Hall and Ames’s. As she articulates, “a careful study of early Chinese texts shows that common accounts of [*yin-yang*] are far too simple” (Wang, 2012:6). Instead, Wang wants to explore and present the inner structure and logic of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm. “The goal is to give a more nuanced, synchronic account of the roles of *yin-yang* within various aspects of early Chinese thinking, while still bringing out common aspects of *yinyang* as a paradigm and strategy” (Wang, 2012: 6). With this point, she differentiates herself from Hall and Ames, though she follows their interpretation that the meaning of *yin-yang* is context-specific. She also tries to generate six universal relations of *yin-yang* that can comprise all possibilities. Her elaboration of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm

transcends contextualization and returns *yin-yang* to its position in the metaphysical/ontological discourses. She deepens the meaning of Hall and Ames's *yin-yang* thinking, discovers additional forms within this thinking paradigm, and shows how different the Chinese and Westerners are when they encounter two contradictory terms. She then applies this *yin-yang* thinking paradigm to gender relations. As *yin* and *yang* are no longer “fixed entities or essential elements,” traditional divisions of *yin/yang*, women/men, female/male, and femininity/masculinity under Western exclusive dualistic logic are no longer applicable. Thus, Wang claims, “one can talk about yin/female within yang/male ... [and what] yinyang gender construction has to offer is a description of gender relationships as dynamic and fluid” (Wang, 2016: 223-4).

Although she tries to distance herself from Hall and Ames and describes six universal forms of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm, Wang is still situated in a mutated form of contextualization. She believes that the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm has six dimensions, and in any given situation, only one will be manifested. Her interpretation comes up against a challenge, however: without a context, what is *yin-yang*? What is the relation between *yin* and *yang* in the absence of a context? Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619-1692) has criticized a contextualized understanding of *yin-yang* relations.⁶ According to his viewpoint, there are two interpretations of how *yin* and *yang* serve as foundations for the myriad things—*dayin* 大因 (universal pattern) and *xiaoyin* 小因 (particular pattern), respectively (Wang, 1996). Contextualization belongs to *xiaoyin* and hence leads to the conclusion that *yin-yang* relations are changeable, uncertain, and

⁶ To remind the reader, this is my interpretation of Wang Fuzhi. I have two reasons to support this reading. First and foremost, gender studies was not a philosophical problem or issue in Qing dynasty. Wang does not think about how to deal with this problem. Thus, I can borrow his reading of *yin-yang* and apply it to interpret modern issues. Second, this dissertation is to reinterpret and innovate some Chinese words and sayings. Thus, I can use Wang's understanding of *yin-yang* and use it to resolve modern issues.

fluid. In contrast, the “one *yin* and one *yang* are the *Dao*”⁷ idea from the *Yijing* is an expression of *dayin*, where *yin-yang* relations are unchangeable, certain, and perpetual. Wang argues that *xiaoyin* will cause people to focus on the differences (*shu* 殊) and neglect the commonality (*tong* 同). Thus, understanding the Chinese *yin-yang* thinking paradigm requires us to include both context-based reading and beyond.

Wang Fuzhi’s alternative suggestion is that *dayin* and *xiaoyin*, difference and oneness, and changeable and unchangeable go hand in hand and that there is no difference between the structure (*ti* 体) and function (*yong* 用) of *yin-yang*. In the ultimate sense, *yin* and *yang* free themselves from context and manifest mere opposing relations (Forke, 1925; Wang, 2012). To demonstrate that the *yin-yang* relation is “neither dualistic in positing two absolutely independent entities, not even simply dialectical in projecting one single pattern for change” (Wang, 2012: 7), Robin Wang gives a vivid example: the left hand and right hand represent *yang* and *yin*, respectively. However, if the situation changes, such as if both hands are raised, both hands are *yang* at the same time. If both are lowered, they will become *yin*. If the right hand is warmer than the left, the right hand will become *yang* rather than *yin*. In Wang’s mind, there is no nominative distinction between *yin* and *yang*; lived *yin-yang* “always applies in particular and relative contexts” (Wang, 2012: 7). When she employs such lived *yin-yang* to gender studies, Wang claims that “[*yin-yang*] gender identity is not a normative ideal, but rather a descriptive feature of experience, a lived body” (Wang, 2016: 223). Her articulation is in line with deconstruction and is against the traditional exclusive dualistic paradigm. Such a view is consistent with Butler’s view of non-essentialist account. According to this view, gender equality is achieved in the fluid

⁷ 一阴一阳之谓道.

and changing process of the alternation of *yin* and *yang*.

Through Robin Wang's anti-essentialist feminism approach, the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm has already been able to inform the discussion regarding whether gender difference exists at the ontological level, suggesting that this thinking has rich resources for gender studies. I agree with Robin Wang that the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm embraces various dimensions, attesting to the changeableness of reality and its richness and diversity. Her approach demonstrates that the resources of *yin* and *yang* are not a superstition but a system that contains various layers of *yin-yang* relations. This complicated *yin-yang* thinking paradigm is not used only to interpret the ontological world but also as a guide for real life. However, as Wang writes,

This study brings together texts from different period and contexts, which is the only possible way to reach the primary goal of this project: going beyond a simplistic explanation of [*yin-yang*] to present a more complicated and diverse account ...

Although grounded in a careful and through study of the sources and the development of ideas over time, it also needs some coherence (Wang, 2012: 17).

While she attempts to gather as much textual evidence as possible to demonstrate the complexity of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm, she likely ignores to create a coherent whole. This leaves some room for further exploration of how to make this theory coherent. Additionally, Wang's application of *yin-yang* dynamic relations to gender studies has indicated that *yin* and *yang* have no essence and they continually transition from one to the other. Thus, "gender is always transformative in the interaction and transformation between men and women" (Wang, 2016: 222). Such a gender-neutral interpretation comes up against a challenge—without the concept of women, who do feminists fight in behalf of? Moreover, Wang's interpretation of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm is context-based: in different situations, *yin* can change to *yang* or vice versa.

Thus, the alternation of *yin-yang* in a cyclic and ceaseless movement provides the basis for the claim that *yin* is becoming-*yang* and *yang* is becoming-*yin*. However, Wang fails to explain how, in cases of fixed entities, the *yin-yang* alternation can occur (e.g., in the case of the sun and moon). Also, its note in the case constantly men is a becoming women and women a becoming men. Thus, Wang's application of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm to gender relations cannot avoid being associated with Wang Fuzhi's *xiaoyin* due to its focus on changeableness, fluidity, and difference and neglect of unchangeableness, perpetualness, and commonness.

Though Wang's theory has some flaws, her contribution in describing the six forms within the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm is nevertheless significant. Her six forms of *yin-yang* relations establishes Chinese *yin-yang* thinking as a relational thinking pattern. This thinking paradigm is compatible with Western dualistic thinking. In his interpretation of the concept of monism, Brook Ziporyn indicates that Westerners adopt a one-two conceptualization while the Chinese employ a two-one conceptualization (Ziporyn, 2015). In other words, the Western one-two view favors a hierarchical system that places one side above the other. In contrast, the Chinese two-one view supports a harmonious system that values both sides equally.⁸ Building on Wang's and Ziporyn's idea, I attempt to make two contributions: (1) I will give a coherent interpretation of *yin-yang* on basis of the *Yijing*, and (2) I argue that the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm can transcend essentialism and anti-essentialism, gender difference and gender equality, and the separation of sex and gender. Thus, the next section will reexamine the use of *yin* and *yang* in ancient times to demonstrate how *yin* and *yang* are fused together as a unity that contains various paired concepts. By showing that *yin* and *yang* in the *Yijing* are two symbols in a

⁸ Considering that co-existence describes things' existence in space, to avoid the implication of a specific space or time, I will use the term bi-existence to refer to a co-existing relationship without any substance, including space, time, or context.

dynamic reciprocal (*wangfu* 往复) relation, the next section aims to provide a clear and coherent interpretation of the *Yijing yin-yang* model.


5. Expanding the Foundations of Gender Equality: A Reciprocity-Based Model

In the current scholarship, it is general knowledge that *yin* and *yang* in the Chinese milieu appear as a pair. Four major interpretations of this pair of concepts have been proposed: (1) the south and north sides of a hill (Rosenlee, 2006), (2) two fundamental forces in the universe (Wilhelm, 1979), (3) two forms of *qi*, namely, *yinqi* 阴气 and *yangqi* 阳气 (Nylan, 2010), and (4) representatives of *nǚ* 女 and *nan* 男, respectively (Wang, 2005). Most scholars assume that *yin* and *yang* must exist as a unit to fulfill their contradictory and complementary relations in a ceaseless cyclic movement (Raphals, 1998). Eric Nelson employs the concept of the art of contextualization to interpret *yin* and *yang* as they are presented in the *Yijing*. He believes that *yin* (--) and *yang* (—) are two symbols with countless possibilities. However, initially, these two concepts did not appear as a pair. They were gradually fused together and accrued various meanings. Diverging from previous interpretations, this section will argue for a consistent interpretation of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm as it is presented in the *Yijing*. I show that *yin* and *yang* are two abstract philosophical concepts that exemplify the Chinese unity of difference and oneness. With its dynamic reciprocal relation, the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm differentiates itself from the static hierarchical system of the West.⁹ Though these two abstract philosophical concepts were formed no later than the Warring States period, they have enjoyed remarkable longevity by being reproduced and transmitted from generation to generation through the accretion of commentary. Thus, this thinking paradigm is the basis for Chinese philosophy's

⁹ Franklin Perkins, Taine Duncan, and Nicholas S. Brasovan have discussed similar issues, but they do not (1) give systematical interpretation, (2) focus on the relationship between *yin-yang* and the *Yijing*.

approach to a contemporary fundamental philosophical issue—gender equality and gender difference; it transcends the incompatibility of gender equality and gender difference and defends the view that gender equality is premised on gender difference.

5.1 From Separation to Pair-ness (*duidai* 对待): Two Abstract Philosophical Concepts

Let us begin with a careful study of the use of *yin* and *yang* in the Shang and Zhou dynasties, during which the Oracle Characters (*jiaguwen* 甲骨文) and the Bronze Characters (*jinwen* 金文) record their main features.¹⁰ At that time, *yin* and *yang* did not frequently appear as a pair, and each of them had many other antonyms. As has been noticed, *yang* has a clear image in the Oracle Characters, but *yin* cannot be found.¹¹ *Yang* has a variety of forms and meanings that have no relation with *yin*. For example, *yang* means *da* 大 (bigness) in the context of *yangzong* 阳宗 (the bigger tribe), a place in the *gaoyangzuo* 高阳左, and a name in the *ziyangzi* 子阳子. In the *Jiagu Buci* 甲骨卜辞 (oracle inscriptions on tortoiseshells or animal bones), *yangri* 阳日 (sunny day) and *huiji* 晦日 (cloudy day) as correlative terms are employed for recording the weather conditions of the divination day (*zhanburi* 占卜日).¹² In comparison, *yin* has a wider variety of possible original forms. Some assume that an early form of *yin* in the Oracle Characters is  or

¹⁰ Most scholars take it for granted that the Oracle Characters are earlier than the Bronze Characters and that the former were used in the Yin and Shang dynasty 殷商时期, while the Bronze Characters appeared around the time of the Zhou dynasty. According to a renowned philology expert, Qiu Xigui 裘锡圭, the Oracle and the Bronze scripts appeared around the same time. They are stylistically different and had different applications: the former were for divination and the latter for recording historical events. Qiu even suspects that the Oracle script is a simplified form of the Bronze script. This dissertation will follow Qiu's interpretation with slight differences. Generally, the Oracle inscriptions are considered slightly earlier than the Bronze inscriptions, but they can prove and guarantee each other's correctness.

¹¹ For further discussion, see Xing Yurui 邢玉瑞, *Methodology and Theory of Huangdi Neijing* 《黄帝内经》理论与方法论, Shanxi Technological Publication 陕西科学技术出版社, 2005.

¹² There is another interpretation of *yangri* and *huiji*, namely, that they are just ways of numbering the days, months, and years. In the lunar calendar, *huiji* means the last day of a lunar month. *Yangri* refers to *zi* 子, *yin* 寅, *chen* 辰, *wu* 午, *shen* 申, and *xu* 戌 days in the Bronze Era. Both *yangri* and *huiji* belong to the *ganzhi* 干支 (heavenly stems and earthly branches) system. (for further discussion see Chen Jiujin 陈久金. (2017). Revised Opinion on the Chronicle Division of the Western Zhou Dynasty. *Journal of Guangxi University for Nationalities*. 23(1):9-23).

隹, some think that the 隹 character engraved on coins (ancient currency) is the most ancient form, and some believe that 隹 in the Bronze Characters is more accurate. Supporters of 隹 and 隹 dispute with each other (Gu, 2004). The former camp relies on the Oracle Characters; Yu Xingwu 于省吾, a renowned lexicographer and philologist in China, suggests that 隹 is a variant form of 隹 (Yu, 2010). Given that 隹 has been commonly used since the Han dynasty and its ancient form is *yin* 隹, Yu asserts that *yin* can be traced back to 隹. Considering that 隹 is a bird that is a signal of weather changes, it is opposite to *qing* 晴 (sunshine). Thus, in the Oracle Characters, *yin* is the opposite of *qing* rather than of *yang*. The earliest co-appearance of *yin* (隹) and *yang* (𠄎) is in the *Yi Bo Zi Xu Ming* 异伯子盥铭 text in the Bronze Characters: “*yin* and *yang* indicate that the army should keep moving forward without a stop.”¹³

These preliminary observations are different from the common interpretation of *yin* and *yang* as the shady and sunny sides of a hill (Raphals, 1998; Rosenlee, 2006; Wang, 2012). Scholars, like Liu Dajun 刘大钧 and Liao Mingchun 廖名春, argue that alternation of *yin* and *yang* are the *dao* of heaven (*tiandao* 天道), and that the *dao* of earth (*didao* 地道) and the *dao* of humanity (*rendao* 人道) are then embraced in the heaven principle (Liu, 2008; Liao, 2008). Although the interpretation of two sides of a hill captures the essence of this pair of concepts—changing and transforming—it fails to show how *yin* and *yang* are theorized as philosophical terms and hence how alternations of *yin* and *yang* unite the *dao* of heaven, earth, humanity, and the sixty-four hexagrams. In the *Shuogua Zhuan* 说卦传 (a chapter of the *Ten Wings*) it reads,

¹³ 其阴其阳,以征以行.

“they [the holy sages] determined the [*dao*] of heaven and called it the [*yin* and *yang*]”.¹⁴ Another important text, the *Mawangdui Yijing Manuscript* 马王堆帛书周易, expresses similar ideas. A section of the Manuscript, the *Essentials* 要篇 reads, “the Changes has the way of heaven in it, and yet you cannot use the sun, moon, stars, and planets to exhaust its names; therefore it is done with the *yin* and *yang*.”¹⁵

The most popular (mis)interpretation of *yin* and *yang* is that they are two sides of a hill. Scholars like Robin Wang believe that this gloss can be traced back to the *Shijing* 诗经 (*The Book of Odes*): “Viewing the scenery [from a] hill, looking for the light and the shade.”¹⁶ In his ancient Chinese dictionary, Xu Shen 许慎 (58?-47?) expresses a similar view, suggesting that *yin* should be darkness, the south shore of a river, and the north side of a hill. Additional textual evidence can be found in what is probably the earliest Chinese dictionary, the *Erya* 尔雅, which reads, “the south of a mountain is *yang*, and the north bank of a river is *yang*.”¹⁷ This interpretation is in line with the Bronze Characters, i.e., *yin* (𠄎) and *yang* (𠄎), which are original forms of the two words 阴阳. In addition, Xu points out that the left side of either *yin* or *yang* is, which is the original form of 𠄎 (𠄎) and 𠄎 (阴阳). Then, he claims that when people combine 𠄎 and 𠄎 together, new forms of the two words become 𠄎 and 𠄎. Xu’s successor, Duan Yucai 段玉裁, believes that “*yin-yang* 𠄎 𠄎 is the correct written form of *yin-yang* 阴阳. The

¹⁴ 立天之道曰阴与阳. Chapter I of the *Shuo Gua/Discussion of the Trigrams* (see Wilhelm and Baynes, 1950: 262). Slightly revised.

¹⁵ 易又（有）天道焉,不可以日月生（星）辰尽称也,故为之以阴阳(see Shaughnessy, 1996:242-3).

¹⁶ 既景乃冈,相其阴阳. (Wang, 2012: 24) and James Legge. 1994. *The Chinese Classics*, 5 vols. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., Vol. IV, p.488.

¹⁷ 山南为阳,水北为阳.

latter becomes popular and gradually replaces the former.”¹⁸ Further textual evidence appears in “The Great Unity of Birth to Water” 太一生水, which reads, “the spiritual of luminous further join with each other, thereby forming yin and yang 会易. Yin and yang 会易 further join with each other, thereby forming the four seasons” (Cook, 2014: 344-5).¹⁹ This example indicates that there were at least two forms—会易 and 阴阳—of the paired concepts of *yin* and *yang* before the Qin dynasty.

Diverging from the most familiar form of the two words (阴阳), there was another way of representing *yin* and *yang* (会易) in ancient times, in which *yin* and *yang* are employed to represent natural phenomena of heaven. Xu interprets *yang* 易 as brightness relating to the sun. Ma Xulun 马叙伦 further argues that 易 is the basic character of 阳 (Ma, 1985). Moreover, *yang* 易 means *kai* 开 (open, remove the shelter), which is the exact opposite of *Yin* 阴. This *yin* 阴, as was discussed previously, is the ancient form of *yin* 阴. Xu interprets this *yin* 阴 as having two meanings: (1) clouds blocking the sun (云覆日也) and (2) mist (ai 霭). Qiang Yunkai 强运开 suspects that *yin-yang*'s oppositional relation emerges from this point (Gu, 2004: 790). Thus, the basic meanings of *yin* and *yang* should be *xian* 显 (visible) and *yin* 隐 (invisible, hidden) rather than two sides of a hill. In Qiang's interpretation, this visible-invisible relation already reflects the abstract features of the *dao* of heaven and is then employed in the *dao* of earth as *yin-yang* 阴阳.

As scholars have already disclosed, *yin* and *yang* have gradually fused together as a fixed

¹⁸ [会易] 此阴阳正字也.阴阳行而会易废矣. (段玉裁《说文解字注》)

¹⁹ 神明 相補也,是以成会易.会易 相補也,是以成四时。

pair of philosophical concepts, including *yinqing* 阴晴, *yin-yang* (会易 and 阴阳), *yinqi* 阴气 (receptive vital force) and *yangqi* 阳气 (creative vital force). All these interpretations have little or no relation with human affairs. Considering that previous scholars have thoroughly discussed the relationships between *yin* and *yang*, this section restates their conclusions. *Yin* and *yang* are contradictory yet complementary, and they are engaged in unceasing cyclic movement. Additionally, according to the previous discussions, as a thinking paradigm, *yin-yang* embraces the following features: correspondences, spontaneity, side-by-side and “both-and” qualities, co-existence, dynamism, variable-sum relations, and the unity of difference and oneness. To return to the *Yijing*, *yin* and *yang* are two symbols that capture the meanings signified by the variety characters discussed above. The next part of this section will elaborate this idea.

5.2 *Yin* and *Yang* in the *Yijing*: Paired Archetypes in All Dimensions

In the *Yijing*, *yin* and *yang* have already become two abstract philosophical archetypes (images). They are the original models of Chinese paradoxical definitions, such as being is becoming and becoming is being. As two archetypal images, they fuse Wang Fuzhi’s the *dayin* and the *xiaoyin*. From the aspect of the *xiaoyin* (small pattern, which is variable), *yin* and *yang* are two balanced forces in a process of change in which one force has an intrinsic tendency to become the other. While, from the aspect of the *dayin* (big pattern, which is unchangeableness), “one *yin* and one *yang* are the *Dao*” indicates unchangeability.²⁰

In the following, I will argue against an exclusively contextualized interpretation of *yin* and *yang* by showing that contextualization captures the changeable aspect of the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm but fails to capture the unchangeable. In addition, I differentiate my reading from


²⁰ 一阴一阳之谓道.

Robin Wang's as there are more than six relations in the *Yijing*. Then, I argue that the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm as it is presented in the *Yijing* represents the unity of changeable and unchangeable, being and becoming, and oneness and difference at the ontological level.

First, *yin* and *yang* as two different archetypes are indispensable foundations of the harmonious archetypal system of the eight trigrams and sixty-four hexagrams. In the Great Commentary (*Xicizhuan* 系辞传), the creative process of the *Yijing* is described as follows:

There is in the Changes the Great Primal Beginning. This generates the two primary forces. The two primary forces generate the four images. The four images generate the eight trigrams (Wilhelm, 1990:318).²¹

This process can be symbolized as follows:



Within the Great Primal Beginning (*taiji* 太极), there is no clear dividing line between the *white part* and the *black part*. There is a small black circle inside of the white part and a small white circle inside of the black part. Although these four parts are separate from each other, they are interdependent and complete each other to form the *Taiji* diagram (*taijitu* 太极图). When -- and — are abstracted from this Great Beginning, they become a mutually inclusive dualistic pair. Within this circle, two opposite colors, black and white, are placed side-by-side, exhibiting a “both-and” logic and co-existing relation. As the two whites and blacks fuse together, there are at least two layers in this cyclic pattern. If we examine the relationship between this diagram and Wang's six forms, it is clear that the latter fits neatly into the former's process. *Yin* and *yang* are

²¹ 易有太极,是生两仪,两仪生四象,四象生八卦.

two opposite white and black parts. They contradict and complete each other to form the Great Beginning. As one small black circle exists in the white part and one small white circle resides in the black part, they are mutually inclusive and dependent in resonance. As this circle is a metaphor of unceasing movement, the black and white parts continually change places; there is no fixed position for any of them. Some may suggest that the hexagram *Qian* 乾 (☰) and the hexagram *Kun* 坤 (☷) are exceptions, as they each contains only one kind of symbol. However, *Qian* and *Kun* represent contemporary phrases in the consistent changing pattern. As was discussed before, *yin* and *yang* contain the relationship between *xian* 显 (the visible) and *yin* 隐 (the invisible). Thus, as *The Doctrine of the Mean* (*Zhongyong* 中庸) states, “nothing is more visible than the hidden.”²² The value of *yin-yang* lies in its representation of Chinese monistic cosmology in all dimensions. In other words, that there are myriad things in one universe can be abstracted as the conclusion that there are various differences within the oneness. Thus, the author (or authors) of the *Yijing* apply this spontaneous thinking to the drawing of the eight trigrams and sixty-four hexagrams.

Second, the principle behind the arrangement/order of the sixty-four hexagrams is pair-ness in the process of change and transformation (*er er xiang ou, fei fu ji bian* 二二相偶，非覆即变). This principle indicates that *yin* should exist as a unit with *yang*. In addition to Robin Wang’s six relational forms, there are another four traditional Chinese relations: *Cheng* 乘 (mounting), *Cheng* 承 (yielding), *Bi* 比 (adjacent or neighboring), and *Ying* (应 correspondence or response).²³ *Ying*, for instance, is a traditional Chinese method of divining fortunate or

²² 莫见乎隐.

²³ Further discussions can be found in *The Introduction of the Yijing* 周易概论 by Liu Dajun 刘大钧.

unfortunate situations. Within one hexagram, the six lines are divided into three pairs consisting of the first and fourth, second and fifth, and third and sixth lines. If two lines of any pair are respectively *yin* and *yang*, they are *ying*. If they are both *yin* or both *yang*, they are *buying* 不应. However, in divination, the judgment of any situation is not determined by a single rule; diviners consider other situations/relations. For example, the rightly hierarchical relation of *yin* and *yang* is the hexagram Standstill (*Pi* 否 ䷋), in which all the *yang* lines are above the *yin* lines. Even though all three paired lines are *ying*, the Judgment reads, “Standstill. Evil people do not further the perseverance of the superior man. The great departs; the small approaches” (Wilhelm, 1990: 52).²⁴ The Image suggests, “Heaven and earth do not unite: The image of standstill” (ibid: 53).²⁵ The hexagram of Peace (*Tai* 泰 ䷊) has the opposite image: “Heaven and earth unite; the image of peace” (ibid: 49). Its judgment is “Peace, the small departs, the great approaches” (ibid: 48). In these two images, ䷋ and ䷊, the *yin* lines and *yang* lines are all *ying*. By mutually changing positions, the hexagrams *Tai* and *Pi* are in a reverse relation. Such a reciprocal relation between *yin* and *yang* makes the unfortunate situation (standstill) transform into a fortunate situation (peace). Thus, *yin-yang* relations in the *Yijing* manifest pair-ness (*yin* and *yang* are always paired) and reciprocity (*liuxing* 流行, *yin* and *yang* change and transform in a non-stop cyclic movement).

Finally, the reciprocal *yin-yang* has enjoyed its longevity by self-presenting its meaning in accordance with time changes. As the *dayin* and the *xiaoyin* have shown, changeable *xiaoyin* reflects the unchangeable *dayin*, because the *dayin* itself is invisible and needs to be manifested through the visible *xiaoyin*. Similarly, various dimensions of the *yin-yang* reciprocal relation

²⁴ 否.否之匪人.不利君子贞.大往小来.

²⁵ 天地不交,否.

have been gradually revealed in the process of its self-presentation. Wang's six forms of *yin-yang* relations—contradiction, interdependence, mutual inclusion, resonance, mutual support, and change and transformation—are also included. To show how Wang's six forms are presented in the *yin-yang* reciprocal relation, I borrow Hellmut Wilhelm's interpretation as a comparison. Wilhelm proposes that there are three major methods to explain the sixty-four hexagrams in the *Yijing*. He writes,

The classical Chinese [*Yijing*] interpretation has developed several methods for the establishment of such pairs. Three of them are often considered especially helpful to an understanding of the hexagrams. The first is the [*pangtong* 旁通]; it consists of changing all six lines of a hexagram into their opposite. The second is the [*zonggua* 综卦], in which the whole hexagram is turned on its head. And the third is the [*cuogua* 错卦], in which the two trigrams of a hexagram are interchanged (Wilhelm, 1977: 108-9).

Pangtong was introduced by Yu Fan 虞翻 (164–233) during the Han dynasty, and *Zonggua* and *Cuogua* were probably first employed by Kong Yingda 孔颖达 (574–648) during the Tang dynasty (Liu, 2008). To show how one hexagram can be changed into correlative others with these methods, I will use hexagram 49 *Ge* 革 ䷰ as an example. *Ge* can be transformed into hexagram 4 *Meng* 蒙 ䷃ through *pangtong*, hexagram 50 *Ding* 鼎 ䷱ through *zonggua*, and hexagram 38 *Kui* ䷥ through *cuogua* (Wilhelm, 1977). Through these three methods, Wang's six relational forms of *yin* and *yang* are evidently presented. Thus, I hope readers can see how the *yin-yang* reciprocal relation varies itself in different contexts. Though scholars use different names to present the inter-dependent relations between *yin* and *yang*, the core idea is reciprocity.

Additionally, these diverse methods recorded in the commentaries reveal in the *Yijing* an openness to all possible paired relations. As was discussed, the *yin-yang* visible-invisible relation is also manifested here. *Ge* is a visible hexagram that has three other invisible relational hexagrams. This is because, by replacing each other in position, *yin* and *yang* in the *Yijing* exhibit a variable-sum relation. Without either of them, the dynamic harmonious system will fall apart.

yin and *yang* as a pair of archetypes in the *Yijing* exhibit its essential feature—the unity of difference as oneness. Their contradictory yet complementary relations, their unceasing cyclic movement, and their equal positions are premised on the difference between and the co-existence of *yin* and *yang*. In the *Yijing*, the relationship between *yin* and *yang* is not above-below but side-by-side, not zero-sum but variable-sum, not single-order but multiple-order. The reason that the *Yijing* can offer the basis for a context-independent interpretation of the *yin-yang* relation is because *yin* and *yang* are archetypes of all paired concepts; they are not equivalent to women and men, respectively. However, on the ontological level, with the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm, the paradox of gender equality loses its foundation—exclusive dualistic logic, which puts men and women in a zero-sum relation and essentializing both genders to fixed social norms and relations. In contrast, as two archetypes or symbols, *yin* and *yang* are equally important abstract philosophical terms with different essences. As they can move into each other's positions within the Great Beginning and the archetypical system of the sixty-four hexagrams, they fuse changeable and unchangeable, *dayin* and *xiaoyin*, and being and becoming into harmonious oneness. Thus, the statement that “one *yin* and one *yang* are the *Dao*” in the *Yijing* defends the claim that “Change: that is unchangeable” (yizhebuyiye 易者不易也) and that being is becoming on the ontological level. The *Yijing yin-yang* thinking paradigm, hence, provides a different

solution to transcending the dilemma of gender equality, namely, it suggests that gender equality should be premised on gender difference.

To sum up, this chapter supports the assertion that the *yin-yang* thinking model can be expanded as foundations for understanding modern gender issues. Under this paradigm, *yin* and *yang* are best characterized as equally important with their own distinct features. They are not bound by a fixed or hierarchical system but exist within a harmonious system. In the *Yijing*, *yin* and *yang*, as two archetypes or symbols, are open to all possible forms of paired relations (man-woman included). Thus, though *yin* and *yang* do not necessarily refer to male/female, men/women, or masculine/feminine, their reciprocal-ness, pair-ness, and variable-sum relation grounds gender relations. The *Yijing yin-yang* thinking model also offers a completely different approach to gender equality in which difference and reciprocal relations between *nan* and *nǚ* provide a basis for gender equality at the ontological level. Thus, the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking provides a unique and powerful foundation of gender equality, which can be viewed as, or at least as, new criteria to redefine and reconstruct the concept of gender equality.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE *YIJING* *YIN-YANG* THINKING PARADIGM—A CIRCULATING, CHANGEABLE, AND SELF-ACTIVATED MODEL

1. Introduction

This chapter aims to explicate the point that the *Yijing yin-yang* model can provide metaphysical ground for the argument—gender equality should be premised on gender difference. In particular, how this *yin-yang* model operates when it encounters feminist issues. In the following, I argue that the *Yijing yin-yang* model is a circulating, changeable, and self-activated one, which includes twofold *yin-yang dao*: broad-sense and narrow-sense. However, when previous scholars applying the *yin-yang* model emerged from the *Yijing* to resolve modern gender problems, neither the naturalistic nor the humanistic approaches has fully developed and uncovered its meaning. This is because they both mainly rely on the narrow-sense *yin-yang dao* and hence ignore the “unchangeable” principles behind the changeable *yin-yang* relations, and further neglect the circulating relation between the abstract and the concrete. On basis of analyzing their drawbacks, I argue an in-between-ness way. It means, through different types of *resonance*, humanistic and naturalistic approaches are involved in a circulated, interdependent, and changeable model. This dynamic model sheds lights on the idea that why *yin* and *yang* are full of rich diverse properties but these two cluster of concepts are still different from each other and should be equally treated, which also indicates that the dilemma of gender equality can be resolved on the symbolically metaphysical level.

2. Twofold *Yijing Yin-Yang Dao*: Narrow-Sense and Broad-Sense

The *yin-yang* theory has been subject to different interpretations. If traced back in history, Dong

Zhongshu 董仲舒 (176-104 BCE) of Han dynasty was probably the first scholar who directly connected the *yin-yang* relation to gender identities. In *Chunqiu Fanlu* 春秋繁露, Dong writes, “the husband is *yang* even if he is from a humble family, and the wife is *yin* even if she is from a noble family” (Bk. 11, section 43; Li, 2000: 5).¹ Dong’s interpretation of *yin-yang* provides a foundation for the well-known sexist oppressive belief that men are superior and women are inferior (*nan zun nü bei* 男尊女卑, hereafter *NZNB*).

Robin R. Wang closely analyzes Dong’s theory and explains its logic. She argues that Dong changes the *yin-yang* relation from one of harmony (*he^a* 和) to one of unity (*he^b* 合).² She then draws a distinction between *he^a* and *he^b*. *He^a* is “built on cultivating difference or respecting otherness” and is a nonhierarchical fluid whole that “is a central goal of all personal, social, and political relationships” (Wang, 2005: 215). In contrast, *He^b* calls for order (*xu* 序), which can be achieved either through the sacrifice of one side or by making one side subordinate to the other. Thus, *he^b* places the myriad things in fixed hierarchical positions, like heaven above human or men over women. In addition, Dong redefines *yin* and *yang* such that *yang* refers to human nature (*xing* 性) and benevolence (*ren* 仁) and *yin* to emotion (*qing* 情) and greed (*tan* 贪) (Wang, 2005: 210). Thus, *yang* as a virtue is morally superior to *yin*. Wang then concludes, “as the result of Dong’s work, *yin-yang* theory lost many of its earlier meanings ... *Yin-yang* concepts served to validate the subordination of women” (Wang, 2005: 209).

I agree with Wang’s argument, as in the previous chapter I have shown that there are richly diverse meanings and relations between *yin* and *yang*. They should not be reduced to only

¹ 丈夫虽贱皆为阳,妇人虽贵皆为阴. Quoted from Chenyang Li (2000) p. 4.

² Here, I employ *He^a* to refer to 和 and *He^b* to refer to 合.

one hierarchical relation (i.e., men play dominant role). Dong's theory cannot account for the fact that some rulers have been women. Female rulers such as Empress *Lǚ* 吕后 would be both *yin* and *yang* at the same time.

There are two ways out this contradiction. First, Empress *Lǚ* is neither purely *yin* nor purely *yang*: it is wrong to exclude *yang* from women's character. If one agrees with this solution, one might commit to the idea that *yin* and *yang* have their essential or unchangeable features (either functions or properties). Even though they are in a dynamic relationship, something intrinsically cannot be changed. However, this solution might be challenged by feminists, because the latter will criticize that such an understanding of *yin* and *yang* are essentially women/feminine/femininity and men/masculine/masculinity respectively. One may respond that the first solution is premised on Dong's theory, where he applies *yin-yang* relation to gender relation. If this solution cannot satisfy feminists, it reversely supports my argument that *yin-yang* relation is not merely a gender relation. If so, it will not betray either essentialist feminist theories or the anti-essentialist feminist supports.

Second, *yin* and *yang* are used to describe properties and functions respectively. In line with this way: on the one hand, *yin* should be a cluster concept that includes women, feminine, and femininity, which make it different from another cluster concept *yang*; on the other hand, *yin* and *yang* are connected with functions, where lord and minister are functions of a state. If one agrees with this reading, one might adopt to the idea that both *yin* and *yang* can vary their meanings in accordance with circumstance or contexts. But, feminists might challenge this solution, too. Besides the essential problems being put forth previously, they might also question: what the relationship between properties and functions is. Further, they may also ask for the criteria for such interpretations. These questions will make this solution untenable; because it

takes *yin-yang* to be rightly and necessarily connected with gender identities.

If new interpretations cannot be formed, similar faults might reappear in the academia. For example, some scholars have pointed out that Confucian model male characters (e.g., gentlemen) embrace qualities of *wen* 文 (properties of femininity) and *wu* 武 (properties of masculinity) at the same time.³ They argue that this is evidence to prove that excluding *yin* from men's character is incorrect. For the sake of argument, I agree with their interpretation that each man and each woman have both *yin* features and *yang* features. I disagree with them and argue that *yin-yang* relation should be interpreted beyond concrete gender relations. This is why I choose the *Yijing* as textual evidence for making my case persuasive.

Now I have discussed the (mis)interpretation of connecting *yin* and *yang* to gender identities, I need to answer the question—how does the *yin-yang* model emerged from the ancient *Yijing* text (that has no necessary relation with gender identities) be applied to resolve modern gender problems? Before I answer this question, I need to distinguish two dimensions of the *dao* of *yin-yang* in the *Yijing*. As some scholars have argued that in the *Yijing* the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm emerges from natural phenomenon and has little or no relation with human affairs. In this reading, a typical assumption is that the *dao* of humanity is included in and duplicates the *dao* of heaven. In the *Shuogua Zhuan* 说卦传, it reads,

In ancient times the holy sages made the [*Yijing*] thus: Their purpose was to follow the order of their nature and of fate. Therefore, *they determined the [dao] of heaven and called it the [yin] and the [yang]*. They determined the [*dao*] of earth and called it the yielding and the firm. They determined the [*dao*] of [human] and called it [benevolence]

³ More discussions see: Louie, Kam. 2002. *Theorising Chinese Masculinity Society and Gender in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

and [rightness] (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 264 italic edited).⁴

This quotation indicates that the *dao* of *yin-yang* is equivalent to the *dao* of heaven, which is another name for *yin-yang* cosmology in the *Yijing* milieu. Yu Fan 虞翻 (164-233) believes that *yin-yang* represents the invisible-visible (*yinxian* 隐显) aspects of the *dao* of heaven. *Yin* and *yang* are exclusive co-existing entities, like daytime and nighttime within a day. They are in a contrary yet complementary cyclic relation; such relations are the fundamental feature of cosmology. I call this the narrow-sense *yin-yang dao*, in which *yin* and *yang* exclude each other as the visible order of cosmos. In the narrow sense *yin-yang* acquires concrete forms, as in Wang Fuzhi's *xiaoyin*.

However, Cheng Yi 程颐 (1033-1107) disagrees with this orientation. He argues that *yin* and *yang* are two kinds of *qi*; what is above *qi* is the *dao*.⁵ Thus, Cheng believes that the *dao* of *yin-yang* should be ontological forms, orders, or principles. His claim has its roots in the *Xici*, which reads, “one *yin* and one *yang* are the *dao*”.⁶ Here, *yin* and *yang* have transcended their state as two kinds of *qi* and have become metaphysical. For instance, the *Xici* reads,

When in early antiquity [Bao Xi Shi] ruled the world, he looked upward and contemplated the images in the heavens; he looked downward and contemplated the patterns on earth. He contemplated the markings of birds and beasts and the adaptations to the regions. He proceeded directly from himself and indirectly from objects. Thus he invented the eight trigrams in order to enter into connection with the virtues of the light of the gods and to regulate the conditions of all beings (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 328-

⁴ 昔者圣人之作《易》也，将以顺性命之理，是以立天之道曰阴与阳，立地之道曰柔与刚，立人之道曰仁与义。兼三才而两之，故《易》六画而成卦。分阴分阳，迭用柔刚，故《易》六位而成章。

⁵ 阴阳气也，阴阳者道也。

⁶ 一阴一阳之谓道。

329).⁷

This excerpt indicates that *yin-yang*, the eight trigrams, and the sixty-four hexagrams are abstractions of heaven, earth, human beings, and the myriad things. In turn, the *dao* of *yin-yang* can be manifested in the *dao* of heaven, the *dao* of earth, or the *dao* of humanity. This *dao* should be characterized as metaphysical (what is above physical form 形而上者) rather than physical. I call this understanding of *yin* and *yang* as mutually inclusive in an invisible unity the broad-sense *yin-yang dao*. In this sense, *yin-yang* is beyond concrete forms, as in Wang Fuzhi's *dayin*.

3. Applying Yin-Yang Model to Gender Problems: Naturalistic and Humanistic Approaches

This section aims to show how previous scholars have used the *Yijing yin-yang* model to intervene in modern gender problems. There are two different approaches: the *naturalistic* and the *humanistic*. The *naturalistic* approach takes *yin-yang* as a cosmological principle rooted in nature; its application to gender is secondary. The *humanistic* approach takes *yin-yang* as primarily gendered concept, and expand them to the cosmos.

Some scholars espouse the *naturalistic* approach. Alison H. Black, for example, has pointed out that “we may legitimately pursue the possibility that some of the basic concerns of Chinese metaphysics and cosmology transcend the question of gender” (Black, 1986: 184). By investigating the first two hexagrams in the *Yijing*, i.e., *Qian* 乾 and *Kun* 坤 (representing *yang* and *yin*, respectively), Black finds that the concepts of masculinity and femininity do not fit into the *yin-yang* binary, primarily because gendered relations cannot emerge from gender-neutral

⁷ 古者包牺氏之王天下也，仰则观象于天，俯则观法于地，观鸟兽之文，与地之宜，近取诸身，远取诸物，于是始作八卦，以通神明之德，以类万物之情。

symbols (the sixty-four hexagrams). She makes her case by citing several paragraphs from the *Xici* 系辞 (i.e., the Great Treatise), such as, “[*qian*] knows the great beginning, [*kun*] brings things to completion”.⁸ She argues that the connections between *qian* and *kun* are gender-free polarities, like nature and culture. To support her argument, she employs the *Record of the Ritual* (*Liji* 礼记) and other early texts to prove that heaven and earth are characterized as benevolence (*ren* 仁) and rightness (*yi* 义), respectively, reversing the common understanding that rightness (rationality/*yang*) is associated with heaven and benevolence (emotion/*yin*) with earth. Her reading suggests that gender has no fixed relation with *yin-yang* cosmology. Thus, Black concludes that *yin* and *yang* are two basic polarities within ancient Chinese dialectic thinking and are inadequate tools for defining gender relations.

Following Black, Lisa Raphals revisits the use of *yin-yang* in the *Yijing* and other early texts. She describes three major relations between *yin* and *yang*, namely, complementary, oppositional, and hierarchical. She argues that, before the third century, “*yin-yang* polarities are mostly cyclic and relatively nonhierarchical. Overall, *yin* and *yang* are not used in analogy with either heaven-earth or gender based polarities” (Raphals, 1998: 142). She believes that it was not until Dong Zhongshu in the Han dynasty that the *yin-yang* concept became embedded in the hierarchical heaven-earth relation. She wishes to shatter the traditional notion that the whole of Chinese philosophy is unfriendly to women. However, there is a kind of *yin-yang* relation in the *Yijing* indicates nonhierarchical and is not related to gender. Lisa Lee Rosenlee and Brook Ziporyn go further, asserting that hierarchical *yin-yang*, heaven-earth, and husband-wife relations are independent of gender division (Rosenlee, 2006; Ziporyn 2015). They respectively argue that

⁸ 乾知大始，坤作成物。

the construction of hierarchical *yin-yang* relations was imposed by emperors. The aim of a hierarchical social system was to preserve political authority and stability. These scholars assert that early Chinese *yin-yang* thinking is about metaphysics, politics, and cosmology rather than gender.

However, some scholars take the opposite position. For example, Jinhua Jia disagrees with the *naturalistic* interpretation, arguing that “the Chinese cosmology, as seen in the [*Yijing*], does not transcend gender; on the contrary, it is gendered” (Jia, 2016: 281). Based on the *Yijing* and its classical commentaries, Jia asserts that most scholars have paid too much attention to the first two hexagrams to the neglect of the others, like *Xian* 咸 (䷞). Thus, they ignore human affairs (*renshi* 人事) in the *Yijing*, which are the main theme of *xiajing* 下经 from hexagrams *Xian* to *Weiji* 未济.⁹ Jia’s investigation of *Xian* and its historical commentaries reveals that the theme of this hexagram is the husband-wife resonance (*ganying* 感应), which is “the core concept of Chinese correlative thinking and cosmology” (Jia, 2016: 286). In reading the *yin-yang* binaries we should pay more attention to complementarity rather than contradiction (Wilhelm, 1977; Graham, 1989; Hall and Ames, 1995; Jia 2016). Jia cites two important commentaries on *Xian* to support the view that the husband-wife relation is the starting point of all human relations, including the renowned five cardinal relations (*wulun* 五伦).¹⁰

The *Xian* hexagram in the [*Yijing*] show[s] the relation between husband and wife. The

⁹ Jia points out that “the transmitted texts of *the Classic of Changes* is divided into two parts (‘*Shangjing*’ 上经 and ‘*Xiajing*’ 下经), the first starting with the Qian and Kun hexagrams and the second with the Xian and Heng. The Classical commentaries explain the Qian and Kun as symbolizing heaven and earth, and the first part as illuminating heaven’s way (*tiandao* 天道); they further explain Xian and Heng as symbolizing the relation of husband and wife and the second part as elaborating human matters (*renshi* 人事) (*Zhouyi Zhengyi*, 9.393a-399a) (Jia, 2016:284).

¹⁰ The five cardinal relationships (*wulun* 五伦) are ruler and minister (*junchen* 君臣), father and son (*fuzi* 父子), husband and wife (*fufu* 夫妇), among siblings (*xiongdidi* 兄弟), and among friends (*pengyou* 朋友).

way of the relation between husband and wife cannot be incorrect, for it is the root for the relations between [ruler] and minister, and father and son (*Xunzi jijie*: 495).

易之咸,见夫妇.夫妇之道,不可不正也,君臣父子之本也.

After there are [men] and [women], there are husband[s] and [wives]. After there are husband[s] and [wives], there are father and son. After there are father and son, there are [rulers] and minister[s]. After there are [rulers] and minister[s], there are superior and inferior (*Zhouyi Zhengyi*: 9.396a) (Jia, 2016: 287).

有男女然后有夫妇,有夫妇然后有父子,有父子然后有君臣,有君臣然后有上下.

She then argues that the husband-wife relation is the foundation of cosmological modes. Though she admits that the *dao* of humanity (*rendao* 人道) is included in the *dao* of heaven and earth (*tiandi zhi dao* 天地之道), Jia gives four analogies to prove that cosmological modes emerged from the husband-wife resonance, not the opposite: (1) the physical-emotional resonance of the husband-wife generates the cosmological-metaphysical resonance of *yin-yang*, (2) the fertility of husband-wife indicates that heaven-earth gives birth to the myriad things, (3) the sages' empathy for others is based on the husband-wife emotional resonance, and (4) more broadly, the husband-wife resonance grounds the myriad things' resonance with each other. Jia further argues that the *dao* of heaven and earth is based on the resonance of *yinqi* 阴气 and *yangqi* 阳气; thus, heaven/*yang* and earth/*yin* are an analogy of the husband-wife resonance. Through this explication, Jia reaches the conclusion that “gender transcends the empirical familial and social relationality to become an ontological category for the generation, resonance, cooperation, and continuation of the myriad things in the cosmos” (Jia, 2016: 290). Zhang Xianglong 张祥龙 agrees that philosophy in the West is characterized as gender-neutral, while Chinese philosophy is gendered (Zhang, 2002: 1-3). Zhang believes that the ancient Greek origins, like water, fire, or

spirit, are sexless, because philosophers care most about substances. While, *yin-yang* in the *Yijing* symbolize the binary genders of women-men, feminine-masculine, and femininity and masculinity.

The debates between the *naturalistic* and the *humanistic* approaches are not unfamiliar to the Chinese, as they have deep historical roots in Chinese history. The *Yijing* has two parts, i.e., the earliest texts (the sixty-four hexagrams, judgment texts, and line statements) and the later canonical commentaries (the *Ten Wings*) (Smith, 2012; Redmond and Hon, 2014; Minford, 2015; Redmond, 2017). While the former focuses on nature, the latter emphasizes human affairs. Furthermore, there are two systems within this book—symbol and text. Liu Dajun 刘大钧 states that there are two layers of meaning in the *Yijing*—the ancient meaning (*guyi* 古义) and the present meaning (*jinyi* 今义), with the ancient emphasizing *yin-yang* alternations and their predictions of calamities and strange phenomena (*yinyang zaiyi* 阴阳灾异) and the present emphasizing human virtues (Liu, 2002). However, the ancient meaning and the present meaning had gradually fused together before the Han dynasty, making it difficult to distinguish nature from humanity subsequently. In the *Mawangdui Yijing Manuscript* 马王堆帛书易经, it reads,

The Master [Confucius] said: “as for the [*Yijing*], I do indeed put its prayers and divinations last, only observing its virtue and propriety. Intuiting the commendations to reach the number, and understanding the number to reach virtues” (The Essentials 要) (Shaughnessy, 1996: 241).

易,我后其祝卜矣,我观其德义耳也.幽赞而达乎数,明数而达乎德.

Confucius and his successors changed the nature of the *Yijing* from being a book about divinations, superstitions, and the cosmos to a book about virtue, humanity, and self-cultivation (Zhu, 2009; Gao 2010; Smith, 2012; Minford, 2015). Similarly, Richard J. Smith observes that

during the 4th-3rd centuries BCE, the most important philosophical issue was the harmonization of human activity with “the natural patterns of changes in the universe” (Smith, 2012: 49). Consistent with this preoccupation, the *Yijing* also explores how to integrate *yin-yang* cosmology with human affairs (gender included). As “a correlation of the situations of life in all strata, personal and collective, and in all dimensions,” the *Yijing* had a significant influence on later scholarship (Dong’s included) (Wilhelm, 1977: 3). In the *Summary List of Four Treasures of Emperor* (*siku quanshu zongmu tiyao* 四库全书总目提要), it states,

The *Yijing* is a book helping people to understand the *dao* of heaven and to know human matters. The stories recorded in the *Zuozhuan* 左传 are the heritage of ancient divination. The Han Confucian are fond of using image and number (*xiangshu* 象数), which is different from the ancient usage. Jing Fang 京房 and Jiao Xun 焦循 use geomantic omen (*kanyu* 堪輿), while Chen Tuan 陈抟 and Shao Yong 邵雍 use fatalism (*zaohua* 造化). They made the *Yijing* inaccessible for common people in Han dynasty. Later, Wang Bi 王弼 transforms the use of image and number with Laozi and Zhuangzi’s theory, he creates the school of meaning and principle (*yili* 义理) in contrast to the school of image and number. Then, Hu Yuan 胡瑗 and Cheng Yi 程颐 articulate the pattern of heaven (*tianli* 天理). Li Guang 李光 and Yang Wanli 杨万里 employ the historical occurrences to interpret the *Yijing*. To sum up, there are two schools (*liangpai* 两派) and six sects (*liuzong* 六宗) within the historical interpretations of the *Yijing*, which quarrel with each other.

故《易》之为书，推天道以明人事者也。《左传》所记诸占，盖犹太卜之遗法。汉儒言象数，去古未远也。一变而为京、焦，入于襍祥，再变而为陈、邵，务穷

造化，《易》遂不切于民用。王弼尽黜象数，说以老、庄。一变而胡瑗、程子，始阐明儒理，再变而李光、杨万里，又参证史事，《易》遂日启其论端。此两派六宗，已互相攻驳。

This comment was made in the Qing dynasty and summarizes the historical development of *Yijing* studies. Though this is not a complete outline, this summary provides fertile ground for the *naturalistic* and the *humanistic* interpretations. In other words, the two schools, the six sects, and even the contemporary *naturalistic* and *humanistic* interpretations have their roots in this all-inclusive *yin-yang* system. Thus, the *Yijing yin-yang* model should not be restricted in the gender relations only; it has something beyond yet can still provide solutions to gender problems. The next part will argue a in-between-ness way, which aims to show through three kinds of resonance, humanistic and naturalistic approaches are involved in a circulating, changeable, and self-activated model.

4. A Third Approach: In-Between-Ness Way

This section argues that neither the *naturalistic* nor the *humanistic* interpretation hit the whole target of the *Yijing*, which emphasizes an inclusive or indivisible nature-humanity relation, which I call it the in-between-ness way. The naturalistic interpretation assumes that there is a pre-set order that provides forms and governs the whole universe. Accordingly, the *Yijing* is significant because it records changeable phenomenon, forms, patterns, and rules of nature. Scholars like Mark Edward Lewis and Michael Puett agree, noting that sages (*shengren* 圣人) in the *Xici* duplicate natural law and apply it to human affairs (Lewis, 1999; Puett, 2001). The humanists argue that *yin-yang* cosmology is gendered, as it imitates the resonance between husband and wife. Wing-Tsit Chan seems to be aligned with the humanistic approach when he writes, “in certain respects, the activity takes the form of cycles, as in the Yin Yang School. But the far

more important aspect of the interaction of *yin* and *yang* is its progressive direction leading to the development of society, morality, and civilization” (Chan, 1963: 263).

I argue that both approaches are too quick to reach their conclusions. I agree that *yin* and *yang* indeed, as two kinds of *qi* or as representatives of earth and heaven, are linked to nature, but this nature-centered orientation ignores humans’ efforts in the formative process of the cosmos. I also agree that the husband-wife resonance is important in the *yin-yang* thinking paradigm; however, I disagree that this human-centered orientation proves that human resonance is the original form for other resonances. I argued that, in the *Yijing yin-yang* thinking, nature and humanity are interfused, interrelated, and interconnected as an inclusive unity. Conflicts between the *naturalistic* and *humanistic* interpretations arise from their reliance on *narrow-sense yin-yang dao*. The *Yijing* emphasizes the *broad sense*, where the *dao* of *yin-yang* is an all-inclusive ontological system.

Before I introduce the three types of resonance within broad-sense *yin-yang dao* and how this model operates, I will present why the *narrow sense* interpretation causes problems in gender studies. As has been discussed, the foundations of mainstream feminist gender studies and feminism lie in an essentializing thinking mode, which make scholars choose one of them. They should either choose that gender relation duplicates *tiandao*, or that *tiandao* results from the gender relationship. This thinking model asks for priorities and orders between two or more different entities or things. Because they believe that there should be something pre-determine cosmic rules. If so, they can only find out or uncover the *xiaoyin* that presents in the phenomenon, but cannot disclose the *dayin* that stands behind the situations. Thus, they place naturalistic and humanistic, men and women, East and West in a hostile relationship. One should rightly dominate the other, at least should rightly be the root cause. Feminists have reflected the

problem of such thinking paradigm, and uncovered the logic behind it (e.g., the exclusive dualistic logic). They believe that this is because scholars cannot jump out of conventions or social gender norms that are set by men. If feminists keep using these so-called justice, equality, or rationality to construct their feminist theories, they might unconsciously be trapped in the patriarchal system. As has been shown in Chapter One, scholars like Carol Gillian or Judith Butler are challenging the conventional understanding of the concepts of sex, gender, women, ethics, and others. Their aim is to create new criteria for women to follow. My discussion is in line with them. Even though I use the term of gender equality, where the concept of equality was put forth by liberal philosophers and originally not had an eye on gender issues, my aim is to reconstruct the criteria of this concept. Diverging from Susan Okin, who has applied a liberal principle of equality to spousal relations asking husbands and wives to do the same amount of unpaid housework, the concept of gender equality is innovated in my reading. The following will introduce how the in-between-ness model operates that can combine naturalistic and humanistic into a harmonious one.

5. How the *Yijing* Yin-Yang Model Operates

In this section, I will show how the *broad-sense yin-yang dao* integrates sex and gender, nature and culture, ontological symbols and cosmological meanings in a circulating, changeable, and self-activated way. First and foremost, I will show how sages in the *Yijing* transform human affairs (gender included) into ontological symbols. Here, “symbol” is used in the broad sense and includes language. For example, in the earliest texts of the *Yijing*, and in the judgement texts (*guaci* 卦辞) and line statements (*yaoci* 爻辞) in particular, the following phrase appears: “it furthers one to invest [in] feudatories” (*lijianhou* 利建侯). This phrase appears three times, i.e., in the judgement texts for the hexagrams *Zhun* 屯 (䷂) and *Yu* 豫 (䷏) and in the line statements

for the bottom line of *Zhun*. In divination, this judgement indicates that the questioner will become a lord, emperor, or ruler in the future. Based on the records of *Zuozhuan* 左传 (B 4.1, B10.7) and *Guoyu* 国语 (*jinyu zhong* 晋语中), Bi Wan 毕万, the Lord of Wei 卫襄公, and Chong'er 重耳 they were presented with this phrase in divination even though the predictions occur in different times and places. It has turned out that these predictions were accurate. Hellmut Wilhelm believes that these historical occurrences are more reliable than the symbols/images in *Shuogua Zhuan*. Thus, he concludes that the sixty-four hexagrams are “alive in the human,” and hence, historical human events (recorded in the *Yijing*) have become archetypes (Wilhelm: 1977: 64-66). In this reading, *Yijing*'s symbols have acquired the status of universality beyond individual events. Also, it can transcend the limitation of time and reappear throughout the history.

Gu Mingdong 顾明栋 may disagree with this conclusion, as he believes that the *Yijing* is “an open hermeneutic with infinite possibilities of interpretation” because of its “unique structure and principle of signification” (Gu, 2005; Nelson, 2016: 281). On the one hand, his claim is correct, since there are infinite interpretations and applications of the earliest texts; on the other hand, his claim is incorrect, as he fails to realize that these *yin-yang* symbols also retain their basic meanings.

In the *Yijing*, the longevity of the changeable *yin-yang* relation is achieved through resonance. For example, such a relation can be seen in the relationship between husband and wife. There are three hexagrams mentioning wives (married, *qi* 妻) and eight hexagrams about husbands (*fu* 夫). The first appearance of a husband-wife pair is in the hexagram *Xiaoxu* 小畜 (䷈), where it reads, “[husband] and wife roll their eyes [to each other]” (*fuqi fanmu* 夫妻反目) (ibid: 42). Instead of resonance, the husband and wife here are in conflict. Moreover, some of the

archetypes of the husband-wife relation in the earliest texts are different from Jia's description. The hexagrams *Meng* 蒙 (䷃), *Bi* 比 (䷇), *Sui* 随 (䷐), and *Kui* 睽 (䷥) mention the husband only, and *Kun* 困 (䷮) mentions the wife only. *Heng* reads, "good fortune for a [wife], misfortune for a [husband]" (ibid: 128).¹¹ Two hexagrams, *Daguo* 大过 (䷛) and *Jian* 渐 (䷴), also fail to exhibit the husband-wife resonance. The hexagram Jia values most, *Xian*, aims to express the idea that "the masculine subordinates itself to the feminine" (*nan xia nv* 男下女) (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 541). The commentary further reads,

Heaven and earth [resonant] each other, and all things take shape and come into being.

The holy [sage resonates] the hearts [with common people], and the world attains peace and rest. If we [observe such resonance], we can know the nature of heaven and earth and all beings (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 541modified).¹²

As a universal phenomenon, resonance is not unique to the husband-wife relation; it also exists in relations between all things in the world. As Jia summarized, causality is not applicable to resonance. In summary, I agree with Jia that resonance is the core of correlative thinking (Jia, 2016: 286).

As Li Wei 李巍 has noticed, since the Warring States period, resonance has been employed to describe sounds or vital force (*qi* 气), for instance, "things that accord in tone vibrate together. Things that have affinity in their inmost nature seek one another" (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 382; Li, 2017).¹³ Li studies early Chinese rational thinking via resonances. He believes that there are three kinds of ancient rationality: humanity, cosmology,

¹¹ 妇人吉,夫子凶.

¹² 天地感而万物化生,圣人感人心而天下和平,观其所感,而天地万物之情可见矣.

¹³ 同声相应,同气相求.

and a interfused way between humanity and cosmology (Li, 2017: 51). He classifies resonance in the *Yijing* as cosmological rationality only. Enlightened by his work, I argue that in the earliest texts of the *Yijing*, human affairs (*renshi* 人事) have already transcended their historical limitations and maintained their longevity in interactive relations between naturalism and humanism.

Passive Resonance

Resonance in ancient texts can be seen in three types. The first type is *passive resonance*; it means that one thing is stimulated by another and is forced to respond. For instance, the *Yijing* states *Kun* “receives the heavenly with devotion” (ibid:386).¹⁴ Even though *Kun* gives birth to the myriad things, when it encounters the heavenly, it is required to follow the *dao* of heaven. A similar phenomenon appears in heaven-human relations. For example, the *Shiji* 史记 relates that a woman by the name of Jiang 姜 conceived Hou Ji 后稷, the ancestor of Zhou, through resonance when she stepped into a giant footprint (probably a symbol of heavenly power) (*Zhou Benji* 周本纪). Similar marvelous stories can be found in the *Liezi* 列子, such as tales of wives capable of self-fertilization.¹⁵ Under the logic that the principle of heaven governs all things, human nature and fate are pre-established by the *dao* of heaven. Thus, human beings have no freedom; the only action they can take is to “follow the order of their nature and of fate” (ibid: 264).¹⁶ This idea is in line with statements in the *Xici*, such as, “heaven creates divine things; the holy sage takes them as models” (ibid: 320).¹⁷ The *naturalistic* interpretation treats “divine things” (*shenwu* 神物) as natural law and heaven as a natural god. Naturalists presume that the

¹⁴ 顺成天.

¹⁵ 不夫而孕.

¹⁶ 顺性命之理.

¹⁷ 天生神物，圣人则之.

dao of heaven is the fundamental principle for everything, and that sages follow holistic cosmological principles and apply them to human affairs. In this respect, the *naturalistic* trend has its roots in the *Yijing*.

Active Resonance

The second type is *active resonance*, it means one thing is self-motivated to feel other things and take initiatives to respond. For instance, the hexagram *Meng* 蒙 states, “it is not I who seeks the young fool; the young fool seeks me” (ibid: 20).¹⁸ This implies a thirst for knowledge arising from the young fool’s own eagerness and desire rather than the teacher (*wo*) forcing him or her to learn. Similar resonance can be observed in human-nature relations. For instance, “the [gentlemen] fosters his character and labors at his task, in order to do everything at the right time” (ibid: 381).¹⁹ This cultivation of virtues is not externally imposed but emerges from self-motivation. This idea is summarized in the hexagram *Jin* 晋 (䷢), which indicates that the gentlemen “brightens his [or her] bright virtue”.²⁰ The *humanistic* interpretation is consistent with *active resonance*, arguing that sages motivate themselves to feel and respond to nature and the myriad things. Without human beings, none of the cosmic principles can be understood. From such a view developed Song Confucian (*songru* 宋儒) philosophy that human beings are the heart of heaven and earth (*tiandi zhi xin* 天地之心).

Interactive Resonance

The third type is *interactive resonance*. In this form, feelings and responses occurring between two different things at the same time. Different elements co-exist and stimulate and respond to

¹⁸ 匪我求童蒙,童蒙求我.

¹⁹ 君子进德修业,欲及时也.

²⁰ 自昭明德.

one another. For example, music produced by the Chinese zither relies on interactions between the twenty-one strings. In the *Yijing*, this resonance is expressed more philosophically in phrases such as, “heaven and earth unite: the image of peace” (*tiandi jiaotai* 天地交泰) and “no going not followed by a return” (*wu wang bu fu* 无往不复) (ibid: 442-444). *Interactive resonance* not only applies to the heaven-earth relation but also to human affairs. *Yin* and *yang* are unified in virtue (*yin yang he de* 阴阳合德). The greatest virtue of heaven-earth is generativeness (*sheng* 生).²¹ If people observe their own *sheng*, they will settle down in the *dao*.²² Thus, the *dao* of *yin-yang*, virtue, generation, and humanity is cyclical, liked the model presented by Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961). Jung believes that the logic behind those astonishing coincidences (examples of Bi Wan, Lord of Wei, and Chong'er that are recorded in the *Zuozhuan* and *Guoyu*) is synchronicity, which means that different things “appear all in the same moment and in the same place” (Bwillhelm/Baynes, 1977: xxiv). Jung further compares synchronicity with causality. He believes that causality calls for order and sequence, like $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ (A causes B and B causes C). Any occurrence has an ultimate cause (as in, I am a Ph.D. candidate because I got an offer; I got an offer because I applied; and I applied because of other reasons). Thus, all things can be placed in a linear relation. Synchronicity, however, consists in mutually inclusive cyclic relations, like $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A$, $B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A \rightarrow B$, or $C \rightarrow A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$. An example of such cyclic relations is the progress of the four seasons: spring, summer, autumn, and winter. Any season can succeed to the other three. Although Jung's attitude toward women is debatable, his interpretation of the *Yijing* echoes the *broad-sense yin-yang dao*. The *interactive resonance* is a more complicated form than

²¹ 天地之大德曰生.

²² 观我生，知进退，未失道

the above two types. It is not a static principle but a process. This process rests on the harmonization of heaven, earth, humanity, and the myriad things (the theme of that time).

To sum up, my task in this chapter is to uncover the inner logic and deep connections inside of the *Yijing yin-yang* model. Through the above argumentations, I have presented that *yin-yang* model is beyond the scope of gender identities. They have richly diverse meaning, and hence have formed a unique thinking paradigm. This dynamic model indicates that two clusters of concepts (i.e., *yin* and *yang* respectively) have great possibilities to be different from each other but also call for equal treatment. Without one, the other will lose its meaning of existence. This model, like the exclusive dualistic model, views men and women as two relevant concepts. However, the *Yijing yin-yang* model does not treat men as the obstacle for women's liberty. Rather, it treats men as equally important human beings as women. In line with this, I argue that sexist oppressions to some extent not merely come from patriarchal system, but also come from the criteria of reevaluating women and gender relations. Feminists have tried their best to create some new gender norms, but for some reason, they cannot unify their stance. This *Yijing yin-yang* model tries to show a different perspective. On the metaphysical level, *yin* and *yang* are two cluster of concepts (both have rich diverse properties), the reason that they can keep unceasing movement lies in that they have become prototypes in the circulating, changeable, and self-activated model. Through three different types of resonances, *yin* and *yang* become the basic elements to motive this system operating by itself. Thus, this self-motivated and fluid system brings some fresh air to resolve the dilemma of gender equality, at least on the metaphysical level. *Yin* and *yang*'s equal important positions should be premised on *yin* and *yang* play different roles, occupy different properties, and represent different symbols.

CHAPTER FIVE: A GENDER HARMONY FOR GENDER EQUALITY

1. Introduction

This chapter argues that the *Yijing yin-yang* philosophy provides a model for a harmonious gender relation between men and women. Such a harmonious gender relation is also an innovation of the criteria of gender equality in the contemporary time. Given that different people have different understandings and interpretations of the concept of *he*^a 和 (harmony) in gender relations, I should analyze previous principle of harmony and present my stance. In Chapter One, I have presented that some scholars believe the idea that women's subordination to men has its roots in the culture of harmony. This is a misinterpretation of harmony. As Chenyang Li has argued, such misunderstandings are rooted in the belief that harmony is equivalent to sameness. I agree with Li in this point, but disagree with him that harmony should happen (at least, most of the time should happen) among heterogeneous things. Instead, I argue that *he*^a should not be a fixed or static status with some pre-determined rules; it should be a process of harmonization, where heterogenization and homogenization should work together. My argument is based on an analysis of Jiyuan Yu's structural reading, Chenyang Li's deep reading, and Chun-ying Cheng's holistic reading of harmony. They all try to show readers a type of harmony, which calls for respecting to difference. In this regard, I propose that the ideal gender equality in Chinese milieu should be settled in the idea of gender harmony. Gender harmony means an interdependent relation where by its core idea of "letting each get its due" (*ge de qi suo* 各得其所) grounds a nonhierarchical, balanced, and fluid relation between genders. Thus, feminist gender studies can escape from the crisis of losing their research target and answer the

question—without essence, how women as a concept can still retain its integrity as a group.

2. *He*^a 和: Harmonization of Heterogenization and Homogenization

In the previous chapter, I discussed how the broad-sense *yin-yang dao* operates, where such a *yin-yang* model indicates how the entire universe is knit together in interconnected and interrelated wholeness, just as *he*^a integrates different elements into a nonhierarchical, fluid system. Regarding this, I argue that *he*^a becomes the ideal state for gender relations. However, some scholars have questioned the usefulness of harmony for gender equality. For example, Bret Hinsch rejects a harmonious approach to gender equality. He believes that harmony (*he*^a 和) results in women's submission (*shun* 顺), which leads to an inferior position for women in gender relations. He writes,


Considering that harmony became increasingly applied to femininity and the most intimate spheres of female affairs, it is significant that harmony itself came to be perceived as a relationship grounded in hierarchy (Hinsch, 1995: 118).

According to Hinsch, harmony means accordance or agreement, which in the context of gender harmony is equivalent to women's subordination to men. Joseph Needham also sees a connection between hierarchy and harmony. For him, harmony is a "co-operation of all beings [arising] ... from the fact that they [are] all parts in a hierarchy of wholes forming a cosmic pattern, and what they obeyed [are] the internal dictates of their natures" (Needham, 1956: 230). According to him, harmony focuses on a pre-set order that determines the intrinsic nature and hierarchical positions of everything (including gender) in the cosmos. Similarly, Martha Nussbaum regards harmony as valueless and it deserves no consideration in our time (Nussbaum, 1990: 131).

I argue against this interpretation that treats harmony as merely sameness or identity, rather I argue that these authors have ignored a different type of harmony, in which difference

plays a crucial role. Given that different scholars have provided different forms of this type of harmony, I will introduce three interpretations in the present day. Through reviewing their argumentations, I also trace back to the ancient or initial meanings of harmony in ancient Greek time and pre-Qin era respectively. My aim is to show *he^a* is a process of harmonization that balances the unchangeable (*heng* 恒) and changeable (*bian* 变) in the *Yijing*, where pre-fixed order does not exist or, to put it another way, there is a generated order out of constant change. Harmonization does not seek for homogeneity but rests on the balance between inclusive homogenization and heterogenization. Thus, order and the process of ordering constitute a synchronic indivisible wholeness, which I call *ordernization*.

Let us begin with Yu Jiyuan's interpretation. Yu argues that harmony is “*to fit together*”; this definition has its root in the Greek tradition (Yu, 2016: 414). Yu carefully examines the numerical harmony of the Pythagoreans, for whom numbers are the key to understanding the cosmos. According to the Pythagoreans, the cosmos have a numerical structure. If people grasp the truths, principles, and patterns of numbers, they will know how the entire cosmos operates. In this view, harmony means to make the whole universe fit into numerical structures. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was the pioneer in applying this structural harmony to the interpretation of the *Yijing*. Leibniz invented the binary system that corresponds to the decimal system. He reasoned that if *yin* refers to 0 and *yang* to 1, his binary system could be applied to the sixty-four hexagrams. The result of his numerically based ordering was exactly the same as Shao Yong's 邵雍 arrangement of the sixty-four hexagrams in the *fangtu* 方图. To give readers a sense of this arrangement, I attach binary numbers to Shao's *fangtu* (Zhang, 2017: 58).



This arrangement is accordance with the numerical sequence, namely, from 0 to 63, though this order differs from that in the earliest texts of the *Yijing*. This difference arises because Shao's rearrangement of the order of the sixty-four hexagrams aims to “transpose the book's a posteriori order (the “Order of Later Heaven”后天) into an a priori order (the “Order of Earlier Heaven”先天) (Wilhelm, 1977: 10). Thus, Shao and Leibniz share the same goal of discovering the pre-set or pre-established harmonious numerical order of the *Yijing*. Leibniz employs numbers to trace “the law of spiritual truths,” where “1 stands for the creative unity, whose highest expression is God, and 0 for the nothingness of unformed chaos” (Wilhelm, 1977: 9). God creates all forms from chaos and arranges them in a numerical sequence. Accordingly, harmony is a structured order.

Then, what does such a harmony of “fit together” mean for women? In Plato’s *Symposium*, Aristophanes claims that “the souls of a reunited couple want something from each other, something which is not just sex” (Hunter, 2004: 68). On this conception, one’s beloved is “my other half” (ibid: 65). Accordingly, in marriage, “fitting together” means a complementary relation between a man and a woman. Scholars, like Lisa Raphals, Dorothy Ko, Catherine Despeux, Livia Kohn, and Sandra A. Wawrytko, have read such a complementary relation in terms of a *yin-yang* relation.¹ However, for a long period of time, “fitting together” model has been used to support the degradation of women. Philosophers have believed that men should develop their ability of reason and women of emotion, and because emotion is subordinate to reason, therefor, “fitting together” implies women’s subordination to men. I believe the root of the problem lies with the mandate for a fixed structure within the family by the structural reading of harmony. In order to solve the problem, we need to find a model of harmony with a flexible order. In other words, although this form of harmony respects difference, it cannot fit into the *Yijing yin-yang* model. This is because the *yin-yang* model is a circulated, changeable, and self-activated one; a pre-fixed reading of harmony cannot express its core value.

Chung-ying Cheng argues that harmony (*he*^a 和) is “the agreement of musical notes that creates a perception of internal togetherness” (Cheng, 2009: 11). There are two ways to integrate different things as a unity. One is Mohist identity (*tong* 同) and the other Confucian harmony. Through the process of homogenization, Cheng believes that different things become integrated through sameness (i.e., *tong*). In contrast, harmony is premised on exclusive oppositions, and its achievements lie in the process of heterogenization. Cheng further presents two types of

¹ See Sandra A. Wawrytko (1986): *The Undercurrent of Feminine Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought*; Dorothy Ko (1994): *Teachers of the Inner Chambers*; Lisa Raphals (1998): *Sharing the Light*. Catherine Despeux and Livia Kohn (2003): *Women in Daoism*.

harmony to show how musical harmony can be applied to other types of harmony, namely, “harmony resulting from explicit differentiation of the unity without losing unity and harmony resulting from explicit integration of differences without losing the opposite nature of differences” (Cheng, 2009: 34). Though Cheng claims that *a priori order* does not exist in harmony, his argument of how to apply Greek musical harmony to other harmonious phenomena aligns him with the structural reading. Harmony, according to Cheng, takes the form of a “unity of opposites” (ibid: 30). This is not a completely pre-ordained system that determines everything, but unity and opposition undergird Cheng’s entire argument. Thus, I suggest that Cheng belongs to the camp of pre-set harmony, as he believes that there are some flexible pre-established orders within harmony.

If the structural reading of harmony cannot fit into my *Yijing yin-yang* model, I shift my focus to another form, namely, deep reading of harmony. Chenyang Li is the representative of this camp. He argues that this harmony is distinct from a conflict-free “innocent harmony,” as conceived by Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 1990: 89; Li, 2014: 8). Li argues that the tension is necessary for deep harmony. He suggests that deep harmony should be characterized by heterogeneity, tension, coordination and cooperation, transformation and growth, and renewal (Li, 2015:9). To differentiate deep harmony from structural harmony, he argues that order is not pre-determined but generated through the process of harmonization. Thus, deep harmony is a “model of harmony without pre-fixed order” (ibid: 21). In his book, *The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony*, Li employs philological and philosophical methods to show that harmony is applicable to all dimensions of the universe. Li’s interpretation is consistent with the *Yijing*. In the *Yijing*, broad-sense *yin-yang dao* embraces the above five features. *Yin* and *yang* represent polar heterogeneities that contradict and complement each other. Without one, the other cannot

work. In Chapter Three, I discussed how change and transformation operate within *yin-yang* using the method of *pangtong*. In traditional divination, renewal occurs when the questioner encounters a changing line (*bianyao* 变爻). For instance, in Bi Wan's 毕万 case (*Zuozhuan*, B 4.1), the changing line was the bottom line of the hexagram *Zhun* 屯 (䷂). As the bottom *yang* line changes to *yin*, it yields the hexagram *Bi* 比 (䷇). Renewal also occurs outside of the sixty-four hexagrams. As has been discussed, the judgement texts (*guaci* 卦辞) and the line statements (*yaoci* 爻辞) in the *Yijing* can reoccur in different contexts to solve inquirer's perplexities. Though hexagrams and signs (languages) are consistent across different circumstances, their meanings can change. Thus, the *Yijing* retains its longevity through the process of renewal. Thus, it seems that I totally agree with Li's interpretation of harmony, and believe deep reading of harmony can be employed to elaborate my *Yijing yin-yang* model that carries out circulating, changeable, and self-activated features.

To articulate my reading of harmony, I will elaborate two points to show why harmony plays the central role in my *Yijing yin-yang* model. In particular, it sheds lights on the pattern of my argument that gender equality should be premised on gender difference. First, *he^a*, as a process of harmonization, simultaneously employs homogenization and heterogenization. As I have discussed, the earliest texts of the *Yijing* are abstracted from reality, giving descriptions such as the following:

Things that accord in tone vibrate together. Things that have affinity in their inmost natures seek one another. Water flows to what is wet, fire turns to what is dry. Clouds follow the dragon, wind follows the tiger. Thus the sage rises, and all creatures follow him with their eyes. What is born of heaven feels related to what is above. What is born

of earth feels related to what is below. Each follows its kind (Wilhelm, 1977: 382).²

This paragraph mentions three types of homogenization: (1) different terms sharing the same classification, such as high-pitched and low-pitched voices; (2) different terms sharing the same property, just as bottles and cups share the capacity to hold water; and (3) different terms sharing the same metaphorical image, just as clouds and the hexagram *Qian* share the image of the dragon. Different things with similarities are necessary for the process of homogenization. This process does not aim to universalize difference; rather, it aims to promote heterogenization. For instance, the hexagram *Qian* is equivalent to heaven, round, father, jade, metal, cold, ice, and so forth in the *Shuogua Zhuan* (ibid: 275). In the process of homogenization, the standard for classifying these terms as *Qian* lies in their resemblance to activity (*jian* 健). At the same time, this process highlights the heterogeneity of these terms, as each term differentiates itself from the others through the process of homogenization. Thus, heterogenization and homogenization are parallel process fusing together as the process of harmonization. There are two points to emphasize here: (1) homogenization does not refer to sameness (*tongyang* 同样) but to similarity (*tonglei* 同类), and (2) homogenization and heterogenization are not mutually exclusive but mutually inclusive as two parallel forces in processes of *interactive resonance*.

Thus, Cheng's interpretation is problematic because (1) homogenization is one step in the process of harmonization, which is not discussed by Cheng; (2) Cheng's two types of harmony are achieved by employing *passive resonance* and *active resonance*, neglecting the third possibility that harmony results from *interactive resonance* between unity and difference; and (3) Cheng's reading of harmony is premised on the assumption that harmony is different from

² 同声相应,同气相求.水流湿,火就燥,云从龙,风从虎,圣人作而万物覩.本乎天者亲上,本乎地者亲下,则各从其类也.

sameness (*he er bu tong* 和而不同) but fails to notice the synchronicity of harmony and homogeneity (*hetong* 和同). In the *Lǚshi Chunqiu* 吕氏春秋, it reads, “heaven *qi* goes down and earth *qi* goes up. Heaven and earth are in harmony and homogeneity, thus grass and forests are generated.”³ Cheng discusses one aspect of harmony, which is the unity of differences. However, harmony has other dimensions, such as harmony and homogeneity. Thus, *he^a* is best characterized as the process of harmonization without any pre-fixed order.

Second, there is neither a completely pre-fixed order nor flexible pre-fixed orders in the process of harmonization; rather, there is an order of constant change in the process of harmonization. Li Cunshan 李存山, for example, argued that pursuing benevolence, emphasizing democracy, insisting on sincerity, respecting rightness, upholding harmony and homogeneity, and achieving the great commonwealth (*datong* 大同) belong to the constant *dao* of Confucianism (Li, 2016: 23). This constant *dao* is not pre-fixed; rather, different dimensions of the *dao* are gradually formed and can be modified based on circumstances. Hellmut Wilhelm believes that the *Yijing* “is an attempt to come near to a solution for the ever-present problem of duration and change, of being and becoming” (Wilhelm, 1977: 31). How to balance changeable (*shibian* 适变) and unchangeable (*liheng* 立恒) is the main theme of the *Yijing*.

Wilhelm explains how the earliest texts of the *Yijing* came into being and were applied to explain infinite circumstances. He argues that the *Yijing* is a record of “space-time schema,” where time (*shi* 时) refers to the changeable and position (*wei* 位) to the unchangeable. He cites the line statements of the hexagrams *Meng* 蒙 (䷃) and *Jiji* 既济 (䷾) to emphasize the importance of “harmony with the time” (Wilhelm, 1977: 16-18). He writes,

³ 天气下降,地气上腾,天地和同,草木繁动.

Time is here [taken] as something filled, pregnant with possibilities, which vary with its different moments and which, magically as it were, induce and confirm events. Time here is provided with attributes to which events stand in a relation of right or wrong, favorable or unfavorable (ibid: 17).

Thus, positions are formed in the process of forming to harmonize with the time, as the concept of form “has double meaning[s] in Chinese, signifying ‘the formed’ and also ‘the forming’” (ibid: 34). In other words, the sixty-four hexagrams are not pre-ordained images but are abstractions in divination, which aims to “search for understanding of the hidden significance of events in the future, present, or past” (Raphals, 2008-2009; Redmond & Hon, 2014: 21). Wilhelm believes that “the hidden significance” is the *dao*, which has two aspects—the Way (*daolu* 道路) and the Meaning (*daoli* 道理). He writes,

Meaning is not grasped in stasis but in movement. The meaning consists of the Way of change and it can be understood only by treading this Way. In this world of change, meaning appears in grasping and pursuing, in trading the Way, in acting out the meaning (Wilhelm, 1977: 72).

Thus, “what is above the form” can also be characterized as the synchronicity of changeable and unchangeable. The six dimensions within the constant *dao* proposed by Li Cunshan are not prefixed static orders. In contrast, the only order that is manifested in the *Yijing* is the indivisible changeable and unchangeable that harmonizes in *ordernization*, which means order and the process of ordering constitute a synchronic indivisible wholeness.

In summary, *he^a*, as the process of harmonization in the *Yijing*, is indeed the ideal state of gender relations. This is because harmonization transcends the dichotomy between essentialist feminism and anti-essentialist feminism. For example, the conflict between Beauvoir and Butler

lies in the incompatibility between being and becoming. Butler writes,

The notion that we somehow choose our genders poses an ontological puzzle. It might at first seem impossible that we can occupy a position outside of gender from which to stand back and choose our genders. If we are always already gendered, immersed in gender, then what sense does it make to say that we choose what we already are (Butler, 1986: 37)?

This divergence is not a problem for harmonization, as I have shown that form and forming, order and ordering, and being and becoming are two inclusive aspects of the same thing. Pre-set orders do not exist in the process of harmonization; thus, there is no fixed degrading position that women are ordained to possess. From day one, a person is already a mix of non-gendered-ness and gendered-ness. Life is a continuing process of becoming gendered and degendered.

3. Mapping Gender Harmony: Letting Each Get Its Due

This section is in line with the previous one, aiming to show that the ideal gender equality in Chinese milieu is gender harmony. I argue that gender harmony should be an interdependent nonhierarchical, balanced, and fluid relation between genders, in which “letting each get its due” (*GDQS* 各得其所) plays a central role. Thus, feminists can avoid losing women as the target of equality and answer the question—beyond the debates of essence, how the concept of women can still retain its integrity. Getting rid of the idea that men are the obstacle to women’s liberty and to achieving the feminist goal towards ending any form of sexist oppression, the new criteria of gender equality require viewing both genders in a win-win relationship.

To articulate this point, I will distinguish the difference between due and *ming* 命 (fate, destiny, or allot). Because the concept of *ming*, although have various meanings, to some extent indicates a pre-determined principle that forces people to follow. Such an understanding

contradicts with my *Yijing yin-yang* model, where it carries out circulating, changeable, and self-activated features. The *Yijing* promotes the view that “everything gets vindicated on its own path of life” (*ge zheng xing ming* 各正性命, hereafter *GZXM*). This idea was later further developed by a Song scholar Zhou Dunyi 周敦颐 (1017-1073). In his celebrated work the *Taijitu Shuo* 太极图说, Zhou developed a philosophy of “letting each get its due” (i.e., *GDQS*). Applying this philosophy to gender issues, men and women should both be treated in appropriate ways. I introduce Zhou’s theory to show how my argument shares the same grounds of the *Yijing yin-yang* model. By bringing Zhou’s idea into my discussion I want to show how homogenization and heterogenization work together in the process of harmonization. Thus, I want to show that on the ontological level, gender equality with difference can be an analogy of the process of homogenization and heterogenization.

Let us begin with Zhou Dunyi’s interpretation of the Supreme Polarity Diagram (*taijitu* 太极图). According to Kat Hung Dennis Cheng 郑吉雄, fifty-four versions of this diagram have appeared at different times in history (Cheng, 2007). Cheng argues that, regardless of the different arrangements, there is a shared ground: the diagram has five layers, and each layer shows a dimension of the holistic circle. These five aspects are not irrelative but connect with each other in a coherent whole. Cheng believes that the Supreme Polarity has its roots in the *Xici* (Cheng, 2007: 195-197). The Taiji diagram presents the indivisible relation between ontology and cosmology, which provides a necessary basis for *GDQS*. Zhou writes,

Nonpolar and yet Supreme Polarity! The Supreme Polarity in activity generates *yang*; yet at the limit of activity it is still. In stillness it generates *yin*; yet at the limit of stillness it is also activity. Activity and stillness alternate; each is the basis of the other. In distinguishing *yin* and *yang*, the Two Modes are thereby established. The alternation

and combination of *yang* and *yin* generate water, fire, wood, metal, and earth. With these five [phases of] qi harmoniously arranged, the Four Seasons proceed through them. The Five phases are the unitary *yin* and *yang*; *yin* and *yang* are the unitary Supreme Polarity; the Supreme Polarity is fundamentally Nonpolar. (Adler, 2014: 168).⁴

For Zhou, Nonpolar is another name for the Supreme Polarity, and *yin*, *yang*, activity, stillness, the four seasons, the five phases, men and women, and the myriad things are co-existences within this all-inclusive circle. In contrast to the ancient Greek concept of chaos, where things are in disarray, there is bidirectional generation in this circle. One direction is from invisible to visible (Nonpolar-the Supreme Polarity-*yin* and *yang*-Five phases-Four seasons); the other direction is from visible to invisible (Five phases-*yin* and *yang*-Supreme Polarity-Nonpolar). As the two directions are mutually inclusive and cannot be separated, they are alien to the concept of order in ancient Greek. Compared with order as a metaphysical form, which can only be repeated in the phenomenal world, the two directions are self-generated in the variable-sum relation between *yin* and *yang*. Thus, causality is not applicable to the interpretation of the Supreme Polarity, as all the terms are in synchronic relation; none are prior to the others.

Zhu Xi's comments on the relationship between Nonpolar and the Supreme Polarity show that their mutually inclusive relation is key to connecting all five layers in a coherent whole. Zhu writes,

“The operation of Heaven above has neither sound nor smell,” and yet it is the pivot (*shuniu* 枢纽) of the actual of creation and the basis of the classification of things. Thus,

⁴ 无极而太极.太极动而生阳,动极而静,静而生阴,静极复动.一动一静,互为其根.分阴分阳,两仪立焉.阳变阴合,而生水火木金土.五气顺布,四时行焉.五行一阴阳也,阴阳一太极也,太极本无极也.

it says “Nonpolar and yet Supreme Polarity!” It is not that there is Nonpolar outside of the Supreme Polarity (Adler, 2015: 170).⁵

Zhu believes that the Nonpolar and the Supreme Polarity are mutually inclusive, as they both rest in the principle of heaven (*tianli* 天理), where “*li* is one but its instantiations are many” (*liyifenshu* 理一分殊) (Jones and He, 2015: 19). Zhu’s *tianli* can be seen as another name for the *broad sense yin-yang dao*, which contains abstractions of reality via *interactive resonance*. Thus, the mutually inclusive principle is applicable to the relations between *yin* and *yang*, activity and stillness, men and women, and the myriad things in different layers of the circle. This principle is also “the pivot” connecting the five layers in a holistic circle. Zhu argues that the Supreme Polarity is not prior to the Two Modes (*liangyi* 两仪); they are mutually inclusive. Activity/*yang* and stillness/*yin* are typically paired to show their functions inside of the circle. As all of these terms are in mutually inclusive relations, it is impossible to distinguish causes and results as separate elements. Thus, causality is not applicable to the Supreme Polarity, and synchronicity captures the essence of this diagram. If scholars interpret this diagram from the holistic perspective, it is the Supreme Polarity. However, if they focus on the particular, this circle contains different images. To sum up, in the process of *interactive resonance*, the ideal state of harmony becomes *the nonstop movement of harmonization*. Thus, the concept of harmonization I have proposed provides the necessary grounds for the *GDQS*.

One possible objection to the above interpretation of harmony is Jiyuan Yu’s functional reading of the *GDQS*. Yu presents two kinds of harmony, i.e., psychic harmony and social harmony in Plato’s theories. Let us take psychic harmony as an example to analyze Yu’s aim.

⁵ 上天之载,无声无臭,而实造化之枢纽,品汇之根柢也.故曰无极而太极.非太极之外复有无极也.

Plato believes that the soul has three parts, namely, logical, spirited, and appetitive. Their functions are as follows: (1) the logical part rules the other parts through knowledge; (2) the spirited part follows the logical part; and (3) the appetitive part pursues pleasure. Plato claims that justice means that each part fulfills its own duty. Similarly, social harmony means that the three classes of the state perform their proper tasks, resulting in a harmonious state. Notably, for each class of the state and each part of the soul, their tasks are mutually exclusive, fixed and unchangeable.

Yu, then, explains the “due” in the Platonic tradition. He presents two ways in which the “due” is determined: an imperfect way and a perfect way. The imperfect way aims to eliminate self-interest to serve the interests of the state and to sacrifice other parts of the soul to serve the logical/rational part. For the good of the entire state, the ruler should not have properties, family, sex, or children, which will intervene in taking care of the whole state. In contrast, the perfect way aims to realize the Form of the Good. As Yu says, “without knowledge of the Forms, the rulers could not frame the best laws and guide the state, and the reason does not have true wisdom” (Yu, 2016: 416). Thus, “due” refers to the *function* of its corresponding pre-set form. For Plato, *GDQS* is to perform activities in accordance with pre-set forms.

Yu holds that “since in Plato harmony in the sense of ‘letting each get its due’ is what justice means, such a link should also open a new venue for us to understand both Confucian harmony and Confucian justice” (Yu, 2016: 416). Yu’s point here is to bring Confucian scholars’ (e.g. Zhou Dunyi or Zhu Xi) thinking into the framework of contemporary theory of justice. According to his view, Plato’s ‘doing one’s own’ is compatible to Zhou Dunyi’s *GDQS*. In Plato, as each part of the soul and each class of the state gets its due, and hence, the whole soul and the state will rest in harmony. On this model, Zhou’s *GDQS* also means everything gets its a pre-

determined due in achieving harmony.

Other scholars, like Chenyang Li, have rejected this functional reading the *GDQS* and argues that harmony in Chinese contexts has much deeper meanings. Li argues that “in Chinese cosmogony, even *tian-di* (heaven and earth) are generated out of *hundun* (chaos)” (Li, 2016: 3). Here, his point is to emphasize that pre-set order does not exist in the very beginning of Chinese harmony. To support his argument, he first discusses the process of Chinese cosmogony in the *Yijing*, writing,

The *Yijing* states that the process of change begins with the Ultimate (chaos), which generates the two wings of *yin* and *yang*. The two forces of *yin* and *yang* further generate their multiple forms of combinations, which eventually account for the myriad things in the world (ibid: 3).⁶

Li concludes that in this *Yijing* cosmogony, there are no orders in the ultimate sense. What has been formed later, like the constant *dao*, is a generated order rather than a pre-fixed order. The generated order is established through interactive cosmological forces and human activities, and is subject to further modification. Li differentiates Confucian harmony from Greek harmony. He holds that in the *Yijing*, the requirement of GZXM leaves adequate room for the wellbeing of the individual.

4. Compatibility between Gender Equality and Letting Each Get Its Due

I argue against Yu’s functional reading of the due, and further point out his two additional problems. Here, I will discuss how to make gender equality and letting each get its due compatible. First and foremost, when different functions are arranged for the good of the whole,

⁶ 易有太极, 是生两仪, 两仪生四象, 四象生八卦.

it may might lead to pre-set hierarchical relations between different parts/classes. For instance, the logical part of the soul is pre-determined to dominate the spirited part, which leads to the assumption that rationality should rightly govern the entire soul. As this pre-set order provides unchangeable hierarchical forms for reality to imitate, if this order does not change, the patriarchal system in reality becomes an immutable fact. Some scholars have demonstrated the risk of this stable pre-set order in which rationality or a philosopher King rightly governs the other parts of the soul or other classes in the state, respectively. As reason/logic is assumed to be an essential property of men/male, such an order results in men having a superior position over women (Lloyd, 1979). Thus, this is a sexist harmony on the pre-set order.

Second, the Form of the Good is incompatible with Zhou Dunyi's cyclic pattern. According to Yu's interpretation, the three parts of the soul and the three classes of the state are mutually exclusive: each part has its own due and cannot interfere with the others. However, the five layers in Zhou's Supreme Polarity Diagram are in mutually inclusive relations. For instance, if *yin-yang* is applied to interpret the five phases, each phase contains two properties (*yin* and *yang*) at the same time. If *yin-yang* and the five phases are applied to interpret men and women, each person constitutes a more complex system in which *yin-yang* and the five phases co-exist. Robin R. Wang has provided a vivid example for such a system from the *Huangdi Neijing* 黄帝内经. She writes,

If we talk about human beings as yinyang, then the exterior is yang while the interior is yin. If we talk about the human body as yinyang, then the back is yang while the front is yin. If we talk about the internal depots (*zang* 臟) and palaces (*fu* 腑) within the human body as yinyang, then the depots are yin and the palaces are yang. The five internal depots are liver, heart, spleen, and kidney, and they are yin. The five palaces are

gallbladder, stomach, small and large intestines, urinary bladder and triple burner, and they are all yang (Wang, 2012: 168).

Based on this excerpt, there is no rigid line between the functions of *yin* and *yang*. Thus, the Greek functional reading of *GDQS* is different from that of Zhou Dunyi's *GDQS*. The former emphasizes a fixed and essential relation between different elements/properties/functions, whereas the latter aims to capture the reality that is a changeable/self-activated one. Gender relations in the former is pre-determined, while in the latter is more fluid.

For clarity, before I discuss what *GDQS* refers to in the *Yijing*, I introduce some basic orders generated in ancient times and that have become accepted in the contemporary world. Within one hexagram, the bottom, third, and fifth lines upward are the *yang* positions, while the second, fourth, and top lines are the *yin* positions. If a *yang* line (*yangyao* 阳爻) is in a *yang* position, it is called proper (*dangwei* 当位); if a *yin* line (*yinyao* 阴爻) is in a *yin* position, it is called proper. As the fifth position occupies the central (*zhong* 中) place in the upper trigram, it represents the ruler of a hexagram (*guazhu* 卦主). If a yang line is in this position, it is right in the middle (*zhongzheng* 中正). These orders are not pre-fixed but are generated through use. In the process of *ordernization*, position is not as important as the tendency toward change (see table one).

Table One: *Yang* Lines and *Yin* Lines in Different Positions (from bottom to top)

<i>Yang</i> lines in different positions	<i>Yin</i> lines in different positions
<p><i>Fu</i> 复 (䷗)</p> <p><i>Yang</i> line at the bottom position means “return from a short distance. No need for remorse.</p>	<p><i>Gou</i> 姤 (䷫)</p> <p><i>Yin</i> line at the bottom position means “it must be checked with a brake of bronze.</p>

<p><i>Great good fortune</i>” (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 98-99).⁷</p>	<p>Perseverance brings good fortune. If one lets it take its course, one experiences misfortune. Even a lean pig has it in him to rage around” (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 172).⁸</p>
<p><i>Shi</i> 师 (䷆) <i>Yang</i> line in the second position means “in the midst of the army. <i>Good fortune</i>. No blame. The King bestows a triple decoration” (ibid: 33).⁹</p>	<p><i>Tongren</i> 同人 (䷌) <i>Yin</i> line in the second position means “fellowship with men in the clan. <i>Humiliation</i>” (ibid: 57).¹⁰</p>
<p><i>Qian</i> 谦 (䷎) <i>Yang</i> line in the third position means “a superior man of modesty and merit. Carries things to conclusion. <i>Good fortune</i>” (ibid: 65).¹¹</p>	<p><i>Lǚ</i> 履 (䷉) <i>Yin</i> line in the third position means “a one-eyed man is able to see, a lame man is able to tread. He treads on the tail of the tiger. The tiger bites the man. <i>Misfortune</i>. Thus does a warrior act on behalf of his great prince” (ibid: 46).¹²</p>
<p><i>Yu</i> 豫 (䷏) <i>Yang</i> line in the fourth position means “the source of enthusiasm. He achieves great things. Doubt not. You gather friends around you. As a hair clasp gathers the hair” (ibid: 70).¹³</p>	<p><i>Xiaoxu</i> 小畜 (䷈) <i>Yin</i> line in the fourth position means “if you are sincere, blood vanishes and fear gives away. <i>No blame</i>” (ibid: 42).¹⁴</p>
<p><i>Bi</i> 比 (䷇) <i>Yang</i> line in the fifth position means “manifestation of holding together. In the hunt the King uses beaters on three sides only. And foregoes game that runs off in front. The citizens need no warning. <i>Good fortune</i>” (ibid: 38).¹⁵</p>	<p><i>Dayou</i> 大有 (䷍) <i>Yin</i> line in the fifth position means “he whose truth is accessible, yet dignified, has <i>good fortune</i>” (ibid: 62).¹⁶</p>
<p><i>Bo</i> 剥 (䷖) <i>Yang</i> line at the top position means “there is a large fruit still uneaten. The superior man receives a carriage. The house of the inferior man is split apart” (ibid: 96).¹⁷</p>	<p><i>Guai</i> 夬 (䷪) <i>Yin</i> line at the top position means “no cry. In the end <i>misfortune</i> comes” (ibid: 170).¹⁸</p>

⁷ 不运复,无祇悔,元吉.

⁸ 系于金柅,贞吉,有攸往,见凶,羸豕孚蹢躅.

⁹ 在师中,吉,无咎,王三锡命.

¹⁰ 同人于宗,吝.

¹¹ 劳谦,君子有终,吉.

¹² 眇能视,跛能履,履虎尾,咥人,凶.武人为于大君.

¹³ 由豫,大有得.勿疑.朋盍簪.

¹⁴ 有孚,血去惕出,无咎.

¹⁵ 显比,王用三驱,失前禽.邑人不诫,吉.

¹⁶ 夬孚交如,威如;吉.

¹⁷ 硕果不食,君子得舆,小人剥庐.

Several preliminary observations can be made based on the above table. First, most of the *yang* lines indicate fortune regardless of their positions; for example, *Shi*, *Qian*, and *Bi* are all judged as “good fortune.” In contrast, most of the *yin* lines indicate misfortune. This observation suggests that the authors of the *Yijing* value *yang*. However, this pattern should not be read as a preference for men or masculinity; it simply emphasizes activity. This interpretation is in line with the *Xici*, in which “generation and regeneration is the *Yi*” (*shengsheng zhi wei yi* 生生之谓易). Second, compared with the hexagram *Bi*, which includes the orders of *dangwei* and *zhongzheng*, the hexagram *Fu* is more fortunate because a *yang* line is at the bottom, indicating a tendency to move forward and change the situation.¹⁹ The inferior position (bottom) is immaterial in terms of the good results. Third, the hexagram *Dayou*, in which the *yin* line possesses the *yang* position, is nevertheless fortunate. This *yin* line retains its fortune because of its “sincerity.” Finally, there is no universal order that is applicable to all situations.

Now, let us look into the connection between order and *ming*. Some may take the *ming* as an unchangeable course which presupposes a fixed pre-set order. There are two types of *ming* in the Chinese context. *Ming* often appears together with heaven as in *tianming* 天命 (*Analects*, 2.4, 16.8). The common interpretation of *tianming* is a certain occurrence that is not disturbed by human affairs and cannot be altered by humans. As *ming* in this sense cannot be changed, human beings are in *passive resonance* when one experiences *ming*. Several hexagrams in the *Yijing* are in line with this interpretation of *ming*. For instance, the hexagram *Dayou* reads, “obeys the benevolent will of heaven” (*shun tian xiu ming* 顺天休命) (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 60). The

¹⁸ 无号,终有凶.

¹⁹ To remind the reader, the movement of lines (*yao* 爻) is from the bottom to the top.

hexagram *Cui* 萃 (䷬) reads, “devotion to the command of heaven” (*shun tianming ye* 顺天命也) (ibid:615). If *ming* is a pre-determined occurrence, *GZXM* leaves no room for human freedom. However, there is another meaning of *ming*, which does not presuppose a pre-set order. The hexagrams, *Ge* 革 (䷰) and *Lin* 临 (䷒), exhibit another type of *ming*. *Ge* means “to change the mandate brings good fortune” (ibid: 191).²⁰ Hellmut Wilhelm believes that *Ge* indicates that the “divine command is not an absolute power ... secular authority [is] equated with divine will” (Wilhelm, 1977: 54). This indicates that human beings can change the will of heaven (*ming*) if they are sincere with themselves and others. The hexagram *Lin* even indicates that “the will of heaven will be ignored” (ibid: 54). In the *Yijing*, *Lin* reads, “Good Fortune! Everything furthers. One need not yield to [*ming*]” (Wilhelm/Baynes, 1977: 483).²¹

To sum up, *ming* does not necessarily mean fate or destiny in the *Yijing*, which helps my interpretation of the *Yijing yin-yang* mode escaping from the trap of pre-fixed order. Even though what is due emerges from the *ming*, it has detached itself from *ming* and formed its own meaning. In addition, I distinguish *GDQS* from the concept of the due in ancient Greek, where the due represented different functions. If so, I put my foot down to the position that *yin* and *yang*, men and women, and other gender features cannot be viewed as fixed functions as in Yu’s model. Instead, through repeatedly showing how the homogenization and heterogenization work together in the Taiji trigram. I try to eliminate any attempts of essentializing *yin* or *yang*, men or women, and other gender features. What I am doing is to present the dynamic process in the harmonization of gender relations. In such a fluid pattern or form, feminist gender studies can escape from the crisis of losing their research target and answer the question—without essence,

²⁰ 有孚改命，吉。

²¹ 吉无不利，未顺命也。

how the conceptual women can still retain its integrity.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to answer the question put forth at the beginning of the dissertation—how *Yijing yin-yang* model can contribute some new criteria or different perspectives to resolve the dilemma of gender equality. This dilemma emerges from a specific background, which is that using the exclusive dualistic thinking model to interpret gender relations. Such a conventional model provides only one attack target for feminists; namely, the root cause of sexism lies in the patriarchal system that is constructed by men. In this regard, the varied criteria of equality to some extent can be viewed as one-sex model. For example, when feminists emphasize equality means women should have the same rational capacities as men, they have already fall into a man-made trap. Feminists have from different perspectives explained where the trap comes from and how it operates; their attempts are not only ending any form of sexism but also transcending the limitations of such a single criterion. My aim is in line with them, and hence I develop the *Yijing yin-yang* model to resolve the dilemma of gender equality caused by such an unequal criterion. Section 1 will discuss the *Yijing yin-yang* model provides a potential different criterion for gender norms, where men do not always play a dominant role between both genders. Circulating and changeable relations between *yin* and *yang* provide metaphysical ground and possibilities for women to play the central role in gender relations. The next section aims to discuss that *yin* and *yang* as prototypes in the *Yijing* can shoulder the responsibility to retain both the conceptual men and women as integrative ones. Thus, the LGBT communities can also settle down in these two clusters of concepts. Section 3 argues that this model is premised on an interdependent relation, which can free both men and women from the conventional gender

norms. Given that the attack target of this model has its roots in the newly appeared recognition—gender norms might vary across cultures, from this perspective, I argue that with a new starting point, the dilemma of gender equality can be resolved in the *Yijing yin-yang* model.

1. New Starting Point: *Yin* and *Yang* Switch Their Positions

I have presented in the previous chapters that the dilemma of gender equality lies in the incompatibilities between sameness and difference, where I also have shown that the root cause of this dilemma is the essentializing thinking model. When women initially required same treatment as men, they should prove that they indeed have the same capacities of reason as men have. When women ask for different treatment in accordance with their biological difference, they might fall into the conventional hierarchical relations. When women further pursue real diversity and neglect women's special needs, they may lose their research target—the integrative concept of women. Even though scholars have discussed how to resolve these problems from different perspectives, my solution is not from the inside of current feminism but from the outside. It aims to see whether gender norms emerged from a different cultural background can provide anything new or different for the present discussions on gender equality.

With this purpose, I find that the attacking target of feminism in somehow is not applicable to the *Yijing yin-yang* model. As Genevieve Lloyd has argued, for the long period of time, the voice that men are led by reason and women are led by emotion have dominated the philosophical academia. Even though a few scholars have stressed the importance of the emotion, the majority of scholars believe that the reason should rightly dominate the emotion. Lloyd further argues that the capacity of reason has been (mis)understood as the crucial essence of being a male. Such stereotype leads to the result that women occupy a degrading position both in private and public spheres. Lloyd's observation represents the majority feminists' stance.

Feminists thus take men/patriarchy as the attacking target, assuming that women play subordinate role across cultures. Additionally, they assume that men always benefit from such a patriarchal value system. I use Chapter Two to show different sexist definitions of sex and gender, which aims to argue that the dilemma of gender equality cannot be resolved within the essentializing thinking model. Even Butler's anti-essential approach might be trapped in the crisis of losing the research target of women, if it is under such an essentializing mode. This is because the starting point of Anglo-American feminists lies in the fact that they have tried their best to fight against and destroy the only criterion in gender relations. The only criterion is that men play a dominant role in unequal gender relations.

Even though the *yin-yang* conception to some extent makes the same mistake (e.g., men are superior and women are inferior), it also provides a different or a new starting point if we read the model to imply that both men and women carry the features of *yin* and *yang* in some degree. The phrase that *yin* and *yang* switch their position (*yinyangyiwei* 阴阳易位) indicates that superior positions should not be occupied by men perpetually and that inferior positions should not be unavoidably connected with women. Empress Lü's case vividly shows that women should play a superior role if she is actually talented enough to be the leader. Examples of tiger mothering and independent women also indicate that women recorded in canonical Chinese texts can provide different textual evidence providing new or different criteria to change unequal gender relations. As I have discussed, there are at least two types of *yin-yang* relations in the past, i.e., *he^a* and *he^b*. The former emphasizes a fluid, interdependent, and harmonious relation between both genders; whereas the later provides a fixed, dependent, and one-side relation. This dissertation uncovers the difference between them and shows that the *Yijing yin-yang* model is based on *he^a*. If so, the *yin-yang* model is different from the binary relationship between reason

and emotion, where reason often plays a dominant role. I view this *yin-yang* inter-dependent relation as a new starting point. There are two reasons to support my argument: (1) the *Yijing yin-yang* model does not only show the problems of one-side gender relation (i.e., *he^b*) it also provides a win-win solution (*he^a*); (2) this fluid relational model destroys the foundation of unequal relation. Thus, I argue that the *Yijing yin-yang* model expands the grounds of gender equality, where gender equality should be premised on gender difference. In other words, only if scholars accept that *yin* and *yang* are different clusters of concepts can they understand that *yin* and *yang* are equally important and hence should be treated equally.

In sum, the idea that *yin* and *yang* can switch their positions provides a model of circulating, changeable, and self-activated relation. Additionally, it to some extent provides metaphysical ground and possibilities for women to play the central role between both genders. This new starting point decides that the development of feminists in Chinese culture might have something different from that in the current feminist discourses. It also suggests that on the metaphysical level gender equality should be premised on gender difference, if gender relation is an analogy of *yin-yang* relation.

2. All-inclusive Prototypes: Retain the Conceptual Women as Integrative Unity

I have argued that *yin* and *yang* are two prototypes in the *Yijing*, which includes almost all features among genders. The biological sex, social gender, symbolical sexual, and psychological sexuality all can be included in this *yin-yang* model. Even though I have argued that *yin-yang* model is a circulating, changeable, and self-active one, I aim to emphasize that this model has its roots in the ancient phrase “change: that is unchangeable.” This phrase means that the unchangeable broad-sense *yin-yang dao* is invisible, and that this invisible mode keeps renewing itself over times. Its visible forms are presented in the narrow-sense *yin-yang dao*. If so, *yin* and

yang as prototypes in the *Yijing* can retain the conceptual women as integrative unity.

It is in this point that the *Yijing yin-yang* model differentiates it from radical feminism, where the latter holds the stance that there is no essences between both genders. It additionally avoid the crisis of losing the research target—women. The *Yijing yin-yang* model does not discuss whether men and women have essences or not. Rather, it focuses on the issue of how to capture the reality or concrete situations to judge whether both genders should be treated equal or not to achieve gender equality. For example, people have heated debated the issue of whether it is justice if a transgendered woman to be champion in a female sports competition. I will not elaborate the details but just borrow both sides' stances here. Supporters argue that transgendered women should be a kind of women, as their psychological features and sexual desires are fit for being a woman. While, objectors argue that transgendered women to some extent are biologically men, and that these women might have physically advantages in a female sports competition. There are different evidences to support both sides, which is not my target. I cite this case aiming to show people cannot reach an agreement if they are still applying essentializing thinking. With such a thinking model, both genders are treated as fixed and perpeturatural features. In some degree, both supporters and objectors do not admit the fact that people's biological features and psychological features keep changing from time to time. It is hard to draw a strict line to define which features are essentially female/feminine/femininity. Only in a concrete situation, can people judge whether both genders should be treated different or be treated the same.

If so, the LGBT communities work with this *Yijing yin-yang* model. Because both *yin* and *yang* are prototypes that represents two clusters of concepts, include but not limited to biological, social, symbolical, and psychological features. They can choose either *yin* or *yang* features on

different aspects. Thus, in this process of self-cultivation and self-recognition, people can finally realize his or her own gender. Such a model also treats gender as a concept with different layers. Considering the topic of this dissertation, I will not elaborate on how the LGBT community fits into the *yin-yang* model. But, I need to remind the reader that this compatibility is different from the idea that forces the LGBT community to satisfy conventional gender norms of heterosexism. Instead, my aim is to show both *yin* and *yang* are all-inclusive prototypes in the *Yijing*, which can retain the conceptual women and men as integrate unities.

3. Interdependence Principle

On basis of analyzing the phenomenon of Chinese modern leftover women, I show that gender norms vary across cultures and I have presented that the *Yijing yin-yang* model can avoid dilemma of gender equality. This model does not provide any strict rules for both genders to follow, except the principle of interdependence. Within the circulating process from the broad-sense *yin-yang dao* to the narrow-sense *yin-yang dao*, gender equality is justified in concrete situations. The circulating process requires that *yin* and *yang* like two polarities should be inter-dependent. This interdependence principle is seldom seen in current feminist discourses. However, I argue that this interdependence model frees both men and women from the traditional hierarchical evaluating system, and that it serves a contemporary approach to gender equality.

Feminists' target has been merely to free women from the traditional hierarchical evaluating system. They presume that men and masculinity always benefit from this unfair patriarchy. In the *yin-yang* interdependent model, women cannot be liberated without the liberation of men at the same time. For a long period of time, wives rely on husbands' earning money to support the family, which makes wives (women)'s living to depend on their husbands.

Additionally, the capacity of reasoning used to be a criterion to judge whether a person is a political individual. When feminists pursued gender equality, they depended on this criterion. However, this capacity is deemed as a type of masculinity. These premises determine feminists' liberation is identical to be an independent political person. In comparison, the *yin-yang* model shows an interdependent solution. This model lies in the phrase that *yin* and *yang* switch their positions. This means that the relation between *yin* and *yang* is not fixed and static dependent or independent; it is a dynamic interdependent relation. Thus, men and women are valuable in different aspects; the hierarchical relation is not applicable to them.

There are at least three ways to show gender equality should be premised on gender difference:

- (1) On the metaphysical level, both men and women have *yin* and *yang* features at the same time. Their difference are not pre-determined yet are distinguished in concrete situations. In different contexts, the *yin* and *yang* features can be varied in digresses. On basis of this recognition, gender equality means metaphysically men and women are same (have *yin* and *yang* features); and this equality should premised on difference (different degrees).
- (2) On the conceptual level, if gender relation is an analogy of *yin-yang* relation. Because both *yin* and *yang* are two clusters of concepts, which can include biological, social, symbolical, and psychological gender features; thus men and women can retain their integrity even though there are diverse kinds inside. Thus, gender equality to some extent should be premised on the commitment that the concept of women has varied forms. So do the men.
- (3) On the principle level, the *Yijing yin-yang* model provides an interdependent

relation, which set the tone for freeing both genders from the conventional unequal relations. In this regards, *yin* and *yang* are different yet should be treated as equally important. The reason that gender relation should imitate this *yin-yang* relation lies in the fact the new model requires to free both men and women from the conventional gender norms and construct new one.

Thus, in the process of harmonization, the *Yijing yin-yang* model captures the real gender relations in daily life. This model is much more flexible than others. It does not provide any fixed proposals to resolve the distributive equality or political equality; rather, it focuses on capturing the real dynamic situations. In the distinguishing process of heterogeneity and homogenization, people should justify the concept of gender equality which should be premised on gender difference.

4. Significance and Contribution

I have argued that the *Yijing yin-yang* model provides a different approach to solving the tension between gender equality and gender difference. I also have explored the interdependent solution as a way to resolve the dilemma of the incompatibility between equality in sameness and equality in difference. In this process, I have three contributions that deserve readers' attention. First, I reinterpret and reconstruct the *Yijing* and bring it to modern feminist discourses on the issue of gender equality and gender difference. The *Yijing yin-yang* thinking model presents an interdependent relation between men and women, in contrast to western exclusive dualistic thinking. This model provides an inclusive dualistic thinking paradigm. In this model, men and women are interdependences and mutually benefit each other. Second, I have provided a solution on an interdependent model to solve the problem of gender inequality, as an alternative to western feminists' approach. I argue the interdependent solution is a new starting

point to resolve the feminist issues. This new starting point can resolve the tension between gender equality and gender difference, and the conflict between ideal equality and actual inequality. This is because it provides a fluid mode, a circulating between general equality (sameness) and concrete equality (difference). Finally, The *Yijing yin-yang* model can have a significant influence on the liberation of both men and women from the traditional hierarchical evaluating system. This freedom indicates a respect for gender diversity. It respects each individuals' choice and their evaluation. In comparison, the main target of feminism is to free women from patriarchal limitations.

5. Future Extension of the Project

Gender equality is a very large issue, the scope of this thesis is limited. Several additional projects are relevant to this thesis. Further studies may involves in a careful studies of the Confucian “five relations” (*wulun* 五伦): ruler-minister (*junchen* 君臣), father-son (*fuzi* 父子), husband-wife (*fufu* 夫妇), brothers (*xiongdì* 兄弟), and friends (*pengyou* 朋友). Ruler-minister relation is no longer applicable to contemporary society. In this place, we need to explore the appropriate relationship between individuals and state. I intend to explore what Confucian ethics on basis of family relations can contribute anything new to the theory of justice. In other words, I will discuss what Chinese form of the family can contribute to modern just society.

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