

# **INDIA-US RELATIONS: ASSESSING INDIA'S SOFT POWER**

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## Summary

How do we think about “soft power” theoretically and how do we study it empirically? What is the relationship between economic and military hard power and soft power traditionally understood as based on culture, political values and foreign policy? These questions guide this study of India’s soft power and how it influenced India’s relations with the United States. The puzzling question it aims to answer is why India has been able to exercise its soft power in its relations with the US more effectively in the post-1998 period as compared to the Nehru era (1947-1964).

From the power analysis standpoint, India’s ability to affect the US in order to accomplish its preferences through attraction is its exercise of soft power. What explains the greater effectiveness of India’s soft power in terms of its preferred outcomes in the post-1998 period when compared to that of the Nehru period? The explanation for this puzzle addresses all the questions raised above, which, although considered by some scholars including Joseph S. Nye at the conceptual level, has not been studied empirically. Even at the conceptual level, disagreements exist, especially with respect to the relationship between soft and hard power. Soft power, as this thesis demonstrates, is enabled by hard power. It can also be undermined by hard power. Its greater effectiveness, therefore, depends on a high level of economic and military hard power resources. No one has thus far systematically shown the dependence of soft power on hard power. The relationship between soft and hard power is sometimes conceptualised in the form of “smart power” and “cosmopolitan power” for optimisation of a state’s influence. This study, however, does not delve into this issue. Instead, it focuses on the greater efficacy of soft power, which needs the support of hard power resources. The present study sheds light on India’s relationship with the US by using soft power as a central explanatory variable.

As far as the level of hard power required to make soft power more effective is concerned, there was a tipping point in the case of India. It was the 1998 nuclear tests

after which the US began to give positive attention to India and to think of it as a rising strategic player. There was a gap, of course, as the US imposed sanctions after the tests, but the “Singh-Talbott talks” brought about the first sign of change. The real transformation happened with the 2005 US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement. With no other “proliferator” has such understanding on the part of the US happened. In India’s case, the acceptance of it as a responsible and a democratic power reflects its soft power attraction: the nuclear breakout was a hard power (nuclear) shift accompanied by soft power attraction. So long as India was a covert nuclear power, the tipping point had not been reached and its attraction by itself was not enough to remove non-proliferation pressure. After the tests, everything changed: the US de-hyphenated India from Pakistan, ended India’s nuclear isolation, and began defence cooperation with it in earnest.

This study uses the “process tracing” method to show empirically the causal processes that link India’s relative effectiveness of soft power with low or high levels of hard power. The effectiveness of soft power is measured in terms of India’s success in achieving preferred policy outcomes through the mechanism of attraction and persuasion. Despite increasing interest in India’s soft power, both among scholars and diplomats, there is hardly any rigorous and systematic case study of successful projection of India’s soft power. This study attempts to fill that gap and seeks to contribute empirically to the literature on relational soft power, while also offering policymakers guidance as to how soft power can be usefully approached and effectively utilised.

## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction

Is “soft power” really power? What is its basis? When does it become a more effective form of state power? What is its relationship with “hard power” such as economic and military power?<sup>1</sup> These questions are central to understanding the concept of “soft power”, which in recent years has gained wide currency in both international relations scholarship and policy discourse. These very questions guide this study of the role of soft power in India’s relations with the United States.<sup>2</sup>

The puzzling question this study seeks to answer is why India’s soft power vis-à-vis the US has been more effective during the post-1998 period when compared with the Nehru era (1947–1964). From the power analysis standpoint, India’s ability to affect the US in order to accomplish its preferences through attraction is its exercise of soft power.<sup>3</sup> In the post-1998 period, India’s soft power enabled it to influence the US in terms of its (a) dehyphenation from Pakistan; (b) civil nuclear cooperation; and (c) enhanced defence cooperation. These preferred outcomes fundamentally transformed the nature of its bilateral relations and have taken it to an unprecedented level. During the Nehru period, India received limited military cooperation. US economic assistance to India grew only after the mid-1950s. The US was keen to extend economic and military assistance to India so as to prevent it from collapsing under the weight of economic failure or military defeat and coming under Communism. Therefore, the overall relations between India and the US swung between cooperation and confrontation. What explains the greater effectiveness of India’s soft power in terms of its preferred outcomes in the post-1998 period when compared to that of the Nehru

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<sup>1</sup>The next chapter presents a detailed description of the concepts of soft power and hard power.

<sup>2</sup>Any research project should aim at (a) dealing “with a real-world topic” and (b) being “designed to contribute, directly or indirectly, to a specific scholarly literature”. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 18.

<sup>3</sup>This relational definition of power is fleshed out in the next chapter.

period? The explanation for this puzzle addresses all the questions raised above, which, although considered by some scholars including Joseph S. Nye at the conceptual level, has not been studied empirically. Even at the conceptual level, disagreements exist, especially with respect to the relationship between soft and hard power. Soft power, as this thesis will demonstrate, is enabled by levels of hard power. It can also be undermined by hard power. Its greater effectiveness, therefore, depends on economic and military hard power resources. No one has thus far systematically shown the dependence of soft power on hard power. The relationship between soft and hard power is, as we shall see in Chapter 2, sometimes conceptualised in the form of “smart power” and “cosmopolitan power” for optimisation of a state’s influence. This study, however, does not delve into this issue. Instead, it focuses on the greater efficacy of soft power, which needs the support of hard power resources.

The present study sheds light on India’s relationship with the US by using soft power as a central explanatory variable. The structural factors have an enabling or disabling effect on the role of India’s soft power; hence, their role cannot be dismissed (see Chapter 2). It is equally pertinent to ask whether India has exercised any power vis-à-vis the US.<sup>4</sup> If so, what are the sources and the nature of that power? This study proposes to examine whether and how India’s soft power is causally linked to the above noted outcomes preferred by India. More specifically, it attempts to shed light on the “observable variation in the dependent variable”,<sup>5</sup> that is, India’s greater success in its soft power relationship with the US in the post-1998 period compared with the Nehru era. It does so in light of the fact that India’s power or its ability to accomplish its preferred outcomes in the latter period mainly rested on non-coercive power resources. India’s soft power was less effective in terms of securing preferred outcomes when its national power consisted of low level of hard economic and military power and was more effective when it was supported by high level of hard power resources.

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<sup>4</sup> Dennis Kux, “A Remarkable Turnaround: US-India Relations,” *Foreign Service Journal*, October 2002, 18.

<sup>5</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 25.

This case study does not intend to produce fresh evidence; rather, it interprets old problems in a new light in terms of the concept of soft power, thus offering a new frame of reference.

As far as the level of hard power was necessary to produce more effective soft power, there was a tipping point in the case of India. It was the 1998 nuclear tests after which the US began to give positive attention to India and to think of it as a rising strategic player. There was a gap, of course, as the US imposed sanctions after the tests, but the “Singh-Talbott talks”<sup>6</sup> brought about the first sign of change. The real transformations happened with the 2005 US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement. With no other ‘proliferator’, such understanding on the part of the US has happened. In India’s case, the acceptance of it as a responsible and a democratic power reflects its soft power of attraction: the nuclear breakout was a hard power (nuclear) shift accompanied by soft power of attraction. So long as India was a covert nuclear power, the tipping point had not been reached and its attraction by itself was not enough to remove nonproliferation pressure. After the tests, everything changed: defence cooperation began in earnest, the US ended India’s nuclear isolation and dehyphenated it from Pakistan.

### **1.1 The Growing Political Utility of Soft Power**

The concept of soft power is new, but the behaviour it suggests is “as old as human history”.<sup>7</sup> As David Baldwin notes, Nye’s discussion of soft power in various forms is well known to the analysts of relational power.<sup>8</sup> Klaus Knorr has discussed various types of non-coercive influences derived even from military and economic bases, which can be “mutually beneficial”.<sup>9</sup> Such non-coercive power or influences can be related to soft power.

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<sup>6</sup> For more details, see chapter 5.

<sup>7</sup> See Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 81-82.

<sup>8</sup> David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, 2nd ed., eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2013), 289.

<sup>9</sup> Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* (London: Macmillan, 1973), 4, 7-9 and 24-25.

Despite claims of high fungibility, military force has unequal and even zero utility in certain contexts in world politics.<sup>10</sup> The factors of legitimacy and cost have reduced the utility of coercive military power as compared to the past.<sup>11</sup> The possession of nuclear weapons makes war irrational, if not obsolete, thus creating space for the potential use of non-coercive soft power.<sup>12</sup> Besides the provision of security and territorial integrity, the exercise of power resources is needed today in a host of new issue areas of interdependence such as global trade, food production, environment, and energy distribution.<sup>13</sup> The interdependence of economic, political and social issues has rendered military force less effective, making alternative means of capabilities more relevant,<sup>14</sup> mostly in relation to the global commons, which require international cooperation.<sup>15</sup> Such abilities include “appeals to common values” and persuasion, which Nye calls soft power.<sup>16</sup> While such capabilities have long existed, their contemporary meanings come from the declining efficacy of military power and the issues of complex interdependence.<sup>17</sup> Globalisation and interdependence create “considerable cost” for the use of force.<sup>18</sup> The efficacy of hard power relative to soft power may have been undercut by growing interdependence, yet it has enlarged the pool of power resources, wherefrom “effective control” arises.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> See Robert J. Art, “The Utility of Force Today,” in *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, 11<sup>th</sup> ed., eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson Longman, 2013), 197-212. See also Robert J. Art, “Force and Fungibility Reconsidered,” *Security Studies* 8: 4 (1999): 183.

<sup>11</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 49. Henry A. Kissinger, “The New Goal of Foreign Policy: Equilibrium,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 36: 2 (1977): 215-216; Colin S. Gray, “Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, 7-22, 44, and 49.

<sup>12</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” *American Political Science Review* 84:3(1990): 744. See also, Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001,” *American Political Science Review* 96:1 (2002): 7; Giulio M. Gallarotti, “Soft Power: What It Is, Why It’s Important, and the Conditions under Which It Can Be Effectively Used,” *Journal of Political Power* 4.1 (2011): 38.

<sup>13</sup> James N. Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges*, Vol.1 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 143-145.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 149-151.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>18</sup> Gallarotti, “Soft Power,” 37.

<sup>19</sup> Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics*, 151.

The information revolution is also enhancing the salience of the power of attraction. It means that it is often more important to have the “best story” on one’s side rather than the strongest military.<sup>20</sup> The causal factors that lead to regime formation include interest in the provision of “public goods” as well as self-interest.<sup>21</sup> The growth of regimes and international organisations thus creates conditions for the application of soft power through their “networks of cooperation”.<sup>22</sup> Even fight against non-state actors such as terrorists and pirates requires cooperation among states.

It is well established that developed democracies do not fight against each other, but are susceptible to disputes and the use of threats against each other.<sup>23</sup> Domestically constrained from using force, they can advance their mutual interests because of value-based cooperation, thus establishing soft power relations.<sup>24</sup> Finally, European nations drained by past wars and bonded by regimes, ideals and interdependence, are today more inclined to use soft power than hard power. Gallarotti argues that the emergence of the theories of neoliberalism and constructivism as a challenge to realism reflects the transformation of world politics, which has amplified the role of soft power.<sup>25</sup>

Globalisation and interdependence place constraints on the use of hard power as states simultaneously pursue “power” and “plenty”.<sup>26</sup> Such interdependence only moderates conflict/rivalry. The role of military power for security and order is like the role of oxygen for breathing. Thus, it continues to be a vital element of power in the 21<sup>st</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Joseph S. Nye, “In an Information Age, Soft Power Wins,” *CNN*, February 14, 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/14/nye.egypt.power/>. See also, Joseph S. Nye, “The Information Revolution and American Soft Power,” *Asia-Pacific Review* 9:1(2002): 69-73.

<sup>21</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” *International Organization* 36: 2(1982):197-199.

<sup>22</sup> Gallarotti, “Soft Power,” 38-39; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations,” *World Politics* 27: 1 (1974): 54.

<sup>23</sup> Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace: Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 1: 4(1995): 495.

<sup>24</sup> Gallarotti, “Soft Power,” 38.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>26</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, “India in Asian Geopolitics,” in *Rising India: Friends and Foes*, ed. Prakash Nanda (New Delhi: Lancer, 2007), 126-127.

century.<sup>27</sup> Disregard for non-military forms of power has also “limited” our understanding of different contexts of the use of military force.<sup>28</sup>

## 1.2 Hypothesis

The hypothesis advanced in this study is that the effectiveness of soft power depends upon the level of hard power. Soft power produces limited effects in terms of achieving preferred outcomes from the target state (in the present case, the United States) with low level of hard power, whereas with high level of hard power, soft power becomes more effective in influencing another state’s policies. India’s rising economic power following its reform process beginning in the 1990s coupled with its growing military power marked by its nuclear tests in 1998 positioned it, more than ever before, as a major power in world politics. The significant increase in hard power in the post-1998 period in comparison with the Nehru era reinforced its soft power, leading to more effective soft power. Therefore, hard plus soft power allowed India to achieve its policy goals vis-à-vis the US, but soft power only worked more effectively when backed up/supported by high level of hard power. India’s 1998 nuclear tests worked as the tipping point to make its soft power more effective vis-à-vis the US.

This thesis presents the null hypothesis that the level of hard power has no bearing on the effectiveness of soft power, that is, whether soft power is effective or not has nothing to do with the levels of hard power. In order to reject the null hypothesis, this thesis presents evidence that confirm relationship between levels of hard power and effectiveness of soft power. It therefore traces as to how key decisions that were made by the US in favour of India were determined by soft power considerations under conditions of high level of hard power. It also shows that there are no variables other than hard power which might explain the failure or success of soft power. Most

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<sup>27</sup> Joseph S. Nye, “Has Economic Power Replaced Military Might?” *Project Syndicate*, June 6, 2011, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/has-economic-power-replaced-military-might>.

<sup>28</sup> David A. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” in *Handbook of International Relations*, 1st ed., eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 184.

importantly, the analysis shows that there is no contradiction between hard and soft power, i.e. there is no evidence that soft power is highly effective when hard power is weak; and similarly, there is no evidence that soft power is ineffective when hard power is strong.

This gives rise to an interesting question: if effective soft power is based on high level of hard power resources, then why despite China's 'charm offensive' in the 2000s, did it have a soft power problem with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states even though it had a lot of hard power? Here, the hypothesised explanation of more effective soft power is at the risk of being falsified. As we shall argue, in agreement with Nye, in the next chapter, a state becomes attractive based on how it uses its hard power resources or how others perceive its power resources, preferences and behaviour.<sup>29</sup> In the case of China, it is found that it lacks restraint in its strategic behaviour. It is perceived as aggressive in the South China Sea. The causal inference developed in this thesis can be generalised into larger populations in terms of the necessity of hard power resources for effective soft power. The inference, however, can be falsified.<sup>30</sup> The hypothesis of this study, as we shall see in the next chapter, differs with that of Nye who, although conceding that hard power resources contribute to soft power, makes the assertion that soft power does not depend on hard power. It agrees with Samuel P. Huntington and others (see Chapter 2) who assert that hard power resources are essential for soft power to be effective.

### 1.3 Significance

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<sup>29</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba suggest, "We should always try to specify the bounds of applicability of the theory or hypothesis". King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 103.

<sup>30</sup> John Gerring notes, "...the broader the inference, the greater its falsifiability, for the relevant evidence that might be interrogated to establish the truth or falsehood of the inference is multiplied". Moreover, he suggests, "...hypotheses should be extended as far as is logically justifiable". John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 82. See also, King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 100-101. King, Keohane, and Verba also suggest, "...theories should be stated as broadly as possible as long as they remain falsifiable and concrete". King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 114.

This study is significant for several reasons. First, most of the studies on India's soft power largely focus on its potential non-military basis of soft power: (a) attractive culture, such as film, music, yoga, spirituality, religion, ancient knowledge, and literature; (b) political values and practices, including successful practices of freedom, human rights, democracy and pluralism; (c) foreign policies that respect and promote international norms and multilateral institutions; and (d) economic factors such as high growth, information technology, human resources, and foreign aid.<sup>31</sup> Pratap Bhanu Mehta equates soft power with "cultural hegemony" underlying the idea of "Greater India" in relation to Southeast Asia.<sup>32</sup> Ellen L. Frost asks Indian diplomats to "revive

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<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 58-63; David M. Malone, "Soft Power in Indian Foreign Policy," *Economic and Political Weekly* 46:36 (2011): 35-39; Nicolas Blarel, "India's Soft Power: From Potential to Reality?" in *India: The Next Superpower? IDEAS Special Report* (London: London School of Economics, 2012): 28-33; Christian Wagner, "India's Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 66: 4 (2010): 333-342; Deepa Ollapally, "India: The Ambivalent Power in Asia," *International Studies* 48:3-4 (2011): 201-222; Devesh Kapur, "Introduction: Future Issues in India's Foreign Policy: Ideas, Interests and Values," *India Review* 8:3(2009): 200-208; David Scott, "India's 'Extended Neighbourhood' Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power," *India Review* 8:2(2009):137; Dinshaw Mistry, "A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of India as an Emerging World Power," *India Review* 3:1(2004):80; Daniel Twining, "India's Relations with Iran and Myanmar: 'Rogue State' or Responsible Democratic Stakeholder?" *India Review* 7:1(2008): 29; Rani D. Mullen and Sumit Ganguly, "The Rise of India's Soft Power: It's Not Just Bollywood and Yoga Anymore," *Foreign Policy*, May 8, 2012, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/08/the\\_rise\\_of\\_indian\\_soft\\_power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/08/the_rise_of_indian_soft_power); Bibek Debroy, "India's Soft Power and Cultural Influence," in *Challenges of Economic Growth, Inequality and Conflict in South Asia*, ed. Tai Yong Tan (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 107-125; Uma Purushothaman, "Shifting Perceptions of Power: Soft Power and India's Foreign Policy," *Journal of Peace Studies* 17:2&3(2010), [http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228325626\\_Shifting\\_Perceptions\\_of\\_Power\\_Soft\\_Power\\_and\\_India's\\_Foreign\\_Policy](http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228325626_Shifting_Perceptions_of_Power_Soft_Power_and_India's_Foreign_Policy); Rosita Dellios and R. James Ferguson, "Sino-Indian Soft Power in a Regional Context," *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*, The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, 9: 2 (2011): 1-20; Herbert Wulf, "India's Aspirations in Global Politics: Competing Ideas and Amorphous Practices," INEF-Report, 107/2013, <https://inef.uni-due.de/cms/files/report107.pdf>, accessed on February 22, 2014, 30-34; Ellen L. Frost, "India's Role in East Asia: Lessons from Historical and Cultural Linkages," RIS Discussion Paper No. 147, [http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/RIS\\_Frost\\_2009.pdf](http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/RIS_Frost_2009.pdf), 10-11; Jahangir Pocha, "The Rising 'Soft Power' of India and China," *New Perspectives Quarterly* (2003), [http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2003\\_winter/pocha.html](http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2003_winter/pocha.html); Joseph S. Nye, "Springing Tiger," *India Today*, September 25, 2006, <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/news-archive/springing-tiger>; George Perkovich, "Is India a Major Power," *The Washington Quarterly* 27: 1(2003-04): 129-144; Amit Kumar Gupta, "Commentary on India's Soft Power and Diaspora," *International Journal On World Peace* XXV: 3 (2008): 61-68; and Christophe Jaffrelot, "India: Power, To What End?" *Politique Internationale* (Autumn 2006), [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/0904\\_Jaffrelot\\_AN.doc.pdf](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/0904_Jaffrelot_AN.doc.pdf).

<sup>32</sup> Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Still under Nehru's Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India," *India Review* 8:3 (2009): 213.

and build on India's historical and cultural legacy in Asia without appearing to be seeking hegemony or trumpeting a chauvinist vision".<sup>33</sup> Thus, while culture can be an important source of soft power, cultural hegemony may not be attractive. Mehta rightly suggests that the success of India's pluralist democracy and economy can be emulated by others, which can create soft power by "example."<sup>34</sup> However, the potential soft power resources noted above are not real soft power in themselves, as will be seen in the next chapter.

While several scholars have written on the scope, domain and benefits of India's soft power, they have done so with insufficient process tracing, thereby failing to provide sufficiently convincing explanations for the exercise of soft power.<sup>35</sup> According to Itty Abraham, India's failure in many non-military issue-areas of national interest is because of its exclusive focus on hard power, and its imitation of great powers, which have caused it to lose the "credibility" of its "uniqueness" and "difference".<sup>36</sup> Abraham, however, does not give sufficiently convincing causal explanations for this argument. His suggestions are to export India's domestic successes, and that provision of humanitarian assistance and foreign aid can enhance India's soft power, but it is not clear how India could succeed in such efforts without the support of hard power resources, especially economic resources.<sup>37</sup> Nicolas Blarel comments that India's soft

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<sup>33</sup> Frost, "India's Role in East Asia," 10.

<sup>34</sup> Mehta, "Still under Nehru's Shadow?" 218-219.

<sup>35</sup> See Malone, "Soft Power in Indian Foreign Policy," 37-38; Blarel, "India's Soft Power," 32; Wagner, "India's Soft Power," 336-340; Purushothaman, "Shifting Perceptions of Power"; Saurabh Shukla, "Soft power," *India Today*, October 30, 2006, <http://archives.digitaltoday.in/indiatoday/20061030/diplomacy.html>. On the relationship between India's soft power and its diaspora in the US, Rafiq Dossani analyses how the Indian-Americans have contributed to India's soft power by, for example, successfully lobbying for the US-India civil nuclear deal. However, he does not suggest that Indian diaspora caused the deal. He raises their limitation to enhance India's soft power in relation to the US in the case of divergent interests. Rafiq Dossani, "Indian Soft Power and Associations of the American Diaspora," Occasional Paper, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, November 18, 2009, [http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22997/Indian\\_Soft\\_Power\\_%26\\_Diaspora\\_Associations\\_Nov09-1.pdf](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22997/Indian_Soft_Power_%26_Diaspora_Associations_Nov09-1.pdf). Christophe Jaffrelot argues that democracy is a "core" element of India's soft power, and without sufficient causal explanation, he links it to the nuclear exception given to it by the West. Jaffrelot, "India."

<sup>36</sup> Itty Abraham, "The Future of Indian Foreign Policy," *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42:42 (Oct. 20 - 26, 2007): 4209-4212.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 4210-4212.

power would be enhanced when it is founded on “material power”; but he does not flesh out this argument.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul argue that soft power resources complement hard power resources, but they too fail to elaborate on this.<sup>39</sup> There are others who believe that India needs to combine hard and soft power, but do not offer any detailed analyses of the nature of such integration.<sup>40</sup>

However, others recognise the close relationship between soft and hard power, and believe that India can project its soft power through its military resources. Walter C. Ladwig, for example, suggests that India can project its soft power through military resources by taking part in peacekeeping, protection of sea-lanes of communication (SLOC), humanitarian relief and non-combatant evacuation.<sup>41</sup> However, it needs to be understood that these are means of exercising soft power, but not soft power. John Lee argues that democratic India’s potential soft power in Asia is not based on its culture, but on its rise, which “complements rather than challenges the preferred strategic, cultural and normative regional order”. That is why India is welcomed in Southeast Asia, both as a “security partner” and as a regional player.<sup>42</sup> He gives the example of the Indian Navy’s peacetime mission after the 2004 Asian tsunami to underline the argument that India’s soft power arises from its military power.<sup>43</sup> He ascribes India’s limited soft power to (a) its neglect of soft power “as a tool of statecraft” and “cultural diplomacy”, and (b) the “lingering doubts as to whether the country can continue to rise by developing its ‘hard power’ credentials and capabilities”.<sup>44</sup> This study is in accord with his argument that says, “...it is doubtful that ‘soft power’ in any meaningful (i.e.

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<sup>38</sup> Blarel, “India’s Soft Power,” 31. Jehangir Pocha also argues that underlying India’s successful cultural bases of soft power is its economic liberalisation of the 1990s. Pocha, “Rising ‘Soft Power’ of India and China.”

<sup>39</sup> Nayar and Paul, *India in the World Order*, 57.

<sup>40</sup> Purushothaman, “Shifting Perceptions of Power.”

<sup>41</sup> Walter C. Ladwig, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” *Asian Survey* 50: 6 (2010): 1162-1183.

<sup>42</sup> John Lee, “Unrealised Potential: India’s ‘Soft Power’ Ambition in Asia,” *CIS Foreign Policy Analysis*, No.4 (June 2010):1-9.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 10. A similar position is also taken by Nye. Nye, “Springing Tiger.”

<sup>44</sup> Lee, “Unrealised Potential,” 1.

instrumental) sense can exist without formidable ‘hard power’ resources”.<sup>45</sup> However, his analysis of India’s soft power vis-à-vis the East Asian region suffers from insufficient process tracing as to how its economic and military resources are producing preferred outcomes through various modalities. Jacques E. Hymans includes both military and non-military aspects of India’s soft power relations with the US since the beginning of the Cold War, but fails in giving a fuller account of the soft power process.<sup>46</sup> The present work builds on the above studies and offers a more systematic and rigorous analysis of India’s soft power which becomes more or less effective depending on the levels of hard power.

This study is concerned with state-to-state relations for effective analysis of the causal concept of power.<sup>47</sup> It uses the “process tracing” method discussed below, to assess whether and how India achieves its preferred outcomes largely through the mechanism of “attraction” as discussed in chapter 2.<sup>48</sup> In exploring the causal mechanisms, this study contributes to a fuller understanding of soft power in a relational power framework and conforms to Nye’s conceptualisation, thereby filling the existing conceptual and empirical gaps in the understanding of India’s soft power.

Second, since the argument of the study is rooted in the interplay between soft and hard power, the study sheds empirical light on their relationship and establishes how soft power becomes more effective when it is backed up by high level of hard power. It does not, however, analyse the extent to which soft power might undercut soft power or the extent to which, in the reverse direction, soft power affects hard power.

Third, there exists a large body of literature on Indo-US relations during both the periods studied here, which deals with alternative variables as well as soft power

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>46</sup> Jacques E. C. Hymans, “India’s Soft Power and Vulnerability,” *India Review* 8.3 (2009): 234–265.

<sup>47</sup> This aspect is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

<sup>48</sup> The concepts of “benignity” or benign power, competence and like-mindedness are defined in the next chapter.

variables such as shared value of democracy. The literature, however, does not use the soft power framework, which can, with an explanatory and generalised hypothesis, offer a new way of analysing bilateral relations.<sup>49</sup> This study uses soft power as a new kind of explanatory variable to ascertain whether and how India has exercised power vis-à-vis the US, thereby identifying its actual soft power resources. The study's major contribution lies in establishing the validity of the causal inference about the dependence of soft power on hard power by using primary and secondary sources of evidence. It is hoped that this study will trigger more case studies on the validity of its argument, both with respect to India's relationship with the US, and with respect to other strategic relationships.

Fourth, both offensive realism and power transition theory equate systemic power shifts with conflict, failing to control cases of peaceful rise of great powers.<sup>50</sup> This study assesses whether India's soft power is linked to its acceptance and accommodation by the US as a rising power. As the study finds this to be the case, it argues that power can be a non-zero sum for both the actors in a dyadic relationship. Thus, it is also relevant in the context of this important aspect of international order.

This study is also significant for its policy relevance. How should India conceive of and invest in its growing soft power? How should policymakers conceive of and employ it in order to be able to accomplish national interests? Some key points are as follows.

First, *power resources become differentially effective across contexts*. This means policymakers have to recognise that approaching power in terms of resources gives rise to a potential power problem, which results in limiting a state's ability to extend its influence. Therefore, they need to know who is the target, what are the preferences of the target, and what is the issue on which they seek to influence the target before mobilising power resources for soft (or hard) power. After carefully assessing the goals

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<sup>49</sup> The only exception is as noted earlier the study by Jacques E. Hymans.

<sup>50</sup> See M. Taylor Fravel, "International Relations Theory and China's Rise: Assessing China's Potential for Territorial Expansion," *International Studies Review* 12:4 (2010): 505-506.

and the target, and its preferences, they need then to decide the means: attraction or coercion.

Second, *for soft power, the dimension of attraction is the key to soft power.* Once it is decided that the target country can be influenced by attraction, mobilising resources for attraction is important. The political utility of power resources in the form of soft or hard power depends on the way they are used across different scopes and domains. Such attraction can be based on any resource, including military. A state's dependence on hard power resources for effective soft power is not very well acknowledged or articulated by Indian policymakers.

Third, *the role of soft power based on culture, political values and foreign policy is at times overemphasised, ignoring the significance of economic and military hard power resources for soft power and influence.* Economic and military resources are not only the foundations of hard power, but of soft power as well. Any true assessment of a soft power resource depends on how it is used, against whom and on which issue. Again, a state needs hard power resources not only to address its vulnerability, but also to support other soft power resources to produce effective power. How is it possible for a state to provide "public goods" and find commonalty/compatibility of interest with others, thereby enhancing its soft power without sufficient economic and military power resources? A democracy can enhance its attractiveness and be an example for others only when it is associated with material success. Otherwise, it will be seen as flawed. Therefore, policymakers need to understand that military power resources can be used for the soft power of attraction in various modes, such as providing security, protection and assistance, maintaining military restraint, and supporting a stable balance of power. Similarly, economic resources can be used to provide aid and assistance, and to project itself as a liberal power. In addition, both these resources undergird a country's effective soft power.

Fourth, *policymakers need to assess whether cultural diplomacy on a grand scale really contributes to soft power in terms of preferred outcomes.* They need to assess their culture in relation to the culture of the target. At the same time, they need to consider their own economic strength, political stability and military power in relation to the target country. A culture resting on the foundation of a weak state when compared to the target is not going to be very effective. Therefore, policymakers need to ponder over the cultural factor and rebalance it in relation to other elements of power in foreign policy strategy. Importantly, they first need to identify the target and the issue that they are concerned with.

Finally, *the utility of military power may have reduced today,*<sup>51</sup> *but it remains vital for hard power as well as soft power.*<sup>52</sup> As noted earlier, its utility depends on contexts.

#### **1.4 Research Methodology**

To demonstrate whether and how India's levels of hard power is causally linked to the hypothesised outcome variables, the methodological approach selected here is the "case study" approach. This "within-case" approach with the benefit of "internal validity" offers the best means to examine the "causal mechanisms" and effects of hard power resources on preferred outcomes by using, in a "qualitative" and "intensive" way, the "process tracing method".<sup>53</sup> This study's central question in the form of a "why" question, i.e. why India's soft power has been more effective in one period than the other, supports its preference for case study research.<sup>54</sup>

This section discusses (a) the basis of case selection, (b) the methods selected to aid the development of the hypothesised relationship between hard power resources and

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<sup>51</sup> See Nye, *The Future of Power*, 29-31.

<sup>52</sup> The contribution of military resources for soft power is discussed more in the next chapter.

<sup>53</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 1, 17, 43, 49 and 65. Also see, George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 224.

<sup>54</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2014), 11.

effective soft power as preferred outcomes, and (c) the sources of evidence (or data) in validating the hypothesised explanation.

#### *1.4.1 Basis of Case Selection*

India faces the great power of the US in three “concentric circles” of its international relations underlying its grand-strategic objectives: (a) the South Asian neighbourhood; (b) the extended neighbourhood; and (c) the world stage.<sup>55</sup> The US has been the predominant global power during both the periods this study deals with. This predominance has not only attracted a great deal of attention from Indian policymakers leading to greater interaction between India and the US, but has also been one of the factors determining India’s power and influence in world politics in all the three circles. As Rudra Chaudhuri argues, “...India’s relationship with the US has been the most comprehensive association the country has had since independence.”<sup>56</sup> The case study of India-US relations, thus, presents ample scope for analysing India’s exercise of soft power. This, though, does not mean that other states are unimportant for India. For example, countries in its extended neighbourhood of Southeast Asia have also drawn considerable attention from Indian policymakers during both these periods, especially in the post-Cold War period when global power has been shifting from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, thanks to the rise of China. There too India encounters US power, which has either bolstered or undermined its influence. Thus, the selection of this case is *intentional* and “consistent” with its “research objectives and strategy”.<sup>57</sup>

Instead of taking up more “cross-case” examples, this study makes “within-case” comparative analyses of India’s soft power processes in relation to the US during two distinct phases, 1947–1964 and 1998–2013, wherein the values of dependent variables

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<sup>55</sup> C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Balance of Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 85:4 (2006): 18.

<sup>56</sup> Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 254.

<sup>57</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 139.

vary.<sup>58</sup> The selection of this case study with distinct observations (on the dependent variable, i.e. preferred outcomes) in relation to the two phases has been made because of their marked differences. The explanation for these differences points to the conditions wherein soft power becomes the more effective power and thus develops the explanation presented in this thesis.<sup>59</sup> The first period shows that India's soft power in terms of preferred outcomes is limited, whereas in the later period the soft power outcomes are more favourable and therefore more effective.<sup>60</sup>

By juxtaposing the two contrasting observations, we can identify India's real sources of soft power and the causes of its effectiveness, which can hold across cases. The India-US relations during the Clinton era, especially till 1998, is discussed in a limited way as an instance of possible falsification of the causal explanation advanced in this study. This test will establish the validity of the causal argument. Similarly, the failures of China in its power of attraction vis-à-vis the Southeast Asian region is discussed to a very limited extent to validate the causal inference made in this case study in order to avoid "selection bias" in the case studies.<sup>61</sup>

Henry E. Brady, David Collier, and Jason Seawright note that in the within-case analysis, "even one causal-process observation may be valuable in making inferences".<sup>62</sup> According to Gerring, "Sometimes, in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of examples".<sup>63</sup> The single case study chosen here has only five "observations" across two periods of India's soft power relations with the US, which thus does not render scope for large-N

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<sup>58</sup> For selection of the dependent variable, see King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 129-130, 141 and 208.

<sup>59</sup> A single case can entail multiple observations across time. For details on the difference between a case and observation, see King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 117-118.

<sup>60</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba suggest that we should "choose a dependent variable that represents the variation we wish to explain". See King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 108.

<sup>61</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 127

<sup>62</sup> Henry E. Brady, David Collier, and Jason Seawright, "Refocusing the Discussion of Methodology," in *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., eds. Henry E. Brady, David Collier, and Jason Seawright (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 24.

<sup>63</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 1. Also see, for how to get more observations, King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 219.

statistical/quantitative studies.<sup>64</sup> Thus, the temporal variation of this single case study presents it as, what Gerring calls, a “diachronic analysis”.<sup>65</sup>

#### *1.4.2 Methods*

Case study research is to a limited extent susceptible to measurement errors as it can thoroughly evaluate “a few variables along several qualitative dimensions”, instead of “having to quantify variables across many cases”.<sup>66</sup> It is concerned with two questions: (a) “What is this a case of?” and (b) “From what historical pathway did this event emerge?”<sup>67</sup> A causal mechanism helps explain the supposed relationship between X and Y or the “causal pathway, or connecting thread,” between them.<sup>68</sup> In other words, it specifies the ways the “effects are exerted”.<sup>69</sup> There is, according to Gerring, “...a methodological affinity between weak causal relationships and large-N cross-case analysis, and between strong causal relationships and case study analysis”. Moreover, a causal relationship can become *deterministic*, if “X is assumed to be necessary and/or sufficient for Y’s occurrence”.<sup>70</sup>

The causal explanation to be validated conforms to this principle that economic and military hard power resources are *necessary* for the effectiveness of soft power. Gerring also points to the well-established association between case study research design and “causal arguments”, which are “deterministic”. Cross-case research, on the other hand, has been affiliated with “slight and highly probabilistic” casual arguments.<sup>71</sup> He underlines the need for case studies to be, at some point, *generalised*.<sup>72</sup> The present analysis provides the basis for such future generalisations. To a very

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<sup>64</sup> For the difference between case and observation, see Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 21.

<sup>65</sup> See Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 19 and 27.

<sup>66</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 220.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 148.

<sup>68</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 73.

<sup>69</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 85-86.

<sup>70</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 54.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

limited degree, this study's explanatory sketch covers cross-case examples, such as China's soft power vis-à-vis the ASEAN countries in order to demonstrate the potential for generalisation across cases. This study also gives the example of Pakistan's limited soft power influence over the US in the post-Cold War period.

The process tracing method can be used to develop theories.<sup>73</sup> It enables an investigator to explore “the chain of events or decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes”.<sup>74</sup> This establishes the causal inference by helping to adjudicate among different explanations.<sup>75</sup> It examines “‘diagnostic’ pieces of evidence within a case” and supports or eliminates alternative hypotheses.<sup>76</sup>

The process tracing method can address two problems, which are faced by researchers when employing only statistical analysis: (a) causal direction; and (b) spuriousness. The first one can be addressed by focusing on “sequencing of who knew what, when, and what they did in response”. Process tracing can also address the problem of spuriousness by helping establish “a causal chain of steps connecting X and Y”, and testing whether there exists similar “evidence for other variables that may have caused both X and Y”.<sup>77</sup> The process tracing from observed effects to possible causes and “from hypothesized causes to subsequent outcomes” helps us discover variables that have not been previously considered.<sup>78</sup> The alternative/rival explanatory variables are included to avoid “omitted variable bias” in the case study.<sup>79</sup> George and Bennett note that while excluding all but one explanation for a case may not be possible, excluding

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<sup>73</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 209.

<sup>74</sup> Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64. See also, Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*, Vol. 2, eds. Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), 35.

<sup>75</sup> Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in *Rethinking Social Inquiry*, 207.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 208.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 208-209.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 209. For similar arguments, see George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 215.

<sup>79</sup> King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 168-178.

at least some explanations may be possible, which could help draw useful inferences for building theory and policymaking.<sup>80</sup>

Gerring suggests that for process-tracing study, what matters more is the “quality” rather than the “quantity” of observations.<sup>81</sup> In addition, as Andrew Bennett notes, in a process tracing study, it is possible that one piece of evidence can confirm/disprove an explanation. The crucial thing is the relationship between the evidence and the hypotheses, and not the quantity of the evidence.<sup>82</sup> Process tracing, George and Bennett argue, does not necessarily have to explore each observable detail, yet it can eliminate some of the rival explanations, thereby increasing our confidence in others.<sup>83</sup>

Since it is impossible to rigorously test several links present in a causal chain linking independent variable X and dependent variable Y in a case study, one needs to “reconstruct a plausible account” or a “counterfactual comparison,” that is, “what would have happened” if X “were different?”<sup>84</sup> George and Bennett argue that an explanation based on “a strong theory or generalization” does not need counterfactual analysis. They, however, do not reject its support to the process-tracing method depending on the researcher’s objectives.<sup>85</sup>

This study uses the effectiveness of India’s soft power as dependent variable, and levels of hard power as independent variable. The process tracing method is used to demonstrate how India’s political values and foreign policy or strategic behaviour and preferences supported by limited military and economic hard power resources failed to create much attraction, resulting in very limited Indian soft power vis-à-vis the US during the Nehru era. The limited soft power yielded limited favourable outcomes in terms of military assistance, which did not grow until the India-China tension that

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<sup>80</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 222.

<sup>81</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 180.

<sup>82</sup> Bennet, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” 219.

<sup>83</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 149.

<sup>84</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 182.

<sup>85</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 231-232.

increased in the late 1950s. The US economic assistance to India increased only from the mid-1950s. The US was mainly concerned with democratic India's economic collapse and coming under Communism. The null hypothesis is disproved by establishing the relationship between low level of hard power with limited soft power. It shows that there are no variables other than hard power that explain the limited effects of soft power.

For the analysis of India's soft power relations with the US during the post-1998 period, the process tracing method is used to show how India's military and economic hard power resources produce the dependent variable of more effective soft power in terms of dehyphenation of India and Pakistan, nuclear deal and close defence cooperation through the causal mechanisms of attraction and persuasion. It does not include the soft power variable of culture, as it is involved only indirectly in the process of soft power in the present case study. It however considers the role of India's democracy and foreign policy or strategic behaviour as of soft power of attraction.

If there were high and low levels of hard power during the Nehru era and the post-1998 period respectively, would the outcomes have been different? Such counterfactual situations would validate the argument of this study by demonstrating the role of hard power on the relative effectiveness of soft power.

This study also uses the method of "structured, focused comparison". This method proposes to remain "focused," i.e. concerned "only with certain aspects of the historical" case at hand. It is "structured" in the sense that one asks general questions consistent with the research objective "to guide and standardize data collection". This helps to make "systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible".<sup>86</sup> The following general questions are asked in the analyses of India's soft power during both the periods as the method of structured, focused comparison suggests. What was the relationship between hard and soft power? What are India's

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<sup>86</sup> George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 67.

soft power resources that were in operation during both the periods? Did these resources result in preferred outcomes?

The process tracing in this study primarily tries to ascertain whether and, if so, how US leaders and policymakers were attracted to India through its soft power resources, which in turn resulted in policies preferred by India. Policymakers can be attracted directly as well as indirectly via the public or third parties. Much of the emphasis is on the direct process.<sup>87</sup>

#### *1.4.3 Sources of Evidence*

The process tracing method can use evidence, which is both qualitative and quantitative.<sup>88</sup> This case study thus uses “triangulation”, that is, “multiple sources of evidence” for validating the causal inference.<sup>89</sup> The primary sources of evidence that this study relies on includes declassified documents, mainly American, supplemented by other archival official documents, such as official statements, interview transcripts, official press accounts, and any other documents and data published by the Indian and US governments, which are available in the public domain. The supplementary or secondary sources of evidence include books, journal articles, newspaper and web articles, interviews of analysts of Indo-US relations available in the public domain, and published opinion polls to validate the explanation advanced in this case study.

The data sources related to India’s economic and military relations with the US have been collected from the government websites of each country, and from secondary sources such as the CEIC WebCDM, published books, journal articles and other web sources. The relevant data on India’s economic growth and success for the post-1998 period have been collected from various secondary sources, such as the World Data Bank, the Human Development Index published by the United Nations Development

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<sup>87</sup> The two models are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

<sup>88</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 179.

<sup>89</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994), 90-93.

Programme, and the Global Competitiveness Index published by the World Economic Forum. Data related to India's economic growth prospects for the post-1998 period comes from Goldman Sachs. Similarly, the evidence of India's economic liberalisation for the same period has been collected from secondary sources, such as the Ease of Doing Business Index published by the International Financial Corporation and the World Bank, the Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation, the Enabling Trade Index published by the World Economic Forum, and from other published secondary works. The evidence of India's military growth has been obtained from the *Military Balance* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

### **1. 5 Structure of the Thesis**

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 first presents a literature review, briefly focusing on the two major approaches to power analysis, which are closely related to the concept of soft power: (a) the "elements of national power" approach; and (b) the "relational power" approach. It then analyses Nye's concept of soft power, which treats power both in terms of resources and in terms of relations, and discusses elements of soft power and its relationship with hard power. This chapter also sheds light on the causal mechanisms that link soft power resources to preferred outcomes and identifies the null hypothesis of this study, that is whether soft power is effective or not has no relationship with the levels of hard power.

Chapter 3 provides background information on India's potential soft power resources and modalities in general. Thus, it gives an account of India's potential soft power bases: its military, economy, political values, and foreign policy. In addition, it discusses various ways whereby India is shaping or mobilising these resources such as military diplomacy, economic assistance, cultural diplomacy, democracy promotion and public diplomacy, for political utility.

Chapter 4, which is the first part of the case study, shows that India's soft power resources of political values and foreign policy, when lacking the support of economic and military hard power resources, produced less beneficial outcomes for India vis-à-vis the US during the Nehru era. Indian soft power was sufficient to motivate the US to offer enough aid to prevent India from falling into the Soviet sphere of control/influence, but not more (i.e. not as much as India wanted). Had India not possessed any soft power and also had no hard power, it would probably not have received *any* aid from India.

Chapter 5, the second part of the case study, shows how India's soft power backed up by increased hard power resources resulted in more effective soft power outcomes vis-à-vis the US in the post-1998 period. As a result, India succeeded in attracting the US to pursue a policy of dehyphenation between India and Pakistan, to engage in civil nuclear cooperation by reversing its domestic laws and changing international rules, and to build a closer defence relationship. The analysis establishes a clear linkage between India's rising hard power resources and the effectiveness of its soft power. It also invalidates the null hypothesis of this study that says that level of hard power have no bearing on the efficacy of soft power.

The concluding chapter offers general theoretical conclusions and policy implications. Following the empirical findings of the single case study, it reiterates the argument that India's soft power in relation to the US was less effective when it was supported by low level of hard power. Nevertheless, since the late 1990s, especially after India's successful nuclear tests in 1998, which followed India's economic reforms, India's soft power was backed by high levels of economic and military hard power, resulting in enhanced Indian influence vis-à-vis the United States.

## CHAPTER 2

### The Concept of Soft Power

The concept of soft power has in recent years diffused from academia to leaders, policymakers and journalists around the world, thus receiving “widespread acceptance and usage”.<sup>1</sup> Some also find the concept of soft power as “ambiguous” and its application as “problematic and uncertain”.<sup>2</sup> This study attempts to contribute to the ongoing debate on soft power: how to think about it theoretically and how to study it empirically. Underlying this debate is another critical question: what is the relationship between hard and soft power. This study examines India’s relations with the US to answer the question as to why India’s soft power has been relatively more effective in the post-1998 period than in the period from 1947 to 1964. The plausible answer is derived from the conceptions of soft power advanced by Joseph S. Nye and others who have elaborated it in resource and relational versions, and suggested that soft and hard power can mutually reinforce and undercut each other.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. The next section presents a brief discussion of the two approaches to power that is relevant to the concept of soft power. In the second section, I discuss the concept of soft power, and discuss its sources and linkages with hard power, thereby identifying this study’s hypothesis that soft power becomes more effective when backed up by high level of hard power. The following section presents the analytical framework of this study and examines some of the major literature on Indo-US relations related to the five observations of this study during both the periods as noted in the earlier chapter. The analytical framework shows how to validate this

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<sup>1</sup> Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos, “From Hegemony to Soft Power: Implications of a Conceptual Change,” in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (New York: Routledge, 2010), 12. Leslie Gelb likens soft power to “foreplay”, arguing that it does not render political utility on its own. Leslie H. Gelb, *Power Rules: How Common Sense can Rescue American Foreign Policy* (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 219. Similarly, Collin S. Gray equates soft power with fool’s gold in light of being understood “as a bona fide instrument of (American) policy.” See Collin S. Gray, “Hard and Soft Power: What is the Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century?,” Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, April 2011, 46.

<sup>2</sup> Zahran and Ramos, “From Hegemony to Soft Power,” 16.

study's hypothesis and disapprove the null hypothesis. The concluding section presents a summary of this chapter.

## 2.1 What is Power?

The explication of politics through "relations of power" is "ancient".<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the meaning of power is "elusive and complex".<sup>4</sup> There are, however, two seemingly contradictory but related approaches to power, which have been brought to bear on the question of what soft power is or how it should be defined: the "elements of national power" approach and the "relational" approach to power.

Power conceived of as resources or elements is closely related to "balance of power",<sup>5</sup> a concept, which suggests that fluctuations in relative power are an observable and measurable phenomenon.<sup>6</sup> Since power is derived from both military and non-military resources, the relative power of states has been "purely a subjective judgement".<sup>7</sup> The underlying assumption of quantitatively measuring national power through "single aggregate" variable (such as national income, total energy consumption, and gross development product) or "multivariate indexes" consisting of both military and non military resources is because of the desire to "find a *currency* of politics".<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Robert A. Dahl, "Power as the Control of Behavior," in *Power*, ed. Steven Lukes (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 38–39.

<sup>4</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 25.

<sup>5</sup> Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1971), 164. The idea can be traced to Thomas Hobbes who viewed power resources as a person's "present means, to obtain some future apparent good". Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 66.

<sup>6</sup> Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 743.

<sup>7</sup> Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New Brunswick, US: Transaction, 2008), 22.

<sup>8</sup> Richard L. Merritt and Dina A. Zinnes, "Alternative Indexes of Power," in *Power in World Politics*, eds. Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 11-28. See also Richard L. Merritt and Dina A. Zinnes, "Validity of Power Indices," *International Interactions* 14: 2(1988): 142.

In contrast to power as resources, the relational conception of power is concerned with *actualized* power rather than potential or *putative* power (resources), thus shifting the focus from “possession” to “interaction”.<sup>9</sup> Thus power is defined as “a relation among actors such that the wants, desires, preferences, or intentions of one or more actors affect the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more other actors”.<sup>10</sup> Such a definition of power overcomes the restrictiveness of using behaviour (i.e. overt responses/effects) as a dependent as well as independent variable, which fails to account for power relations established through anticipated reactions.<sup>11</sup> Specifying scope and domain is a must for anyone who uses a causal concept of power,<sup>12</sup> although there are other dimensions of power. According to Robert Dahl, a full description of a power relation requires references to: (a) the “base” of A’s power, i.e. the resources that A possesses, which can be used to influence B; (b) the “means”<sup>13</sup> of A’s power, i.e. instruments for exploiting the “passive” resources or bases by A to change the behaviour of B; (c) the “scope” (or “range”) of A’s power or “the matter over which the actor has power;” (d) the “amount”<sup>14</sup> or “extent of” A’s power over B, i.e. A’s “probability” of success in affecting the behaviour of B; and (e) “domain,” i.e. over whom A has power.<sup>15</sup> Another dimension of power is “cost”: the actor who can exercise influence cheaply is more powerful than the one for whom the exercise of influence is costly.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power* (New York, Basic Books, 1973), 14; James N. Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges*, Vol.1 (New York: Routledge, 2006), 143.

<sup>10</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1991), 32.

<sup>11</sup> Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Politics: Nature and Development* (New York: Harper, 1937), 16–18. See also Jack H. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 23–28.

<sup>12</sup> Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*, 14. There are also other important dimensions of power.

<sup>13</sup> The means are “numerous” and include, among others, “threat”, “promise”, “exercises of charm and charisma”. Furthermore, the means is “a mediating activity by A between A’s base and B’s response”. Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” *Behavioral Science* 2:3 (1957): 203. David A. Baldwin classifies the means of power into four: “symbolic”, “economic”, “military”, and “diplomatic” means. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” 2002, 179.

<sup>14</sup> Dahl in his later work uses “amount” interchangeably and “magnitudee”. See Dahl, “Power as the Control of Behavior,” 41. It is same as the dimension of “weight”. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” 2002, 178.

<sup>15</sup> Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” 203; Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 1991, 22.

<sup>16</sup> Baldwin, “Power and International Relations,” 2002, 178.

Dahl's definition of power, that is, *A* changing *B*'s behaviour against its first choice, failed to uncover another "face" of power according to which *A* can exercise power over *B* by "mobilization of bias" or "control over agenda" in an institution.<sup>17</sup> Steven Lukes suggests a "third" face: *A* can exercise power over *B* "by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants".<sup>18</sup> As Jeffrey C. Isaac writes, notwithstanding the differences between the formulations, they all agree to a causal conception of power which entails "a regular sequence of behaviours".<sup>19</sup> Peter Digeser introduced the "fourth" face of power derived from Michel Foucault's ideas of power wherein power is not in "anybody's hands" and is "never appropriated as a commodity or peace of wealth".<sup>20</sup> Preference over agential or structural power approaches indicates "different value commitments".<sup>21</sup>

Neither of the approaches on its own is "sufficient". In other words, the power of a state "exists and is subject to meaningful assessment only in so far as it is directed at and responded to by other actors".<sup>22</sup> Moreover, while power as resources is necessary for states to assess what can and cannot be done in terms of foreign policies, for its "productive and analytic value" it has to be "estimated in the context of its appropriateness to situations".<sup>23</sup> As David A. Baldwin summarises relational power

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<sup>17</sup> Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *The American Political Science Review* 56: 4 (1962): 952. See also, Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 25.

<sup>18</sup> Lukes, *Power*, 27.

<sup>19</sup> Jeffrey Isaac, *Power and Marxist Theory* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17. See also Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," 2013, 276. Robert O. Keohane, "Stephen Krasner: Subversive Realist," in *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World*, eds. Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 29.

<sup>20</sup> Peter Digeser, "The Fourth Face of Power," *The Journal of Politics* 54: 4 (1992): 980-990. Similarly, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall provide a structural analysis of power in their fourfold typology. Their conceptions of "compulsory" and "institutional" power can be explained by the relational power approach, but the conceptions of "structural" and "productive" power are not agent-centric although an agent can be enabled and constrained by such forms of power. See Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59: 1(2005): 39-75.

<sup>21</sup> Keith Dowding, "Agency and Structure: Interpreting Power Relationships," *Journal of Power* 1:1 (2008):31.

<sup>22</sup> Rosenau, *The Study of World Politics*, 141.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 142.

approach, "... 'who has power with respect to which other actors, on which issues?' 'By what means is this power exercised?' And 'What resources allow states to exercise this power?'"<sup>24</sup> As we shall see in the ensuing discussion, Nye defines soft power as a relational concept, which also includes soft power resources that cause preferred outcomes. This study adopts the same causal concept of soft power.

## 2.2 The Concept of Soft Power

Nye, like other relational power analysts, believes that the resources possessed by an actor indicate its potential power, and that actual power is reflected in its exercise, which can be described by referring to the scope and domain or context of power.<sup>25</sup> Although Nye has given many behavioural/relational definitions of power, in general he defines power as "the ability to affect others to obtain the preferred outcomes".<sup>26</sup> Of the three major means of securing preferred outcomes, "coercion", "inducement" and "attraction", he uses attraction to describe soft power.<sup>27</sup> Hard power, on the other hand, is the ability to make others do, through threats or rewards, what they would not otherwise do.<sup>28</sup>

Whereas some scholars have linked soft power with either second, third or fourth faces of power,<sup>29</sup> Nye describes the three faces of relational power through the concepts of

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<sup>24</sup> Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," 2002, 186.

<sup>25</sup> Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 5-18.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph S. Nye, "Responding to my Critics and Concluding Thoughts," in *Soft Power and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 216.

<sup>27</sup> Nye, "Notes for a Soft Power Research Agenda," 163.

<sup>28</sup> Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* 77: 5(1998): 86. For more on the relationship between reward and coercive power, see Klaus Knorr, *Power and Wealth* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 9-13.

<sup>29</sup> See Giulio M. Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations: A Synthesis of Realism, Neoliberalism, and Constructivism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25-31; Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," 2013, 276; Keohane, "Stephen Krasner," 29. Alexander L. Vuving, "How Soft Power Works?," Paper presented at the panel "Soft Power and Smart Power," American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, September 3, 2009, <http://apcss.org/Publications/Vuving%20How%20soft%20power%20works%20APSA%202009.pdf>; and Edward lock, "Soft power and Strategy: Developing a 'Strategic' Conception of Power," in *Soft Power and US Foreign Policy*, 34-35.

soft and hard power. In doing so, Nye also addresses Lukes' notion of shaping a subject's preferences in his soft power analysis.<sup>30</sup> First, *A* can change *B*'s existing preferences and strategies either through attraction or persuasion (soft power) or through force or payment (hard power). Second, *A* through the mechanism of attraction or institution set a legitimate agenda. Alternatively, it can use force or payment "to truncate *B*'s agenda" irrespective of *B*'s preference. Third, *A* can shape *B*'s original preferences using "attraction and/or institutions". It can also achieve the same result through force or inducement.<sup>31</sup> It is important to note here that the fourth face of power is more of a structural analysis than an agential one. This thesis is concerned with the latter in order to study India's soft power relations with the US.

The means of attraction as the causal mechanism of soft power is the common variable present in the analysis of the three faces of soft power. Nye says that attraction has to be positive, if it is to produce preferred outcomes.<sup>32</sup> Attraction is defined as "an attitude or a predisposition to respond to another in a positive way".<sup>33</sup> As Ted L. Huston writes, "...the consideration of attraction as a power resource is equivalent to asking why people like to be liked". Receiving "benefits" is one of the bases of the desire to be liked. If someone is liked, others may not harm him and may even offer help when required. "Benevolent friends" should not deliberately harm each other. Attraction as a power resource is linked to "friendship". A person is also liked through "persuasive communication".<sup>34</sup> According to Huston, similarity generates attraction as "it gives both parties to the relationship persuasive power over the other". Moreover, "...similarity, likableness, and complementarity of needs may all be antecedents of attraction" as they mitigate chances of conflict and enhances chances of exercising

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<sup>30</sup> Steven Lukes, "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power," in *Power in World Politics*, 97. Nye has also pointed out that he uses an "agent-focused" definition of soft power and that an agent can shape the preference and control the agenda as he prefers. Moreover, unlike Lukes, Nye uses preference instead of interest. Nye, "Notes for a Soft Power Research Agenda," 163.

<sup>31</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 91.

<sup>32</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 92.

<sup>33</sup> Ellen Berscheid and Harry T. Reis, "Attraction and Close Relationships," in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. 2, 4th ed., eds. Gardner Lindzey, Daniel Gilbert, and Susan T. Fiske (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 205.

<sup>34</sup> Ted L. Huston, *Foundations of Interpersonal Attraction* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), 204–205.

power.<sup>35</sup> John French and Bertram Raven use attraction as a key variable in their concept of “referent power”, i.e. “identification” of the target of power with the agent. According to them, greater attraction causes greater identification and, thus, greater referent power.<sup>36</sup> Susan T. Fiske et. al., in their empirical study, find that “people perceived as warm and competent elicit uniformly positive emotions and behaviour, whereas those perceived as lacking warmth and competence elicit uniform negativity”.<sup>37</sup> In this process, “people want to know others’ intent (i.e. warmth) and capability to pursue it (i.e. competence)”.<sup>38</sup>

Alexander L. Vuving at the level of state proposes three qualities of an actor that cause attraction: “benignity”, “brilliance”, and “beauty”.<sup>39</sup> Benignity includes “a wide spectrum of behaviours, ranging from doing no harm to others to actively protecting and supporting others”.<sup>40</sup> Behaviours such as “harmfulness, aggressiveness, and egoism” are antithetical to benignity.<sup>41</sup> Benignity causes “gratitude and sympathy” and thereby, attraction.<sup>42</sup> Brilliance or “competence”, in general, is “the property of someone or something that is capable or successful”.<sup>43</sup> Brilliance can create “myths of invincibility and inevitability”.<sup>44</sup> It can generate “admiration”, “respect”, and “emulation”, or “imitation”.<sup>45</sup> Beauty is “the quality that draws actors closer to each other through shared values, goals, or missions”.<sup>46</sup> Whereas contrasting causes and values can create mutual perceptions of ugliness among states, common values and

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<sup>35</sup> Huston, *Foundations of Interpersonal Attraction*, 210.

<sup>36</sup> John R. P. French and Bertram Raven, “The Bases of Social Power,” in *Studies in Social Power*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 163.

<sup>37</sup> Susan T. Fiske, Amy J.C. Cuddy and Peter Glick, “Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 11:2 (2006):77.

<sup>38</sup> Susan T. Fiske, Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick and Jun Xu, “A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 82: 6(2002): 879.

<sup>39</sup> These three variables were first introduced by Vuving and were later adopted by Nye. Vuving, “How Soft Power Works”; Nye, *The Future of Power*, 92.

<sup>40</sup> Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.”

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. See also Nye, *The Future of Power*, 92.

<sup>44</sup> Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.”

<sup>45</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 92.

<sup>46</sup> Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.”

causes make them appear as “beautiful” to each other, encouraging “confidence, friendship, and cooperation”.<sup>47</sup> As Vuving notes, “...a stronger form of beauty can be found in those who represent their ideals, values, causes, or visions in a compelling way, with strong confidence and convictions, and high energy and perseverance”.<sup>48</sup> Such perception lends legitimacy, reliability, and moral authority to the agent, that together make the object of an agent’s power look at him for leadership, precedent, and motivation.<sup>49</sup>

The concept of benign power/state is not new in the literature of international relations. According to Charles A. Kupchan, “self-binding” or strategic restraint is a means for exercising benign power. It can be codified as in the cases with Japan and Germany or it can be practised. Instead of maximising power, a benign state endeavours to “manage power”. Further, it promotes joint gains and abstains from behaving “in an extractive and exploitative manner”. It supports order based on shared norms and acts unilaterally “when multilateralism fails to produce an acceptable outcome”. He further notes, “...benign states seek not just to preserve the status quo, but to deepen its stability and cooperative character by reassuring other states and fostering consensual governance through the withholding as well as the exercise of power”. Exercising power in a benign manner does not cause balancing and “gives rise to the trust, shared interests and identities, and international institutions essential to escaping anarchy and fostering a community of states within which the rules of self-help competition no longer apply”.<sup>50</sup> Benign states refrain from “predatory behaviour”.<sup>51</sup> They seek “advantages, influence, and prestige”<sup>52</sup> and desire absolute rather than relative gains.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid; Nye, *The Future of Power*, 92. Steven B. Rothman adopts “diffusion of norms” as a mechanism of attraction. He argues that successful norms create attractions. Perceived competence or success is a quality that produces attraction. This has already been discussed by Nye and others. See Steven B. Rothman, “Revising the Soft power Concept: What are the Means and Mechanisms of Soft Power?,” *Journal of Political Power* 4:1 (2011): 57-59.

<sup>50</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,” *International Security* 23: 2 (1998): 46 and 46 n 11–12.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 49 n21.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 50-51n 24.

There are two types of hegemony: benign and predatory (or malignant). Whereas benign hegemony induces response of bandwagon, predatory hegemony attracts balancing, be it “traditional” or “soft”.<sup>54</sup> Benign hegemony is underpinned by the “logic of collective goods”.<sup>55</sup> The difference between benign and “coercive” hegemony is rooted in the mechanism or means used by the great powers. Whereas a benign hegemon is “accommodative”, a coercive hegemon uses “threat of intervention” and is unilateral.<sup>56</sup> According to realists, a hegemon bears the cost of the provision of global public goods for long terms gains in terms of “prestige, glory, immortality”.<sup>57</sup>

According to Robert Gilpin, the intangible concept of “prestige” is important for political outcomes.<sup>58</sup> It refers to “the perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capacities and its ability and willingness to exercise its power”.<sup>59</sup> In other words, it is the “reputation for strength” based on economic and military power (resources and exercise).<sup>60</sup> According to E. H. Carr, “If your strength is recognized [prestige], you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it”.<sup>61</sup> As noted earlier, a person with good intent and the capability to enact it causes positive behaviour. Therefore, competence and benignity are complementary causing attraction and soft power.

Persuasion is another means that is said to mediate between soft power resources and outcomes. Persuasion can be of two types: (a) “rational persuasion”, i.e. influence “through the means of rational communication – a successful effort by *A* to enable *B* to

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 54 n 31.

<sup>54</sup> Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 35.

<sup>55</sup> Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” *International Security* 17: 4 (1993): 13.

<sup>56</sup> Benjamin Miller, *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 218.

<sup>57</sup> Charles P. Kindleberger, “International Public Goods without International Government,” *The American Economic Review* 76: 1 (1986):8.

<sup>58</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13–14.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>60</sup> Ralf Hawtrey is quoted in Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 32.

<sup>61</sup> Quoted in Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 98.

come to an understanding of the ‘true’ situation by means of truthful information”; and (b) “manipulative persuasion”, i.e. when *A* attempts to persuade *B* by “means of manipulating *B*’s understanding”; it, therefore, is “deceptive”.<sup>62</sup> However, according to Nye, “...persuasion almost always involves some degree of manipulation”.<sup>63</sup> Following Robert O. Keohane, Nye suggests that most persuasive arguments include “assertions about facts, values, and framing that depend upon some degree of attraction and trust that the source is credible”.<sup>64</sup> Persuasion and attraction are as closely related as are persuasion and agenda framing. Nye argues that an argument framed attractively and seen by the target as legitimate is more persuasive.<sup>65</sup>

Janice Bially Mattern finds a problematic “dual ontology” in Nye’s conception of attraction as both *natural* (coming from universal values like democracy) and “socially constructed” (e.g. through public diplomacy).<sup>66</sup> Mattern offers an alternative “model” of attraction based on “verbal fighting”, a form of “representational force”, arguing that since attraction can be created through such representational force, “attractiveness tends to be suffused with coercion”. Thus, she holds, the distinction between soft and hard power is “unsustainable”.<sup>67</sup> Nye points out that attraction is not based solely on such representational force, and not all are susceptible to such influence. Further, a subject susceptible to soft power has “more degrees of freedom” than the freedom available under the pressure of any coercive instrument.<sup>68</sup> As discussed earlier, the distinction between hard and soft power is made on the basis of the means each of them uses to get preferred outcomes: inducement and coercion in the case of hard power, and

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<sup>62</sup> Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 1991, 40.

<sup>63</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 93.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid. Keohane, “Stephen Krasner,” 41.

<sup>65</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 93. Rothman includes “framing” as a means to exercise soft power, which he divides into two categories: normative and analytical. The former entails appeals to “morals” or “emotions” and the latter involves creating “causal” stories. He also uses another related mechanism, “rhetoric and discourse control” to cause soft power outcomes. Rothman, “Revising the Soft Power Concept,” 54–55 and 49–64.

<sup>66</sup> Janice Bially Mattern, “Why Soft Power Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and Attraction in World Politics,” in *Power in World Politics*, eds. Felix Berenskoette and Michael J. Williams (London: Routledge, 2007), 103.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 100, 106 and 110.

<sup>68</sup> Nye, “Notes for a Soft-Power Research Agenda,” in *Power in World Politics*, 168–170.

attraction and persuasion in the case of soft power. There are, as noted earlier, various causes of attraction addressing Mattern's concern for the understudied concept of attraction.<sup>69</sup>

As Nye notes, attraction hinges not only on the "qualities" of the agent of power such as beauty, benignity and competence, but also on how the target perceives them. A state with a particular power resource lacking the above mentioned qualities might induce "indifference or even revulsion". Attraction for one can be revulsion for another.<sup>70</sup> As Nye writes, "When an actor or action is perceived as malign, manipulative, incompetent, or ugly, it is likely to produce revulsion".<sup>71</sup> The dimension of attraction as a means of soft power mediates between power bases and outcomes. Attraction is a positive attitude or behaviour by the target of power who takes a positive action consistent with an agent's preference and whose attitude and opinion are shaped by the above qualities.

Gallarotti, in his analysis of "cosmopolitan power", adopts the concept of "endearment" in order to investigate the process of soft power, which he assumes, though without properly defining it, to be "a broadly representative term". He adopts it as a replacement for such variables as respect, admiration and emulation, which cause attraction.<sup>72</sup> However, he does not say why the concept of attraction, which has been adopted by Nye and Vuving in their analyses of soft power, cannot be adopted. The concept of attraction holds adequate breadth, so it will be adopted here.<sup>73</sup>

As described below, there are various types of resources or power bases that produce attraction. Besides traditional resources, soft power is also rooted in hard power sources. Nye suggests that various kinds of *resources* can engender soft power, "...but

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<sup>69</sup> Mattern, "Why 'Soft Power' isn't So Soft," 102.

<sup>70</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 92.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>72</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 21–22.

<sup>73</sup> Nye uses the term "co-opt" to contrast it with "command". According to him, attraction, persuasion and agenda setting are "co-optive" means. See Nye, *The Future of Power*, 21.

that does not mean that soft power is any type of *behaviour*".<sup>74</sup> As noted earlier, attraction and persuasion are associated with soft power behaviour. As Nye points out, there exists "distinction between coercive and attractive behaviour".<sup>75</sup>

### 2.2.1. Sources/Bases of Soft Power

Paul Kennedy while assuming soft power as "volatile" equates it with non-military and non-economic intangible resources.<sup>76</sup> Others view it very narrowly, including only culture and commercial goods.<sup>77</sup> James Traub equates exercise of soft power with "humanitarian helicopter missions" of the US Navy in the Indonesian province of Aceh after the 2005 tsunami.<sup>78</sup> According to Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, soft power derives from three major sources: "convergence of political values, an attractive culture, and policies that seem benign to others".<sup>79</sup> While the traditional

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<sup>74</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 20.

<sup>75</sup> Nye, "Responding to my Critics and Concluding Thoughts," 217. Nye's distinction between hard and soft power based on means used by an actor, which determines as to whether a particular behaviour is attractive or coercive should address the concerns raised by Zaharan and Ramos. Zahran and Ramos, "From Hegemony to Soft Power," 18 and 20.

<sup>76</sup> Paul Kennedy, "The Return of Soft Power?" *The New York Times*, October 13, 2008, [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/opinion/13iht-edkennedy.1.17797777.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/opinion/13iht-edkennedy.1.17797777.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0); Paul Kennedy, "Soft Power is on the up. But it can always be Outmuscled," *The Guardian*, November 18, 2008, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/nov/18/usa-obama-economy-military>. Similarly, Matthew Kroenig, Melissa McAdam, and Steven Weber equate nonmaterial resources to soft power. Matthew Kroenig, Melissa McAdam, and Steven Weber, "Taking Soft Power Seriously," *Comparative Strategy* 29: 5 (2010):413.

<sup>77</sup> Joseph Joffe, "The Peril of Soft Power," *The New York Times*, May 14, 2006, [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/magazine/14wwln\\_lede.html?pagewanted=all](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/magazine/14wwln_lede.html?pagewanted=all); Ying Fan, "Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion?," *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 4: 2 (2008):149; Niall Ferguson, "Think Again: Power," *Foreign Policy*, January 1, 2003, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2003/01/01/think\\_again\\_power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2003/01/01/think_again_power).

<sup>78</sup> James Traub, "The New Hard-Soft Power," *The New York Times*, January 30, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/30/magazine/30IDEA.html>. Brooke A. Smith-Windsor makes a similar argument in the context of Canada; Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, "Hard and Soft Power Reconsidered," *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2000): 53.

<sup>79</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. Katzenstein, "The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism," in *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, eds. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert Owen Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 286–287.

understanding of sources of soft power includes foreign policy, culture, and political values, soft power is also derived from economic and military hard power resources.<sup>80</sup>

#### 2.2.1.1 Traditional Sources

First, in order to produce soft power through foreign policies, states ought to show their respect for international law, regimes, and institutions that promote international cooperation. The “commitment to ‘playing by the rules’ in the service of the collective goods generates an image of dependability, sensitivity, legitimacy, and a stance against violence”.<sup>81</sup> Nations in order to generate soft power must also honour international agreements and commitments to alliances, show readiness to sacrifice short-term interests for shared multilateral issues, and articulate their interests in a way that supports provision of public goods.<sup>82</sup> It should be noted here, “...pure public goods are rare” in the sense that some are not benefited by it, especially in trade and security. Therefore, such goods can be termed as “club goods” or “partial public goods” enjoyed by many, if not all.<sup>83</sup> In this view, balance of power in Asia, preserving global commons such as freedom of navigation, openness in international economic system and supporting international regimes and institutions benefit many, with the exclusion of the few who do not benefit from broad goods.<sup>84</sup> Sometimes unilateralism can be a means to promote global public goods.<sup>85</sup> A rising power like India will be perceived as

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<sup>80</sup> Although Nye maintains that soft power is primarily based on attractive culture, political values and foreign policy, he also concedes that economic and military resources can contribute to soft power. Nye, *The Future of Power*, 21–22, 84–87 and 99.

<sup>81</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relation*, 29. Similarly, Vuving suggests that states “promoting peace”, exhibiting “normative principles” in their foreign policy, and conducting “foreign policy through international institutions and organizations” can produce the perceptions of beauty and benignity. Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.”

<sup>82</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relation*, 30; Nye, *The Future of Power*, 220–221.

<sup>83</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 215.

<sup>84</sup> See also Joseph S. Nye, “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods,” *International Affairs* 78:2 (2002): 241–243.

<sup>85</sup> Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Major Superpower can’t go it alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 160–161.

responsible and thereby produce soft power when it contributes to public goods.<sup>86</sup> It is pointed out that nations perceived to be holding “moral authority” would have greater soft power than others would.<sup>87</sup> A state following the principle of non-intervention in others’ domestic affairs and adopting multilateralism in foreign policies can also generate attraction and soft power.<sup>88</sup>

According to Christopher Layne, soft power does not help understand international politics as it is simply a “pithy term for multilateralism, institutionalism, the democratic peace theory, and the role of norms in international politics”.<sup>89</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt contrast *realpolitik* with “*noopolitik*”, and relate the former with military hard power and the latter with non-military soft power.<sup>90</sup> However, as Nye points out, soft power is compatible “with realist, liberal or constructivist perspectives”.<sup>91</sup> He argues that soft power as a form of power should not be neglected by the realists, as it can be politically costly.<sup>92</sup> Thus, in this sense, soft power can be understood as *power over* through attraction and persuasion, and not merely as *power to* and *power with*.<sup>93</sup> As we discussed earlier, a realist perspective also includes a great

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<sup>86</sup> Amrita Narlikar adopts public goods in a pure sense, but I adopt it in a generic sense as discussed above. See Amrita Narlikar, “Is India a Responsible Great Power?” *Third World Quarterly* 32: 9 (2011): 1608–1609.

<sup>87</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 84

<sup>88</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relation*, 30. See also Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.”

<sup>89</sup> Christopher Layne, “The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power,” in *Soft Power and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 71. Ernest J. Wilson III in a similar fashion, associates hard power with neorealism and soft power with liberal institutionalism. Ernest J. Wilson III, “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616:1(2008):110–124. David W. Keam argues that the practical value of soft power is limited to the realms of “shared norms and values” and “hegemony”. David W. Keam, “The Hard Truths about Soft Power,” *Journal of Political Power* 4:1 (2011):81.

<sup>90</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy* (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 1999), 40. A somewhat similar position is taken by Mark Haugaard while suggesting that realism fits with anarchy, and soft power based approach fits with a context that resembles “society”. Mark Haugaard, “Editorial,” *Journal of Political Power* 4:1(2011): 5.

<sup>91</sup> Nye, “Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts,” 219.

<sup>92</sup> Joseph S. Nye, “Forum: In the National Interest,” *Boston Review*, July 2, 2012, <http://bostonreview.net/nye-politics-information-age>.

<sup>93</sup> Haugaard, “Editorial,” 4-5.

power supporting the provision of public goods for goals such as prestige. Soft power and realism are compatible with each other.<sup>94</sup>

Second, both “high” culture, “which appeals to elites” and popular culture such as “mass entertainment” can contribute to attraction and soft power.<sup>95</sup> A culture which promotes universal values such as liberalism and tolerance and is successful is likely to generate soft power of attraction.<sup>96</sup> Culture can sometimes also lead to the perception of imperialism, thus producing repulsion.<sup>97</sup> States use cultural diplomacy to induce attraction.<sup>98</sup> John Lenczowski offers a long list of activities that come under the rubric of cultural diplomacy including exhibitions, exchanges, educational programmes, distribution of literature, language teaching, etc.<sup>99</sup> In this thesis, however, culture and cultural diplomacy are not considered in the case studies as their role in determining outcomes is largely indirect.

Third, soft power outcomes can be caused by political values and institutions. A nation has to respect them domestically and internationally in order to exercise soft power.<sup>100</sup> Based on “democracy, liberalism, pluralism, and constitutionalism”, these values and their successful practices can generate soft power.<sup>101</sup>

#### 2.2.1.2 Soft Power Aspects of Hard Power

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<sup>94</sup> Joseph S. Nye, e-mail message to author, October 15, 2014.

<sup>95</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, 11.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. See also Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 31; Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.”

<sup>97</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 35. See also Joffe, “The Perils of Soft Power.”

<sup>98</sup> Vuving, “How Soft Power Work.”

<sup>99</sup> John Lenczowski, “Cultural Diplomacy, Political Influence, and Integrated Strategy,” in *Strategic Influence: Public Diplomacy, Counterpropaganda, and Political Warfare*, ed. J. Michael Waller (Washington: The Institute of World Politics Press, 2008), 82–88.

<sup>100</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 84.

<sup>101</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 31. See also Vuving, “How Soft Power Works.”

Standard conceptualisations of soft power tend to neglect the soft facets of hard power, which are numerous. Economic resources can both induce and attract. A successful economy not only attracts but also provides resources for hard power for “inducements in the form of payments as well as coercive sanctions”.<sup>102</sup> Moreover, as Nye suggests, “Payments, aid and other positive sanctions” have both soft and hard power effects depending on the context of their use.<sup>103</sup> In real-world economic relationships, soft and hard powers are often found to be blended.<sup>104</sup> A nation’s “size and quality of gross domestic product (GDP), per capita income, the level of technology, natural and human resources, political and legal institutions for markets” are fundamental economic resources that contribute to both hard and soft power.<sup>105</sup> Liberal economic policies engender positive image and soft power as they provide “opportunities for economic growth in other nations”.<sup>106</sup> The provision of economic aid, assistance, investment and other economic benefits can also enhance attraction and soft power for a nation.<sup>107</sup>

According to Nye, military force can also contribute to the soft power of attraction although it is the “defining” base of the hard power of coercion.<sup>108</sup> When the use of force is perceived as benign, it can generate attraction. One example of this is fighting for friends.<sup>109</sup> If a country benefits from another nation that is fighting, it develops a positive image for the fighting nation.<sup>110</sup> Nye divides the use of military resources into four categories: “fighting”, “coercive diplomacy”, “protection”, and “assistance”. In the dimension of fighting, competence and legitimacy are two key variables that enable a state to exercise hard or soft power.<sup>111</sup> For example, Operation Desert Storm (1991) boosted American soft power because it was effective and, due to coalition

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<sup>102</sup> See Nye, “Notes for a Soft-Power Research Agenda,” 165–166.

<sup>103</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 76.

<sup>104</sup> Nye, “Notes for a Soft-Power Research Agenda,” 166.

<sup>105</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 52.

<sup>106</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 30.

<sup>107</sup> Vuving, “How Soft Power Work”; Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 35.

<sup>108</sup> Nye, “Notes On a Soft Power Research Agenda,” 167.

<sup>109</sup> Nye, *The Future Of Power*, 25.

<sup>110</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 34–35. See also Nye, *The Future of Power*, 25.

<sup>111</sup> Nye, *The Future Of Power*, 41–48.

involvement, legitimate.<sup>112</sup> Hard power can also undermine soft power. When a country uses its force with brutality and becomes indifferent to just-war norms, it can lose its legitimacy, which in turn can undermine its soft power.<sup>113</sup> The US-Iraq War (2003) shows that while the initial US invasion produced attraction through perceived competence, the subsequent incompetency in establishing order compounded by “perceived lack legitimacy in the absence of a second UN resolution” undercut its soft power.<sup>114</sup> The threat of force or coercive diplomacy for compellence or deterrence also can contribute to soft power in the perception of beneficiaries.<sup>115</sup> The mere possession of a strong military force can engender attraction.<sup>116</sup>

A state can also produce soft power by providing protection to an ally or friend.<sup>117</sup> Alliances such as the NATO not only augmented US hard power, they also helped it develop a network of “personal ties and a climate of attraction”. The US hard power, manifested in the military protection it offered to its allies during the Cold War, generated an atmosphere of soft power, advancing its “milieu goals of stability and economic prosperity in the Atlantic area”.<sup>118</sup> A state can also enhance its soft power by rendering protection against aggression, taking part in peacekeeping operations, and “overthrowing tyrannies”.<sup>119</sup>

Military assistance includes, inter alia, providing training, education and technical assistance to other militaries, engaging in military exercises, and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Such actions can cause the perception of competence and benignity and thereby cause attraction, affecting outcomes preferred

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<sup>112</sup> Nye, “Notes for a Soft-Power Research Agenda,” 167.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 168.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 168. See also, Nye, *The Future of Power*, 43.

<sup>115</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 44-47.

<sup>116</sup> Gallarotti, *The Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 33.

<sup>117</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 46.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> See Nye, *The Future of Power*, 249n70; Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 33.

by an actor.<sup>120</sup> Nye offers the example of the US Navy's new strategy, which aims at building partnerships with other states to promote "mutual trust". This strategy establishes military-to-military cooperation including joint training, assistance, exchanges, etc., and thus creates scope for the exercise of soft power.<sup>121</sup> Such activities can be included in the broader category of "defence diplomacy" involving the use of militaries and their infrastructure during the time of peace. Defence diplomacy involves several activities that in the past were described as military cooperation or assistance.<sup>122</sup> These include, but are not limited to, bilateral defence cooperation for training and provision of material aid and expertise on defence-related issues; and bilateral contacts and exchanges between military and civilian defence officials in the form of joint military exercises, appointment of defence attaches and placement of military personnel in partner countries' militaries.<sup>123</sup>

By relying exclusively on "image and diplomatic goodwill" at the expense of hard power, a state becomes vulnerable to another's use of force. This "saintly route" leads to "soft disempowerment". Power can be truly optimised only if hard and soft resources are diversified in optimally.<sup>124</sup> We will see below more linkages between soft and hard power.

### *2.2.2 More Linkages between Soft and Hard Power*

Soft power is "like a bit of an epiphenomenon", that is, one requires "a lot of hard power to produce much of the soft variety".<sup>125</sup> According to Samuel P. Huntington, "...soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power". Cultural and

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<sup>120</sup> See Nye, *The Future of Power*, 47-48. See also Larissa Forster, "The Soft Power Currencies of US Navy Hospital Ship Missions," *International Studies Perspectives* (2013):3.

<sup>121</sup> Nye, *The Future of Soft Power*, 47.

<sup>122</sup> Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, "Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance," *The Adelphi Paper* 44:365(2004): 6-7.

<sup>123</sup> Cottey and Forster, "Reshaping Defence Diplomacy," 6-7.

<sup>124</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 56-57.

<sup>125</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "Joe Nye was Right," *Foreign Policy*, January 19, 2010, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/19/joe\\_nye\\_was\\_right](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/19/joe_nye_was_right).

ideological attraction is rooted in material success and decline in economic and military power results in “self-doubt, crisis of identity and efforts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military and political success”. According to him, whether it was the appeal of the Communist ideology during the Cold War or the Western culture between 11<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries, it was rooted in economic and military power. Their decline is linked to their decrease in hard power.<sup>126</sup> Nye, however, gives examples such as the soft power of Vatican City and argues that soft power is not dependent on hard power and that a state can enhance or undermine its soft power on the basis of how it uses its hard power resources.<sup>127</sup> Zaharan and Ramos find inconsistency in his argument and point out that, in Nye’s examples, hard power resources are never missing.<sup>128</sup> Also in the case of the Vatican City, it has limited soft power appeal. It does not play any meaningful role on the dominant issues of world politics that involve major and great powers. If the Vatican City has historically been associated with poverty that is seen in a Third World country, then it would not have reached where it is today in terms of its influence. David Kern argues that there would hardly be any state possessing appreciable soft power that does not have a certain amount of hard power resources. Though a state’s way of using its power may be more important than its mere possession, this still presupposes a certain amount of resources that enable the state to plan and execute policies, which can create attraction. Attractiveness can be caused by soft power resources, but ultimately it is the hard power resources that would be determining the success of the state.<sup>129</sup>

According to Nye, soft and hard power can both reinforce and undermine each other.<sup>130</sup> In Gallarotti’s opinion their mutual relationship is “complex and interactive”. They “are

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<sup>126</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon and Schuster, 1996), 92-93.

<sup>127</sup> Keohane and Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” 86-87; Nye, *Soft Power*, 9-10.

<sup>128</sup> Zahran and Ramos, “From Hegemony to Soft Power,” 19.

<sup>129</sup> Kern, “The Hard Truths about Soft Power,” 74. Others have also taken a similar position. See, for example, Christopher A. Ford, “Soft on ‘Soft Power,’” *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 32:1(2012):105 and Ying Fan, “Soft power,” 151-152.

<sup>130</sup> Nye, *Soft Power*, 25.

neither perfectly substitutable nor rigidly complementary”. Exercising soft power may enhance hard power and vice versa.<sup>131</sup> Robert Cooper believes that there is no soft power without hard power and vice versa.<sup>132</sup>

A nation can generate hard power for itself by using its favourable image. A state’s favourable image can help it in its efforts towards augmenting its military-industrial capacity by, for example, helping it conclude favourable trade agreements with natural resource exporting countries or helping it find strategic locations for new military bases and co-development of military weapons.<sup>133</sup> Gallarotti, in a study of American “soft empowerment,” shows that the cultural attractiveness of the US produced scope for its hard power, which consequently reinforced its cultural attraction.<sup>134</sup>

On the other hand, building soft power can come at hard power’s expense.<sup>135</sup> For example, signing the Kyoto Protocol and the Law of the Seas will no doubt augment US soft power, but can arrest the US’ economic growth and its access to important resources. Similarly, joining the International Criminal Court would affect American overseas military operations. Gallarotti also maintains that the countries with the reputation of being extremely cooperative and respectful of international law might lose some credibility when threatening others.<sup>136</sup> However, there is scope for soft power wherein a state with a credible image of “loyalty” gains easier support from

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<sup>131</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 33. See also Mark Haugaard, “Editorial,” 7.

<sup>132</sup> Robert Cooper, “The Goals of Diplomacy, Hard power, Soft Power,” in *American Power in the 21st Century*, eds. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 179.

<sup>133</sup> Gallarotti, *Power Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 33-34.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 34 and Chapter 6.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.* Similarly, G. John Ikenberry also makes a similar case of soft power through “strategic restraint” by a winning state after the war, thus “conserving” its power. First, in losing some freedom to use force, the dominant state can build rules and institutions and reduce the “enforcement costs for maintaining order”. It is “far more effective over the long term to shape the interests and orientations of other states than directly shape their actions” through hard power. G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53-54.

allies, thereby reducing its costs. Nevertheless, a state's "intransigence to multilateralism" may antagonise others, potentially undermining its hard power.<sup>137</sup>

A state can use soft power resources such as institutions to coerce,<sup>138</sup> and a "winning" state in the post-war period can use its hard power to set up rules and institutions that are legitimate, thereby enhancing its soft power.<sup>139</sup> Gallarotti empirically finds how the economic primacy of the US and Britain based on economic hard power enhanced their soft power through emulation by others, which eventually engendered their hard power.<sup>140</sup> However, if hard power resources are used aggressively and unilaterally, they can undermine soft power.<sup>141</sup>

Having coined the concept of smart power that successfully combines soft and hard power, Nye suggests going beyond the "sterile debates over structural realism and structural liberalism, or realism vs. idealism" in order to locate the cases of successful integration of soft and hard power.<sup>142</sup> As Haugaard points out, "...in practice soft and hard power techniques are frequently mixed".<sup>143</sup> This study acknowledges the intrinsic linkage between soft and hard power and argues that while soft power plus hard power allows India to achieve its policy goals vis-à-vis the US, its soft power becomes more effective when backed up by high level of hard power.

### 2.3.3 Causal Models of Soft Power

Nye proposes direct and indirect models of assessing soft power. In the direct model, policymakers of the target country might be attracted and persuaded by the agent's

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<sup>137</sup> Gallarotti, *Power Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 36.

<sup>138</sup> Terry M. Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 6 (1990): 213.

<sup>139</sup> Zahran and Ramos, "From Hegemony to Soft Power," 18. See also Nye, "Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts," 216; Nye, *The Future of Power*, 21; Ikenberry, *After Victory*, 50.

<sup>140</sup> Gallarotti, *Cosmopolitan Power in International Relations*, 34 and Chapter 4.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>142</sup> Nye, "Notes for a Soft-Power Research Agenda," 172.

<sup>143</sup> Haugaard, "Editorial," 6.

beauty, benignity and competence which in turn produce preferred outcomes for the agent. Such perceptions depend on the agent's resources and behaviour.<sup>144</sup> The indirect model includes two stages. In the first stage, an enabling environment is created when third parties and publics are positively influenced by programmes such as cultural and public diplomacy. They subsequently influence the policymakers of the target countries.<sup>145</sup> Nye suggests that both the processes of soft power can be assessed by using the process tracing method. He also points out that public opinion polls and content analysis can estimate the presence of an enabling or "disabling" environment.<sup>146</sup> Nye's elaboration of the concept of soft power through attraction and its causal paths can also dispel doubts raised by others as to the causal/relational concept of soft power.<sup>147</sup>

In the indirect model of soft power, both state and non-state actors affect the development of enabling conditions for preferred outcomes.<sup>148</sup> This indirect way of creating attraction to foreign publics by a state also involves "public diplomacy", which can complement traditional diplomacy.<sup>149</sup> States through public diplomacy "sell the

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<sup>144</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 99-100.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 94-95.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.* Nye's reference to using process tracing method would address Layne's concern with the causal mechanism of soft power process. Layne also argues, "...the causal logic of soft power is undermined" for public opinion and it does not affect foreign policy making. However, as Nye rightly argues, Layne's argument "ignores direct effects, matters of degree, types of goals and interactions with other causes". Layne, "The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power," 54-54 and 57; Nye, "Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts," 218-219.

<sup>147</sup> See for example Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, "The Conception of Soft Power and its Policy Implications: A Comparative Study of China and Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17: 56(2008):446; Kearn, "The Hard Truths about Soft Power," 65-85; James Bernard Murphy, "Perspectives on Power," *Journal of Political Power* 4: 1 (2011):100; Alexandre Bohas, "The Paradox of Anti-Americanism: Reflection on the Shallow Concept of Soft Power," *Global Society* 20: 4(2006):409-410; Maiko Ichihara, "Making the Case for Soft Power," *SAIS Review* 26:1 (2006):198-199; Ford, "Soft on 'Soft Power'," 106-107; Ying Fan, "Soft Power," 153-156; Andrey A. Kudryavtsev, "A Systemic View of the Soft Power," Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Working Paper, 2014, [http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29922/RSCAS\\_2014\\_16.pdf?sequence=1](http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29922/RSCAS_2014_16.pdf?sequence=1); Alan Chong, "Singaporean Foreign Policy and the Asian Values Debate, 1992-2000: Reflections on an Experiment in Soft Power," *The Pacific Review* 17: 1 (2004): 95-133.

<sup>148</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 101.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 101-102. See also, Jan Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, eds. Jan Melissen, Donna Lee and Paul Sharp (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 3-27.

truth” in an “information age”.<sup>150</sup> This works at three levels: (a) communicating on issues of foreign and domestic policies on a daily basis; (b) “strategic communication”, that is, “developing a set of comprehensive messages and planning a series of symbolic events and photo opportunities to reinforce them”; and (c) “developing lasting relationships with key individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels”.<sup>151</sup> This, according to Jan Melissen, involves forging relationships with civil society actors in other countries and facilitating networks between non-governmental actors at home and abroad.<sup>152</sup>

Critics point out problems in these causal models of soft power and offer correctives. For example, Todd Hall proposes three distinct causal pathways of “institutional power”, “reputational power”, and “representational power”, which can replace the mechanism of attraction and are easily traceable.<sup>153</sup> However, the causal mechanism of attraction is a broader concept with much greater explanatory power. Matthew Kroening, Melissa McAdam, and Steven Weber do not sufficiently suggest why the mechanism of attraction is of little use, and offer three conditions to be present whereby a state can exercise soft power. While the last two conditions- change of attitude and its causal relation to outcome, are not new to the concept of soft power, on the third condition of communication, as the authors admit, an actor with an “unattractive message” will fail to shape the preference of the target even if it succeeds in communicating.<sup>154</sup>

A systematic approach to soft power of the kind discussed above can also address Brantly Womack’s concern with the “analytical fuzziness” of soft power.<sup>155</sup> Edward

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<sup>150</sup> Mark Leonard, “Diplomacy by Other Means,” *Foreign Policy*, September 1, 2002, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2002/09/01/diplomacy\\_by\\_other\\_means](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2002/09/01/diplomacy_by_other_means).

<sup>151</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 105-106; Leonard, “Diplomacy by Other Means.”

<sup>152</sup> Melissen, “The New Public Diplomacy,” 22.

<sup>153</sup> Todd Hall, “An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3:2 (2010): 189–211.

<sup>154</sup> Kroening, McAdam, and Weber, “Taking Soft Power Seriously,” 414-416.

<sup>155</sup> Brantly Womack, “Dancing Alone: A Hard Look at Soft Power,” *Japan Focus* 16 (2005), <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Brantly-Womack/1975>.

Lock's problem with Nye's conception of soft power is that it does not take into account the "inter-subjective" nature of social structures like norms or values when defining them as resources possessed by an actor.<sup>156</sup> However, Nye has largely adopted an agent-centred relational approach to power that also elaborates the bases/resources an agent possesses. In describing the constraints and enabling effects of democratic values in "multiple directions", Nye rejects the approaches of the structuralists.<sup>157</sup> Nye points out that choosing a particular approach or definition depends on "one's interest and values".<sup>158</sup>

As with power in general, soft power for some remains "vague and contested".<sup>159</sup> Ying Fan argues that the concept of soft power can be replaced by the concepts of public diplomacy and "nation branding".<sup>160</sup> As seen earlier, these can be useful means to exert soft power. Some even argue that soft power is not power, but influence.<sup>161</sup> Power can be differentiated from influence, but this study adopts power in the generic sense as others including Nye have done, and, in so doing, it conceives of power in terms of preferred outcomes.<sup>162</sup>

Many fail to understand the various dimensions of relational power, namely the bases/resources, the means, and the responses/outcomes, thus creating unnecessary confusion about soft power.<sup>163</sup> In light of the above discussion, it is safe to conclude that Nye's

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<sup>156</sup> Lock, "Soft Power and Strategy," 32-48.

<sup>157</sup> Nye, "Responding to my Critics and Concluding Thoughts," 217.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>159</sup> Philip G. Cerny, "Book Review: The Future of Power," *Journal of Political Power* 4:1(2011):146.

<sup>160</sup> Fan, "Soft Power," 156-157.

<sup>161</sup> See, for example, Murphy, "Perspectives on Power," 101.

<sup>162</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 6. Nagel uses power in a "generic sense" which includes various "power terms" including "influence" and "control". Nagel, *Descriptive Analysis Power*, 8. Baldwin also uses power in generic sense. David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics* 31: 2(1979): 162-163. See also Haugaard, "Editorial," 5-6.

<sup>163</sup> See for example Layne, "The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power," 53-58; Gelb, *Power Rules*, 219; Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2009); Owen Harries, "The Perils of Hegemony," in *The Right War?: The Conservative Debate on Iraq*, ed. Gary Rosen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 77; Barry M. Blechman, "Book Review: Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* 119:4 (2004/2005): 680 – 681; Jim Hoagland,

conception of soft power in a relational framework is more consistent and systematic than that of his critics by giving emphasis to important dimensions of power discussed earlier. Based on the above literature review on the definition of soft power, its relationship with hard power, and causal mechanisms, the next section presents the analytical framework of this study.

## **2.4 Analytical Framework**

This study is limited to Nye's general definition of soft power as the causation of preferred outcomes through attraction instead of following watertight distinctions between the three faces of power. Besides attraction, it examines the role of the causal mechanism of rational persuasion during the Singh-Talbott talks of the Clinton era. This study aims to establish how, as a weaker state, India exercised soft power vis-à-vis the US consistent with its preferences and thus, remains embedded in Nye's causal conception of power. The causal mechanism of agenda setting does not apply in the present case. This study considers attraction as deriving primarily from two sources. First, under domestic source, it is traced as to how India's democracy has caused positive attraction among the US policymakers during both the periods across the five observations this study considers and influenced the US decisions. Second, it traces the role of India's responsible foreign policy or strategic behaviour and preferences causing attraction and preferred outcomes. This study also adopts, unlike Nye, the concept of anticipated reactions as discussed earlier, which is based on preferences of the agent resulting in attraction and preferred outcomes. Such reactions can be related to strategic and foreign policy preferences or behaviour in the present case.

Additionally, it also has its primary focus on the direct process of soft power, that is, at the state-to-state level, which produced (or did not) the outcomes preferred by India. It does give some examples of enabling conditions for India's soft power created by the

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"Elasticity," *The New Republic* 230 :18(2004): 30-34; Joffe, "The Perils of Soft Power"; Ferguson, "Think Again"; Fan, "Soft Power," 150.

indirect process, noted earlier. With this direct causal model, this study tests the hypothesis that the effectiveness of soft power is determined by the levels of hard power. The effects of soft power are limited for the projecting state (in the present case, India) in achieving preferred outcomes in the form of preferred policies of the target state (the United States) with low level of hard power. In contrast, soft power becomes more effective when backed up by high level of hard power. It seeks to disapprove the null hypothesis of this study that the level of hard power has no relationship with the effectiveness of soft power. It does so by establishing a clear relationship between the levels of hard power and relative effectiveness of soft power and by eliminating alternative/competing variables that might apply, especially those used by the realist approach. It also applies process tracing as to how US made decisions on the five issues noted earlier during the two periods under low and high levels of hard power to establish the relationship between levels of hard power and relative effectiveness of soft power. Evidence showing no relationship between levels of hard power and relative effectiveness of soft power would support the null hypothesis.

This thesis uses the state that exercises (or tries to exercise) soft power as the 'projecting state' and the state that it seeks to influence as the 'target state.' We have seen above that soft power is dependent on hard power, that is, a projecting state exercises appreciable soft power with high level of hard power. How can we connect hard to soft power? A projecting state with low level of hard power would attract a low level of strategic interest from the target state and limited influence. Contrary to realist expectations that a target state's policy, being driven by hard power concerns, will not be influenced by a weak state, the projecting state that possesses significant soft power attributes will tend to exert appreciable influence, but this will be limited. This is shown in chapter 4. In contrast to this, the target state shows high level of strategic interests in the projecting state with high level of hard power. The target state is strongly attracted towards the latter if it possesses significant soft power. This is demonstrated in chapter 5. It can also be deduced that in the case of a projecting state

with high levels of hard power, but with low level of soft power the projecting state's influence on the target state will be limited or short-term.

**Figure 2.1 Projecting State's Hard Power, Soft Power and Influence on US Policy<sup>164</sup>**

	<b>Low Soft Power</b>	<b>High Soft Power</b>
<b>Low Hard Power</b>	<p><i>Insignificant influence:</i></p> <p>Pakistan – 1971 India-Pakistan War</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pakistan in 1971 is an example of a state at the time of the 1971 Bangladesh War with low both in hard and soft power aspects.</li> </ul>	<p><i>Limited influence:</i></p> <p>India - Nehru Era</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economic aid</li> <li>• Military aid</li> </ul>
<b>High Hard Power</b>	<p><i>Limited/short-term influence:</i></p> <p>Pakistan: post-1998 period: US partnership with Pakistan has been limited, notably in fighting Taliban and al-Qaida as shown in chapter 5.</p>	<p><i>Significant long-term influence:</i></p> <p>India: Post-Cold War Era</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dehyphenation of India and Pakistan</li> <li>• Civil Nuclear deal</li> <li>• Defence cooperation</li> </ul>

The figure above shows the relationship between hard power and soft power. When hard power is low soft power's effectiveness becomes low or insignificant as was the

<sup>164</sup> The categories are ideal types and actual states will have varying degrees of hard and soft power.

case of Pakistan in 1971 war with India. With high level of hard power and low level of soft power, Pakistan's influence was limited or short term vis-à-vis the US in the post-1998 period. Only the Indian cases, where hard power is low and high, are analysed at length in this thesis. The first period (Nehru era) in this thesis (chapter 4) shows that India's hard power in terms of economic and military power was low or limited while its soft power as a large and relatively stable democracy was high. This gave India the ability to attract US policies consistent with its preferences, but this influence was limited. Therefore, the US was not willing to extend high levels of economic and military assistance to India except to prevent it from collapsing under the weight of economic failure or military defeat which would have affected American struggle against Communism. During the second period (1998-2013) studied in this thesis (chapter 5), India's hard economic and military power resources increased considerably and its high soft power in terms of its successful and stable democracy as well as its foreign policy or strategic behaviour as a responsible power made it sufficiently attractive to the policymakers of the United States. As a result, the US changed remarkably from its well-established preferences and was prepared to make a U turn on three major issues by dehyphenating India from Pakistan, making an exception for India with regard to civil nuclear trade, and engaging in unprecedented military cooperation with it.

As noted earlier, this thesis will confirm the hypothesis also by showing that all other explanations for the US policies on the five issues as inadequate. The discussion below shows how the structural, domestic and leadership level variables are not sufficient in themselves.

## **2.5 Alternative Explanations**

It is argued that with the structural constraints of bipolar struggle, India and the US could not achieve a close relationship due to three factors: dissimilar worldviews,

divergent national priorities and asymmetric capability.<sup>165</sup> There is largely a consensus that the bipolar structure of the Cold War determined the American approach to India.<sup>166</sup> According to Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly, there were primarily two factors that aggravated the bilateral relationship: the Cold War and India's nonalignment policy.<sup>167</sup> Satu P. Limaye argues that the "discord" was mainly because of disparate national, regional and international priorities and concerns, which were rooted in their divergent histories, necessities, resources and outlooks.<sup>168</sup> It was a case conflict of vital security interests that alienated the two countries during the Cold War.<sup>169</sup> In the background of economic impoverishment, India's "urgency of domestic economic transformation required a minimum diversion of resources to defence weapons and forces". This urgency of addressing material weakness necessitated friendly relations with all through a policy of nonalignment.<sup>170</sup> Such a strategic behaviour conflicted with security interest of the US in the Cold War.

Ashley Tellis points out, for its "economic weakness", India was accordingly not taken seriously by the United States—except when absolutely necessary". India's war with China in 1962 was one such context.<sup>171</sup> India began receiving economic aid since 1951, although it was limited. It also received limited military assistance. A realist explanation would have concluded that India was weak in hard power and had conflict of interest with the US with the latter approaching the Cold war mainly in terms of

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<sup>165</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, *Unity in Difference: Overcoming the U.S.-India Divide* (Washington, DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 7-14. See also Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

<sup>166</sup> See Harold A. Gould, "U.S.-India Relations: The Early Phase," in *The Hope and the Reality: U.S.-India Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan*, ed. Harold A Gould and Sumit Ganguly (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); 17-39; McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, Introduction; Harold A. Gould, "The Reasons Why: The US Failure to Control the Nuclear Agenda in South Asia," in *India and the United States in a Changing World*, eds. Ashok Kapur, Y.K Malik, Harold A. Gould, and Arthur G. Rubinoff (New Delhi: Sage, 2002), 171.

<sup>167</sup> Gould and Ganguly, "Introduction," 2.

<sup>168</sup> Limaye, *US-India Relations*, Chapter 1.

<sup>169</sup> Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1993), xii-xiii.

<sup>170</sup> See for details, Raju G. C. Thomas, *The Defence of India: A Budgetary Perspective of Strategy and Politics* (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India Limited, 1978), 33-35.

<sup>171</sup> Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 11-12.

balance of power. Therefore, the US should have ignored provision of aid to India. The realist theory does not explain such positive response from the US even though it was limited.

According to studies, American concerns with Communism conditioned its economic and military aid to India.<sup>172</sup> Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly point out that India's adherence to liberal democracy caused high expectation in the US of a "natural affinity".<sup>173</sup> Besides "unrealisable expectations", shared values have caused the display of their differences openly and thereby exacerbated them.<sup>174</sup> Nevertheless, Tellis argues that shared value of democracy "prevented the two countries from ever becoming real antagonists, but was unable to eliminate the political disaffection that arose regularly as a result of divergence in critical interests".<sup>175</sup> As Raju G. C. Thomas points out, India's Western orientation in political system meant "there could be no question of parliamentary democracy being subverted from this direction" by the US either through war or "aggressive" military encirclement.<sup>176</sup> According Garry Hess, independent India's image in American elite perception changed from "flawed democracy" of the late 1940s and early to mid 1950s to "essential democracy" from the late 1950s to early 1960s attracting economic aid. The image of India finally shifted to "estranged democracy" from mid-1960s.<sup>177</sup> Chapter 4 will empirically show how democratic India on a foundation of low level of hard power exercised soft power of limited attraction, receiving limited economic and military aid from the US. Although the above studies do not make reference to soft power, shared value of democracy was a key component of India's soft power. Limited hard power meant, the US provision aid was only

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid; McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, Conclusion; Dennis Merrill, "The Political Economy of Foreign Aid: The Case of India, 1947-1963," in *Four Decades of Indo-U.S. Relations: A Commemorative Retrospective*, ed. A. P. Rana (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1994), 231-260; Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina, 1990). See also Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 270.

<sup>173</sup> Gould and Ganguly, "Introduction," 1.

<sup>174</sup> Limaye, *US-India Relations*, 9-10.

<sup>175</sup> Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 20.

<sup>176</sup> Thomas, *The Defence of India*, 36.

<sup>177</sup> Garry Hess, "American Perspectives on India, 1947-1990," in *Four Decades of Indo-U.S. Relations*, 170-171.

directed at saving democratic India from economic collapse and preventing it from Communism.

Most scholars agree that the overall transformation of the Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War was based on structural, domestic and leadership factors. The end of the bipolar Cold War and the disappearance of the Indo-Soviet and US-Pakistan security relations provided opportunity for the two countries to recast their bilateral approach to each other with India's preference for the policy of nonalignment losing its particular structural context. Besides, the rise of China also emerged as an important structural variable that pulled the two countries towards each other.<sup>178</sup> There exists unanimity among analysts on the argument that the upswing in the India-US relationship is based on several common or parallel interests or what some would call "convergence" of interests. Free from the structural constraints of the Cold War, India and the US have increasingly found common interests, such as maintaining stable balance of power in Asia, fighting against terrorism, working against proliferation of WMD, securing global commons, energy security, protecting environment and promoting liberal international trade.<sup>179</sup> In this context, balancing China was a major variable in the civil nuclear cooperation agreement.<sup>180</sup> According to Peter Levoy, "...banking on India's

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<sup>178</sup> See, for example, S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, "The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future," *Asian Survey* 47: 4(2007): 647-648; Dennis Kux, "A Remarkable Turnaround: U.S.-India Relations," *Foreign Service Journal* (October 2002), 19; Harsh V. Pant, *The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 21-35; Ashley J. Tellis, "What Should We Expect from India as a Strategic Partner?," in *Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation*, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 234-238; Dinshaw Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 9-10; Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 23 and 25-26; Baldev Raj Nayar, "India in 2005: India Rising, but Uphill Road Ahead," *Asian Survey* 46:1(2006): 95; Christophe Jaffrelot, "The India-US Rapprochement: State-driven or Middle Class-driven?," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 65: 1 (2009):5; and John Garver, "The China-India-U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," *NBR Analysis* 13: 5 (2002): 5-56.

<sup>179</sup> See Robert D. Blackwill, "The India Imperative: A Conversation with Robert D. Blackwill," *The National Interest* 80 (Summer 2005): 9-17; Tellis, "What Should We Expect From India As A Strategic Partner?," 241-242; and Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 25.

<sup>180</sup> See Strobe Talbott, "Good Day for India, Bad Day for Non-Proliferation," *International Herald Tribune*, July 21, 2005, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/07/21southasia-talbott>; "Transcript: Senior ex-US diplomat on India-US relations," *Financial Times*, May 6, 2009, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1ec735fe-3a12-11de-8a2d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz35ExauiFS>; C. Raja

growing global power and looking for a counterweight to China in Asia”, the US removed nuclear sanctions on India and engaged in defence and security cooperation.<sup>181</sup> For Harsh V. Pant, the Indo-US nuclear deal was “about the emergence of a new configuration in the global balance of power”.<sup>182</sup> He shows how changing power distribution at the systemic level converged with factors of national and individual levels to bring about the nuclear deal, and argues that “great power politics will continue to trump institutional imperatives”. Therefore, non-proliferation concerns were “peripheral”.<sup>183</sup> Indo-US defence cooperation became better only after the end of the Cold War. The factor of common interests drives this relationship, which includes struggle against terrorism and piracy, maritime security, stable Afghanistan, and disaster relief.<sup>184</sup>

Despite convergence of interests, as Tellis argues, “...short of the most desperate circumstances”, US-India partnership would not reach the level of alliance and would rather materialise in “strategic coordination”.<sup>185</sup> Mohan Malik argues that the factor of China “draws the two [India and the US] closer as much as it pulls them apart”. The existing power differential between them “influences strategic orientation of each toward the other”.<sup>186</sup> As Tellis argues, while “the rise of Chinese power ought to naturally intensify ties between Washington and New Delhi, the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership remains something to be produced by assiduous effort on both sides rather

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Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States, and The Global Order* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006), 73-81; Jaffrelet, “The India-US Rapprochement,” 7; George Perkovich, “Global Implications of the U.S.-India Deal,” *Daedalus* 139:1(2010): 22.

<sup>181</sup> Peter R. Lavoy, “India in 2006: A New Emphasis on Engagement,” *Asian Survey* 47:1 (2007):115.

<sup>182</sup> Harsh V Pant, “The US–India Nuclear Deal: The Beginning of a Beautiful Relationship?,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20:3(2007):455-472.

<sup>183</sup> Harsh V. Pant, “The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics,” *Asian Security* 5:3(2009): 273-295.

<sup>184</sup> See Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, Chapter 5; C. Christine Fair, “US–Indian Army-to-Army Relations: Prospects for Future Coalition Operations,” *Asian Security* 1: 2 (2005): 157–173; S. Amer Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement: Steady As They Go,” A Report of the CSIS Wadhvani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2012, 1-48.

<sup>185</sup> Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 33. Similar position has also been taken by others. See, for, example, Teresita C. Schaffer, “Building a New Partnership with India,” *The Washington Quarterly* 25:2(2002): 31-44.

<sup>186</sup> Mohan Malik, “India Balances China,” *Asian Politics & Policy* 4:3(2012): 364-365.

than a spontaneous outcome that materializes automatically”.<sup>187</sup> According to Hathway, “...it is up to New Delhi to demonstrate to the Americans that it is in their interest to institutionalize a new and closer partnership with India. Indian actions, at home as much as abroad, will have a large role in determining the future of this relationship”.<sup>188</sup> Tellis points out that the change in India’s behaviour regarding the three factors discussed earlier, that impeded close relations during the Cold War, contributed to a closer relationship between the two democracies: policy of nonalignment, planned economy, and “hesitant” approach to nuclear weapons.<sup>189</sup> According to him, an effective American containment policy, which led to the demise of the Soviet Union and the bipolar struggle, also made India’s nonalignment policy “irrelevant in one fell stroke”. As he further argues, the three elements that impeded and later helped close bilateral relationship “have not disappeared, even if their specific policy consequences have atrophied in varying degrees”.<sup>190</sup> Most importantly, besides power asymmetry, “bilateral collaboration could be stymied by competing national preferences over the strategies used to realize certain objectives”.<sup>191</sup>

As the above analysis suggest, India and the US do see more commonality than before, but India is still following an overall grand strategy that is not too far removed from “nonalignment”. Today, it may be called “nonalignment 2.0”<sup>192</sup>. It is not an ally of the US against its main adversary (China) and there are clearly drawn limits even to India-US cooperation, e.g. (a) on inter-operability and provision of logistics support on an on-going basis; and (b) India’s preference for closer relations with Iran. Therefore, the convergence of interests (as per a realist explanation) has some, but limited value as an explanation. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, it is India’s democracy and responsible

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<sup>187</sup> Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 31.

<sup>188</sup> Robert M. Hathway, “The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25:4(2002): 30

<sup>189</sup> Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 15.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, 17-20.

<sup>191</sup> Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 32.

<sup>192</sup> Sunil Khilnani et al., *Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century* (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012), [http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/working\\_papers/NonAlignment%202.0\\_1.pdf](http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/working_papers/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf).

strategic behaviour that brings them closer to each other, not realpolitik alone in conjunction with high level of hard power.

Dennis Kux argues that besides shared interests, shared values also mattered, especially during the Bush.<sup>193</sup> According to Amrita Narlikar, the “affinity of political system [democracy] had a good deal to do with the US embrace of India” as a strategic partner during the Bush presidency.<sup>194</sup> Following the literature, Chapter 5 demonstrates that Indian soft power attributes (such as democracy) as well as behaviour (being responsible) have drawn the US toward India despite the fact that India has in many ways maintained a certain amount of distance (e.g. by avoiding overly close military relations). Daniel Twining argues that structural factor is not alone responsible and argues that “ideational logic” or “values-based calculus” was equally important.<sup>195</sup> Karthika Sashikumar argues that India presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power facilitated the nuclear deal.<sup>196</sup> As Pant in his analysis of the nuclear deal points out, “India was viewed not only as a potential counterweight to China and militant Islam but also as a responsible rising power that needs to be accommodated into the global order”.<sup>197</sup>

Robert M. Hathaway sees the role of “the growing political clout of the Indian-American community” on the US-India relationship since the mid-1990s.<sup>198</sup> For Arthur G. Rubinoff, the successful Indian-Americans in the US were a “decisive” factor.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Kux, “A Remarkable Turnaround,” 18-23.

<sup>194</sup> Amrita Narlikar, “India Rising: Responsible to Whom?,” *International Affairs* 89: 3 (2013):595.

<sup>195</sup> Daniel Twining, “The US Engagement of India after 1991: Transformation,” in *The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses*, ed. Ian Hall (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 19-38.

<sup>196</sup> Karthika Sasikumar, “India’s Emergence as a ‘Responsible’ Nuclear Power,” *International Journal* 62: 4(2007):825-844. See also Kate Sullivan, “Is India a Responsible Nuclear Power?” Policy Report, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, March 2014, 1-9.

<sup>197</sup> Pant, “The US-India Nuclear Pact,” 292.

<sup>198</sup> Hathaway, “The US-India Courtship.” 7. Similar views have also been expressed by others. See, for example, Stephen P. Cohen, “India and America: An Emerging Relationship,” A Paper Presented at the Conference on the Nation-State System and Transnational Forces in South Asia, December 8-10, 2000, Kyoto, Japan, 15-20; and Tellis, *Unity in Difference*, 25.

<sup>199</sup> Arthur G. Rubinoff, “The Diaspora as a Factor in U.S.-India Relations,” *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 32:3(2005): 169-187.

According to another study, the “lobby” by Indian-Americans “was critical in pressing members of Congress to support the nuclear agreement”.<sup>200</sup> Above all, it was the “India lobby” as it is called that included various groups including “Indian Americans, American business, strategic affairs experts, a formal ‘Coalition’ of these groups, the Indian government, Indian business, and additional constituents” also played an important between 2005 and 2008 in support of the nuclear deal.<sup>201</sup> Chapter 5 shows that diaspora factor and Indian lobby do not explain the effectiveness of soft power. Rather it is as this thesis argues based on higher level of hard power. Lacking higher level of hard power, such variables could not have influenced the transformation in Indo-US relations in terms of dehyphenation of India and Pakistan, civil nuclear cooperation and close defence cooperation. They played only facilitative role. Rafiq Dossani relates Indian-Americans and their lobbying to India’s soft power, but emphasises their limitation in the case of divergence of interests between India and the US.<sup>202</sup> On the relationship between the Indian diaspora and India’s soft power vis-à-vis the US, Devesh Kapur argues that the former’s “influence on bilateral relations can perhaps best be characterized as facilitative rather than causal”.<sup>203</sup> This study agrees with Kapur’s analysis.

There are also some analysts who have discussed India’s soft power in relation to the US. While analysing it generally, some have made linkages between India’s soft power resources and their influence on American policies. They have failed to provide sufficiently convincing explanations for the exercise of India’s soft power vis-à-vis the US. This failure is related to either to the concept or the method. For example, without defining what is hard and soft power, Karl F. Inderfurth and Bruce Riedel in their

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<sup>200</sup> Jason A. Kirk, “Indian-Americans and the U.S.–India Nuclear Agreement: Consolidation of an Ethnic Lobby?,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4: 3 (2008):275-300.

<sup>201</sup> See Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement*, 24-26. See also Subrata Ghoshroy, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal: Triumph of the Business Lobby,” Audit of the Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center for International Studies, September 2006, [http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit\\_09\\_14\\_Ghoshroy.pdf](http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_09_14_Ghoshroy.pdf).

<sup>202</sup> Rafiq Dossani, “Indian Soft Power and Associations of the American Diaspora,” Occasional Paper, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, November 18, 2009, [http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22997/Indian\\_Soft\\_Power\\_%26\\_Diaspora\\_Associations\\_Nov09-1.pdf](http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22997/Indian_Soft_Power_%26_Diaspora_Associations_Nov09-1.pdf).

<sup>203</sup> Devesh Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 200.

study, examine prospects of US-India cooperation with “hard-power choices” to include “common strategic interests” such as stability in Afghanistan, peace and stability in South Asia, fight against terrorism, and defence cooperation. They include in the category of soft power-based cooperation such areas as economic cooperation, and American support to India’s membership in the UN Security Council.<sup>204</sup> Similarly, some scholars have not sufficiently explained the relationship between independent variables of shared values and diaspora, and better Indo-US relations, including the nuclear deal.<sup>205</sup> There are exceptions to this trend as we shall see below.

There is only one study that identifies the role of India’s soft power or rather the lack of it vis-à-vis the US in the Nehru period and the post-Cold War period. According to Jacques E. C. Hymans, India’s soft power in the later period is based on its post-Pokhran II<sup>206</sup> foreign policy behaviour that was “muscular, realistic, and cooperative”; its economic success and promise; and successful India-Americans.<sup>207</sup> His analysis, however, fails to show how and on what basis India exercised soft power vis-à-vis the US during the Nehru period even though it was limited. Further, his analysis of the post-1990s is insufficient in reflecting the process tracing concerning factors such as India’s military, its foreign policies and its economy contributing to soft power. Contrary to his assertion, this study argues that India’s democracy has facilitated India’s soft power vis-à-vis the US. The present study fills these gap and presents a more systematic and rigorous analysis of India’s soft power relations with the US to convincingly show why India’s soft power was more effective in the post-1998 period when compared with the Nehru era by using both primary and secondary sources of data as well as interviews.

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<sup>204</sup> Karl F. Inderfurth and Bruce Riedel, “Breaking More Naan with Delhi: The Next Stage in U.S.-India Relations,” *The National Interest*, November/December 2007, 56-62.

<sup>205</sup> See, for, example, Nicolas Blarel, “India’s Soft Power: From Potential to Reality?” in *India: The Next Superpower? IDEAS Special Report* (London: London School of Economics, 2012), [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43445/1/India\\_India%27s%20soft%20power%28lsero%29.pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43445/1/India_India%27s%20soft%20power%28lsero%29.pdf); Christian Wagner, “India’s Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations,” *India Quarterly* 66: 4 (2010): 335-338. Christophe Jaffrelot, “India: Power, To What End?,” *Politique Internationale* (Autumn 2006), [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/0904\\_Jaffrelot\\_AN.doc.pdf](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/0904_Jaffrelot_AN.doc.pdf).

<sup>206</sup> Pokhran II refers to India’s nuclear tests conducted at Pokhran in Rajasthan in 1998.

<sup>207</sup> Jack E. C. Hymans, “India’s Soft Power and Vulnerability,” *India Review* 8: 3(2009): 234-265.

## **2.4 Conclusion**

Having elaborated on various dimensions of soft power and its relationship with hard power, Nye's conception of soft power in terms of causation of preferred outcomes is rooted in relational power analysis. In this conception, attraction and persuasion are two important causal mechanism of soft power. With this conceptualisation of soft power, we shall attempt to shed light on whether, and how India's soft power was relatively effective in terms of producing preferred outcomes during the two periods under study depending on the low or high levels of hard power. It thus establishes the hypothesis that soft power become more effective with high level of hard power and its impact would be limited with low level of hard power. As chapters 4 and 5 show, it does so (a) by establishing clear relationship between levels of hard power and relative effectiveness of soft power (b) by process tracing US decisions on five issues under study to demonstrate how US perceptions were influenced by Indian soft power under varying levels of hard power and (c) by eliminating alternative/competing explanatory variables. The next chapter generally discusses India's potential sources of soft power.

## CHAPTER 3

### Foundations of India's Soft Power

This chapter discusses five potential bases of India's soft power: political values, foreign policy, military power, economy and culture. It does not aim at giving an account of whether India has been able to accomplish its preferences using these elements of its soft power as it has been covered in subsequent chapters. Rather, it considers the following: what are generally the potential sources of India's soft power and how is India, at the most fundamental level, mobilising these resources for exercising power? The answers to these questions will set the stage for the next two empirical chapters on how, and to what extent India has been able to obtain preferred outcomes vis-à-vis the United States during 1947–1964 and 1998–2013.

The concept of soft power is new, but its exercise is not. The same holds true for India's soft power. As Christian Wagner notes, "India looks like a soft power by default. A democratic tradition of more than 60 years, Mahatma Gandhi with his concept of non-violence and peaceful conflict mediation as national hero, Bollywood as a quasi-global dream fabric, and India's long engagement in multilateral institutions are indicators that seem to qualify India as one of the leading soft powers of the twenty-first century".<sup>1</sup> As noted below, India's cultural and public diplomacy efforts date back to the immediate post-independence period. It is, however, only recently that Indian policymakers have embraced the concept at a broader level. They now publicly appreciate the importance of, and the need for investing in, soft power by referring to its cultural basis and human resources.<sup>2</sup> They also suggest that in order to advance its

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<sup>1</sup> Christian Wagner, "India's Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations," *India Quarterly* 66: 4 (2010): 334.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, "PM's Address to IFS Probationary Officers," Prime Minister's office, *Press Information Bureau* (PIB), Government of India, June 11, 2008, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mainpage.aspx>; "Build a Naya Jammu and Kashmir which is Symbolized by Peace, Prosperity and People's Power: PM," PM Addresses the Convocation at the University of Jammu, Prime Minister's Office, PIB, Government of India, July 15, 2007, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mainpage.aspx>; "Overseas Indians have Increased India's Stature: Pranab Mukherjee," *The Economic Times*, January 30, 2012,

national interest, India needs “an integrated approach” that combines soft and hard power.<sup>3</sup> Emphasising that soft and hard powers are closely linked, India’s former Minister for External Affairs, Pranab Mukherjee, once observed:

While conventional wisdom dictates that economic and military power are the determinants of international power projection, today the role of soft power, as an important adjunct, can hardly be overrated. A brief look at international power structures reveals that nations that wield influence are those that possess significant economic and military power. However, history, even recent history, shows that such power can be wielded effectively only when enabled by soft power. Soft power shapes perceptions of hard military power, obviates its use and endows it with legitimacy when the use becomes inevitable.<sup>4</sup>

Narendra Modi, the newly elected prime minister of India, is a great proponent of developing and using soft power. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had promised, in its manifesto for the May 2014 elections, to bolster India’s soft power.<sup>5</sup> Shashi Tharoor, then Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, wrote an article in 2009 asking the question, “What makes a country a world leader?” His answer was that it is soft power rather than military or economic hard power that makes a country a world leader. He urged India to pay increasing attention to strengthening its soft power. Tharoor views

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[http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-30/news/31005633\\_1\\_soft-power-indian-workers-social-security-agreements](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-01-30/news/31005633_1_soft-power-indian-workers-social-security-agreements); “Adequate Investment Needed in Education, Medical Sectors: President Pranab Mukherjee,” *The Economic Times*, October 1, 2013, [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-01/news/42576596\\_1\\_president-pranab-mukherjee-soft-power-sectors](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-01/news/42576596_1_president-pranab-mukherjee-soft-power-sectors).

<sup>3</sup> PM’s Remarks at Combined Commanders’ Conference, Prime Minister’s office, PIB, Government of India, October 18, 2006, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mainpage.aspx>.

<sup>4</sup> “Pranab Mukherjee Inaugurates International Seminar on Aerospace Power: Calls for Strengthening of International Legal Regime for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space,” Ministry of External Affairs, PIB, Government of India, February 4, 2007, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/mainpage.aspx>.

<sup>5</sup> “Ek Bharat - Shreshtha Bharat (One India, Great India): Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas (With Everyone and Development for Everyone),” Election Manifesto 2014, Bharatiya Janata Party, [http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf\\_2014/full\\_manifesto\\_english\\_07.04.2014.pdf](http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf); “Art, Culture should not be State-Dependant: Narendra Modi,” *The Economic Times*, September 29, 2013, [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09-29/news/42503094\\_1\\_narendra-modi-soft-power-mythili-prakash](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09-29/news/42503094_1_narendra-modi-soft-power-mythili-prakash).

soft power in terms of non-military resources, such as culture, political values and foreign policy. For him, “hard power is exercised” whereas “soft power is evoked”. Tharoor, however, towards the end of his essay, seems to be contradicting his earlier position where he observes, “Soft power becomes credible when there is hard power behind it”. He further notes that “hard power without soft power stirs up resentments and enmities” and “soft power without hard power is a confession of weakness”.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, his assertion that soft power is not exercised is not correct.

The chapter is divided into six sections. The first discusses how India has soft power potential in being a successful liberal democracy. Its democratic experience attracts those states that share similar value, and additionally, its efforts at promoting democracy tend to enhance its image as a responsible power. The next section deals with India’s foreign policy behaviour such as multilateralism, which has the potential to shape its image as a non-threatening and responsible power and thus project soft power. In an age of increasing interdependence, this approach stands it in good stead. The third section discusses India’s military diplomacy, which by virtue of being built on its rising military capacity, already underlines its benevolent behaviour and can promote its image as responsible power. The fourth section examines the economic sources of India’s soft power based on its economic openness, economic success, and the provision of aid and assistance. India’s economic success over the last decade has been a major source of its attraction. Its increasing economic openness enhances its attraction as it conforms to the liberal economic order and provides opportunities of development for others. While India receives economic aid, it is also emerging as a donor to many developing countries, especially in South Asia and Africa. The fifth section, which focuses on India’s culture and cultural diplomacy, considers India’s cultural strengths and its recent dynamism in public diplomacy efforts targeting civil society of foreign countries to shape its soft power image. The chapter concludes by reaffirming the dependence of soft power on hard power resources for its effectiveness.

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<sup>6</sup> Sashi Tharoor, “Indian Strategic Power: ‘Soft,’” *Global Brief*, May 13, 2009, <http://globalbrief.ca/blog/2009/05/13/soft-is-the-word/>.

### 3.1 Political Values

Just days after Independence, a section of the British as well as the American press “began to reassess and question the capacity for self-governance of Indians”.<sup>7</sup> India, in 1947, was left with a “stagnant” economy, 83 per cent illiteracy, “an undigested partition, and unclear political alignments, combined with widespread communal violence and social disorder”.<sup>8</sup> However, for all its continuing troubles, it has been successful in adopting the core elements of the Western political culture of democracy in a poor country. Along the way, it has become the world’s fourth largest economy and has posted rapid economic growth in the last decade, creating more than a simple image of a rising power. The combination, which is both unusual and powerful, has had considerable impact. While the growth of its material power has made others react and has given India strategic space, the soft power of its values has made India’s rise largely acceptable and even welcome to both major and minor powers.

According to Freedom House, India is a “free” country.<sup>9</sup> In Polity IV’s Country Regime Trends, India has scored nine, considered a good score since 1950 (except during 1975–1976, when it scored seven and eight during 1977–1994). It has been labelled as largely a “democracy”, just one point below a “full democracy”,<sup>10</sup> and has held peaceful elections regularly and maintained freedom of the press and the judiciary.<sup>11</sup> Certainly, the picture is mixed. While the above has been “very impressive”, Francis Fukuyama notes, it “doesn’t look very appealing on closer

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<sup>7</sup> Susan Williams, Robert Holland and Terry A. Barringer, “Preface: ‘The Midnight Hour,’” in *The Iconography of Independence: ‘Freedoms at Midnight’*, eds. Robert Holland, Susan Williams, Terry Barringer (Abingdon: Routledge: 2009), xii.

<sup>8</sup> Gurucharan Das, “India: How a Rich Nation became Poor and will be Rich Again,” in *Developing Cultures: Case Studies*, eds. Lawrence E Harrison and Peter L Berger (New York: Routledge: 2006), <http://gurcharandas.org/rich-nation-poor>.

<sup>9</sup> Freedom House, <http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/india-0#.U70ijpSSzyC>.

<sup>10</sup> Centre for Systematic Peace, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

<sup>11</sup> Amartya Sen, “India at 60,” *Forbes*, August 13, 2007, [http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/05/india-amartya-sen-oped-cx\\_ams\\_0813amartyasen.html](http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/05/india-amartya-sen-oped-cx_ams_0813amartyasen.html).

inspection”.<sup>12</sup> From the criminalisation of politics, its slow judicial process, other institutional failures, to corruption, and patronage, India faces serious challenges to its democracy.<sup>13</sup> It ranks very low in the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International and has declined in its rank from 71 (among 91 countries) in 2001 to 94 (among 177 countries) in 2013.<sup>14</sup> In comparison to authoritarian China, the world’s most populous democracy “has been completely hamstrung in its ability to provide modern infrastructure or basic services such as clean water, electricity or basic education to its population”.<sup>15</sup> As the following data shows (see Table 3.1), India’s percentile rank on this count is poor for the period 1996–2012 and it is placed somewhere in the middle in all the six governance indicators.

Still, however imperfect as the Indian democracy may be, as Gurucharan Das notes, “The stubborn persistence of democracy is itself one of the Indian state’s proudest achievements. Time and again, Indian democracy has shown itself to be resilient and enduring—giving a lie to the old prejudice that the poor are incapable of the kind of self-discipline and sobriety that make for effective self-government”.<sup>16</sup> Notwithstanding the qualification, therefore, Indian democracy projects a positive image. The extent to which this fosters the Indian external influence abroad will be examined in the chapters that follow.

Table 3.1 India’s Percentile Rank (0–100) in Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996–2012.<sup>17</sup>

Year	Voice and	Political Stability	Government	Regulato	Rule	Control
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<sup>12</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “At the ‘End Of History’ Still Stands Democracy,” *The Wall Street Journal*, June 6, 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661>

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. See also, Rajesh M. Basrur, “Introduction,” in *Challenges to Democracy in India*, ed. Rajesh M. Basrur (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1–9.

<sup>14</sup> “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/>.

<sup>15</sup> Fukuyama, “At the ‘End Of History’ Still Stands Democracy.”

<sup>16</sup> Gurcharan Das, “The India Model,” *Foreign Affairs* 85:4 (2006):16.

<sup>17</sup> The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, The World Bank, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.

	Accountability	and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	Effectiveness	Quality	of Law	of Corruption
1996	62.02	19.23	53.66	32.35	59.33	40.00
1998	57.21	13.94	54.15	32.84	60.29	43.90
2000	56.25	17.79	51.22	42.65	59.81	46.34
2002	58.17	15.87	51.71	40.20	51.20	38.05
2003	59.13	8.65	55.12	40.69	55.02	42.93
2004	61.06	13.46	55.12	39.22	54.07	43.41
2005	60.10	17.79	55.12	46.57	57.89	43.41
2006	59.13	17.31	54.15	45.59	56.94	45.85
2007	59.13	13.94	56.80	44.17	55.98	40.78
2008	60.10	14.35	54.37	40.78	56.25	43.69
2009	60.19	10.90	55.98	42.58	54.98	38.76
2010	60.66	12.26	56.46	39.23	54.50	36.19
2011	60.09	11.32	54.98	39.81	52.11	33.18

2012	58.29	11.85	47.37	33.97	52.6	34.93
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Besides, the successful practice of democracy in India since its independence over 60 years ago strengthens the claim that “democracy is a universal value”.<sup>18</sup> Living up to that value and promoting it outside creates opportunities for India to wield soft power. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta suggests, the success of India’s pluralist democracy and that of its economy can be emulated by others, which can create soft power by “example”.<sup>19</sup> Indian and American leaders have periodically invoked the “natural allies” theme as they have transformed their bilateral relations (see Chapter 5). India has also shared its experience and thus, promoted democratic values and practices in the world. It has collaborated with the US, globally, for the cause of democracy promotion.<sup>20</sup> It has participated “greatly” in Afghanistan for democracy promotion.<sup>21</sup> During 2008–2012, of its total aid to foreign countries, 9.5 per cent went to the cause of “strengthening the administrative apparatus and government planning, activities promoting good governance, strengthening civil society, and other social infrastructure projects”.<sup>22</sup> India provides training programmes to foreign parliamentarians and officials mainly through the Parliamentary Internship Programme and the International Training Programme in Legislative Drafting to partner countries under its ITEC programme.<sup>23</sup> It has provided 698 internships by 2013.<sup>24</sup> India’s Election Commission has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) on electoral cooperation with 19

<sup>18</sup> Amartya Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” *Journal of Democracy* 10:3 (1999): 3–17.

<sup>19</sup> Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Still under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of Foreign Policy Frameworks in India,” *India Review* 8:3 (2009): 213 and 218–219.

<sup>20</sup> See Chapter 5 for details.

<sup>21</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, “India: Power, To What End?” *Politique Internationale* (Autumn- 2006), [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/0904\\_Jaffrelot\\_AN.doc.pdf](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/0904_Jaffrelot_AN.doc.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Andreas Fuchs and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati, “The Needy Donor: An Empirical Analysis of India’s Aid Motives,” Working Papers 0532, University of Heidelberg, June 2012, <http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren/intwipol/needy2.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Parliament of India, <http://164.100.47.210/bpstnew/internationalpro.aspx>.

<sup>24</sup> Parliamentary Internship Programme (PIP), Bureau of Parliamentary Studies and Training.

countries and has joined various multilateral organisations.<sup>25</sup> Besides, it has offered training programmes for capacity building under the Indian International Institute of Democracy and Election Management to ITEC partner countries and has signed MOUs with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) to share its experience.<sup>26</sup>

India's democracy promotion initiatives are seen by some as passive,<sup>27</sup> "minimalist",<sup>28</sup> and are linked with "'realist' concerns".<sup>29</sup> It is also argued that its "own success will do far more for democracy promotion than any overtly ideological push in that direction could ever hope to accomplish".<sup>30</sup>

India is also a pluralist democracy. Absorption of diversity has old and deep roots in India, which is a "shared home" to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, Muslims, Parsees, Sikhs, Jews, Baha'is and others.<sup>31</sup> Independent "India was among the first major democracies in the world to recognise and provide for the right of the cultural collectivities—diverse religious, linguistic communities, castes and tribes living in the country".<sup>32</sup> The Indian Constitution recognised these diversities in a democratic, secular and federal framework and promoted cultural and political integration of these weaker sections of the society. Under pluralism, the religious minorities were provided

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<sup>25</sup> "International Cooperation," Election Commission of India, [http://eci.nic.in/eci\\_main1/international-cooperation.aspx](http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/international-cooperation.aspx).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Xenia Dormandy, "Is India, or Will it Be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?" *The Washington Quarterly* 30:3 (2007):125.

<sup>28</sup> Siddharth Mallavarapu, "Democracy Promotion circa 2010: An Indian Perspective," *Contemporary Politics* 16:1(2010): 49-61.

<sup>29</sup> Jan Cartwright, "India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?," *Asian Survey* 49: 3 (2009): 403-428. See also C. Raja Mohan, "Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with Democracy Promotion," *The Washington Quarterly* 30:3 (2007): 99-115.

<sup>30</sup> Pratap Bhanu Mehta, "Do New Democracies Support Democracy? Reluctant India," *Journal of Democracy* 22:4 (2011):112. C. Raja Mohan takes a similar position. See "India's Role in Democracy Promotion," Council on Foreign Relations, May 8, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/india/indias-role-democracy-promotion/p19366>.

<sup>31</sup> Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian* (London: Penguin, 2005), 16–20.

<sup>32</sup> Zoya Hasan "Tokenism or empowerment?: Policies and Institutions for Disadvantaged Communities," in *Pluralism and Democracy in India: Debating the Hindu Right*, eds., Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 176.

with freedom in their social, cultural, linguistic and educational pursuits.<sup>33</sup> The lower social groups, Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) were given reservations to uplift their status. The affirmative policies have empowered the SCs. The case of minorities in relation to benefits of democracy remains controversial.<sup>34</sup> Over the years, India's tradition of respecting diversity became synonymous with secularism, which was ironically inserted into the Preamble of the Indian Constitution when an Emergency (1975–77) was imposed. Secularism in contemporary India has been challenged by periodic bouts of communal violence. It has also been contested by the Hindu Right, which has sought to renovate nationalism by giving it a communitarian foundation. Much of this distortion arises from strategies of political mobilisation, often connected to the quest for electoral success. Remarkably, on coming to power, the Hindu Right – best represented by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – has tended to shift its policy agenda away from its communitarian project and veered toward centrist policies. Nowhere is this more evident than in the BJP's virtual abandonment of its former insistence on the creation and implementation of a uniform civil code. Therefore, the role of shared or similar value of liberal democracy and value based cooperation produces a positive image. Such sources of India's attraction in the US have been explored in chapters 4 and 5 while arguing that democracy alone is insufficient to produce soft power.

### **3.2 Foreign Policy**

From a position of weakness, India under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi turned nonviolence into a potent soft power instrument hastening India's freedom from the Raj.<sup>35</sup> The experience influenced the making of India's foreign policy as an independent nation.<sup>36</sup> With its potential power, its strategic location and a strong sense

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 187.

<sup>35</sup> See Jacques E. C Hymans, "India's Soft Power and Vulnerability," *India Review* 8:3 (2009): 238–244 and 259.

<sup>36</sup> G. S. Bajpai, "Ethical Stand on World Issues: Cornerstone of India's Foreign Policy," in *Studies in Foreign Policy*, ed. K. P. Mishra (Delhi: Vikas, 1969), 28.

of civilisational destiny, India sought a global role.<sup>37</sup> While renouncing force and the balance of power for peaceful international relations, it adopted a world view in terms of a policy of nonalignment to minimise the impact of the great powers' evolving Cold War on its domestic priority – the national consolidation and development of an economically poor nation. Such a policy of nonalignment was not “neutralism”, but rather a willingness to lean towards one side or the other “through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue”.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, a nonaligned foreign policy did not exclude the notion of “preferential partnerships”.<sup>39</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, as the prime minister as well as the foreign minister of independent India, became a pioneer in articulating “Asian resurgence” and emerged as an “idealistic advocate of conscience in international politics”. While associating with the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), he distinguished it from a nonaligned foreign policy. He proclaimed the latter as “a guiding principle of India's foreign policy so that India is assured of having the freedom of choice in making decisions responsive to its national interests without being subject to external influences”.<sup>40</sup>

It has been argued that he was guided by idealism in taking the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations (UN).<sup>41</sup> However, it has also been argued that he was a realist and that his nonaligned foreign policy was a form of balance of power.<sup>42</sup> The blend of idealism and realism that Nehru pursued is best explained by Archibald Nye, British High Commissioner to independent India from 1948 to 1952. Nye suggested that India's foreign policy could be seen in different modes in each of “three concentric circles”. In the first circle of adjacent territories, India was guided by “narrow calculation of self-

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<sup>37</sup> Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major- Power Status* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 4; J. Bandyopadhyaya, “Nehru and Non-Alignment,” in *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, ed. B. R. Nanda (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1976), 170–184.

<sup>38</sup> Bajpai, “Ethical Stand on World Issues,” 25–26.

<sup>39</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, *US and India: Unity in Difference Once More* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 8.

<sup>40</sup> J. N. Dixit, “Ultimate Idealist,” *India Today*, <http://www.india-today.com/itoday/millennium/100people/menon.html>.

<sup>41</sup> Dixit, “Ultimate Idealist.”

<sup>42</sup> K. Subrahmanyam, “Nehru and Defence Policy,” in *Nehru Revisited*, ed. M. V. Kamath (Mumbai: Nehru Centre, 2003), 81–82.

interest". In this realist framework, using force was not discounted. As a result, we have seen the use of force by India in liberating Goa from the Portuguese, integrating Hyderabad with the Indian Union, and defending Kashmir against Pakistan. In the second circle of the "free world", which excluded the US and Great Britain, India's interests ranged from "moderate (in Southeast Asia) to minimal (South America)". Its policy was guided by anti-colonialism and nationalism, urging sanctions, but not direct action. In the "outermost ring", India engaged the great powers, including China, in the policy of nonalignment, and its policy was primarily aimed at preserving its own region from their intervention.<sup>43</sup>

In this background, it is appropriate to describe India's multilateral diplomacy as the centrepiece of its foreign policy after 1947. This multilateralism had the potential to produce a positive image and soft power for India. It is said that India under Nehru carried an agenda of "expansive internationalism". This resulted in India promoting the resurgence of Asia and thus, uniting against colonialism. In the larger arena, India promoted the idea of "one world" through peaceful means.<sup>44</sup>

Nehru was influenced by the prevailing opinion of nationalist leaders on the agenda of Asian unity and the friendly attitude of China before India was freed from colonial rule.<sup>45</sup> T. A. Keenleyside notes that the strong Asianist tendency of the pre-independence period and the associated concept of "Greater India" for cultural and political ties with the Asian countries "made it difficult" for independent India to reject it.<sup>46</sup> The drive towards Asianism was reflected in India's hosting of the Asian Relations Conference in 1947 and the important role it played in the Bandung conference in

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<sup>43</sup> Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 46–47.

<sup>44</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "The Changing Dynamics of India's Multilateralism," in *Shaping the Emerging World: India and the Multilateral Order*, eds. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce D. Jones (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 26; Bandyopadhyaya, "Nehru and Non-Alignment," 176–177.

<sup>45</sup> T. A. Keenleyside, "The Inception of Indian Foreign Policy: The Non-Nehru Contribution," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 4: 2(1981): 63-78.

<sup>46</sup> T. A. Keenleyside, "Nationalist Indian Attitudes towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian Foreign Policy," *Pacific Affairs* 55: 2(1982): 210-225.

1955.<sup>47</sup> However, this flirtation with the Asian unity, which began to fail from 1950, prevented India from pursuing, even at minimum level, regional cooperation to accomplish its national interests.<sup>48</sup> The emergence of China meant an altered balance of power in Asia, challenging the relevance of India's nonaligned policy.<sup>49</sup>

India's approach to the UN also reflected its faith in multilateralism. In the Cold War power struggle, India took upon itself the role of a mediator, first entering the scene in the Korean War and helping in the repatriation of prisoners of war. From peacekeeping and mediation to championing anti-colonialism and anti-racism, India sought to enhance its global role. It was the first to bring the issue of apartheid to the UN, thereby leading the charge on behalf of universal ideals.<sup>50</sup> During the drafting of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, India's approach also aimed at promoting "universalism" rather than on a narrow focus on state sovereignty.<sup>51</sup> In good part, this signified its "global leadership" ambitions.<sup>52</sup> As Charles Heimsath notes, "except for problems of Germany and Berlin, there was no international issue or crisis of major importance after the Korean War in which India's influence was not felt". While its representatives played an active role and enhanced India's prestige in various forums of the UN, India took an "anti-status-quo" stand on numerous global issues, though it adopted a relatively "conservative" approach towards the "basic structure" of the UN to protect its independence and sovereignty.<sup>53</sup> Its image as a peacemaker, of course, was affected by its unending dispute on Kashmir with Pakistan and by the use of force in Goa, which went against the principle of peaceful resolution of conflict. However, at

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<sup>47</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, "India's Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective," *India Review* 2: 2 (2003): 35–68.

<sup>48</sup> Keenleyside, "Nationalist Indian Attitudes towards Asia," 225.

<sup>49</sup> Sisir K. Gupta, "Asian Nonalignment," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 362 (1965): 44–51.

<sup>50</sup> Stanley A. Kochanek, "India's Changing Role in the United Nations," *Pacific Affairs* 53:1(1980): 49–50.

<sup>51</sup> Mohan, "The Changing Dynamics of India's Multilateralism," 26–27.

<sup>52</sup> Kochanek, "India's Changing Role in the United Nations," 48–49.

<sup>53</sup> Charles Heimsath, "Nonalignment Reassessed: The Experience of India," in *Foreign Policy in the Sixties: the Issues and the Instruments; Essays in Honor of Arnold Wolfers*, eds. Robert C. Good and Roger Hilsman (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), 51; Kochanek, "India's Changing Role in the United Nations," 50.

the same time, its peacekeeping roles and leadership benefited India, enhancing its global recognition. In addition, its commitment to the UN got it positions in the UN Secretariat and enabled it to receive economic and technical assistance under UN auspices.<sup>54</sup> Even on the issue of Goa, the UN General Assembly formally “approved” India’s liberation effort.<sup>55</sup>

India’s membership in the Commonwealth and NAM was not equal to “third worldism”. The first NAM summit took an initiative towards superpower nuclear dialogue and the movement tried to act as an “honest broker” between them. India’s approach to nuclear disarmament also exhibited its idealist orientation. Nehru was not inclined to support the Indian nuclear bomb after the war with China.<sup>56</sup> India became the first country to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT).

The post-Nehru period witnessed India maintaining a politically “low profile” in the UN following wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965), which led India to give priority to security interests with an emphasis on “bilateralism”.<sup>57</sup> While the US used coercive diplomacy during India’s intervention in East Pakistan, the UN did not criticise India.<sup>58</sup> India was preoccupied with issues vital to its national interest. The changing balance of power with close relations, with the US, Pakistan and China drawing closer in the 1970s, drove India towards the Soviet Union as a *de facto* ally. Even after being a champion of non-proliferation and disarmament,<sup>59</sup> India rejected the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1974 on the ground of the treaty’s discriminatory nature and tested its first peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, thus diverging sharply from the non-proliferation order.<sup>60</sup> It was active in terms of economic

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<sup>54</sup> Kochanek, “India’s Changing Role in the United Nations,” 50–52.

<sup>55</sup> Srinath Raghavan, “India as a Regional Power,” in *Shaping the Emerging World*, 59.

<sup>56</sup> Mohan, “The Changing Dynamics of India’s Multilateralism,” 27. For India’s record of nuclear disarmament, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, “India and Disarmament,” in *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, ed. B. R. Nanda (Delhi: Vikas, 1976), 228–251.

<sup>57</sup> Kochanek, “India’s Changing Role in the United Nations,” 52–53.

<sup>58</sup> Raghavan, “India as a Regional Power,” 59.

<sup>59</sup> Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” *Foreign Affairs* 77: 5(1998).

<sup>60</sup> Mohan, “The Changing Dynamics of India’s Multilateralism,” 31.

issues in the UN, advocating a greater role for less developed countries in trade and financial institutions.<sup>61</sup> In the 1970s, India's orientation towards multilateralism drifted from idealism to a more "ideological" one. This was partly because the NAM itself became more anti-Western. This radical orientation was also reflected through the Group of 77 (G-77). In any case, India's preference for an autarkic economy meant it was less interested in engagement with international trade and finance, including that with its partners from the "Global South". Its opposition on issues of information and space on sovereignty grounds meant it stood against the global liberal agenda.<sup>62</sup> Thus, India's soft power efforts were directed towards the Third World, which weakened its attraction from the perspective of the United States.

In the 1980s, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi restored in some measure, India's liberal multilateral agenda, which included his grand plan for universal nuclear disarmament, and an effort to develop economic policies that are more liberal.<sup>63</sup> In the 1990s, India followed a strategy of "defensive internationalism". From the issue of Kashmir to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), India had to defend its vital security interest from increasing international pressure to submit to what it saw as dictated solutions imposed by outsiders, including the US.<sup>64</sup>

With liberalisation of its economy after 1991, India became more interested in regionalism, first with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and then with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).<sup>65</sup> In contrast with its engagement with the ASEAN, which has enhanced its scope for soft

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<sup>61</sup> Kochanek, "India's Changing Role in the United Nations," 52–54.

<sup>62</sup> Mohan, "The Changing Dynamics of India's Multilateralism," 29–30.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 32–33.

<sup>65</sup> See Ted Osius and C. Raja Mohan, "Enhancing India-ASEAN Connectivity," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CISS), June 2013, [http://csis.org/files/publication/130621\\_Osius\\_EnhancingIndiaASEAN\\_WEB.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/130621_Osius_EnhancingIndiaASEAN_WEB.pdf). Raghavan, "India as A Regional Power," 60–65.

power through perceptions of benignity and competence,<sup>66</sup> India's experience with SAARC was not very encouraging despite the greater imperative of its immediate national interests.<sup>67</sup> However, its multilateralism tendencies remained strong. By discarding much of its "third worldism", India began pursuing what C. Raja Mohan calls "responsible multilateralism". While not abandoning its association with groups such as NAM and G-77, India mainly focused on newer groups emerging on the world stage, such as the Group of Twenty (G20) developing states, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa).<sup>68</sup> It now participates in 75 international organisations.<sup>69</sup> In its nuclear policy, though it has not gained undisputed recognition as a "responsible nuclear power", India has received recognition and acceptance by several major powers, especially the US, which has devoted considerable effort to paving the way for India's integration into the global nuclear order. Between disarmament and arms control, it has veered towards respecting arms control.<sup>70</sup> As greater responsibilities come with its great power, the demand on India has induced it to show "a strong commitment to a new and responsible multilateralism". As Mohan notes, "while the pace of progress does not satisfy India's external critics, domestic critics feel that India has already gone too far". It has indeed made progress on many multilateral issues, from nuclear arms control to climate change to trade liberalisation to security of global commons.<sup>71</sup>

While continuing to practice responsible multilateralism, India has not abandoned its traditional emphasis on sovereignty and non-intervention. Its behaviour as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council since 2011 has not been perceived as benign by the West, because of its ambiguity on the issue of intervention in Libya,

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<sup>66</sup> Ajaya Kumar Das, "Soft and Hard Power in India's Strategy towards Southeast Asia," *India Review* 12:3 (2013):165–185.

<sup>67</sup> Partha S. Ghosh, "An Enigma that is South Asia: India versus the Region," *Asia-Pacific Review* 20:1(2013): 100–120.

<sup>68</sup> Mohan, "The Changing Dynamics of India's Multilateralism," 35.

<sup>69</sup> The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

<sup>70</sup> This aspect is discussed in detail in chapter 5.

<sup>71</sup> Mohan, "The Changing Dynamics of India's Multilateralism," 36.

“reluctance to support regime change in Syria, and criticism of unilateral western sanctions against Iran”.<sup>72</sup> The fact is in India’s first concentric circle of neighbourhood, all its neighbours except Bhutan have experienced its unilateral intervention of “different degrees”. However, India’s participation in UN peacekeeping suggests its flexibility on this principle.<sup>73</sup> India’s difference with the West on the practices of intervention has many premises like the legacy of anti-imperialism; the likely negative reaction of India’s large Muslim minority to intervention in the Middle East; the concern for realpolitik involved in intervention; “mixed results from the post-Cold War interventionism”; and changing Western debate on intervention.<sup>74</sup>

Its reluctance to take responsibility and provide public goods from trade to climate change has been empirically established.<sup>75</sup> Nevertheless, India’s growing economic interdependence and political interests necessitate a more responsible multilateralism.<sup>76</sup> Its increasing dependence on global commons will force it to cooperate with others by overcoming its rhetoric of strategic autonomy and start thinking in terms of supporting provision of public goods, from international trade; environment; non-proliferation; regional stability; to terrorism and piracy. India, even unilaterally, can pursue such a responsible agenda. For example, the Indian Navy has unilaterally escorted an increasing number of ships in its anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. As over 85 per cent of those escorted are foreign-flagged, India's involvement has been for the global good and signifies its desire to emerge as responsible power.<sup>77</sup> India’s responsible multilateralism has, however, rested on its growing economic and military power.

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 37–38.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 38–39.

<sup>75</sup> Amrita Narlikar, “Is India a Responsible Great Power?,” *Third World Quarterly* 32:9 (2011):1607–1621.

<sup>76</sup> Mohan, “The Changing Dynamics of India’s Multilateralism,” 37 and 39.

<sup>77</sup> “India Submits Anti-Piracy Proposals at the UN to Build Consensus: Antony,” Ministry of Defence, PIB, Government of India, February 27, 2012, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=80543>.

The growth of its hard power has enabled India to be strategic in relation to its interests in the second concentric circle of its foreign policy. Therefore, India's policy does not exclude balance of power. Similarly, in the third circle, India is slowly becoming more confident about its role as a great power. In the first circle of its neighbourhood, it has sought to establish primacy. While seeking primacy, it has made a transition since the 1990s to be seen as more of a benevolent hegemon and less of a "regional bully".<sup>78</sup> Therefore, it gives greater emphasis to soft power approaches of "inter-governmental co-operation, negotiated settlements and economic collaboration" in place of "hard power strategy of military and diplomatic interventions".<sup>79</sup> As long as India is seen positively by others, it will exercise soft power. In short, pursuing multilateralism, seeking peaceful international relations, respecting international norms, regimes, institution, and treaties, and working for collective good suggest cooperative, peaceful and responsible Indian foreign policy behaviour and thereby, enhance its attraction and soft power. Chapter 5 traces how such responsible foreign policy behaviour results in India's soft power of attraction vis-à-vis the US.

### 3.3 Military Power

Despite inheriting a relatively well-established military infrastructure, independent India under the leadership of Nehru was hesitant to use force. Having been an arm of the Raj, the Indian army did not elicit much "trust" from Nehru. In building state power, his focus was on the economy and not on military power. Besides, India's policy of nonalignment meant India did not have to "anticipate and prepare for" potential war.<sup>80</sup> The defence budget was "stagnant" and defence planning was "non-existent". It was not until the late 1950s when India had to face increasing tension and

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<sup>78</sup> See C. Raja Mohan, "India and Balance of Power," *Foreign Affairs* 84: 4 (2006):18. See also Christian Wagner, "From Hard Power to Soft Power?: Ideas, Interaction, Institutions, and Images in India's South Asia Policy," Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, Working Paper No. 26, March 2005, 13–14.

<sup>79</sup> Wagner, "From Hard Power to Soft Power?" 14.

<sup>80</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 130.

aggression from China, which forced it to “reconsider” its approach to defence and security and move away from its orientation of an “unmilitary state”.<sup>81</sup>

As noted earlier, India did in fact use force in Hyderabad and Goa, but this was viewed by it as only an internal matter aimed at completing the task of decolonisation. Despite some reservation about the use of force abroad, India decided to send its forces for UN peacekeeping roles from 1953 (Korea).<sup>82</sup> This soon became a major expression of its soft power – the use of minimal military power under the UN flag for the preservation of global peace. Since 1953, India’s has participated in 43 peacekeeping missions, sending out about 160,000 troops, which makes it the biggest contributor in such activities.<sup>83</sup> In 2013, India's contribution to UN peacekeeping was 7849 personnel, encompassing military and police personnel, and experts involved in various UN missions around the globe.<sup>84</sup> In doing so, India has stood to gain in terms of being perceived favourably not only in the country where it serves, but also internationally by helping establish peace and stability peace and not focusing on the pursuit of its narrow self-interest.

During the 1970s and the 1980s, Indian strategic behaviour underwent a phase of military activism, perhaps owing to a combination of domestic pressures and its steadily growing military capabilities. Notably, India in 1971 intervened in East Pakistan backed by the Soviet Union and helped in the secession of Bangladesh, conducted a nuclear test in 1974; engaged in major military confrontations with China and Pakistan in 1986–87; sent an unwelcome peacekeeping force to Sri Lanka in 1987; and sent an expeditionary force to overthrow a coup in the Maldives in 1988. Nevertheless, restraint was practised in a significant way on nuclear weapons. Despite the 1974 test, Indira Gandhi did not proceed to build an arsenal. Though India did

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 128–130 and 154.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 132–133.

<sup>83</sup> “India and United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding,” Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York, <https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=5> (accessed August 3, 2014).

<sup>84</sup> See “Troop and police contributors archive (1990–2013),” [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors\\_archive.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml),

covertly do so under Rajiv Gandhi in the late 1980s, the nation reverted to restraint, which was exemplary during the Kargil crisis. India's interventions in Bangladesh and Maldives were welcomed by the respective countries. In the latter case, the US and Britain also viewed India positively.<sup>85</sup>

India now possesses the world's third-largest armed forces. As the *Military Balance* notes, "current procurement programmes, including new airlifters, air tankers and aircraft carriers, promise to improve India's power projection capabilities substantially over the next decade".<sup>86</sup> India's defence expenditure, which was \$443.0 million in 1948, reached \$36.3 billion in 2013.<sup>87</sup> On two accounts India now shows greater potential to emerge as a responsible power reinforced by its hard power. First, with its rising capability it maintains a culture of military restraint.<sup>88</sup> Such restraint is a "positive attribute" in the context of its difficult geostrategic environment.<sup>89</sup> Second, India has become a keen practitioner of military diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>90</sup> This is not new. In the 1950s and 1960s, India engaged in military diplomacy with the arc of countries from the Middle East to East Asia. The Indian navy conducted exercises regularly with Commonwealth countries, made goodwill visits and provided humanitarian assistance. India also offered military training and engaged in capacity building and other exchanges.<sup>91</sup> However, in the 1970s, New Delhi turned to relative isolation in terms of military-to-military relations. India did not allow such a relationship even with the Soviet Union, its major supplier of weapons.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> David Brewster, *India's Ocean: The Story of India's Bid for Regional Leadership* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 58.

<sup>86</sup> "Chapter Six: Asia," *The Military Balance*, 114:1(2014): 241.

<sup>87</sup> See A. Martin Wainwright, *Inheritance of Empire: Britain, India, and the Balance of Power in Asia, 1938–55* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 126; "Chapter Six: Asia," *The Military Balance*, 241.

<sup>88</sup> Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1–28.

<sup>89</sup> Cohen and Dasgupta, *Arming Without Aiming*, 2.

<sup>90</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "From Isolation to Partnership: The Evolution of India's Military Diplomacy," ISAS Working Papers, No. 144, February 20, 2012, [http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS\\_Working\\_Paper\\_144\\_-\\_India%E2%80%99s\\_Military\\_Diplomacy\\_28022012155929.pdf](http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Working_Paper_144_-_India%E2%80%99s_Military_Diplomacy_28022012155929.pdf).

<sup>91</sup> "Brief Statement of the Activities of the Ministry," 1954–1955 to 1957–1958, Ministry Of Defence, Government of India; "Report," 1958–59 to 1960–1961, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

<sup>92</sup> Mohan, "From Isolation to Partnership."

With the end of the Cold War, India gradually expanded its military diplomacy. This has included defence cooperation agreements, joint exercises across services, training, high-level visits, service-to-service talks, port visits, and so on.<sup>93</sup> The Indian Navy is at the forefront of Indian defence diplomacy. From providing disaster relief to anti-piracy operations and capacity building, India is fast emerging as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific with its rising military capabilities.<sup>94</sup> Walter C. Ladwig, for example, suggests that India can project its soft power through military resources by taking part in peacekeeping, protection of sea-lanes of communication (SLOC), humanitarian relief and non-combatant evacuation.<sup>95</sup> Such behaviour supports India's image as a responsible power.

India has also embraced defence multilateralism, which includes initiatives, such as the MILAN biennial exercise involving several countries of the Indian Ocean region, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and participation in the Malabar exercise (held bilaterally since 1992, essentially between India and the US but also occasionally involving others such as Japan). India has developed defence multilateral links with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM-Plus) also.<sup>96</sup>

This brief review highlights two aspects of Indian military power. First, the soft component of this power has a longer history than is usually recognised. Second, the linkage between hard and soft power is clear. When India's military capabilities were

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<sup>93</sup> See "Annual Report Year 2012–2013," Ministry of Defence, Government of India, [http://mod.gov.in/writereaddata/AR\\_2013/Eng/ch14.pdf](http://mod.gov.in/writereaddata/AR_2013/Eng/ch14.pdf).

<sup>94</sup> Admiral Nirmal Kumar Verma, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy, "Metamorphosis of Matters Maritime: An Indian Perspective," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Monday, June 25, 2012, <https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2012-4a49/june-7879/metamorphosis-of-matters-maritime-an-indian-perspective-e8cf>; Rory Medcalf, "Unselfish Giants? Understanding China and India as Security Providers," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 66:5 (2012): 554–566.

<sup>95</sup> Walter C. Ladwig, "India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?" *Asian Survey* 50: 6 (2010): 1162–1183.

<sup>96</sup> Iskander Luke Rehman, "From an Ocean of Peace to Sea of Friends," in *Shaping the Emerging World*, 131–153; Mohan, "From Isolation to Partnership."

limited in the 1950s and 1960s, it did not gain much from its soft power. For instance, it obtained little support on the Kashmir issue and in the 1965 war with Pakistan. When India mainly projected hard power and not its soft side during the 1970s and 1980s, it did not gain much sympathy. On the contrary, India's intervention in Pakistan in 1971 (backed by the Soviet Union) brought negative reactions from the United States, China and several other states. In addition, the expansion of its naval power in the 1980s raised concerns in Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia.<sup>97</sup> In the post-Cold War era, in contrast, perceptions of the rapid growth in India's military power have been generally favourable owing to the predominance of its soft face.

The next two chapters trace US perceptions of India's soft power and how these were dependent on its hard power. They show that during the Nehru era, when India's hard power was weak, its soft was also weak. In contrast, when its hard power rose significantly, so did its soft power.

### **3.4 Economy**

The Indian economy was during the early days shaped around a kind of soft power that incorporated Indian interests and its determination to stay autonomous, while projecting the country as a model for developing countries to emulate. In the first half of the twentieth century, the economy was stagnant: India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 0.8 per cent a year between 1900 and 1950.<sup>98</sup> But the "model" did not really take off and, during 1950–1980, India's growth rate, though better than before, hovered around 3-3.5 per cent in what came to be well-known as "the Hindu rate of growth."<sup>99</sup> With socialist economic policies, which required the control of the private sector, India failed to take advantage of the opportunities offered by international trade and investment. As we shall see in the next chapter, such an

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<sup>97</sup> Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, "Region's New Bogey?" *Statesman* (Delhi: March 5, 1989), reprinted in *Indian Ocean Review* 2: 2 (June 1989):1-2.

<sup>98</sup> Das, "India."

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

economic model had limited appeal to the US, given its liberal capitalist economic agenda. In short, the autarkic model provided no soft power at all barring a few early years of expectation.

The onset of more fundamental economic reforms in 1991 proved to be a turning point following the modest economic reforms of the late 1980s. Liberalisation helped India to harmonise with the prevailing norms of the global free market economy and overcome India's economic estrangement from the existing liberal economic order. By conforming to liberal norms, India created scope to be attractive and its relative economic success generated unprecedented attraction to the outside world, which was now based on its success. This success is measurable. Despite a noticeable decline in its growth rate after 2011 (parallel with similar declines worldwide), India has remained an attractive economy for investors. Overall, its ranking on a number of scales is significant for a developing country. Currently, with respect to its contribution to the common goods of science and technology, planet and climate, prosperity and equality, and health and wellbeing, India is ranked 56<sup>th</sup>, 107<sup>th</sup>, 117<sup>th</sup> and 37<sup>th</sup> respectively in the Good Country Index.<sup>100</sup>

India's export of goods and services as a percentage of its GDP rose from 4.4 per cent in 1960 to 24.8 per cent in 2013, thus suggesting that it is far more integrated with the global economy than it was earlier.<sup>101</sup> FDI inflows have also risen since the reforms of the 1990s, peaking at \$43 billion in 2008, and then going down to a little below \$24 billion in 2012.<sup>102</sup> As with other economic indicators, the picture is mixed. India's share of world trade slipped from 2.26 per cent in 1948 to 2.06 per cent in 2013. Similarly, its share of total world exports declined from 2.53 per cent in 1947 to 1.66 per cent in 2013.<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless, India is currently the fourth largest economy in the

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<sup>100</sup> "The Good Country Index," <http://www.goodcountry.org/country/IND>.

<sup>101</sup> World DataBank, The World Bank, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> "India Should Keep up with its Trade Reforms to Ensure Strong Economic Growth," World Trade Organization, April 1, 1998, [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/tpr\\_e/tp71\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp71_e.htm).

world today, with a GDP (in purchasing power parity or PPP terms) of \$4.99 trillion in 2013.<sup>104</sup> Total (standard) GDP has risen substantially since 1961, reaching \$1.877(current US\$) trillion in 2013. Similarly GDP per capita was \$83.8 (current US\$) in 1983 and reached \$1,498.9 in 2013 declining from \$1,539.6 in 2011.<sup>105</sup> It is projected that India's growth rate will be faster than that of others at 5 per cent over the next 30 to 50 years.<sup>106</sup>

According to Goldman Sachs, India will be the third largest economy in 2050, below only China and the US. Its demography supports such projections. Its working age population (15–60 years) as a share of its total population<sup>107</sup> will peak more slowly over the decades when compared and it will have a 200 million-strong labour force by 2030. The comparative figure for China is 67 million. In addition, India's middle class has risen from about 50 million in 2002 to about 100 million in 2010.<sup>108</sup>

Figure 3.1: India's High-technology Exports (Current US\$)<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> The World Factbook.


<sup>105</sup> World DataBank.

<sup>106</sup> Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman, "Global Economics," Paper No. 99, Goldman Sachs, October 1, 2003, <http://antonioguilherme.web.br.com/artigos/Brics.pdf>.

<sup>107</sup> India's total population is projected to be 1.62 billion by 2050 becoming the world's most populous country. "World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision," United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, <http://esa.un.org/wpp/>.

<sup>108</sup> "India Revisited," White Paper, Goldman Sachs, June 2010, [http://www.goldmansachs.com/gsam/docs/instgeneral/general\\_materials/whitepaper/india\\_revisited.pdf](http://www.goldmansachs.com/gsam/docs/instgeneral/general_materials/whitepaper/india_revisited.pdf). For similar positive economic projections of India, see "World in 2050, The BRICs and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges and Opportunities," PWC Economics, January 2013, [http://www.pwc.com/en\\_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf](http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf); Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil, "The World Order in 2050," Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2010, [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/World\\_Order\\_in\\_2050.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/World_Order_in_2050.pdf).

<sup>109</sup> World DataBank.



India's success in the high technology sector is also dramatic since 1991, as its exports have grown rapidly (see Figure 3.1). India's foreign exchange reserve crossed the \$290 billion mark by March 2013 from a meagre \$2161 million in 1951 (see Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: India's Foreign Exchange Reserve (annual, USD million) since 1951.<sup>110</sup>



<sup>110</sup> CEIC database, Accessed June 8, 2014.

Other statistics on its economy continue to trouble. India's value in the Human Development Index has risen slightly from 0.345 to 0.554 between 1980 and 2012 and it currently ranks at 136 among 187 countries, which is very low.<sup>111</sup> In the Global Hunger Index (GHI), India's position was in the category of "extremely alarming" in 1990, doing marginally better (moving to the category of "alarming") by 2013. In contrast, its South Asian neighbours are doing better.<sup>112</sup> The problem of widespread poverty is huge. Still, according to the World Bank, its performance has improved: the proportion of the Indian population that lived on \$1.25 or less a day in 1978 was 65.9 per cent. By 2010, this had declined to 32.7 per cent.<sup>113</sup> According to one projection, this figure will substantially decline to reach 2.5 per cent in 2050.<sup>114</sup>

According to the Heritage Foundation, India ranks under the category of "mostly unfree" economy. In 1997, it was ranked 122<sup>nd</sup> and fell by three positions in 2013. It reached its highest score of 55.2 in 2013 in the Economic Freedom Index, up from 45.1 in 1995. In the category of Business Freedom, however, it fell from a score of 55.0 in 1995 to 37.3 in 2013. In the category of Trade Freedom, it rose substantially from 14.0 in 1996 to 63.6 in 2013. In the category of Investment Freedom, its position dipped from 50.0 in 1995 to 35.0 in 2013.<sup>115</sup> According to the World Economic Forum's Enabling Trade Index, India ranked 100 in 2012, down from 71 in 2008. In the Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index, it ranked 65<sup>th</sup> in 2013 dipping three positions from its 2009 position. Further, in its Global Competitiveness Index, India has slipped to the 59<sup>th</sup> position in 2012–2013 from the 48<sup>th</sup> in 2000.<sup>116</sup> In the "Ease of Doing Business" Index, India is down to rank 132 in 2013 from 116 in 2006.<sup>117</sup> India is also viewed as a "rule breaker" in international institutions such as the World Trade

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<sup>111</sup> Human development reports, United Nations Development Programme, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IND>.

<sup>112</sup> International Food Policy Research Institute, <http://www.ifpri.org/tools/2013-ghi-map>.

<sup>113</sup> World Databank.

<sup>114</sup> Dadush and Stancil, "The World Order in 2050."

<sup>115</sup> 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/index/download>.

<sup>116</sup> World Economic Forum, <http://www.weforum.org/>.

<sup>117</sup> "Doing Business," International Financial Corporation and The World Bank, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.

Organisation (WTO). Its stand on the Doha Development Round trade negotiation in July 2008 manifested such a tendency.<sup>118</sup>

One consequence of this overall pattern of growth is, as noted, the growing attraction of India as a trade and investment partner. Another, though lesser known aspect, is that India itself has become a significant aid giver. While India continues to receive foreign developmental aid and assistance (see Figure 3.3), it has provided aid and assistance since the 1950s and this has begun to expand.<sup>119</sup> Outward aid started with the establishment of the Technical Cooperation Scheme (TCS) under the Colombo Plan in 1950, which involved the provision of technical assistance to neighbouring countries.<sup>120</sup> Indian aid, which included grants as well as loans, mainly provided technical assistance.<sup>121</sup> In the 2013–2014 budget, India’s planned expenditure for total grants and loans to foreign countries is INR 7018.79 crore (about INR 70.19 billion and \$1.3 billion).<sup>122</sup> This amount is comparable to the development assistance given by Australia and South Korea.<sup>123</sup> According to Stephen Howes and Jonathan Pryke, India’s aid “will have increased by 260% by 2014-15”.<sup>124</sup> The major beneficiaries of India’s aid have been its South Asian neighbours, Bhutan being the biggest.<sup>125</sup> For small and weak developing countries, the offer of aid represents India’s significant soft power.

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<sup>118</sup> Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Bruce Jones, “A Hesitant Rule Shaper?” in *Shaping the Emerging World*, 8–9.

<sup>119</sup> Fuchs and Vadlamannati, “The Needy Donor.” According to one study, India received more aid than any other developing country after World War II, receiving about \$55 billion between 1951 and 1992. Shyam J. Kamath, “Foreign Aid and India: Financing the Leviathan State,” *Cato Policy Analysis* No. 170, May 6, 1992, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-170.html>.

<sup>120</sup> Fuchs and Vadlamannati, “The Needy Donor.”

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*


<sup>122</sup> “Expenditure Budget,” Vol. I, 2013–2014, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, <http://indiabudget.nic.in/budget2013-2014/ub2013-14/eb/stat11.pdf>.

<sup>123</sup> Rani D. Mullen, “5 Predictions for India’s Development Cooperation under New Government,” *The Asia Foundation*, May 28, 2014, <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/05/28/5-predictions-for-indias-development-cooperation-under-new-government/>. See also Stephen Howes and Jonathan Pryke, “Is India’s Aid Bigger than Australia’s?” *Development Policy Centre*, June 6, 2014, <http://devpolicy.org/is-indias-aid-bigger-than-australias-20140606/>.

<sup>124</sup> Howes and Pryke, “Is India’s Aid Bigger than Australia’s?”

<sup>125</sup> “Annual Report 2012–2013,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/21385\\_Annual\\_Report\\_2012-2013\\_English.pdf](http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/21385_Annual_Report_2012-2013_English.pdf); “Expenditure Budget.”

Figure 3.3: Developmental Assistance and Aid Received by India<sup>126</sup>



Besides the TCS, India has extended assistance through its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) and the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa Programme (SCAAP). These have involved, among other things, training of personnel in the civil and defence sectors of ITEC partner countries, deputing Indian experts to foreign countries for assistance (from IT to military training to agricultural research and English teaching), giving gifts or donations to ITEC partners, and providing disaster relief aid.<sup>127</sup> Why does India engage in this provision of aid? India calls the aid relationships “development partnerships” to strengthen South-South cooperation and advertises it through its newly established Public Diplomacy Division in the Ministry of External Affairs.<sup>128</sup> In return for its provision of developmental assistance, India has sought to garner support for its cause in multilateral forums, such as obtaining support for its quest for permanent membership of the UN Security

<sup>126</sup> World DataBank.

<sup>127</sup> “About ITEC,” Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation Programme, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://itec.mea.gov.in/?1320?000>.

<sup>128</sup> “Annual Report 2010-2011,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/45\\_Annual-Report-2010-2011.pdf](http://mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/45_Annual-Report-2010-2011.pdf); “About ITEC”; Fuchs and Vadlamannati, “The Needy Donor.”

Council and securing favourable votes on matters of interest in the UN General Assembly.<sup>129</sup> By extending Lines of Credit as a new way of extending assistance, it furthers its direct interests as well as its soft power. As “these credits are largely tied to goods and service provision by Indian firms, they help open markets for Indian business.”<sup>130</sup> From South Asia to Sub-Saharan Africa, India’s developmental assistance is seen as an instrument to secure its geopolitical, energy and business interests while simultaneously acquiring foreign policy influence.<sup>131</sup> Between 2008 and 2010, 45 per cent of the aid sponsored by the Ministry of External Affairs was towards the commercial sector (with 23.1 per cent towards the energy sector) and 24 per cent towards “basic public goods”.<sup>132</sup> As long as aid does not become an exploitative tool and both donor and recipient benefit, aid is an important source of soft power influence.

Therefore, India’s economic hard power can also produce soft power of attraction on the bases of adopting economic openness, economic success, and economic aid and assistance. The next two only considers level of economic hard power and its impact on soft power’s effectiveness.

### **3.5 Culture and Cultural Diplomacy: Do They Matter?**

Arguably, India is one of the “four main cradles of civilization from which the elements of culture have spread to other parts of the world”. In this respect, it is sometimes argued that India should be given more credit than it has received, particularly in light of its huge cultural impact on Asia and beyond. It has the world’s

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<sup>129</sup> Rani D Mullen, “Holding Back on Soft Power,” *The Indian Express*, March 4, 2013, <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/holding-back-on-soft-power/1082532/0>.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Fuchs and Vadlamannati, “The Needy Donor”; Rani D. Mullen, “Perspective: India Flexes Its Foreign Aid Muscle,” *Current History* 111:744 (April 2012):154-156. Rani D. Mullen and Sumit Ganguly, “The Rise of India’s Soft Power: It’s Not Just Bollywood and Yoga Anymore,” *Foreign Policy*, May 8, 2012,

[http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/08/the\\_rise\\_of\\_indian\\_soft\\_power](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/08/the_rise_of_indian_soft_power).

<sup>132</sup> Fuchs and Vadlamannati, “The Needy Donor.”

oldest unbroken culture, with China and Greece coming second and third.<sup>133</sup> The spread of Indian culture, moreover, was largely without state sanction and support. Its transmission continues privately today through its civil society. At the same time, the Indian state is also actively involved in advancing its cultural influence, following the mode of cultural diplomacy.

At the forefront of India's cultural diplomacy is the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, established in 1950 to forge cultural relations with foreign countries and thereby, enhance its "soft power".<sup>134</sup> It has established 35 cultural centres across the world with 15 more in the pipeline. The various modalities through which it works to enhance India's cultural attraction include organising Indian cultural festivals abroad (since the 1980s) and foreign cultural festivals in India, despatching and receiving cultural troupes, sponsoring exhibitions in India and abroad, sending busts and statues of figures of national importance abroad, supporting seminars and conferences on Indian culture both in India and abroad, sponsoring distinguished foreign visitors, supporting Chairs of Indian Studies abroad (currently, there are 106 chairs), and awarding fellowships "to international scholars specialising in Indian studies in the fields of culture and social sciences".<sup>135</sup> Besides, ICCR also runs 24 scholarship programmes for foreign nationals to study in India. Currently, there are approximately 4750 students studying in India representing about 135 countries. Of the scholarships awarded, numbering some 3365, about 1000 are given to Afghan nationals and 900 to students from African countries.<sup>136</sup> The organisation also awards eminent foreign nationals the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for promoting "international understanding, goodwill, and friendship among peoples of the world". Since its institution in 1965, the

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<sup>133</sup> A. L. Basham, "Introduction," in *A Cultural History of India*, ed. A. L. Basham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1-2.

<sup>134</sup> "ICCR's Global Presence: Indian Cultural Centres Abroad," Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, <http://www.iccrindia.net/culturalcentres.html>.

<sup>135</sup> Indian Council for Cultural Relations, <http://www.iccrindia.net/index.html>.

<sup>136</sup> "The Many Scholarship Schemes of ICCR," Indian Council for Cultural Relations, <http://www.iccrindia.net/scholarshipschemes.html>.

award has been given to 36 leaders, the first being the U Thant.<sup>137</sup> The ICCR has also invited many eminent persons to deliver the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Memorial Lectures in India to promote international understanding since its institution in 1958, the first being Arnold Toynbee.<sup>138</sup>

All these state-sponsored efforts aimed at influencing other societies may indeed have positive effects, but whether they are able to alter policy preferences of the highest order is doubtful. Nevertheless, as Ellen L. Frost argues, while Indian diplomats need to “revive and build on India’s historical and cultural legacy in Asia, they should not apparently be “seeking hegemony or trumpeting a chauvinist vision”.<sup>139</sup> Thus, while culture can be an important source of soft power, cultural hegemony may not be attractive. It is important to note here that visa restriction on researchers should be removed to suggest the presence of a liberal culture and democracy.<sup>140</sup> Even cultural diplomacy needs the support of money. On these two accounts, India lags China.<sup>141</sup> As we will see in detail in chapters 4 and 5, cultural diplomacy has little to do with the ways in which states actually exercise power and influence.

Whether through cultural diplomacy or public diplomacy, any country as noted in chapter 2, creates enabling environment by targeting the people of foreign countries, which in turn can induce the government towards a positive outcome. India’s public diplomacy began as early as 1948 with the establishment of the All India Radio’s External Services Division. Broadcast within 72 hours in over 108 countries and 15

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<sup>137</sup> “The Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding,” Indian Council for Cultural Relations, <http://www.iccrindia.net/jnaward.html>.

<sup>138</sup> “Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Memorial Lectures,” Indian Council for Cultural Relations, <http://www.iccrindia.net/azadlecture.html>.

<sup>139</sup> Frost, “India’s Role in East Asia,” 10.

<sup>140</sup> “Use Visa Card Sensibly,” *The Hindu*, December 11, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/use-visa-card-sensibly/article4185295.ece>.

<sup>141</sup> Pavan K. Varma, “Culture as an Instrument of Diplomacy,” in *Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*, eds. Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007): 1137.

foreign and 12 Indian languages, it presents the Indian outlook on major issues, its development and policies, its democracy and culture, etc.<sup>142</sup>

India is also now increasingly focused on its public diplomacy. Launched in 2006, India's public diplomacy division in the MEA aims "to foster a greater understanding of India and its foreign policy concerns".<sup>143</sup> It now reaches out to the global and Indian public through blogs, instagram, Google+, you tube channel, twitter and Facebook, and uses the Web 2.0 tools. It distributes its publications such as *India Perspective*, and films and photos related to India. It also organises seminars, conferences and other events concerning India and hosts foreign delegations.<sup>144</sup> MEA had such initiatives as "India Is" launched in 2011 through which it asks the people across the world to share their experience of India in the forms of videos and photographs.<sup>145</sup> Through the initiative of "IndiaAfrica - A shared future", it promotes people-to-people contacts between India and Africa. Additionally, the MEA, jointly with its External Publicity and Public Diplomacy Division, sanctions foreign TV channels to use videos related to major Indian news stories.<sup>146</sup>

Ian Hall, after surveying India's public diplomacy, concludes that "targeted public diplomacy by India and its diaspora" had soft effect in the case of Indo-US nuclear deal in influencing the Congress.<sup>147</sup> However, Devesh Kapur rightly argues that the role of Indian-Americans in the Indo-US nuclear deal was "facilitative rather than causal".<sup>148</sup> Shashi Tharoor argues that India should engage in public diplomacy and that India's

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<sup>142</sup> External, Prasar Bharati, <http://allindiaradio.gov.in/Services/External/Pages/Default.aspx>.

<sup>143</sup> Public Diplomacy Division, Ministry of External Affairs, <http://www.aseanindia.com/about/organisers/pdd/>.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

<sup>145</sup> MEA, India, <http://www.mea.gov.in/mea-campaigns.htm#indiaIs>.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ian Hall, "India's New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power and the Limits of Government Action," *Asian Survey* 52: 6 (2012):1109.

<sup>148</sup> Devesh Kapur, *Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 200.

reality, not its image, matters.<sup>149</sup> Like cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy is not included in the case studies for it creates mostly indirect effect, which is outside the scope of this thesis.

A word about culture is necessary. It is commonplace to treat the diverse manifestations of cultural life and their extensions abroad as aspects of soft power. Certainly, much can be said of the popularity of Indian culture – films, literature, yoga, and song – especially at the popular level. These are no doubt significant in themselves, but whether they can be incorporated into the strategy of soft power, which influences the political attitudes and behaviour of other states, is doubtful. Some forms of culture disseminated from India are barely recognised as “Indian”, Buddhism for instance, (which has very small number of adherents in India itself) is widely followed in East Asian societies, but few would consider it in everyday sense as a measure of Indian influence. Similarly, yoga, which has a wide following in the developed West, is not really a form of soft power in the context of the Indian state achieving its preferred outcomes of the highest order. More generally, interest in a specific culture or its various forms does not translate into soft power in the sense investigated here. Nothing is more reflective of this gap than the commonplace reality that American popular culture from jeans to Hollywood films is not necessarily accompanied by deference to American political preferences. There is no evidence that the reality is any different with respect to Indian culture.

It is pointed out that besides commerce and Indian-Americans, “Indian ideas and culture through movies, literature, food, and travel” enhance Indo-US societal ties. Such ties along with “convergence of interests” complement shared values, which would in future secure an upward trajectory of Indo-US strategic partnership.<sup>150</sup> While agreeing to this hypothesis, the following chapters do not consider the role of culture as a basis of India’s attraction on the issues addressed in either periods of this study. The

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<sup>149</sup> Shashi Tharoor, *Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2012), 295–312.

<sup>150</sup> Tellis, *US and India*, 25.

above popular sources of Indian culture have no direct causal relations with the outcomes preferred by India as discussed in the following two chapters.

India's tradition of toleration and pluralism is ancient, has continued to the present day affecting Indian culture and is creating significant scope for its soft power.<sup>151</sup> As Parag Khanna writes, "Secularism, pluralism, tolerance, diversity — the increasingly confident Indian experiment can teach the dozens of ongoing blue-ribbon inter-faith dialogues run by Saudi princes and American think-tanks a thing or two about so-called universal values".<sup>152</sup>

### 3.6 Conclusion

India's soft power has grown in view of its economic liberalisation and success as well as its rapid acquisition of military power. The growth of its hard economic and military power resources has reinforced India's confidence in projecting its soft power as. While resources are important, how they are used is still more important in the case of soft power. "Positive" views about India in world public opinion decreased from 37 per cent in 2007 to 34 per cent in 2013. In the same years, "negative" views of India increased more substantially from 26 per cent to 35 per cent.<sup>153</sup> India's decline in economic growth among others, contributed to such negative views. The next two chapters examine India's soft power relations with the US, the most powerful state in the world, in order to gauge the effectiveness of these resources. As noted, cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy are not included in the analysis since the effect they have is indirect.

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<sup>151</sup> K. M. Panikkar, *Essential Features of India Culture* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1964), 5-7. See also Shashi Tharoor, *India: From Midnight to the Millennium and Beyond* (New Delhi: Penguin 2012), Chapter 1.

<sup>152</sup> Parag Khanna, "Bollystan --The Global India: How is India Projecting its Growing Global Influence?" *The Globalist*, December 3, 2004, <http://www.theglobalist.com/bollystan-the-global-india/>.

<sup>153</sup> See "BBC World Service Poll," March 6, 2007, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/06\\_03\\_07\\_perceptions.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/06_03_07_perceptions.pdf); BBC World Service Poll, May 22, 2013, 2-3.

## CHAPTER 4

### Soft Power Limitations: India and the United States, 1947–1964

Before India's independence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other New Deal liberals with their anti-imperialist orientation were "favourably disposed" towards independence of India.<sup>1</sup> There was, however, ambiguity in the US position towards India's independence and ultimately, the priorities of nationalist Indians and the US differed. For nationalists, independence was the primary interest, but for the US, it was secondary.<sup>2</sup> As a result, the interaction was largely unfruitful. The Truman administration preferred a united India for its "political and economic interest". As the prospect for partition became imminent, the US became neutral.<sup>3</sup> The arrival of Truman presidency brought a change in the US foreign policy outlook with a dominant orientation towards balance of power and "containing Communism".<sup>4</sup> The US saw its relationship with India largely in the context of this Cold War bipolar power struggle.

India as a post-colonial sovereign nation-state inherited a stagnant economy, mass illiteracy and poverty – problems that were only compounded by the partition and the conflict over Kashmir with Pakistan. It however adopted constitutional democracy and liberal politics following Western practices and the socialist path of economic development. Externally, it chose the nonaligned foreign policy. Independent India also carried the baggage of a negative image in the US as popularly presented by Katherine Mayo in her book *Mother India*, which continued to be the leading source of views about India after its independence.<sup>5</sup> The book made "a lasting impression" on

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<sup>1</sup> Harold A. Gould, *The South Asia Story: The First Sixty Years of U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan* (New Delhi: Sage, 2010), 23.

<sup>2</sup> Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1992), Chapter 1.

<sup>3</sup> See H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 18.

<sup>4</sup> Gould, *The South Asia Story*, Chapters 1 and 2.

<sup>5</sup> Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 1.

Americans.<sup>6</sup> The images of India in the US “were usually negative”.<sup>7</sup> India was perceived as “geographically remote from U.S. national interests, culturally exotic, psychologically unfathomable, lacking in religious or philosophical exactitude, socially disunited, economically inefficient, oppressive in physical environment, its people poor, non-aggressive, oppressed, keen-minded but in large numbers uneducated, morally sensitive but difficult to deal with personally”. This image continued during the initial years after independence. India was thus, viewed as “mysterious”, “primitive” and “remote”.<sup>8</sup> There was no “built-in psychological bridge” and India was perceived as being diametrically opposite to the US in the “spiritualism-materialism dichotomy”.<sup>9</sup>

India was not however the “estranged democracy” to the US, as one would deduce from Dennis Kux’s title of the book, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941 - 1991*. As Garry Hess who first coined<sup>10</sup> the phrase points out, US image of India shifted from “essential democracy” to “estranged democracy” in the mid-1960s.<sup>11</sup> As noted in chapter 2, the India-US relationship had swung between cooperation and antagonism during the entire Cold War period. This chapter looks into two issues that had a profound impact on the nature of India’s relationship with the US during the Nehru period to trace the limited effect of soft power under the condition of low level of hard power. On the issue of economic aid and assistance, the US was initially reluctant and began providing significant amount of aid and assistance only from the late 1950s so as to prevent India from economic collapse and come under Communism. Similarly, US military cooperation reached an appreciable level during

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<sup>6</sup> Garry Hess, “American Perspectives on India, 1947-1990,” in *Four Decades of Indi-U.S. Relations*, ed. A. P. Rana (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1994), 169. See also Nathan Glazer, “Four Decades of Indian-American Cultural Exchange,” in *Four Decades of Indi-U.S. Relations*, 205.

<sup>7</sup> Charles H. Heimsath, “The American Images of India as Factors in U.S. Foreign Policy Making,” in *Race and U.S. Foreign Policy During the Cold War*, ed. Michael L. Krenn (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1998), 101.

<sup>8</sup> Heimsath, “The American Images of India as a Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy Making,” 100-101.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>10</sup> Dennis Kux attributes to Garry Hess for the phrase, “estranged democracies”. See Kux, *India and the United States*, xiv.

<sup>11</sup> Garry Hess, “American Perspectives on India, 1947-1990,” in *Four Decades of Indi-U.S. Relations*, 181.

India's war with China in 1962 in order to save the democracy from Communist China. This chapter advances the argument that India's limited economic and military power resources during 1947–1964 constrained its soft power of attraction and thereby, its ability to obtain its preferences vis-à-vis the United States. It proceeds in two sections with each section dealing with each of the above two issues.

## **4.1 Economic Assistance**

### *4.1.1 Introduction*

For the US, India was economically and militarily a weak power, yet also significant because it was a large democratic state. Therefore, despite its strong policy differences with the US on the Cold War, India was worth saving because it was a democracy that, if too weak, would come under Soviet control. But because of its limited strategic utility as a weak power, the US did not find the logic to support it beyond a point in light of policy divergences. US economic aid to India however grew from zero in 1950 to \$465.5 million in 1962 (see Table 4.2). There was growth in US aid, but primarily to save India from falling under Soviet influence and from internal Communist challenge. It was also seen in the long term that an economically and politically successful India could be a source of counter attraction in the context of success of Communist China to many Third World countries. But as a weak democracy, it did not attract the kind of strong assistance that would have greatly enhanced its power and influence as a strategic player. In short, India as a democracy mattered, but not strongly. This section establishes relationship between India's limited soft power effects in terms of economic assistance and its low level of hard power. It also tests the validity of the null hypothesis that its soft power outcomes had no relationship with the level of hard power.

### *4.1.2 Explaining Policy in Terms of Indian Power*

***Early American Reluctance:*** While foreign aid had already become a key instrument in the external economic policy of the US to advance economic development in the world, independent India as an evolving democracy in need of economic aid failed to influence it in its favour between 1947 and 1950.<sup>12</sup> Hard power weakness combined with New Delhi's refusal to support American Cold War strategy meant India's attractiveness as the world's largest democracy was limited.

Just before independence in June 1947, a draft report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee pointed out, "The situation in India is not now, nor is likely to be within the next five years, so critical as to necessitate special appropriations of American public funds in order to safeguard United States security by extraordinary measures of financial aid to India".<sup>13</sup> Henry F. Grady, then US Ambassador to India in his reply to an unofficial query by Girja Shanker Bajpai, India's Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations on September 3, 1947 on possible US loans to India stated that "if the Dominion Governments solve their initial problems of organization and the economic and political situation reverses the present downward trends so that the outlook is promising, I saw no reason why application for private credits on the part of industries from American banks would not be in order, and that the Government of India might for its large public works approach the International Bank and /or the Export-Import Bank".<sup>14</sup> Grady had earlier written to the Department of State regarding India's food deficit following partition and its request for American food supply to be increased to 100,000 tons to maintain "controlled hunger".<sup>15</sup> Robert A. Lovett, the acting Secretary of State immediately wrote back with a negative reply.<sup>16</sup> Grady

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<sup>12</sup> See Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina, 1990), 19.

<sup>13</sup> Quoted in Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 218n24.

<sup>14</sup> The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, September 3, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Vol. III(1947):166.

<sup>15</sup> The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, September 2, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III (1947):164-165.

<sup>16</sup> The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, September 3, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III (1947):166.

showed interest in a provision of assistance to increase India's food production in late 1947. His discussion of such aid with State Department officials in December 1947 did not, however, reach the level of secretary of state or the president, despite the motive behind his initiative being to induce India to the American side in the Cold War.<sup>17</sup>

India's then Ambassador to the US, Asaf Ali asked US acting Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett if the US could increase its export allocations of food grains, only to be declined.<sup>18</sup> Bajpai raised the issue of possible US assistance on India's hydroelectric developmental projects during his visit in April 1948 in light of no favourable response despite India's request in the past in this regard. He was told to continue to engage the US Embassy in New Delhi.<sup>19</sup> In his discussion with Lovett, Bajpai said that only the US could provide aid to India repeating what Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in July 1947 had told Grady.<sup>20</sup> During his discussion with the State Department officials, he emphasised India's inability to make open political alignment with the US due to the fear of "aggression from Russia or the internal difficulties which might ensue". He however assured that "Should the world once again become involved in conflict, India could only associate itself with, those nations holding the same ideals of freedom and democracy".<sup>21</sup> India's request for assistance did not however find US favour.<sup>22</sup> While India mattered to the US in the long term, the latter had immediate priorities in other places of the world in fighting against Communism.<sup>23</sup> A policy statement by the State Department on May 20, 1948 emphasised private investment

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<sup>17</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 26–27.

<sup>18</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, October 7, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III (1947):169.

<sup>19</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), Washington, April 2, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1(1948), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d401>.

<sup>20</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), Washington, April 2, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1 (1948), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d402>; Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 37.

<sup>21</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), April 2, 1948.

<sup>22</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 29.

<sup>23</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), April 2, 1948.

rather than foreign aid for India's economic development. India was not the same as Marshal Plan-countries in terms of US priority.<sup>24</sup> Indian officials continued to explore US economic assistance by appealing to senior administration officials including the new ambassador Loy W. Henderson on the basis of preventing rise of communists after their ascendance in China by economic development, while the US remained indifferent.<sup>25</sup>

Events such as the Dutch action in Indonesia towards the end of 1948 raised anti-imperialist opinion in Asia with India taking the lead by organising the New Delhi Conference raising US suspicion of a likely "anti-Western block". India's behaviour was not anti-American, and Nehru for the first time even considered preferential alignment with the US to benefit economically and militarily.<sup>26</sup> In the context of the rise of nationalism in Asia and communists in China, the US was beginning to reconsider its policy towards Asia, which included provision of economic aid. The US announced its Point Four programme without serious planning and included India as a beneficiary.<sup>27</sup> India also approached for aid to its "Grow More Food" programme as the US embassy in New Delhi mulled over providing US assistance. India also asked the US to provide one million ton of wheat on "concessional or easy terms". This request came in the context of Nehru's desire to visit the US, India's decision to join the Commonwealth, and its "liberal policies toward foreign capital".<sup>28</sup> Ambassador Henderson appealed for economic aid for India linking it to its political stability in May 1949. A report by the State Department also drew linkage between economic problems and political stability. However the Truman administration did not make a decision in favour of India and advised it to approach the World Bank or private investment.<sup>29</sup> India had responded negatively to the US to its proposed "Special Treaty for

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<sup>24</sup> See Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 48.

<sup>25</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 47-48. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 31.

<sup>26</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 32-33. See also Sarvepalli Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*, Vol. 2, 1947-1956 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979), 59.

<sup>27</sup> Kux, *India and the United States*, 78-79. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 31-34.

<sup>28</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 35-36.

<sup>29</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 48-49.

Friendship, Navigation and Commerce” to enhance economic and cultural relations owing to its attachment to nonalignment.<sup>30</sup> In India, as Grady has noted, “The leaders and people in general have an almost irrational fear of what they call dollar imperialism”.<sup>31</sup>

There were also British initiatives to highlight India’s strategic importance in Asia and its requirement for American aid. When British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin raised the issue of American assistance to “reduce famine” in India, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson recognised American thinking “along vague lines” on India and also pointed out that the administration was “doubtful about India” by making reference to India’s nonalignment policy. While British officials engaged the US on this, the American response was “mixed”, because of India’s nonalignment posture.<sup>32</sup> Clearly, from a realpolitik standpoint, the US disinterest in India as an aid recipient was due to India’s divergence from Washington’s Cold War priorities.

Close to Nehru’s visit, US policymakers in their assessment viewed India as a potential “bulwark” against Communism in Asia.<sup>33</sup> Ambassador Henderson in October proposed a provision of \$500 million economic aid for five year, supported India’s request for one million tons of wheat, and emphasised such aid meant to bring about “greater stability” and would make India as a bulwark against Communism in Asia. He argued that without such assistance, India “might degenerate in a vast political and economic swamp, the unclear exaltations of which would pollute the international atmosphere for an indefinite period of time”.<sup>34</sup>

Economic aid to India did not merit a favourable decision by the US in 1949 despite such wishful thinking of seeing India as the potential bulwark against Communism in

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<sup>30</sup> Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 38-40.

<sup>31</sup> John T. McNay, *The Memoirs of Ambassador Henry F. Grady: From the Great War to the Cold War* (Columbia: University of Missouri, 2009), 131.

<sup>32</sup> See for details, Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 36–39.

<sup>33</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 50-54.

<sup>34</sup> See Kux, *India and the United States*, 79; McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 54.

Asia. Nehru's visit resulted in surfacing of differences over recognition of Communist China, the threat from the Soviet Union, racialism and colonialism. The divergence was "more fundamental than either side had previously recognized".<sup>35</sup> According to Henderson, India was not contributing to resolving "world problems" and would not do so with a nonalignment policy.<sup>36</sup> His utterances on nonalignment "dampened the 'attitude of the Congress and public'".<sup>37</sup> Nehru failed to influence the US to provide economic assistance.<sup>38</sup> After returning to India, Nehru complained that "the United States had expected total acquiescence from him in return for economic assistance".<sup>39</sup>

If the US had some "sentimental image of Nehru and Indian independence", that dissipated with the US becoming "less certain" after listening to Nehru.<sup>40</sup> The State Department responded negatively to Henderson's aid proposal a few days after Nehru's visit. As McMahon notes, "India evidently had not achieved sufficient prominence in official thinking to warrant a significant financial commitment". Neither did the US feel it necessary to respond positively to India's modest request of one million tons of wheat.<sup>41</sup> This shows how India as a weak power compounded by nonalignment policy evinced limited strategic interests and received no positive response. As Rudra Chaudhuri after surveying British, American and Indian archival sources concludes, "The difficulties in actually attaining aid at this time had little to do with Nehru's cautious or reserved negotiating style, but the fact that the Truman administration was simply not prepared to make an offer".<sup>42</sup> In Secretary of State Dean Acheson's "American world", "India had a limited if not altogether invisible role".<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 56.

<sup>36</sup> Henderson quoted in Robert J. McMahon, "Food as a Diplomatic Weapon: The India Wheat Loan of 1951," *Pacific Historical Review* 56: 3 (1987): 352.

<sup>37</sup> Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 41.

<sup>38</sup> Charles H. Heimsath, and SurjitMansingh, *A Diplomatic History of Modern India* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), 350.

<sup>39</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 57.

<sup>40</sup> Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the U. S.-I: Case History of a Mistake," *The New Republic*, August 10, 1959, 13.

<sup>41</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 55.

<sup>42</sup> Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 41-46.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

***Democracy Begins to Matter (But only A Little):*** The economic aid required by India could be accomplished by the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank. Making this suggestion, a draft paper by the National Security Council, NSC 48, which was approved by the president in December 1949, looked into US position in Asia in the face of the Communist menace and emphasised military means with a focus on the Southeast Asian region to contain Communism. In light of India's nonaligned posture, it suggested against viewing India as the only "bulwark" against communism in Asia.<sup>44</sup>

Yet the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent and the partition of British India into two new states gradually began to concern the US.<sup>45</sup> Broadly, despite India's policy divergence, the US was interested in preventing the collapse of Indian democracy, which it viewed positively. According to a report by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), "The political foment and economic distress obtaining in most of the South Asian countries, combined with their weak military defenses, make this area particularly susceptible to Communist penetration".<sup>46</sup> Moreover, as the report emphasised, "...the loss to the U.S. of access to the raw materials and present and possible productive capacity, manpower and military bases of this area, or Communist control of the area and its vast population, would gravely affect the security of the U.S. Such an eventuality *would prevent the development in these countries of political and economic principles compatible with our own....*" The report thus suggested American economic and technical assistance for economic development in South Asia which would support "more stable and democratic governments".<sup>47</sup> While India continued to emphasise its foreign policy of nonalignment, the US officials showed displeasure and wanted India to be on the American or the "democratic side".<sup>48</sup> Indian officials in 1948 reiterated India's ultimate

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<sup>44</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 43–45.

<sup>45</sup> Report by the SANACC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East, Washington, April 19, 1949, FRUS, Vol. VI (1949), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v06/d3>.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> The Charge in India (Merrell) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, January 21, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III, (1947):138-139; McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 16

alignment with the democratic side on the basis of shared values even as Nehru reiterated India's commitment to nonalignment and criticised US policies on the issues of racialism, colonialism and Kashmir.<sup>49</sup> After his talks with Bajpai, Loy W. Henderson, then Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs shared the position of Indian officials that the shared value of democracy would not bring India and the Soviet Union together in the event of a conflict.<sup>50</sup>

The above discussion shows that India's soft power of attraction rooted in shared value of democracy within the first three years of its building a new, sovereign, and democratic nation-state on a foundation of material (hard power) weakness did have some influence on American thinking, but was not enough to have the desired effect of obtaining American aid in an "unobligated partnership" as preferred by Nehru.<sup>51</sup> While some officials suggested provision of economic aid, India as a weak democracy was not sufficient to attract the US to subsequently provide aid. It was neither strong enough nor strategically agreeable enough to attract American interest beyond a point. McMahon in his study of various policy documents of the Harry S. Truman administration on importance of India to the US core interests in this period concludes that the administration was inclined to view American interest in "power terms" and considered India (and Pakistan) as "peripheral".<sup>52</sup> As he writes, "Neither India nor Pakistan possessed the basic ingredients of military-economic power that U.S. strategists most valued. Without an advanced industrial base, a skilled workforce, or crucial raw materials, the Indian subcontinent barely factored into American calculations about overall correlations of world powers".<sup>53</sup> In the order of importance to American security interests, according to a report by the Central Intelligence Agency

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<sup>49</sup> See, for example, The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, March 20, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V(1948): 498; The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 20, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V (1948): 500; Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), April 2, 1948; McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 44-45.

<sup>50</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 44.

<sup>51</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, *Unity in Difference: Overcoming the U.S.-India Divide* (Washington, DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015), 9.

<sup>52</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 13-14.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

(CIA) in September 1947, India (and Pakistan) stood last with the Western Europe at the top, and the Near and Middle East and the Far East as second and third respectively.<sup>54</sup>

But, as we shall see below, there was some positive response from the US on provision of economic assistance during 1950–1951, which included the wheat loan following India’s food crisis.

Table 4.2: Total US Grants and Loans to India, 1950–1964<sup>55</sup>

Year	Total Grants and Loans (millions of US dollars)
1950	0.0
1951	4.8
1952	52.8
1953	44.3
1954	87.2
1955	85.7
1956	60.0
1957	65.3
1958	89.8
1959	137.0
1960	194.6
1961	200.8
1962	465.5
1963	397.2
1964	336.5

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Data taken from Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 4.

National Security Council document 68 (NSC-68) of 1950 emphasised that “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”. Therefore, the US had a global agenda to “lead in building successfully functioning political and economic systems in the free world”.<sup>56</sup> While the US was emphasising military tools in its efforts to contain Communism in Asia, Nehru was in favour of economic development through aid “without strings”.<sup>57</sup> Henderson in a telegram to Acheson stated that “anti-American feelings” in India were caused by Indian perceptions of American support to Pakistan on Kashmir, its failure to render economic assistance, and its interest in imposing “free enterprise” on Indian economy.<sup>58</sup> Acheson in his reply to Henderson was of the opinion that US-India relations must be founded on factors “more enduring than million tons wheat, dollar loans or gifts”. He did not like India’s attitude of receiving aid “without any strings attached”. According to him, India never intended “assistance [for] solution [of] food problem on basis [of] alleviation [of] human suffering”. Moreover, “assistance to India and other countries can only be forthcoming when there is coincident Ind receptivity and our own ability, and constructive purpose to be served”.<sup>59</sup>

India was allocated a meagre \$4.5 million in 1950 under the Point Four programme and agricultural experts to help India’s Grow More Food programme.<sup>60</sup> At the same time, George McGhee, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (NEA) proposed economic aid in the form of a development proposal of \$200 million annually from 1952 for South Asian countries, especially in the agricultural sector, and linked it to the larger American strategy of containing Communism. Despite differences over the Korean crisis, McGhee’s proposal received support at the highest level in the State Department and subsequently, it was decided

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<sup>56</sup> A Report to the President in Pursuant of President’s Directive of January 31, 1950, Washington, April 7, 1950, FRUS, Vol. I (1950): 241.

<sup>57</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 49.

<sup>58</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, April 12, 1950, FRUS, Vol. V (1950): 1461–1463.

<sup>59</sup> The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, April 21, 1950, FRUS, Vol. V (1950): 1464–1488.

<sup>60</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 50.

that such aid for South Asia would be included in the Mutual Security Programme for 1951 instead of presenting to the Congress in 1950.<sup>61</sup> Similarly, another policy paper by the Office of the South Asian Affairs supported such economic aid to South Asia.<sup>62</sup> Even though India was not falling in line with US Cold War policies, there was a fear that Indian democracy was vulnerable to communism. Thus the National Security Council proposed economic assistance along with military assistance to India to ensure India not falling into the “Communist orbit”.<sup>63</sup>

In September 1950, Truman approved of the supply of 500,000 tons of milo with the US agreeing to pay \$4.5 million for it following India’s request in July. McGhee counseled Acheson to respond positively on humanitarian as well as political reasons. To him, such assistance would support “stability of an important free nation of Asia”.<sup>64</sup> According to Acheson, it would bolster “a friendly and stable government”.<sup>65</sup> However, India’s food crisis became more serious due to floods and droughts in some states for which it approached the US in November and subsequently in December 1950 when Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, India’s Ambassador to the US, approached Acheson making a formal request for two million tons of food grain following exploratory talks between Indian officials and US embassy in New Delhi. Acheson agreed to “explore the situation urgently and thoroughly”.<sup>66</sup>

The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs took a position in favor of immediate aid lest it would affect political stability in India as well as the American position in Asia.<sup>67</sup> More important than the reservations shown by the Department of the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget over the cost of food aid, it was the concern of the State

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 51–54.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>63</sup> Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal), Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council, Washington, January 22, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 1651–1652.

<sup>64</sup> McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon,” 355.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 356.

<sup>66</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 55.

<sup>67</sup> McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon,” 358.

Department as to how to approach the issue.<sup>68</sup> The officials of the Department of State concluded that humanitarian rationale for the aid would not be enough to persuade the Congress and therefore NEA had to suggest how to find support from the Congress and the public.<sup>69</sup> Such support was already evolving in favour of India on humanitarian ground as well as on the ground as to keep India secured from Communism.<sup>70</sup> According to a Gallup poll later in March, 59 per cent Americans polled supported food aid to India.<sup>71</sup> Some senators and congressmen voiced their support and subsequently sent a bipartisan letter to the president in support of emergency food aid to “prevent starvation” and cited shared values of liberty even as they expressed their opposition to some of the foreign policies of India.<sup>72</sup>

But there were limits to India’s attraction as a democracy. During the interagency process, William C. Foster, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) questioned Nehru’s foreign policy orientation.<sup>73</sup> McGhee and Acheson developed an aid strategy on India’s potential support for collective security against possible Chinese aggression in South and Southeast Asia, which needed resolution of the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. By suggesting in advance a grant-in-aid, Acheson made the US strategy of linking aid to India’s change in foreign policy behaviour obvious, as the loan would have been much easier if India toed the US line.<sup>74</sup> Food aid as a grant instead of loan was difficult to be approved by the Congress, but appeared as a diplomatic tool.<sup>75</sup> Acheson on December 30, 1950 informed the US Embassy in India

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<sup>68</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 62-63.

<sup>69</sup> See McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon,” 358-359.

<sup>70</sup> See *Ibid.*, 359.

<sup>71</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 69.

<sup>72</sup> Bipartisan Letter to the president in support of providing India food grains, January 30, 1951. See *Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 82d Congress, First session*, Vol. 97, Part 4 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1951), 5262. See also McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon,” 360.

<sup>73</sup> McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon,” 361.

<sup>74</sup> See, for details, Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 63-65.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 65. See also McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon,” 349-377.

that the State Department was very sympathetic, and working on technical aspects, ascertaining availabilities.<sup>76</sup>

The US soon realised after the meeting of the Commonwealth prime ministers in January 1951 that Nehru was averse to any regional defence arrangement.<sup>77</sup> While Nehru was critical of the US military approach in solving the Korean issue, Acheson dismissed his call for the four-power conference on finding a peaceful resolution of the Korean issue.<sup>78</sup> At this time, the National Security Council in its policy proposal recommended that India should be provided with economic assistance, as it would contribute to the economic development of India and regional stability.<sup>79</sup> Nehru also conveyed India's empathy with the democratic side while pointing out differences.<sup>80</sup> According to McGhee, "The Indian request collides with a highly unsatisfactory Indian position on the Far East crisis". US assistance would not change India's behaviour immediately, but it would provide a basis for future rapprochement. As he said, "We could mitigate much of the anti-Western bitterness which enables Nehru to maintain his present posture in foreign affairs". He suggested to Acheson to offer food aid to India on humanitarian ground.<sup>81</sup> While discussing political considerations, McGhee advised taking "calculated risk" on Nehru as the alternatives of dictatorial forms of government of left or right were not favourable to the US. He emphasised, "...if the present government falls India would either be thrown into a state of chaos or come under control of a government far less sympathetic to our ideals and objectives than the

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<sup>76</sup> The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, December 30, 1950, FRUS, Vol. V (1950): 1481.

<sup>77</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs (Gatewood), Washington, January 22, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 1714. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 65–66.

<sup>78</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 66.

<sup>79</sup> Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal), Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council, Washington, January 22, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951):1651–1652.

<sup>80</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 66.

<sup>81</sup> Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 30, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2096–2097.

present government”.<sup>82</sup> For Henderson, India as a stable democracy was important to the US even though India’s attitude on the Korean issue was unfavourable.<sup>83</sup>

While Acheson and McGhee failed to change India’s nonaligned or independent foreign policy behaviour, they also found it difficult to approach the Congress for aid as a grant after the response from the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was critical of India’s independent foreign policy behaviour. Nevertheless, Henderson warned that that an unfavourable decision by the US on food aid might result in “upsurge of Communist activity” and “serious weakening of government” and in India approaching the Soviet Union and China.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, Secretary Acheson wrote to President Truman that US aid would strengthen “the pro-Western elements” in India and rejection would “strengthen elements inimical to the United States”.<sup>85</sup> In other words, India as a democratic country was important enough to keep out of communist arms even if it was reluctant to supportive of US policies.

Backed by bipartisan Congressmen and former Republican President Herbert Hoover, President Truman sent a message to the Congress on February 12, 1951 to support a grant of \$190 million for India to purchase two million tons of wheat.<sup>86</sup> His message was premised on three grounds: shared values, countering Communism, and humanitarian need.<sup>87</sup> In response, bill for food aid to India as a grant was introduced in both the Houses of Congress. The House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 1 endorsed it to prevent famine in India amidst some opposition during hearings whereas the Senate Foreign relations Committee held it up and in between, there was a minority report in the House Foreign Affairs Committee suggesting providing food aid as loan

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<sup>82</sup> “Annex II,” January 24, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2104–2105.

<sup>83</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, January 28, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2093.

<sup>84</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, February 2, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2109.

<sup>85</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, February 2, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2110.

<sup>86</sup> Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on the Famine in India,” February 12, 1951, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14011>.

<sup>87</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 68.

instead of grant repayable by India with beryl, monazite and manganese.<sup>88</sup> The matter reached the House Rules Committee for a solution. Senate Foreign Relations Committee still refused to hear it. The delay and the congressional criticism of India's foreign policy caused dissatisfaction in India.<sup>89</sup> For Nehru, it was "insulting and outrageous".<sup>90</sup> Ambassador Henderson sounded out the State Department about impending "serious famine".<sup>91</sup> A State Department memorandum for Acheson emphasised the urgency of the famine situation needing prompt action.<sup>92</sup> McGhee on March 26 in a cable reminded that "action too late, if not too little will deny us the benefits we should otherwise expect from our response".<sup>93</sup>

President Truman again appealed to Congress to act faster on the legislation on humanitarian basis as well as on shared values of democracy.<sup>94</sup> India then came to know about the condition in the House bill as to US supervision of the distribution of wheat in India. For Nehru it amounted to "converting India into some kind of a semi colonial country or at least a satellite in economic sense". He preferred the aid on terms of deferred payment".<sup>95</sup> Nehru in a letter to the chief ministers pointed out India's weak economic power that was undercutting India's freedom of action. He wrote, "If we can stand on our own feet, we can get better terms from other countries".<sup>96</sup> There was also another factor: food aid offers by China and the Soviet Union on March 30 prompted the Truman administration to put pressure on the Congress to start deliberation on the wheat loan to India.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 68–69. See also McMahan, "Food as a Diplomatic Weapon," 366-367.

<sup>89</sup> See McMahan, "Food as a Diplomatic Weapon," 368.

<sup>90</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, March 24, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 2 (1951): 2131.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 2132.

<sup>92</sup> See McMahan, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 97.

<sup>93</sup> Telegram 163 from the Legation at Amman, March 26, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 2 (1951): 2132.

<sup>94</sup> Harry S. Truman, "The President's News Conference," March 29, 1951, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14043>.

<sup>95</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, as quoted in Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, 137. See also The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, April 12, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2142.

<sup>96</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, as quoted in Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru*, 136–137.

<sup>97</sup> McMahan, "Food as a Diplomatic Weapon," 369.

Subsequently the Senate on April 16 began hearings and passed the bill suggesting half of wheat in grant and the other half as loan and the House bill had the provision of all in loan payable by “unspecified raw materials”.<sup>98</sup> Nehru strongly objected to the attached “political string” by the Congress, including supply of monazite in repayment of loan which prompted the Congress to postpone further action on the Wheat bill.<sup>99</sup> Acheson sought to convince the Congress by stating that India’s embargo on Monazite was compatible with US interest of such material not falling into the hands of the enemy.<sup>100</sup> It was not enough for the Congress to proceed to legislation. In light of grave economic situation, Nehru had to make a “conciliatory” statement in Parliament to point out that both the bills were “acceptable” and not “discriminatory against India and are not of political nature”.<sup>101</sup> Ultimately, Truman signed the Emergency Indian Wheat Bill on June 15, 1951.<sup>102</sup>

India achieved what it wanted, but it came with delay, criticism and the attempt to extract a political and economic quid pro quo. As Robert McMahon concludes, “...the whole episode aggravated tensions between the two nations and left a substantial residue of bitterness”.<sup>103</sup> Both, because it was a weak state and because it followed a policy of nonalignment, India’s appeal as a democracy was severely limited. Yet its commitment to democracy had some appeal and the US anticipated cooperative behaviour from India in future in exchange of food aid. If India had not followed the norm of liberal democracy, it would have been impossible to influence the US in this context. While knowing Nehru’s nonalignment policy at times appeased the Communist bloc, the US still chose to support Nehru’s regime, in this instance as well as in the future as we shall see below. It is because India was democratic and liberal

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<sup>98</sup> Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay), Washington, May 10, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951):1692.

<sup>99</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 71.

<sup>100</sup> Executive sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vol. 3, Issue 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 365.

<sup>101</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, May 7, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2158. See also McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 99-10.

<sup>102</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 72.

<sup>103</sup> McMahon, “Food as a Diplomatic Weapon,” 377.

and shared such values with the US that it remained attractive to Washington despite the serious strategic differences between them. The above episode however shows US desire to continue a limited courting of India so that it could be oriented towards the West and how India's weak democracy had limited appeal.

***Chester Bowles – Saving India's Democracy:*** US perceptions that India was both weak and unfriendly remained significant. There was no end to India's anti-Westernism despite the wheat loan. American diplomatic and Consular Officers, earlier in March pointed out that the "lack of interest in India on the part of Western nations has offended the Indians and has thereby encouraged anti-Westernism in India."<sup>104</sup> Some officials thought that "India could be ignored and bypassed".<sup>105</sup> But this never happened. India as a democracy remained attractive enough not to be abandoned by the US. A paper prepared by the NEA in August 1951 suggested, "In the long run an effective means of combatting Indian 'neutralism' lies in increasing the capacity of other non-communist Asian states to exert influence and leadership in building collective security".<sup>106</sup>

According to a NSC report in May 1951, India was "the keystone to stability in South Asia". Therefore the US needed to help support the stability of the non-communist government in India through economic assistance. The US wanted India to either maintain "benevolent neutrality" or "active support" to the free world in the event of war with the Soviet Union.<sup>107</sup> NSC 98/1 concluded that "The loss of India to the Communist orbit would mean that for all practical purposes all of Asia will have been lost". This would seriously affect the US security interests for its "political, strategic manpower and resource potential". Therefore, it was in the US interest to have a free,

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<sup>104</sup> Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 20, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 1672.

<sup>105</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 108.

<sup>106</sup> Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Washington, August 30, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2173.

<sup>107</sup> Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), "United States Objectives, Policies and Course of Action in Asia, Washington, May 17, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 1(1951):45 and 62.

friendly and stable India. “While avoiding assumption of responsibility for economic welfare and development”, the US, according to NSC 98/1, needed to provide economic assistance.<sup>108</sup>

According to the some assessments by the CIA and the State Department, India was unlikely to change its strategic behaviour of nonalignment in the conflict between the free world and the Communist bloc.<sup>109</sup> “In the event of war, initially India will probably attempt to maintain a posture of neutrality”, concluded American diplomatic and Consular Officers at South Asian Regional Conference.<sup>110</sup> India’s deteriorating economic condition made it susceptible to anarchy or communist control of national government which would result in posing “graver threat to the Western position in Asia”. India alone could not avoid economic decline and was in need of “substantial” outside assistance.<sup>111</sup> A likely control of India by the Soviet Union was seen by the intelligence community more as “political and psychological than military”.<sup>112</sup> As Merrill notes, “India was, after all, the world’s second most populous nation, and the mere existence of a non-Communist government there was deemed to be a foreign policy asset”.<sup>113</sup>

Yet the flow of aid remained very limited. The Truman administration in its foreign assistance programme (or Mutual Security Programme), which it submitted to Congress in May 1951 allocated only \$65 million for India. The bulk of the distribution

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<sup>108</sup> Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council, “The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia,” Washington, January 22, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 2(1951): 1651-1652.

<sup>109</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 103-104.

<sup>110</sup> Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 20, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 1664.

<sup>111</sup> Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, “India’s Position in the East-West Conflict: The Problem,” Washington, September 4, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 2 (1951): 2175-2179.

<sup>112</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 104. See also Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, 2175-2179.

<sup>113</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 75.

went into military aid to priority areas in Western Europe and Korea, Formosa and Indochina. The Congress finally approved just \$54 million for India.<sup>114</sup>

The arrival of Chester Bowles, a new dealer, as the US Ambassador to India in October 1951 created a new opportunity for India to receive increased economic assistance from the US during its first five year planning. Upon being asked as to why he wanted to go to India by President Truman, Bowles replied that “India was the key to Asia” and a close US-India relationship would help India “succeed in establishing a stable and effective democracy in South Asia”.<sup>115</sup> He soon developed interest in spending US aid in Community Development Programme (CDP) for rural development as a step towards India’s economic modernisation. He discussed his plan with Nehru and subsequently in January 1952, signed a joint Technical Agreement whereby a joint fund was constituted involving \$54 million by the US and the same amount from India.<sup>116</sup> Ambassador Bowles envisioned that the CDP could first help India’s food sufficiency and then provide a basis for liberal economic development in India.<sup>117</sup> Following the Point Four Program agreement signed on January 5, 1952, India and the US signed a Community Development Agreement on June 10, 1952.<sup>118</sup>

Bowles made the case for American aid to India to make its democracy successful. He argued that India as a democracy was critical to the US even if the two did not agree on basic strategy. In a letter to Truman, he wrote, “If India goes [Communist] in the next few years, it is likely that all of South Asia and the Middle East will also go”. Therefore to prevent Communist takeover, he suggested that the US needed to provide \$200 to \$300 million annually to help India succeed in its five-year plan.<sup>119</sup> In a letter to Acheson, he argued that if Indian economy stagnates in its plan period while China

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 78. See also Memorandum of Discussion between the President and Budget Bureau, March 1, 1951, FRUS, Vol. 1(1951): 283–286.

<sup>115</sup> Chester Bowles, *Ambassador’s Report* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), 1-2.

<sup>116</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 84.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>118</sup> Community Development Agreement with India, *Department of State Bulletin* (DSB), 1952, <http://ia700504.us.archive.org/16/items/departmentofstatx2652unit/departmentofstatx2652unit.pdf>.

<sup>119</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 113-114.

succeeds, then the resulting “critical situation” could be “increased by the long range weakness of Indian leadership” and the “present democratic society could rapidly disintegrate”. According to him, “Clearly, if India should go, the whole vast area from Cairo to Tokyo would be in grave danger”.<sup>120</sup> “India’s success will buttress”, as he argued “every free government in Asia”.<sup>121</sup> While preferring economic measures to military strategy, Bowles believed that the US would show more “progress” with Nehru by respecting India’s independence while disagreeing with him.<sup>122</sup>

In light of the emergence of the Communist Party of India (CPI) after the 1952 general election as the largest opposition party in the Parliament and the ruling party only receiving 45 per cent of the vote share, Bowles argued for increasing the aid amount to \$1 billion for a four year term.<sup>123</sup> In January 1952, Bowles went to Washington to meet senior administration officials and key legislators to lobby for increased aid to India.<sup>124</sup> In his meeting with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he argued that “if we fail, we have another China on our hands, only this time it could be even worse because many other countries might fail, too”. The success of India’s five-year plan would improve its economic condition, bring political stability and strengthen American position in Asia and the Middle East.<sup>125</sup> While some senators were sympathetic to Bowles appeal for \$250 million annually for four years which consisted of \$125 million as direct financial assistance and the other half in agricultural commodities, Chairman Tom Connally was not persuaded and pointed out that “Nehru is not friendly to the United States”.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Memorandum by the Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, December 6, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2192-2195.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 87.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 88–89.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>125</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 114.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

After Bowles's appeals, the State Department increased aid allocation to India from \$70 million to \$115 million under Point Four Programme for 1953.<sup>127</sup> Bowles argued that, "Failure of Indian democracy would in all probability result in disaster substantially greater than Communist victory in China since Southeast Asia and Middle East would become impossible to hold once India is lost".<sup>128</sup> In light of Bowles appeal for additional \$125 million, an intra-departmental Working Group in May "did not come to an agreement regarding the immediacy of the need for supplementary funds" and left the final decision to the State Department.<sup>129</sup> Acheson and W. Averell Harriman, Director for Mutual Security in a letter to President Truman said that a separate appropriation for further aid lacked justification in light of American objectives and India lacked "a critical emergency".<sup>130</sup> The Mutual Security Act of 1952 only allocated \$45 million which was less than 20 percent of the \$250 million requested by Bowles. Questions were raised by Congressmen about India's nonalignment policy and lack of full support in the Korean War.<sup>131</sup> For the Truman administration, "while India carried enough stature to merit the continuation of a modest aid program, it still remained a secondary among other foreign policy objectives".<sup>132</sup> President Truman criticised Congress regarding cut in foreign aid and

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<sup>127</sup> The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, March 3, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1004>; Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews), Washington, February 8, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1001>; The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State, New Delhi, February 21, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1002>; The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State, New Delhi, February 21, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1003>; The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, March 3, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1004>. See also McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 115.

<sup>128</sup> The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State, New Delhi, February 21, 1952.

<sup>129</sup> Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry), Washington, May 19, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1008>.

<sup>130</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Director of Mutual Security (Harriman) to the President, June 5, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1010>.

<sup>131</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 91.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

referred to India as “the largest democratic nation in all Asia”, but did not accept Bowles’s appeal for making another request.<sup>133</sup>

Bowles again appealed for appropriation of \$250 million for the fiscal year of 1954. In a letter to Acheson, he asked: “Am I correct in my assumption that a free India is vitally important to world stability and to our future security?” and “Am I correct in my assumption that steady economic progress in the next few years is essential to the survival of a free India?” He argued that “there is one chance in three that India will disappear behind the Iron Curtain within the next few years with profound repercussions throughout the free world”. He recommended a three-year program of \$250 million annually.<sup>134</sup> Acheson informed Bowles that in the Mutual Security Program of 1953 India’s share might be \$200 million. According to him, “...a stable and democratic South Asia to United States security will continue to argue for the provision of substantial economic aid”. Moreover, it was in America’s “best interests” that “India must be encouraged to remain in the democratic free world” with American economic and technical assistance.<sup>135</sup>

As pointed out by Bowles’s friend, William Benton, Democrat from Connecticut, “It’s hard for you to realize how remote India is to people here in Congress”.<sup>136</sup> Bowles’s logic for increased aid of India “‘falling’ to Communism” under serious challenge from the CPI after the 1952 election was not viewed as credible by the senior administration officials despite India grave economic conditions.<sup>137</sup> As Joh H. Ohly, Harriman’s deputy wrote, “He is probably right that every penny of this amount [\$750 million over three years] is needed if the goals of the Indian 5-year plan are to be approached, but it may also turn out that he has vastly overshot the mark in his estimate as to the necessity

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<sup>133</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 117-118.

<sup>134</sup> The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, October 28, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1027>.

<sup>135</sup> The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in India (Bowles), Washington, January 8, 1953, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1031>.

<sup>136</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 119.

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, 119-120.

of approaching those goals in order to prevent the dangerous increase in Indian susceptibility to communism”. As he noted further, the US “cannot afford an economic development program unrelated to the communist threat”. Again, according to Ohly, “Is it in our best interest to spend large sums to build strength in a neutral India which is thereby able to assume the leadership of the Asian countries?”<sup>138</sup> “Views of Pakistan” was also a factor in the provision aid to India as the administration was courting Pakistan as an ally.<sup>139</sup> As McMahon argues, “The country promised few tangible economic and strategic rewards to American Cold War planners. Nor did it face an imminent communist threat”. Therefore despite strong efforts by Bowles in favour of increased aid to India, it remained to the Truman administration “an area of secondary, not primary, interest”.<sup>140</sup> Why did the US then help at all? The Truman administration intended to help India with modest aid to support its stability as a democracy as against substantial aid as was strongly appealed by Bowles.

The provision of \$200 million aid for India was never implemented despite recommendation from the NEA, which argued that India “is faced with grave and perplexing problems of establishing workable and lasting democratic institutions and of meeting inter-related economic problems” and was “the largest country in free Asia and potentially it could be a powerful force on the side of the free world”.<sup>141</sup> John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State doubted if the amount could be “justified by facts or could be justified to the Congress”. Therefore, he directed to reduce the amount.<sup>142</sup> Finally, the administration with an allocation of \$140 million approached the Congress and the latter approved \$ 89.1 million. It was justified by Dulles on the ground of

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<sup>138</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 120.

<sup>139</sup> Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry), Washington, May 19, 1952; See also McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 120.

<sup>140</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 122.

<sup>141</sup> Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 3, 1953, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1033>.

<sup>142</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Smith), Washington, March 4, 1953, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1034#fn2>.

containing Communists.<sup>143</sup> Secretary Dulles supported American assistance “on a modest scale” to support India’s five-year plan in the context- “whether ways of freedom or police-state methods can achieve better social progress”.<sup>144</sup> Thus, Washington’s perception of India was mixed. On the one hand, the US recognised India’s poor economic condition which had the potential to affect the political stability of the Nehru’s democratic government and therefore did not want economically weak India to collapse or fall into the arms of the communists; on the other, it viewed such danger not so imminent and continued to view India as being of limited power and strategic significance in the Asian balance. India thus did not merit the kind of attention that its Cold War allies did. It was a like-minded state because of its democratic experiment, but it was weak and unsupportive of US aims, so its attraction was limited.

US policymakers increasingly viewed the “psychological and political” consequences of democratic India falling into communist influence as worrisome. India’s democratic development was compared with China’s totalitarian methods. They were in favour of continuing economic aid to India.<sup>145</sup> While recognising the military and strategic importance of the region, the National Security Council in its policy proposal (NSC 5409) argued that the US should not be deterred by India’s opposition to US military assistance to Pakistan.<sup>146</sup> The *National Intelligence Estimate* of 1953 emphasised that American economic aid would help Indian “economic stability”.<sup>147</sup> Secretary Dulles appearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the Mutual Security

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<sup>143</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, March 16, 1953, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1036>; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Mutual Security Act of 1953, U.S. Senate, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 1953, 374.

<sup>144</sup> Address by Secretary Dulles, June 1, 1953, DSB, Vol. XXVIII, No. 729 (June 15, 1953), <http://ia600304.us.archive.org/3/items/departmentofstatx2853unit/departmentofstatx2853unit.pdf>.

<sup>145</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, “Probable Developments in South Asia,” Washington, June 30, 1953, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954):1073–1088; Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council, “United States Policy Toward South Asia,” Washington, February 19, 1954, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954): 1089-1095; Study Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council, Washington, undated, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954):1096–1115.

<sup>146</sup> Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National, Security Council, February 19, 1954. Study Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council, undated.

<sup>147</sup> National Intelligence Estimate, “Probable Developments in South Asia,” June 30, 1953.

Program supported American assistance in order to support the “path of free development”.<sup>148</sup>

Secretary Dulles appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee defended the proposed allocation of a total of \$104,500,000 to India by citing shared value of democracy, and compared India’s democratic development to China’s communist path.<sup>149</sup> But Congress approved only \$85.7 million of which \$45 million was allocated as loan under a new provision injected into the Mutual Security Act.<sup>150</sup>

American thinking is best explained by McMahon: “Policymakers in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had come to disparage India’s salience to U.S. Cold War objectives in much the same way that they had come to doubt India’s willingness to support those objectives”. As he argues, “India ... lacked the manifest or latent strategic value traditionally associated with a nation possessing the industrial infrastructure, raw materials, skilled manpower, base sites that contribute to military power. India in short did not fit any of the geopolitical and geostrategic categories that Cold War planners most valued”. Although some policymakers, such as Bowles, Henderson and McGhee drew attention to “India’s centrality” in Asia, they did so “on a weak foundation”.<sup>151</sup> For the Eisenhower administration, Pakistan was a “tangible asset” whereas India was an “intangible and uncertain” one.<sup>152</sup> Therefore India as a democracy attracted modest American economic support to remain stable and away from Communism, but not more. As Nick Cullather notes, “For most of the 1950s, the debate on aid to India teetered between images of a downtrodden, dependent nation

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<sup>148</sup> Statement by Secretary Dulles, “The Importance of the Mutual Security Program to Our National Security,” Made before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the Mutual Security Program, July 9, 1953, DSB,

<http://ia700504.us.archive.org/22/items/departmentofstat291953unit/departmentofstat291953unit.pdf>.

<sup>149</sup> Statement by Secretary Dulles, “Maintaining Free World Unity,” Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 4, 1954, DSB, Vol. XXX, No. 781 (June 14, 1954): 923; Ambassador George V. Allen, “The Growth of Freedom In India,” May 16, 1954, DSB, Vol. XXX, No. 780 (June 7, 1954): 864–866.

<sup>150</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 109–110.

<sup>151</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 179.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

grateful for American attention, and the state personified by Nehru, defiant, socialistic, and unwilling to countenance even a suggestion of inferiority”.<sup>153</sup>

***Cold War Thaw and US Aid:*** In the beginning of 1955, the Office of South Asian Affairs in a briefing paper highlighted the expansion of economic engagement of the Communist bloc with India, especially after a trade agreement between India and China and an offer by the Soviet Union to build a steel mill in India.<sup>154</sup> An agreement was made in February to build a steel mill at Bhilai in Madhya Pradesh with loan from the Soviet Union after the World Bank declined to assist the state-owned project.<sup>155</sup> In a conversation in the Department of State towards the end of 1955, it was concluded that cut in aid would lead India into socialism and reliance on the Soviet Union.<sup>156</sup> The US embassy in New Delhi conveyed their assessment of growing Indo-Soviet relations following the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev as “a gain for Russians” despite India’s independent foreign policy and “basic orientation toward Western Democracies”.<sup>157</sup> According to a study by the White House, the Soviet economic penetration in countries like India intended to “neutralize U.S. influence and undermine the Western politico-military position”.<sup>158</sup> President Truman being concerned about this favoured increased aid to India so that India remains “strong enough to remain neutral or ‘least neutral on our side’”.<sup>159</sup> The Congress however appropriated only \$60 million for the fiscal year 1956 to India’s “disappointment” with some Congressmen criticising of Indian neutrality.<sup>160</sup> The administration proposed only \$70 million, defending it on the ground

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<sup>153</sup> Nick Cullather, “Hunger and Containment: How India Became ‘Important’ in US Cold War Strategy,” *India Review* 6:2 (2007): 63-64.

<sup>154</sup> Briefing Paper Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs, Washington, January 19, 1955, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d143>.

<sup>155</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 118.

<sup>156</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 18, 1955, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d153>.

<sup>157</sup> Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, New Delhi, November 25, 1955, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d154>.

<sup>158</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 220.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, 221-222.

<sup>160</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 110–112. See also McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 222-223.

that it would keep India away from Communism.<sup>161</sup> Notably, this minimal approach was designed not to build India up, but only to keep it from being drawn into the Soviet orbit.

There was a perceptible shift in the Indian attitude towards the US in the second half of 1955. Indo-US relations improved during this period even though both differed on issues of colonialism and international Communism. In the view of Department of State, India's favourable attitude potentially derived from Nehru "counterbalance" to India's growing ties with the Soviet Union and China since the beginning of 1955 as well as "the thawing of the cold war".<sup>162</sup> Concerned with the Soviet support for the Bhilai project, some officials of the Eisenhower administration as well the president showed interest in assisting the Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) when the Indian government allowed it to expand its production. Tata approached the World Bank as well as the Export-Import Bank for financial assistance. While the administration mulled over extending assistance through the Export-Import Bank, the State and Treasury Departments finally rejected it on the ground that by providing loan on special interest to TISCO, it would set a precedent for other borrowers and thereby affect the bank as a tool of influence for the government. Subsequently, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) approved a \$75 million loan in June 1956.<sup>163</sup>

Between 1951 and 1956, US aid was basically aimed at agricultural and rural development. With the priority on CDP, the US dollars received as aid were used for

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<sup>161</sup> Summary of Discussion at a Legislative Leadership Meeting, Washington, June 28, 1955, FRUS, Vol. X (1955-1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v10/d5>.

<sup>162</sup> Instruction from the Department of State to the Diplomatic and Consular Offices in India, Washington, January 20, 1956, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d155>. For India's evolving ties with the Soviet Union, see Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 117-118.

<sup>163</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 119-121. See also Letter from the Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board (Hoover) to the President of the Export-Import Bank (Edgerton), Washington, June 6, 1955, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d149>.

importing capital goods and raw materials, and importing iron and steel.<sup>164</sup> With limited US private investment in India, such aid was in contrast with the Soviet aid (Bhilai project).<sup>165</sup> In its “Economic Intelligence Report”, CIA in August 1956 found that India along with Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Egypt received “over 90 per cent of all the Soviet bloc credits”.<sup>166</sup> Concerned with the Soviet Union’s “economic offensive”, the Eisenhower administration deliberated on US aid strategy to the Third World from late 1955.<sup>167</sup>

In light of India’s second Five Year Plan, a paper drafted by the US embassy in India suggested a “re-evaluation of US aid programs” to India by paying attention to the Soviet “economic penetration” and India’s efforts “to build the economic base for the maintenance of independence and democracy”. India mattered to the US despite foreign policy differences, because of its democracy in relation to Communist China and its strategic minerals. The paper pointed out a shortage of about 1.7 billion dollars in foreign exchange in Indian estimation, which according to Indian estimates could be reduced to less than \$1.4 billion with the assistance from the IBRD, the Colombo Plan and the Soviets. Therefore, it recommended the “U.S. should consider a total program over a period of up to 5 years, for some 500 millions of dollars in Economic Development (foreign exchange) Assistance and a minimum sale of 300 million dollars in surplus agricultural commodities to India”. It also suggested “a long-term moratorium on India’s repayment in kind of the U.S. Lend Lease silver (some 120 million dollars) due next year”.<sup>168</sup> Secretary Dulles established a study group, which recommended \$75 million in annual development assistance over a five-year period along with \$300 million PL 480 programme.<sup>169</sup> The US embassy and NEA supported

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<sup>164</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 121.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, 123–125.

<sup>168</sup> Paper Prepared in the Embassy in India, “A Feasible Program of U.S. Economic assistance for India,” New Delhi, March 13, 1956, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d158>.

<sup>169</sup> Summary Minutes of a Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Ambassador Cooper’s India Aid Proposals, Department of State, Washington, May 3, 1956, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957),

increase in aid but other bureaus in the State Department and Treasury Department stood for “cautious and modest approach”. For Vice President Richard Nixon, “It was extremely important that we not appear to court neutrals and to abandon our allies”. Such opinion was also held by a fairly large number of legislators.<sup>170</sup> While the administration requested \$75 million for development assistance for India, the Congress approved \$65 million, and \$10 million for technical assistance was approved by the Congress as requested. In August, the US negotiated \$360 million PL 480 agreement whereby the US will provide rice, wheat and cotton over a three-year period.<sup>171</sup> But India did not receive long-term development assistance as was considered by the US embassy paper and Ambassador John Sherman Cooper, and the Mutual Security Program of 1956 gave greater emphasis to military assistance.<sup>172</sup> This shows how the US, though concerned about India’s democratic political stability intended only to provide modest assistance. India as a weak power clearly had a low level of attraction.

At the 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, Secretary Dulles defended the US offer of economic as well as military assistance to India and went to the extent of saying that he would rather prefer to “lose Thailand, an ally, than to lose India, a neutral”.<sup>173</sup> President Eisenhower early in his second term, proposed a three year Development Loan Fund (DLF) of \$2 billion for the Mutual Security Program. It followed recommendations of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, which studied American aid to Third World countries recognising most importantly, Soviet challenges, among others. Besides, there were also four major studies that looked into the US Mutual Security Program, which recommended changes to the existing aid

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<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d159>. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 127. PL 480 is the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act or Public Law 480 passed in 1954 to provide food aid to foreign countries. Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 109.

<sup>170</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 228-229.

<sup>171</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 129–130.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, 130.

<sup>173</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 295th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 30, 1956, FRUS, XXI (1955–1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v21/d118>.

policy. The Congress however appropriated only \$350 million for the first year DLF programme.<sup>174</sup> NSC 5701 approved by the president in January 1957, recommended that the US in order to support India for the achievement of its plan should consider provisions such as loans, PL 480 programme and “other measures” including private investment. According to the report, “the risks to U.S. security from a weak and vulnerable India would be greater than the risks of a stable and influential India. A weak India might well lead to the loss of South and Southeast Asia to Communism. A strong India would be a successful example of an alternative to Communism in an Asian context and would permit the gradual development of the means to enforce its external security interests against Communist Chinese expansion into South and Southeast Asia”.<sup>175</sup>

In light of the Soviet “economic offensive” during the Cold War thaw, the Eisenhower administration was inclined in favour of substantial economic assistance to India. India faced a foreign exchange crisis in the second year of its second five-year plan (1957).<sup>176</sup> William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA wrote to Dulles regarding provision of American assistance to meet the crisis lest “a substantial failure of the plan may threaten the continuation of democratic institutions of India”. Besides, the US ambassador to India, Ellsworth Bunker saw the crisis as a serious challenge to its economic stability needing American aid.<sup>177</sup> Indian officials also sounded out the Eisenhower administration for assistance, especially through PL 480 and the Development Fund. India’s second plan had a deficit in foreign exchange of \$700 to \$900 million.<sup>178</sup> According to C. Douglas Dillon, then US Deputy Undersecretary for

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<sup>174</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 137–138.

<sup>175</sup> National Security Council Report, “Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy toward South Asia,” Washington, January 10, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d5>.

<sup>176</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 141.

<sup>177</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 234.

<sup>178</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955–1957), n3, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d165#fn3>; Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, “India’s Desire for Additional US assistance in Financing the Second Five-Year Plan,” Washington, May 31, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955–1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d166>; Progress Report by the Operations

Economic Affairs, "...the question [of aid] is, therefore, one of amount and not of principle".<sup>179</sup> But Ambassador Bunker concluded from his talks in Washington with administration officials and Congressional leaders that there was "no prospect of any legislative action on a loan or credit to India in this session of Congress".<sup>180</sup> An Interdepartmental Working Group set up by Eisenhower administration completed its study in May and recommended providing assistance to India through supplementing the PL 480 agreement, providing loan from the DLF and Export-Import Bank and supporting India's application for a loan from the IBRD.<sup>181</sup> The prospect of ascent of communists in other states of India since their coming to power in the Indian state of Kerala and the likely instability and its long-term impact of India coming into the Communist orbit played into the American consideration of assistance to India.<sup>182</sup> In his press conference on September 10, Dulles maintained that India's request "will receive sympathetic consideration".<sup>183</sup> But Ambassador Bunker after being advised by Dulles discussed with a group of senators from both parties and concluded that unless there was a situation of looming collapse of India, no special legislation on India was possible.<sup>184</sup>

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Coordinating Board, Washington, July 24, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d6>; and Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon) to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall), Washington, July 15, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VII (1955-1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d169>. See also Telegram from the Ambassador in India (Bunker) to the Department of State, New Delhi, September 20, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d173#fn4>.

<sup>179</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1957.

<sup>180</sup> Letter From the Ambassador in India (Bunker) to Frederic P. Bartlett, at London, New Delhi, June 27, 1957, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d167>.

<sup>181</sup> Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, July 24, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d6>. See also Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1957.

<sup>182</sup> Memorandum From Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), Washington, September 11, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d172>. See also Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, July 24, 1957.

<sup>183</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 25, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), n3, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d174#fn2>.

<sup>184</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 236-237.

Following recommendation from senior officials of the Department of State,<sup>185</sup> Dulles wrote to the president to take an executive branch decision preferably before November 13 to provide India about \$250 million annually over the next three years of the second plan period. In defence of the aid, he cited the NSC 5701, which recommended a substantial aid to India, and the *National Intelligence Estimate* of October 8, which opined that India's second plan should succeed in order to maintain democratic stability and to check Communism.<sup>186</sup> The meeting for the executive decision was held on November 12 and concluded that instead of going for special congressional legislation, the administration would approach Germany for meeting the trade deficit of India, and arrange with DLF and the Export-Import Bank for \$250 million. In a telegram to the US embassy in India inviting Indian experts for staff level talks for technical details in implementing US loan programme on January 10, 1958, Dulles informed India about the US decision to provide about \$225 million loan from the DLF and the Export-Import Bank sources besides considering to meet its grain shortage.<sup>187</sup> The official announcement to the effect was made on January 16.<sup>188</sup> In reply to India's appreciation of US assistance, Dulles emphasised that it was important that India was "trying to solve its problems through democratic processes".<sup>189</sup> While the amount of aid allocated was not big in relation to India's foreign exchange deficit, there was growth in aid amount in comparison to previous years. Besides democratic stability, the factor of economic offensive by the Soviet Union factored in US decision. This again shows how India as a weak democracy exercised limited attraction.

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<sup>185</sup> Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretaries of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) and Economic Affairs (Dillon) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State Washington, October 16, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955–1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d178#fn3>.

<sup>186</sup> Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, November 4, 1957, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955–1957), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d179>.

<sup>187</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, January 10, 1958, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d199>.

<sup>188</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d204>.

<sup>189</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 17, 1958, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d201>.

Besides the Export-Import Bank loan, India received \$89.9 million in 1958, \$137 million in 1959, and \$194.6 million in 1960. Senators John F. Kennedy and John Sherman Cooper on March 25 introduced a resolution asking the US, in collaboration with other Western nations, to assist India in succeeding in its ongoing economic plan. For them, India's success would set an example for other Third World countries.<sup>190</sup> India continued seeking US assistance including 25 percent of the next DLF provision.<sup>191</sup> In the meeting of five countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Canada) and the IBRD in August, it was agreed to contribute about \$350 million to meet India's foreign exchange gap up to March 31, 1959 and another \$250 million was intended during the final two years of the second plan. The US agreed to provide up to \$100 million from DLF besides extending initially \$200 million through PL 480 and relieving India of \$3.5 million through defer payments on India's wheat.<sup>192</sup> The US signed a series of PL 480 agreements with India, the largest in history in 1960 consisting of \$1276 million for a four-year period.<sup>193</sup> India had received 40 per cent of all the DLF resources by 1961.<sup>194</sup>

Allocation for economic aid exceeded military assistance in the Mutual Security Program with more liberalised loan practices of the Export-Import Bank and an expanded DLF programme.<sup>195</sup> In March, the group of five countries again expressed their intention to give \$175 million in aid for the fiscal year beginning on April 1,

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<sup>190</sup> Congressional Record, U.S. Senate, 85th Congress, 2d Session, Vol. 104, March 25, 1958 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), 5246–5255.

<sup>191</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 16, 1958, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d213>; Memorandum of a Conversation between the Indian Commissioner General for Economic Affairs (Nehru) and the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), Department of State, Washington, August 26, 1958, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d216>.

<sup>192</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d214>. See also National Intelligence Estimate, Washington, September 2, 1958, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d217>.

<sup>193</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d220>; Surplus Agricultural Commodity Agreement with India, September 26, 1958, DSB, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1007 (October 13, 1958): 591; Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d243>; and Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d257>.

<sup>194</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 139.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*, 145.

1959.<sup>196</sup> Kennedy and Cooper introduced another resolution in 1959, asking for a World Bank mission to India for a recommendation to the five-nation group to assist India in completing its second, and later the third plan (1961–1966). It received the support of the administration with a revision that included the study mission to consult all South Asian countries and was passed in the US Congress.<sup>197</sup> For Kennedy and Cooper, American aid was not only in its “best interest”, but also would support the spread of democratic values in the world.<sup>198</sup> Kennedy viewed India with its successful democratic development as a counterbalance to China and suggested US to be tolerant of India’s nonalignment policy.<sup>199</sup>

As India planned for its Third Five Year Plan, it estimated a foreign exchange requirement of \$5 billion from external sources. Therefore, India sought long-term assistance from the US and expected to receive \$500 to \$600 million.<sup>200</sup> The US embassy in India was in favour of larger and long-term programme for India involving both public and private sector.<sup>201</sup> There was a growing recognition by now that American interest in India coincided with shared value of democracy. A Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board asked in May 1959, “should our basic objective toward India be stated more correctly as the development of a strong India, more friendly to the United States, and better able to serve as a counterweight to Communist China?”<sup>202</sup> But President Eisenhower at the 408th NSC meeting emphasised that India was simply too weak and that it “simply could not

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<sup>196</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d225s>.

<sup>197</sup> W. W. Rostow, *Concept and Controversy: Sixty Years of Taking Ideas to Market* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 240–242.

<sup>198</sup> Joint Statement by Senators Kennedy and Cooper, DSB, Vol. XLII, No. 1072 (January 11, 1960): 63.

<sup>199</sup> Paul M. McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 89. See also Arthur Meier Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (New York: First Mariner Books, 2002), 522.

<sup>200</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, May 5, 1959, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d227>.

<sup>201</sup> Paper Prepared in the Embassy in India, New Delhi, May 12, 1959, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d228>.

<sup>202</sup> Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board, Washington, May 26, 1959, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d1>.

afford to play the role of counterweight”. He argued that if the U.S. were actually to try to make India a counterweight to Communist China, the task would be so great that we would probably bankrupt ourselves in the process”. Douglas C Dillon, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs argued that the US could think beyond preventing “India from going Communist” and in terms of “counter-attraction if not a counterweight to Communist China” while committing a long term assistance program to counter the Soviet Union.<sup>203</sup> NSC 5909/1 which was approved by President on August 2, 1959 made it clear, “While India’s policy of non-alignment will on occasion bring India into opposition to U.S. programs and activities, and a strong and increasingly successful India will add weight to this opposition, over the longer run, the risks to U.S. security from a weak and vulnerable India would be far greater than the risks of a strong, stable, even though neutral, India”.<sup>204</sup> The Mutual Security Program of 1960 included India as a key nation, an “island of development” to receive major US aid. India’s “democratic development” could be as an example for other Third World countries.<sup>205</sup>

As the Eisenhower administration began to increase aid to India, it was influenced by two social scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Walt Whitman Rostow and Max Millikan who proposed a non-communist liberal model of economic development in the Third World, especially Rostow’s five “stages of economic growth”. India emerged as “the big urgent test case” for their model and its mixed economy was not an impediment. It required American assistance for the success of democracy and capitalism.<sup>206</sup> As a result, large amounts of US aid went into public sector infrastructure projects, such as electric power, rail transport and steel. The administration even mulled over assisting India’s fourth public steel mill in the third plan. At the same time, the private sector also received many funds. India on its part

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<sup>203</sup> Memorandum of Discussion at the 408th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 28, 1959, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d2>.

<sup>204</sup> National Security Council Report, “Statement of U.S. Policy toward South Asia,” Washington, August 21, 1959, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d6>.

<sup>205</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 148.

<sup>206</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 153–156.

faced with foreign exchange shortage of 1957 brought about some liberalisation to promote private investment including liberalisation of its tax structure and signing a double tax treaty with the US in 1959. The US export to India became more than double.<sup>207</sup> American officials got informally and indirectly involved in India's planning for the Third Five Year Plan.<sup>208</sup>

***The Kennedy Presidency – Optimism and Decline:*** Senator Kennedy before his inauguration as President “discussed India more forcefully and more frequently than any other nation”. A democratic India that succeeded in economic growth vis-à-vis China was beneficial to the US. While not ending the alliance with Pakistan, Kennedy was more inclined towards India.<sup>209</sup> As noted above, the bilateral relationship was in an upswing, overcoming the downturn of 1954. Kennedy as the president-elect appointed a task force for provision of aid to India, which recommended annually \$500 million besides PL 480 that would make India the top aid recipient.<sup>210</sup> Concerned with the increased influence of the Soviet Union in the Third World and especially among the nonaligned states, the Kennedy administration gave central focus to these countries emphasising on economic assistance to reverse this trend.<sup>211</sup> In Asia, India was regarded by President Kennedy as “the key area” among “all the neutral countries”.<sup>212</sup>

With increased aid appropriation by the Congress while it declined to approve multiyear provision, the Kennedy administration gave priority to “economic

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<sup>207</sup> Ibid., 155–161.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 165–166.

<sup>209</sup> John F. Kennedy, Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, High School Auditorium, Pocatello, Idaho, September 6, 1960, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25650>; Question and Answer Period Following Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Mormon Tabernacle, Salt Lake City, Utah, September 23, 1960, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=74177>; John F. Kennedy, Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy, War Memorial Building, Rochester, NY, September 28, 1960, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74261>. See also Robert J. McMahon, “Choosing Sides in South Asia,” in *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 200–201.

<sup>210</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 170.

<sup>211</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 272-273.

<sup>212</sup> Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 522–523.

development assistance”.<sup>213</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, US Ambassador to India had to engage in “guerrilla warfare against the ikons and the taboos of the State Department” and defended India’s nonalignment, advocated increased aid to India, and questioned the US alliance with Pakistan.<sup>214</sup> India received \$465.5 million US aid for the fiscal year 1962 although the administration requested the Congress for \$500 (compared to \$400 for the rest) and the IBRD sponsored “India consortium” pledged to contribute over \$2 billion for the first two years of the Third Five-Year Plan with the US committing over \$1 billion for the two-year period besides agreeing to “making available surplus commodities in the amount of approximately \$1,300,000,000”.<sup>215</sup> The US assistance for 1962 went into industrial development<sup>216</sup> with India obtaining “maximum flexibility” for the utilisation of US aid.<sup>217</sup> The Kennedy administration instead of a broader framework of CDP aimed at increasing food production by contributing to Indian agricultural research. The administration also employed its Peace Corps with Nehru’s enthusiasm for food production and agricultural development.<sup>218</sup> Nehru appreciated US assistance.<sup>219</sup>

But the upswing did not last long as the deep differences between the two prevailed. After Nehru’s visit to the US in 1961, though President Kennedy never thought of discarding the US provision of aid to India, he “gave up hope” that “India would be in the next years a great affirmative force in the world or even in South Asia”.<sup>220</sup> For Kennedy, Nehru’s visit was “the worst head-of-state visit” he had experienced and was a “disaster”.<sup>221</sup> Though India was viewed positively for its constructive role in Congo

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<sup>213</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 172–173.

<sup>214</sup> Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 523. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 175.

<sup>215</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d24>. See also McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 277.

<sup>216</sup> See Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 176.

<sup>217</sup> Letter from Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy, New Delhi, May 13, 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d19>.

<sup>218</sup> See, for more discussion, Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 177–178.

<sup>219</sup> Letter from Prime Minister Nehru to President Kennedy, May 13, 1961.

<sup>220</sup> Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 526.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*

and Laos,<sup>222</sup> Kennedy and Nehru disagreed on key issues of nuclear disarmament, Berlin and Vietnam.<sup>223</sup> The US on Pakistan's insistence, tried but failed to persuade Nehru for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, but did not attach this issue with its assistance to India, as Pakistan wanted.<sup>224</sup> Following US condemnation of use of force by India against the Portuguese to free Goa from colonialism, Secretary of State Dean Rusk maintained that this issue would not have any impact on the US aid to India.<sup>225</sup> Nevertheless, it did negatively affect US aid.<sup>226</sup>

In 1962, the Kennedy administration saved aid appropriation for India facing demand for cut in the Congress on the issues including Goa and Kashmir.<sup>227</sup> In Defence, Rusk invoked "common commitments" and emphasised that "it would be a great mistake, I think, if we did not take an active, even if only a small, part in India's development program".<sup>228</sup> Kennedy also defended his decision to assist India's fourth steel plant at Bokaro (now in the state of Jharkhand) against Congressional opposition, but India subsequently withdrew from this public project after Kennedy's request.<sup>229</sup> The Bureau of NEA suggested against using US aid to pressure India on the Kashmir issue, and

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<sup>222</sup> Memorandum of Conversations, New Delhi, August 8 and 9, 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d35>; Memorandum of Conversation, New Delhi, May 18, 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d20>.

<sup>223</sup> John F. Kennedy, The President's News Conference, November 8, 1961, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8428>; McMahon, "Choosing Sides in South Asia," 209. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 182.

<sup>224</sup> See Memorandum of Conversation, Karachi, May 20, 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d22>; Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 11, 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d30>; Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 7, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d60>. See also McMahon, "Choosing Sides in South Asia," 212.

<sup>225</sup> "Security Council Considers Situation in Goa," December 18, 1961, DSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1178 (January 22, 1962): 145-149; Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Reporters Roundup", January 7, 1962, DSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1178 (January 22, 1962): 124.

<sup>226</sup> See Paper prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Washington, January, 10 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d88>.

<sup>227</sup> Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 531. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 187.

<sup>228</sup> Quoted in Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 187.

<sup>229</sup> Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 531. For discussion on this issue, see Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 200–201.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 531.

linked increased aid to political stability and to keep India away from depending on the Communist bloc. It suggested undertaking “new initiatives”, thus not allowing US aid to dissipate over the conflict over Kashmir.<sup>230</sup> President Kennedy, however, decided to propose Eugene Black, the President of the IBRD as the mediator to the Kashmir issue linking it to the future of American aid to India and Pakistan.<sup>231</sup> India rejected the mediation offer.<sup>232</sup> US delegates at the Indian Consortium meeting on January 29, 1962 expressed concern over dissipation of aid resources by India over its disputes with Pakistan and doubts over the US ability to provide substantial aid.<sup>233</sup> The Kennedy administration seriously grappled with the issue of the relationship between US aid to India and the arms race in South Asia.<sup>234</sup>

The Kennedy administration hoped for US-India alignment following India’s 1962 war with China.<sup>235</sup> US alliance with Pakistan as a factor influenced India to engage in resolving the Kashmir issue. But US failure on the Kashmir issue and its commitment to its alliance with Pakistan took the momentum away from India. While Congress made the largest ever cut in foreign aid in 1963, the allocation for India was only \$350 million for the fiscal year 1964 despite earnest efforts by Ambassador Bowles.<sup>236</sup> President Kennedy still had a deep commitment toward democratic India. Before the

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<sup>230</sup> Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, January, 10 1961.

<sup>231</sup> Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, January 12, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d90>; Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Nehru, Washington, January 18, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d95>. See also Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 186.

<sup>232</sup> PM Nehru’s letter to JFK, January 27, 1962, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, John F. Kennedy: Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-118-024.aspx>.

<sup>233</sup> Statement by the US Delegate to the Indian Consortium Meeting, January 29, 1962, John F. Kennedy: Presidential Library and Museum, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-118-024.aspx>.

<sup>234</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 27, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d116>; Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, May 9, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d119>.

<sup>235</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 287.

<sup>236</sup> Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 194–197.

House of Representatives began considering the proposed mutual defence and assistance bill of 1964, he asked in a press conference, “Should we deny help to India, the largest free power in Asia, as she seeks to strengthen herself against Communist China?”<sup>237</sup> But, while the US continued its (much reduced) aid to India after 1963, as Secretary Rusk informed Ambassador Galbraith, “It would be folly to assume that aid levels to India will increase in years ahead”.<sup>238</sup> The Kennedy administration, McMahon argues had an illusion that “India, in spite of its poverty, military weakness, and vast internal problems, could offer meaningful support to American Cold War policies”.<sup>239</sup> Such aid as was given was mixed up with the foreign policy objectives of the Kennedy administration, especially to bring India close to the US after India’s 1962 war with China (which is discussed below). The story remained—essentially the same: India was worth some effort to the US because of its democratic credentials, but these were not strong enough to override the constraints imposed by its divergent policies. The fact that it was weak (and hence needed American aid) meant that the attraction of its soft power was never more than very limited.

#### *4.1.3 Conclusions*

India’s requests for economic assistance received no positive response from the US between 1947 and 1950 mainly because India, on a foundation of weak economic and military hard power and a foreign policy of nonalignment appeared strategically insignificant even though it presented an attractive image because it had adopted Western practices of constitutional democracy and liberal polity. Even though shared values were elements of soft power for India, it was a matter of fact that India was a weak state with uncertain future emerging from colonialism and violent partition. Despite its big territorial size and population, India did not possess “the essential

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<sup>237</sup> John F. Kennedy, The President’s News Conference, August 20, 1963, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9374>.

<sup>238</sup> Quoted in Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot*, 197.

<sup>239</sup> See McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 304.

prerequisites for genuine military or economic [hard] power”.<sup>240</sup> It did not also provide any “major military advantages” to the US in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.<sup>241</sup> While the US was preoccupied with the threat of Communism in Western Europe and East Asia, Truman administration “had little time for the problems of two poor, weak countries [India and Pakistan] located along the Third World periphery”.<sup>242</sup> Even when some assessments indicated India’s vulnerability to Communism required the offer of American assistance, its weak hard power ensured its soft power limits.

India’s seeking of American economic assistance, especially food grain, suggests its poor economic condition. The American wheat loan of 1951 after much delay and criticism compared to the manner in which it was given to Pakistan in 1953 demonstrates India’s limited strategic value and soft power as a liberal democracy.<sup>243</sup> The US remained fearful of India’s poor economic condition and its susceptibility to Communism, internally and externally even though it showed commitment to democracy through regular democratic elections. The US-Pakistan military alliance in 1954 despite India’s opposition suggested India’s weak hard power and its limited strategic relevance to the US. Ambassador Bowles’s strong appeals to provide substantial aid to democratic India for its first five-year plan did not find positive response except the US decision to provide modest assistance to India to make it stable against the rise of Communism. India however lacked the hard power that would give it the strategic significance Western Europe and East Asian countries attracted. In US assessments, India was economically and militarily a weak state, vulnerable to the Communist bloc. It did offer the soft power of attraction as a large democratic state, but that was not enough in itself to ensure significant US aid.

The growing economic offensive by the Soviet Union from the mid-1950s and India’s closeness to the Communist bloc post-1954 and the Communist win in elections in the

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<sup>240</sup> Ibid., 337.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid., 158-165.

state of Kerala determined the nature of aid so as to keep India free and stable, away from the orbit of the Soviet Union. Again growing India-China tension on the border generated hope of India coming closer to the West. All these factors shaped US decisions on increasing aid towards the end of the Eisenhower administration and during the initial years of the Kennedy Presidency. The US policymakers also viewed India in the long term as a counter attraction to Communist China if it was assisted to address its foreign exchange gaps. Therefore India's soft power varied between US perceptions of India between "flawed democracy" and "essential democracy".<sup>244</sup> A structural realist argument would have concluded that India's weak power and incompatibility of interests would have resulted in no aid to India. But India, after a slow start, did receive considerable aid. India's soft power *did* play a role in getting aid, but it was limited because India's hard power was weak and therefore India was not strategically significant. The US constantly pressed for a change in Indian foreign policy as a prerequisite for major aid. In contrast, this is not required today, the difference being that India was then a weak democracy; and is now a strong democracy.

## **4.2 Military Cooperation**

### *4.2.1 Introduction*

India began searching for military assistance from the US right after its independence. Such requests were however made while respecting its attachment to nonalignment. The last section showed how India was very sensitive about sovereignty while seeking economic aid. For Nehru, receiving military aid meant "practically becoming aligned to that country".<sup>245</sup> The US initially responded negatively to India's requests and the sale of M-4 Sherman tanks to India (see Figure 4.2) by the US came only in 1952. By this

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<sup>244</sup> See the discussion in chapter 2 on perceptions of India as a "flawed democracy" as well as "essential democracy".

<sup>245</sup> Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Rajya Sabha, Vol. 40, Issues 11-20 (New Delhi: Council of States Secretariat, 1962), 2989.

time, the US had almost decided to forge an alliance with Pakistan against the Communist bloc which resulted in massive US military assistance following a mutual security agreement in 1954. The opportunities for receiving an unprecedented level of military assistance came when India fought a losing war against China in October 1962. The American military aid that resulted was however limited. This section advances the argument that India received limited military assistance because it had soft power rooted in its democracy, but had little hard power, so it did not receive more substantial assistance. Therefore it received either no or limited military assistance. By establishing relationship between limited hard power and low level of soft power, this section rejects the null hypothesis that the level of soft power has no relationship with level of hard power. Had the US been influenced by a realist approach that US and Indian interests were strategically compatible, then the US would not have given aid at all. Why would the US give aid to a state that is both weak and has an incompatible foreign policy? Therefore, India's soft power played a role in getting military aid, but it was limited because India's hard power was weak and therefore India was not strategically valuable.

This section first traces India's failure or very limited success in military purchases from the US since 1947. It then traces how Chinese aggression on India in 1962 created another opportunity for India to receive military assistance. Such opportunity however produced limited military assistance as against India's expectation because, though attractive to US policy makers as a thriving democracy, India was relatively insignificant because it was a materially weak power and because its foreign policy was incompatible with that of the US.

#### *4.2.2 Explaining the Policy in terms of Indian Power*

*The Early Years – US Cold War Priorities:* Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru through G. S. Bajpai, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs first made a formal request to the US for providing ten transport planes to evacuate 50,000 non-Muslims

under communal attack in Peshawar in Pakistan to India, following the Partition, in October 1947. Henry Grady, then US Ambassador to India in a letter to the Secretary of State supported American assistance.<sup>246</sup> The Acting Secretary of State and the President decided that for a positive response, there must be (a) a joint request by India and Pakistan and (b) a joint endeavour against communal violence and displacement of the population. Further, such provision would be under US control.<sup>247</sup> As India repeated its request, Ambassador Grady found the American condition of a joint request as “unrealistic” and reiterated his support for assistance in protecting India’s stability and thereby keeping it away from the Russian control.<sup>248</sup> In reply, the Secretary of State justified the negative reply stating (a) the improving refugee situation caused by the partition; (b) Pakistan’s own effort in transporting non-Muslims by rail; (c) Pakistan’s lack of enthusiasm for the need of American planes; (d) the availability of planes in India, which it was using for airlifting to Kashmir due to the conflict with Pakistan; and (e) American assistance would not help improve bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.<sup>249</sup> The US sought British concurrence before taking this decision.<sup>250</sup>

India again approached the US in 1948 for military purchases. Colonel Brij Mohan Kaul, then India’s military attaché in Washington approached the State Department and the Department of Defence “to obtain medium bombers [B-25] and other military equipment for the Indian armed forces”. While India was producing “small arms and ammunition”, it was “largely dependent on foreign sources for planes, tanks, ships, heavy ordnance, etc”.<sup>251</sup> He was turned down because such sale of combat capability would have increased the threat of India-Pakistan war over the issue of

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<sup>246</sup> The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, October 5, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III (1947): 166–167.

<sup>247</sup> The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, October 9, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III (1947): 169–170.

<sup>248</sup> Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, November 10, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III (1947): 171.

<sup>249</sup> The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, November 14, 1947, FRUS, Vol. III (1947): 172.

<sup>250</sup> Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism*, 18–19.

<sup>251</sup> Report by the SANACC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East, Washington, April 19, 1949.

Kashmir. Another reason given by the US government was that it did not have surplus in that category. Indeed, in view of the India-Pakistan tension, the US decided to suspend licenses to export military materials to India and Pakistan.<sup>252</sup> Bajpai in April 1948 again raised the issue of India's requirement of US military equipment including bombers to strengthen Indian's defence capability. He emphasised that India "was in no position effectively to resist aggression from the north, and that the GOI [Government of India] could not risk an open declaration of its anti-USSR views". He made it clear that shared values of "freedom and democracy" would align India with the US in the event of a conflict. According to him, India was "not able to make an open declaration of its position as it could not now withstand the aggression from Russia or the internal difficulties which might ensue". He expressed India's preference "to send a military mission to the US at an early date to explore the possibilities of obtaining equipment". It would aim at procurement and later on "improving Indian techniques". Bajpai made it clear that India was not likely to receive any "effective assistance from the USSR" and saw the US as the possible source of economic and military aid. While the State Department officials reiterated the US policy of arms embargo and pointed out its requirements limiting favourable American reply, they did intend considering India's requests.<sup>253</sup> In June, Mr. Chopra, First Secretary, Embassy of India, asked about US preference for potential "exchange of military information and technical training". He also enquired about likely American reaction to India's "formal request" for US arms and ammunitions to be used "exclusively in the India military training program". While making this request, he pointed out that India would be on the American side "should there be a third world war".<sup>254</sup> On July 29, the US informed about its decision not to supply live ammunition as it would enhance India's capability and would therefore

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<sup>252</sup> Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman, Washington, March 11, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1(1948), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d396>.

<sup>253</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Mathews), Washington, April 2, 1948. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett), April 2, 1948.

<sup>254</sup> Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, Washington, May 10, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1 (1948), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d403>; Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, Washington, July 29, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1 (1948), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d405>.

affect US policy towards India and Pakistan, unless the situation substantially changes in relation to the issue of Kashmir.<sup>255</sup> India was, however, not precluded from importing spare parts “for equipment of U.S. origin”.<sup>256</sup> Before Bajpai, H. V. R. Iengar, then Acting Secretary General External Affairs had also invoked shared values to give assurance that India will not side with the Soviet Union should conflict arose. He further stated that “there was no question about his [Nehru’s] fundamental friendliness to US”.<sup>257</sup> While such attempts by Indian officials for military purchase and invocation of shared values for its orientation towards the West have been construed by some as India’s desire for military alliance with the US, it was not so. Rather India stuck to its policy of nonalignment.<sup>258</sup> By this time, India had enunciated a foreign policy of being free from alignment with either of the two blocs.

Through nonalignment, India was seeking an “independent” foreign policy of “friendship with all and enmity with none”,<sup>259</sup> a policy that was bound “to be misunderstood”.<sup>260</sup> In contrast to this policy, Pakistan sought alliance with the West, mainly to balance India. It has been argued that the creation of Pakistan was premised on uncertainty regarding India’s alignment with the Western powers in checking the expansion of the Soviet Union as early as 1946 when Nehru was formulating the policy of nonalignment.<sup>261</sup> Sir Olaf Caroe, Foreign Secretary of British India, concerned about the “Middle Eastern defense” in the context of the power vacuum created by the British

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<sup>255</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph S. Sparks of the Division of South Asian Affairs, July 29, 1948.

<sup>256</sup> Memorandum by the Director of the Office of the Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwait) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, November 10, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1 (1948), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d409>. See also Report by the SANACC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East, April 19, 1949.

<sup>257</sup> The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, March 20, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1 (1948), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d398>.

<sup>258</sup> See Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 28-47.

<sup>259</sup> G. S. Bajpai, “India and the Balance of Power,” in *The Indian Year Book of International Affairs*, ed. Charles Henry Alexandrowicz (Madras: The Indian Study Group of International Affairs, University of Madras, 1952), 4–5.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>261</sup> K. Subrahmanyam, “Nehru and Defence Policy,” in *Nehru Revisited*, ed. M.V. Kamath (Mumbai: Nehru Centre, 2003), 81–82. See also Narindra Singh Sarila, *The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005), Chapters 1 and 7.

withdrawal from the subcontinent, influenced the US policy towards South Asia “about which Americans knew virtually nothing”.<sup>262</sup> As Harold A. Gould notes, “The Americans were enticed to favour a ‘greater Pakistan’ that included Kashmir because their Brit imperial mentors dangled before them the prospects of establishing an American air base in the Kashmir valley if the provinces incorporated in Pakistan”. The Truman administration was inclined towards traditional power politics and therefore had “no feel” for nonalignment.<sup>263</sup> Therefore, the question arose about why the US should build up nonaligned India’s military capability against Pakistan, a potential ally. India adopting a liberal democratic polity was not enough to attract the US in its favour. By 1948, it was “widely” believed in India that America’s favourable attitude towards Pakistan as compared to India relating to the Kashmir dispute was due to its desire to establish bases in Pakistan in the event of war with the Soviet Union.<sup>264</sup> However the US policies on arms sales to both India and Pakistan remained the same at this time.

The report by SANACC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East in April 1949 while recognising India as the “natural political and economic centre of South Asia” suggested a “regional approach” to South Asia in terms of US assistance that is, not differentiating between India and Pakistan and aiming at “regional cooperation”, which would produce combined capability in the interest of the US.<sup>265</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff in his memorandum opined, “From the military point of view, the countries of South Asia excepting Pakistan have, under present and prospective conditions, little value to the United States”. Pakistan’s “Karachi–Lahore area” was important for air bases “against central USSR” and “in the defense or recapture of Middle East oil areas”. Nevertheless South Asia as a whole was important in light of containing

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<sup>262</sup> Gould, *The South Asia Story*, 28.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>264</sup> The Charge in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, September 29, 1948, FRUS, Vol. V, Part 1(1948), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v05p1/d407>.

<sup>265</sup> Report by the SANACC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East, April 19, 1949.

Communism and securing the war potential of all the countries.<sup>266</sup> As discussed in the earlier section, India for its material weakness combined with a policy of independence was seen at this time as peripheral to US security interests. While it was susceptible to Communist influence, it was not imminent and not fertile strategically for the two Cold War rivals. Therefore India was seen as a weak democracy with limited attraction. It did not therefore influence the US in its favour. As a result, the US followed a regional approach to the two countries with an eye on Pakistan as a future military ally. In March 1949, the US lifted the arms embargo and based its decision on the announcement of cease-fire in Kashmir and improvement in India-Pakistan relations.<sup>267</sup> No further development in the negotiations on Kashmir meant the US was hesitant to sell military equipment.<sup>268</sup>

Nehru differed with American perception of threat of Communism and need for military preparation.<sup>269</sup> Nevertheless, the US did not abandon India. The State Department in one analysis in December 1950 viewed India as a pivotal state among the non-communist states in Asia and intended to provide India reimbursable military assistance. Such assistance for India was “justified in terms of India's internal security, its defense needs, the desirability of its participation in any possible regional defense plans, and its possible international commitments in defense matters (such as might arise through its association with UN action)”.<sup>270</sup> The National Security Council in a policy proposal concurred with the suggestion on military assistance and reiterated the political and strategic importance (war potential) of India (and Pakistan) against the

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<sup>266</sup> Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, March 24, 1949, FRUS, Vol. VI (1949), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v06/d3#fnref12>.

<sup>267</sup> The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, March 31, 1949, FRUS, Vol. VI (1949):1696.

<sup>268</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, July 29, 1949, FRUS, Vol. VI (1949): 1727.

<sup>269</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, November 3, 1950, FRUS, Vol. V (1950): 1472.

<sup>270</sup> Department of State Policy Statement, Washington, December 1, 1950, FRUS, Vol. V (1950): 1478–1479.

Communist bloc.<sup>271</sup> The Korean War provided India with the opportunity to behave as a responsible power holding a non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and enhance its profile in the US strategy. Initially, it took a stand that was in favour of the US in identifying North Korea as the aggressor, but later it voted with the Soviet Union against censuring China as the aggressor (unlike Pakistan, which abstained). India refused to send its combat forces to Korea to support the UN-backed effort and defended its reluctance by saying that its “moral help” was “big enough” to outweigh the “petty” military assistance of others.<sup>272</sup> This diminished US interest in helping India develop its military capability.<sup>273</sup> India was critical of the US and supported the recognition of China in the UN.<sup>274</sup> India’s ultimate rejection of the Japanese Peace Treaty ensured India’s independent behaviour despite sharing liberal democratic values with the West.

Despite the assessment that India was not going to discard “neutralism”, the US did not stop courting India while simultaneously considering how to contain it.<sup>275</sup> By this time, the US had failed to induce Nehru to accept its agenda of collective security.<sup>276</sup> McGhee, who visited New Delhi in March 1951, returned “convinced that India was a hopeless case”.<sup>277</sup> During his discussion with Nehru on the threat of aggression by the communist states of the Soviet Union and China, Nehru by differing with the military preparation of the US against the Communist bloc emphasised India’s effort to

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<sup>271</sup> “Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on South Asia,” Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council, Washington, January 22, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI, Part 2 (1951):1651–1652.

<sup>272</sup> A. Martin Wainwright, *Inheritance of the Empire: Britain, India, and the Balance of Power in Asia, 1938-1955* (London: Praeger, 1994), 123–124.

<sup>273</sup> Wainwright, *Inheritance of the Empire*, 148.

<sup>274</sup> Harrison, “India, Pakistan and the U. S.-I,” 13; Robert J. McMahon, “The Evolution of American Geopolitical Strategy and India, 1947-1965,” in *Four Decades of Indo-US Relations: A Commemorative Retrospective*, ed. A.P. Rana (Delhi: Har-Anand, 1994), 82.

<sup>275</sup> Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, August 30, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2172–2174; Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency, September 4, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2175–2179.

<sup>276</sup> See for details, the section on economic assistance.

<sup>277</sup> Henry W. Brands, “India and Pakistan in American Strategic Planning, 1947-1954: The Commonwealth as Collaborator,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 15:1 (1986): 47–49.

“explore peaceful settlement before resorting to war”.<sup>278</sup> According to McGhee, India was least likely to “to make any contribution to Near East defense”.<sup>279</sup> Similarly, American diplomatic and consular officers in a regional conference felt that India would not provide military assistance to the West unless it changed its foreign policy. In light of change in India’s foreign policy and the US offer of aid to India and Pakistan, it would, they felt, in the long term be beneficial to the US for its war potential. They supported American non-grant military aid to India under Section 408E of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and suggested that the US “should consider India as a worthwhile long-term risk from a military standpoint, and endeavor through non-pressure methods to insure its friendship and ultimate support”. Having suggested challenging India’s opposition to collective security, it recognised Pakistan’s positive attitude towards the “defense of the Middle East”.<sup>280</sup>

The new Eisenhower administration in February announced its decision to provide military aid to Pakistan.<sup>281</sup> While announcing it, President Eisenhower wrote to Nehru that India’s potential request for military aid would receive “most sympathetic consideration”.<sup>282</sup> India’s hostile reaction to the proposed US military agreement with Pakistan did not deter the Eisenhower administration from actualising its programme.<sup>283</sup> The US military deal with Pakistan meant “increasing U.S. disillusion with and devaluation of India.”<sup>284</sup> The perceived benefits for its Cold War policies led the US to explicitly pursue an “independent relationship” with both the states.<sup>285</sup> India gave priority to receiving economic aid without political strings as noted in the earlier

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<sup>278</sup> The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, New Delhi, March 10, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 2229.

<sup>279</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Frick Root, Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom, London, April 3, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951):1689–1691.

<sup>280</sup> Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 20, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI(1951): 1664–1669.

<sup>281</sup> Military Aid for Pakistan, White House Press Release, February 25, 1954, DSB, Vol. XXX, No. 768, <http://ia700504.us.archive.org/10/items/departmentofstat301954unit/departmentofstat301954unit.pdf>.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> McMahon, “The Evolution of American Geopolitical Strategy and India, 1947-1965,” 85–86.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>285</sup> Harrison, “India, Pakistan and the U. S.-I,” 10.

section. In contrast, Pakistan was in favour of economic and military aid, and showed interest in alliance with the US. Nehru remained “critical of regional defense pacts, atomic weapons, racialism, and the alleged tendency of the Western powers to intrude in Asian affairs”.<sup>286</sup> The new initiative was backed by Vice President Nixon as a counterbalance to India’s neutralism. Secretary Dulles, on the other hand, was attracted by Pakistan’s spirituality and its “martial spirit”, which made it a “dependable bulwark against Communism”.<sup>287</sup> Whatever may have been the benefits to the US, the military agreement was from the Indian standpoint a “Cold War intrusion” into South Asia.<sup>288</sup> As discussed in the earlier section, in some officials’ assessments India possibly under the control of the Soviet Union was seen more in terms of a political and psychological than a military challenge. Some officials presented an inflated strategic value of India in Asia on a weak foundation, but Pakistan ultimately emerged as the tangible asset for its willingness and strategic location. By 1951, the US had made up its mind to secure bases in Pakistan because of Nehru’s nonalignment or perceived “anti-Westernism”.<sup>289</sup> India and the US differed on three fundamental issues affecting each other: the threat of expansionist communism, colonialism and China.<sup>290</sup> From supporting nationalism in Asia to bonding with Asian states, including Communist China, to securing “for Asia its rightful place” in the global arena, India’s interest and nonaligned posture were not largely in harmony with the security policies framed by the US to fight against the menace of communism.<sup>291</sup> India opposed the American security agenda in Asia including its “assistance to French and British colonial regimes in southeast Asia, protection of the Nationalist Chinese regime in Formosa, and the establishment of defence pacts with Asian states like South Korea and the Philippines”.<sup>292</sup> During a

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<sup>286</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, May 28, 1955, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955-1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d147>.

<sup>287</sup> Harrison, “India, Pakistan and the U. S.-I,” 14–17.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid., 20-25; Heimsath and Mansingh, *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 344.

<sup>289</sup> Harrison, “India, Pakistan and the U. S.-I,” 12–13; Selig S. Harrison, “India, Pakistan and the U. S.-II: Cost of a Mistake,” *The New Republic*, August 24, 1959, 20.

<sup>290</sup> “P” [K.M. Panikkar], “Middle Ground Between America and Russia: An Indian View,” *Foreign Affairs* 32 (January 1954): 259–269.

<sup>291</sup> Bajpai, “India and the Balance of Power,” 3; Heimsath and Mansingh, *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 352.

<sup>292</sup> Heimsath and Mansingh, *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 352–353.

meeting with visiting Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Nehru deplored regional defence pacts (SEATO and Baghdad Pact) and argued that armament of Pakistan had forced India to divert its resources from economic development to defence. Dulles asked Nehru if India could join the SEATO. In reply, Nehru said that he “morally disapproved” of it.<sup>293</sup> To Dulles, the policy of nonalignment was “short-sighted” and “immoral”.<sup>294</sup> Dulles also sought to allay Indian fears of armament of Pakistan and about establishment of military bases in Pakistan. He went to the extent of saying that the US would support India in case Pakistan first showed aggression.<sup>295</sup>

India in March 1951 agreed with the US under Section 408 (E) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 to receive military assistance on a “reimbursable basis”.<sup>296</sup> As a result, it received 200 M-4 Sherman tanks from the US in 1952 (see Table 4.2). Ambassador Bowles supported the supply of tanks citing expansion of Communism in Asia.<sup>297</sup> India also requested for “50 to 200 F-84E, F-80B, F-9F aircraft plus a six years supply of maintenance spare parts” as well as 54 C-119 Fairchild transport aircraft. While The US delivered the C-119s,<sup>298</sup> the Department of State raised the issue of India’s ability to pay for fighter jets while seeking foreign aid for economic development.<sup>299</sup> Clearly, the US was pointing to India’s economic and military weakness and questioning the justification for India to spend large sums of money on military equipment. As a weak state, India had to face such difficult questions. In contrast, as will be shown in Chapter 5, as a “rising power,” India in the post-Cold War

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<sup>293</sup> Memorandum of Conversations between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Nehru, March 9, 1956 and March 10, 1956, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955–1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d156>.

<sup>294</sup> Address by Secretary Dulles, “The Cost of Peace,” Made at Commencement Exercises at Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, June 9, 1956, DSB, Vol. XXXIV, No. 886 (June 18, 1956 ): 999-1000.

<sup>295</sup> Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 1, 1956, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955–1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d21>.

<sup>296</sup> Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay), Washington, May 10, 1951, FRUS, Vol. VI (1951): 1692.

<sup>297</sup> The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State, New Delhi, August 13, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952–1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1019>.

<sup>298</sup> See Table 4.2.

<sup>299</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, by William L. S. Williams of the Office of South Asian Affairs, Washington, August 1, 1952, FRUS, Vol. XI, Part 2 (1952-1954), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v11p2/d1017>.

years has come to be viewed both as an attractive market for weapons as well as a democratic and responsible power which contributes to building a more secure world. In defending India's request, India's Ambassador, Binay R. Sen emphasised that India's defence budget had been consistent over the past few years and that such purchases aimed at replacements and were not contradictory to India's development agenda. India, however, dropped its request for aircraft.<sup>300</sup>

In light of American reluctance to provide it with arms, India decided to turn to the Soviet Union. An effort by Lord Mountbatten and Dulles's talk with Nehru forestalled India's attempt to buy planes from the Soviet Union in 1956, but India remained interested in buying arms from the Soviet Union because it was concerned about the reliability of the supply of arms from the West.<sup>301</sup> NSC 5701 recommended facilitating "India's procurement of its military equipment from the West".<sup>302</sup> In response to the disappointment of US Ambassador to India, Ellsworth Bunker, over the negative reply to India's request for Sidewinders missiles, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, G. Lewis Jones, Jr. noted that the US was supplying such weapons to Pakistan, which was an ally of the US. A neutral India did not attract such a favourable decision and could go to Britain for the Firestreak missile.<sup>303</sup> Roswell L. Gilpatric, then US Deputy Secretary of Defense reopened in September 1961 "the question of possible military sales to India" in light of India's search for advanced weapons such as aircraft following the transfer of F-104 to Pakistan by the US with the predilection of India's Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon towards the Soviet Union.<sup>304</sup> A "position paper" prepared before Nehru's impending visit to the US, noted in light of Communist

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

<sup>301</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, New Delhi, April 8, 1956, FRUS, Vol. VIII (1955–1957), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v08/d18s>.

<sup>302</sup> National Security Council Report, Washington, January 10, 1957.

<sup>303</sup> Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of India, Ceylon, and Nepal Affairs (Fleck), Washington, June 7, 1960, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d260>; Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Jones) to the Ambassador in India (Bunker), Washington, July 13, 1960, FRUS, Vol. XV (1958–1960), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v15/d262>.

<sup>304</sup> Letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles), Washington, September 13, 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d42#fn3>.

China's growing strength and aggressive intentions US readiness "to consider Indian requests for certain items of dual-purpose military equipment such as transport aircraft, high-altitude helicopters, radar, engineer bridging and construction equipment".<sup>305</sup> In September 1961, there was an initiative in the Department of State to assist democratic India with advanced atomic programme testing a nuclear device before the impending Chinese nuclear test, which threatened to enhance the appeal of Communism. It would at least reduce its "psychological" effect. Nevertheless, according to Ambassador Galbraith, Nehru would not like to be an "atomic ally".<sup>306</sup> Secretary Rusk was not in favour of proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>307</sup> It was also possible as Ambassador Galbraith assessed that "the chances are roughly only one out of fifty that Nehru's reaction would not be the negative one" to any US offer.<sup>308</sup>

The inability of the Indian military to achieve a victory against Pakistan's much smaller armed forces immediately after independence had exposed India's limited military capacity. But whereas the American attraction for India's democracy had prompted significant aid to India to prevent it from coming under communist control, there was no such consideration involved in the case of military aid. The US did not feel it necessary to safeguard India from its main adversary during this period, i.e. Pakistan. This was to change significantly with the rise of tensions between India and China.

***Sino-Indian Tensions and US Military Aid:*** As mentioned above, American reluctance to supply India with major military equipment caused India to look for an alternative source: the Soviet Union. The US embassy was informed in early May 1962 by India's Foreign Secretary, M. J. Desai that India's exploratory talk on MIG aircraft

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<sup>305</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, Washington, December 8, 1961, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d67>.

<sup>306</sup> Memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, "Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Communist Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability," September 13, 1961, FRUS Vol. VII/VIII/IX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07-09mSupp/d5>.

<sup>307</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle), Washington, October 7, 1961, FRUS, Vol. VII (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d80>.

<sup>308</sup> Memorandum from McGhee to Rusk, September 13, 1961.

with the Soviet Union was at an advanced stage for its prompt availability and affordable price.<sup>309</sup> Concerned with the strategic consequences of the deal, the US tried to spoil the deal in collaboration with Britain by offering British Lightnings.<sup>310</sup> Pakistan emerged as a major factor limiting the US offer of F-104 by providing “military communications and intelligence facilities”.<sup>311</sup> For India, the deal was “a normal commercial transaction without any political implications.”<sup>312</sup> But, for the US, foreign policy in South Asia was influenced by the priority it gave to a Cold War ally (Pakistan), whereas India was neither an ally nor a significant power even though it was a fellow democracy. Soon the US faced a strategic opportunity which prompted the

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<sup>309</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, New Delhi, May 8, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d118>.

<sup>310</sup> See Memorandum of Discussion, Washington, May 13, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d120>; Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, New Delhi, May 18, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d122>; Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, May 25, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d125>; Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, June 1, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d128>; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, June 9, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d133>; Telegram from Prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy, London, June 13, 1962, FRUS Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d135>; Telegram from the White House to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, June 9, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d134>; Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 14, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d136>; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, June 14, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d137>; Memorandum for the Record, Washington, June 19, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d139>; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, June 19, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d140>; Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, New Delhi, June 20, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d141>; Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 21, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d143>; Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, June 24, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d146>; and Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, July 6, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d152>.

<sup>311</sup> See Telegram from the White House to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, June 9, 1962.

<sup>312</sup> Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Washington, September 19, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d167>.

Kennedy administration to engage in military cooperation with India at an unprecedented level.

On October 20, 1962, the simmering border dispute between India and China erupted into all out hostilities. India's relationship with China had worsened following the revolt in Lhasa in 1959 and India's decision to grant political asylum to Dalai Lama and his supporters who fled from there. Diplomacy failed to address overlapping claims on border which had become a "constant source of friction" between the two Asian powers who boasted their peaceful relations by enunciating the *Panchsheel* or the "Five principles of Peaceful Coexistence" first in their bilateral agreement signed on April 29, 1954.<sup>313</sup> On September 10(or 11), 1962, Defence Minister Menon had ordered Indian Army to evict the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from the Thagla Ridge area of North-East Frontier Agency which India believed as part of its territory. On October 10, Indian forces en route to evict the PLA engaged in a battle leading to recommendation by B. M. Kaul, commander of the 4Corps in charge of the operation to expel the Chinese forces to seek American military assistance in light of limitations of Indian Army for this goal.<sup>314</sup> Although India facing superior Chinese forces suspended eviction orders, it faced full-scale Chinese offensive on October 20, 1962.<sup>315</sup> The war ended on November 21, 1962 when China unilaterally declared a ceasefire.

Faced with the prospect of border war with China, India made three requests to the US to purchase "spare parts and military transportation and communications equipment" in the first week of October to which the US responded positively.<sup>316</sup> As Rober J. McMahon writes, "Kennedy administration strategists almost immediately interpreted the war as a watershed event, one that, if handled properly would enable them to secure

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<sup>313</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 287-288; "Panchsheel," External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191\\_panchsheel.pdf](http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/191_panchsheel.pdf).

<sup>314</sup> See Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 88-93.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*, 93-94.

<sup>316</sup> Memorandum from the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, October 15, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d174>.

India's alignment with the West".<sup>317</sup> These initial requests for purchase were made while maintaining a nonaligned posture.<sup>318</sup> After receiving India's requests, the US on November 1 sent its first military supplies including anti-personnel mines, ammunition, machine guns, mortars, ANPRC-10 radios, and ANGRC-9 radios.<sup>319</sup> Such assistance was, as William H. Brubeck, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary wrote to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, "designed to help a friend, not win an ally".<sup>320</sup> Indian officials made sure that Nehru's appeal for assistance to Kennedy would not publicly affect India's nonaligned status.<sup>321</sup> Avoiding such phrases as "*military alliance and military aid*", Kennedy replied positively to India's request for "support".<sup>322</sup> As Jane S. Wilson emphasises, "That the United States had come to India's aid almost immediately after the fighting with China began, despite the near simultaneous occurrence of the Cuban missile crisis, demonstrated that the United States was willing to support a democratic nation at a time of Communist aggression, as well as U.S. interest in expanding its military ties with India".<sup>323</sup> Nehru however asked for military assistance on October 29, but succeeded in persuading the US not to use in public statements that the assistance amounted to "alliance".<sup>324</sup> Ambassador Galbraith soon wrote to Kennedy that "We cannot decently help someone who is afraid to be seen in our company".<sup>325</sup> On November 14, both sides established "a formal basis for the military assistance" which included the provision that "U.S. representatives in India be permitted to observe the

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<sup>317</sup> McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 287.

<sup>318</sup> John Kenneth Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1988), 431. See also Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 95-95

<sup>319</sup> Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy, Washington, November 3, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d190>.

<sup>320</sup> Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy, November 3, 1962.

<sup>321</sup> See Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 96-98.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>323</sup> Jane S. Wilson, "The Kennedy Administration and India," in *The Hope and the Reality: US-Indian Relations from Roosevelt to Reagan*, eds. Harold A. Gould and Sumit Ganguly (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 56.

<sup>324</sup> Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 99.

<sup>325</sup> Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to President Kennedy, New Delhi, November 13, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d196>.

use of the military supplies provided and that any excess supplies be returned when no longer needed for the purposes for which they had been supplied”.<sup>326</sup> As Rudra Chaudhuri points out, “Given the circumstances, these were hardly objectionable clauses”.<sup>327</sup> Nehru tried to make the US assistance appear as not violating his much cherished notion of foreign policy independence.<sup>328</sup>

As the US readied to provide military assistance, as expected Pakistan’s reaction was negative and it began flirting with China.<sup>329</sup> Why not? Pakistan was an ally of the US and India being a neutral was receiving economic aid and now began to receive military aid without any political obligation in return. Nehru wrote another letter to Kennedy on November 19, 1962. Explaining the prevailing atmosphere as “really desperate”, Nehru requested Kennedy for,

...the immediate despatch of a minimum of twelve squadrons of supersonic all-weather fighters and the setting up of radar communications. American personnel would have to man these fighters and installations, and protect Indian cities from air attacks by the Chinese till India personnel had been trained. If possible, the United States should also send planes flown by American personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in any battles with the Chinese in Indian air space; but aerial action by Indian elsewhere would be the responsibility of the Indian Air Force. Nehru also asked for two B-47 bomber squadrons to enable India to strike at Chinese bases and air fields, but to learn to fly these planes Indian pilots and technicians would be sent immediately for training in the United States. All such assistance and equipment would be utilized solely against the Chinese.<sup>330</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Editorial Note, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d197>.

<sup>327</sup> Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 103.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*, 103-104.

<sup>329</sup> Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy, November 3, 1962.

<sup>330</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State, New Delhi, November 19, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d203>.

Kennedy on the same day after deliberation with senior officials from the State and Defence Departments made a decision to send a mission to Delhi and send some C-130s as well as spare parts for C-119s to India. At the same time, he emphasised coordinating with Britain to get assistance from the Commonwealth countries.<sup>331</sup> The US also sent a carrier task force, led by the *USS Enterprise* into the Bay of Bengal to “steady Indian nerves”.<sup>332</sup> While the US implemented the president’s decision, Rusk informed Galbraith that the administration was not convinced of the nature of the request by Nehru and it amounted to “a request for an active and practically speaking unlimited military partnership between the United States and India to take on Chinese invasion [of] India”. Emphasising incompatibility of India’s nonalignment policy with its request, Secretary Rusk noted that India might “now face a choice between Pakistani assistance in the defence of India and some kind of satisfaction of Pakistan’s interest in the Kashmir question”.<sup>333</sup> Kennedy informed Nehru that a team of top US officials headed by Averell Harriman would visit India to take stock of the situation and evaluate the request for military assistance.<sup>334</sup> At this time, on November 20 China declared a unilateral ceasefire and ordered its forces to pull back from their forward positions.

Following Harriman’s mission, the US mulled over splitting its provision of assistance into two phases. The first emergency phase for the next two months needed military assistance to India constituting about \$60 million that included what had already been transferred to India by the US as agreed to with the UK. A similar amount would also be spent by the UK and other Commonwealth countries. The next phase of the air defence programme to India was strongly linked to the resolution of the Kashmir

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<sup>331</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Washington, November 19, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d202>. See also Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, November 19, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d205>.

<sup>332</sup> Kux, *India and the United States*, 207.

<sup>333</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, November 20, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d206>.

<sup>334</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, November 20, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d208>.

issue.<sup>335</sup> Following Harriman's report, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council established a subcommittee to recommend a military assistance programme for India. President Kennedy approved the recommendation of a \$60 million aid programme for the emergency phase with the same amount by UK and other Commonwealth countries agreed on at Nassau.<sup>336</sup> India was "hoping for a far larger" aid programme and the decision was "disappointing".<sup>337</sup> By January 1963, US military assistance was about \$22 million consisting of army ground equipment, infantry equipment and ammunition, two Caribou transport aircraft, spare parts for C-119, snow goggles, winter clothing and other administration and training type support. The US had also sent twelve C-130s for potential use. The Kennedy administration also decided to send a joint US-UK Air Defence Team to decide on air defence requirements of India for the next phase, which was conditioned on the resolution of the issue of Kashmir.<sup>338</sup> There was also the fear that India under pressure from the West on Kashmir might make terms with China. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence in his remarks before the NSC emphasised that if India joined the Chinese, there would be "no free South Asia".<sup>339</sup>

After delaying over the ministerial talks on Kashmir following suggestions from Britain, the US subsequently decided to send its air defence team to India on 24 January 1963.<sup>340</sup> It also sent a defence production team and Army Medical Research

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<sup>335</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, December 5, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d216s>.

<sup>336</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, December 8, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d221>; National Security Action Memorandum No. 209, Washington, December 10, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d223>. See also Memorandum of Conversation, Nassau, December 20, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d230>.

<sup>337</sup> Kux, *India and the United States*, 212.

<sup>338</sup> Memorandum for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, Washington, January 7, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d238>.

<sup>339</sup> Notes by Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Washington, January 22, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d244>.

<sup>340</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, January 21, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961->

Team and was embarking on the provision of Special Forces training.<sup>341</sup> In his preliminary views, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff commenting on the report of the Commonwealth/United States Air Defence Mission to India reiterated his earlier position that UK would take the lead for the provision of air defence for India.<sup>342</sup> President Kennedy finally after deliberations with the State Department decided that the administration did not have sufficient information on India's need for long term military assistance to determine the nature of American cooperation for air defence and defence production.<sup>343</sup> For long term US/UK military assistance to India, the two countries held a discussion in April and agreed that they should try to confine Indian military planning to about 16 divisions.<sup>344</sup> Following this talk, Secretary Rusk informed the president that there had been no progress on provision of U.S./U.K.-Commonwealth air defence assistance, defence production assistance and long term military assistance.<sup>345</sup> While the correlation between US military assistance for the second phase and settlement of the Kashmir dispute remained in place after the fifth round of discussion, Secretary Rusk in a letter to the president showed his inclination towards assistance in all the three areas noted above with or without U.K./Commonwealth participation "regardless of the outcome of the Kashmir talks". He emphasised that "We have much at stake in India and the Chinese can be expected

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63v19/d243; Memorandum for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, Washington, February 16, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d253>.

<sup>341</sup> Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, Washington, February 16, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d253>; Memorandum for the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, Washington, February 16, 1963.

<sup>342</sup> Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Washington, March 12, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d266>; Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Washington, December 14, 1962, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d225>.

<sup>343</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 1, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d271>; Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, March 31, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d270>.

<sup>344</sup> Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, London, April 11, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d274>.

<sup>345</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, April 19, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d278>.

to threaten the Free World at the periphery of their control for many years”.<sup>346</sup> After meeting senior level administration officials, President Kennedy decided that the US would move forward irrespective of British reluctance and without conditioning further military aid to the issue of Kashmir, with a programme of military assistance to India of \$300 million for three years as against Indian hope for over \$1.6 billion in aid. He however preferred to keep Britain involved and reserved the final decision on air defence assistance pending Secretary Rusk’s return from his visit to the subcontinent.<sup>347</sup> Rusk upon return suggested in favour of air defence assistance to India in the case of a Chinese attack. He emphasised that making “all military assistance contingent on Kashmir in coming months is to risk losing out on the main chance”.<sup>348</sup>

Regarding the air defence programme for India, the Kennedy administration intended to engage in periodic joint exercises along with Britain, with the latter showing reluctance and linking it to progress on the issue of Kashmir.<sup>349</sup> India preferred joint exercises as it was focussed on building its own capability as a nonaligned state.<sup>350</sup> Therefore as T.T. Krishnamachari, Indian Minister of Economic and Defence Coordination made clear to President Kennedy, “India hoped to remain non-aligned; basically, it didn’t like to expand the area of conflict with China. Rather, the Indians wanted to localize this conflict and to deal with it themselves, ‘rather than to drag our friends into the fray’”.<sup>351</sup> US Ambassador Galbraith, while engaging India on the long term military assistance programme, “requested that India pursue a conciliatory policy

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<sup>346</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, April 25, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d282>.

<sup>347</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Washington, April 25, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d283>; Note Memorandum for the Record, Washington, April 26, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d285>.

<sup>348</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of State, Rusk to President Kennedy, Washington, May 8, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d292>.

<sup>349</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, May 13, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d295>.

<sup>350</sup> Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, May 18, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d299>; Memorandum for the Record, Washington, May 20, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961–1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d300>.

<sup>351</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Washington, May 20, 1963.

toward Pakistan, support the United States in opposing Chinese aggression elsewhere in Asia, and work with U.S. officials on planning and procurement to improve the Indian Army”.<sup>352</sup> While the US had such expectations, the Kennedy administration was also keen to save democratic India. President Kennedy in a letter to Nehru on August 15, 1963 during the ongoing India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir said, “You know that we are determined to assist India to the fullest in building a free society, a task now rendered more difficult by an obvious external threat”.<sup>353</sup>

The US interest to bring the Commonwealth element to the programme was based on the desire not to “compromise” Indian non-alignment position, for otherwise it would tend to bring China and the Soviet Union much closer.<sup>354</sup> The first joint exercise was conducted in November 1963. Nehru did not prefer a second one scheduled for April 1964 because of (a) facing domestic opposition, (b) the decline of the Chinese threat, and (c) the likely assistance of the Soviet Union.<sup>355</sup> Nehru went before the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian Parliament) to declare that India would not allow foreign forces operating in Indian territory for its defence.<sup>356</sup>

Following Ambassador Bowles’s appeal, Rusk, McNamara, and Bell together recommended substantial military aid by means of condition that (a) India would limit its own military build up (b) it would find balance between defence and development and (c) it would not lean too much on the Soviet Union for military assistance. Nonetheless, they suggested a five-year MAP program for India in the annual range of \$50-\$60 million.<sup>357</sup> While Kennedy favoured a bigger and long term aid programme for

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<sup>352</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, June 18, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), n 2, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d305>.

<sup>353</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, August 15, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d319>.

<sup>354</sup> Memorandum for the Record, Washington, May 17, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d297>.

<sup>355</sup> McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, 239-240.

<sup>356</sup> *Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>357</sup> Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, Washington, December

India, he was “caught between two irreconcilable goals - the alignment of India with the West and the maintenance of the Pakistani-American alliance”. He could not take a decision before his assassination.<sup>358</sup> To make the final decision, the US wanted to know more about India’s defence planning. As a result, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited India in December 1963.<sup>359</sup> He recommended after his visit a five year programme of military assistance (with annual assistance of \$50–\$60 million) for India under conditions as suggested before by Rusk, McNamara and Bell. He also put another condition that India should (a) exercise restraint vis-a-vis Pakistan, and (b) assist the US in the “containment” of China.<sup>360</sup> Secretary Rusk agreed to his recommendations and suggested the President to decide on it.<sup>361</sup> The new President Lyndon B. Johnson authorised “exploratory approaches” to military assistance programmes for India as suggested by Rusk.<sup>362</sup> Then the US became concerned about India’s defence planning. Ambassador Bowles sounded out the administration regarding Indian’s turn towards the Soviet Union for military procurement. Three months had passed since General Taylor had visited India.<sup>363</sup> There was no final agreement regarding long term military assistance. Robert Komer, in a memo wrote to President Johnson that “India, as the largest and potentially most powerful non-Communist Asian nation, is in fact the major prize in Asia”. Making reference to the Pakistan factor as an impediment, he emphasised that “We have already invested \$4.7 billion in the long-term economic buildup of a hopefully democratic power”. He also pointed out, “With India heading into a succession crisis,

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11, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d342>.

<sup>358</sup> McMahan, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 299.

<sup>359</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, December 19, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d344>.

<sup>360</sup> Memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, Washington, December 23, 1963, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v19/d348>.

<sup>361</sup> Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, Washington, January 16, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d3>.

<sup>362</sup> National Security Action Memorandum No. 279, Washington, February 8, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d13>.

<sup>363</sup> Memorandum from Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, Washington, February 26, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XIX (1961-1963), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d20>.

we have to keep a sharp eye out. If India falls apart we are the losers. If India goes Communist, it will be a disaster comparable only to the loss of China. Even if India reverts to pro-Soviet neutralism, our policy in Asia will be compromised".<sup>364</sup> By this time, India had indicated the difficulty of withdrawing from the MIG deal.<sup>365</sup> With the decline in bilateral relations from the high point of the winter of 1962, McGeorge Bundy, President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs wrote to Ambassador Bowles that among other reason, "Delhi's handling of its military program has been so tediously slow as to damp much of our enthusiasm here".<sup>366</sup> Secretary Rusk in a telegram to the US embassy in Pakistan wrote that Pakistan's pressure tactic against India with its flirtation with China was incompatible with the US strategy of "helping to maintain the security of free Asia against the Chinese Communists".<sup>367</sup> The US-Pakistan relationship went to the brink over the American decision to continue providing military assistance to India after the failure of several rounds of ministerial level talks.<sup>368</sup> The US also failed to change India's nonaligned policy and its attitude towards Pakistan.<sup>369</sup> It had also failed in its hope throughout the Kennedy presidency of India emerging in the long term as a counterbalance to China.<sup>370</sup>

In the meantime, India presented to the US embassy its Five Year Defence Plan. According to Komer, the Indian plan was "grossly inflated". The US however planned a programme of military assistance under MAP including F-6As and engines for HF-24 fighter so as to scuttle the MIG deal.<sup>371</sup> An Indian defence team led by Defence

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<sup>364</sup> Ibid.

<sup>365</sup> Message from Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Bowles), Washington, February 27, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXV (1964-1968), n4, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d21>.

<sup>366</sup> Letter from the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to India (Bowles), Washington, March 9, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXV (1964-1968), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d24>.

<sup>367</sup> Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, Washington, March 9, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXV (1964-1968), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d25>.

<sup>368</sup> McMahan, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 299-303.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid., 304.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid.

<sup>371</sup> Memorandum from Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, Washington, April 2, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXV (1964-1968), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d33>.

Secretary P.V.R. Rao and Lieutenant General Moti Sagar, Chief of Staff of the Indian Army visited the US in early May to engage on India's Five Year Defence Plan.<sup>372</sup> The discussions with the senior level officials from the State and Defence Departments focussed on US assistance for India's foreign exchange expenditures, military credit sales for FY 1965 and long term military assistance, including the sale of F-104s. The US mulled over military assistance of \$60 million a year and credit of about \$50 million for FY 1965.<sup>373</sup> In the middle of US consideration for military assistance programme for India, Nehru died suddenly. In June 1964, India and the US signed a MoU on military assistance.<sup>374</sup> The momentum had already been lost. Concerned about Pakistan's reaction, however, the US scaled down its military aid package to India, which now consisted of only \$50 million per year. This did not satisfy India, which finally turned to the Soviet Union.<sup>375</sup>

The above example show that soft power of democracy was not enough to have the desired effect of obtaining significant quantities of military aid. US military assistance was significant, but it was only just enough to save India from Communist China and prevent it from falling under Soviet influence. Besides emergency aid, the US conditioned its provision of defence assistance with the resolution of the Kashmir issue. Also, being concerned about Pakistan, it scaled down its provision of long term military assistance to India. India was a weak power and had conflict of interest with the US whether it was on the issue Kashmir or balancing China. On the top of it, it was a weak power expecting large amount of economic and military aid while pursuing nonalignment. As the previous section has shown, President Kennedy was attracted to India's democracy and his administration extended economic assistance to India to

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<sup>372</sup> Memorandum from Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, May 21, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXV (1964-1968), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d44>.

<sup>373</sup> Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 22, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXV (1964-1968), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d46>.

<sup>374</sup> See Memorandum from Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, Washington, June 4, 1964, FRUS, Vol. XXV (1964-1968), <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v25/d53>.

<sup>375</sup> Dennis Merrill, "The Political Economy of Foreign Aid: The Case of India, 1947-1963," in *Four Decades of Indo-U.S. Relations*, 248.

ensure its democratic stability and viewed India in the long term if successful economically as a counter attraction to Communist China. It was also seen in the long term as a counter balance to China. As noted in the earlier section, the Kennedy administration’s approach to India had an illusion that weak India could be useful to American geopolitical goals such as balancing China. At the fundamental level, the US wanted India to remain free, stable and secured from Communism. India’s consistent attachment to nonalignment conflicted with its desire to see India as a counterbalance to China. As a result, weak India combined with policy differences ensured limited military assistance. That the US constantly pressed for a change in Indian foreign policy as a prerequisite for major aid is not required today: the difference being that India was then a weak democracy; and is now a strong democracy. Even the “team India” in the Kennedy administration including Bowles could not change much to India’s favour even though they were favourably inclined towards India from the beginning.<sup>376</sup>

Table 4.2: Transfer of Major Conventional Weapons from the US to India, 1950 to 1964.<sup>377</sup>

No. Ordered	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of Order/Licence	Year(s) of Deliveries	No. Delivered/Produced	Comment
(200)	M-4 Sherman	Tank	(1951)	1952	(200)	Second-hand; \$19 m deal
(5)	T-6 Texan	Trainer aircraft	(1951)	1951	(5)	Second-hand; probably

<sup>376</sup> Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis*, 86-87.

<sup>377</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>. The parentheses are used to indicate the numbers that are either estimates or unsure.

						modernized to T-6G before delivery
6	S-55/H-19 Chickasaw	Helicopter	(1952)	1954	6	S-55C version
26	C-119 Packet	Transport aircraft	(1954)	1954- 1955	26	‘MDAP’ aid
(30)	T-6 Texan	Trainer aircraft	(1955)	1956	(30)	Second-hand; T-6G version
4	Bell- 47/OH-13	Light helicopter	(1956)	1957	4	Bell-47G-2 version
2	S-55/H-19 Chickasaw	Helicopter	(1956)	1957	2	
12	Bell- 47/OH-13	Light helicopter	(1960)	1961- 1962	12	
(28)	C-119 Packet	Transport aircraft	(1960)	1961	(28)	Second-hand
2	S-62A	Helicopter	1960	1960	2	For evaluation and VIP transport
24	C-119 Packet	Transport aircraft	(1962)	1963	24	Second-hand; aid during border war with China

#### 4.2.3 Conclusions

The US offered no military assistance to India during 1947-1949 when India made several requests for military purchases. The US adopted a regional approach to India and Pakistan, a possible ally. India with its weak hard power and strategic preference

for nonalignment was peripheral to US interests. Pakistan on the other hand with its potential military bases and willingness to join the American alliance system, was viewed more favourably, which further undermined India's strategic relevance. India as a large democratic state was seen as relevant politically and psychologically. Although India was successful in military procurement from the US from 1952, it was insignificant until it faced aggression from Communist China in 1962 which resulted in greater military assistance from the US. Yet the assistance was limited. The US provided aid to save democratic India from Communist China. But India was a weak power and was hesitant to leave its nonaligned foreign policy. So its strategic value to the US was limited. As a result it received limited aid with political conditions. Knowing India's commitment to nonalignment and material weakness, the US went on till the end of the Nehru era to provide limited military assistance to save its democratic stability and because of the long term hope that it would be a democratic counterbalance to Communist China. Had the developments conformed to the realist interpretation, India, which was both economically and militarily weak and insisted on sticking to nonalignment, should have received virtually no aid at all. Because it was a democracy – and for that reason worth saving – it did exercise some soft power and obtained significant military assistance from Washington. But that soft power was never enough to make the amount of aid anything close to what Nehru wanted and had asked for.

### **4.3 Conclusion**

We can thus conclude that when India lacked economic and military hard power resources, it exercised limited soft power. India's soft power mattered enough for it to be given limited economic and military aid, but not enough to cause major aid flows from the US to India. Chapter 5 will show how the change in India's level of hard power made it more influential in terms of its soft power impact. India in the Nehru era was materially a weak state in hard power terms, which limited its overall attractiveness and hence that of its soft power as well. Had India been a rising power, it

would have been taken more seriously as a strategic player and its soft perceived very favourably as justifying more US assistance. Hence, it would have received stronger economic and military cooperation from the US which is happening since 2000. This suggests that the level of hard power determines the extent to which soft power is effective. That is, low hard power means limited effectiveness of soft power. The next chapter will demonstrate that when hard power is higher, so is soft power's effectiveness.

The realist approach, which emphasises hard power, is inadequate. A realist prediction would have stated that, because of the lack of Indian hard power and incompatible interests and strategy, India should have received virtually no aid. That is, soft power would have had no effect at all. In practice, because India did have soft power, it did – in spite of its low hard power – receive both economic and military aid, though only to a limited extent. As chapter 5 will show, India even today remains a state that does not play the role of US ally. It retains foreign policy independence and the India-US relationship is for New Delhi one of many strategic partnerships. But, because of its rising hard power, India and its soft power are viewed more favourably in Washington, with results that are beneficial for New Delhi.

## CHAPTER 5

### Soft Power Success: India and the United States, 1998-2013

The US perception of India changed as Indian hard power grew. In the post-Cold War era, the Indian economy began to grow much faster and India was increasingly viewed around the world as an “emerging market”. But the real turning point was the testing of nuclear weapons by India in 1998, which – after an initial negative reaction from the US – led to a re-framing of the US view of India, which came to be seen in Washington as well as other capitals as an “emerging power”. From a realist perspective, US interest in India arose from the rise of Indian economic and military power, which made it a potential strategic partner to hedge against the threat posed by the rise of China.

But the increasing coincidence of strategic perceptions is not enough to explain the rapidity with which the two countries have come close together. US strategic interest in Pakistan, which also tested nuclear weapons in 1998, was in a way stronger since the latter was critical in countering the biggest and most immediate threat to American national security: terrorism. Pakistan was also America’s ally in the Cold War. Yet Pakistan did not benefit from a warmer relationship with the US because its soft power was limited – it was at best a “hybrid”<sup>1</sup> regime and its strategic behaviour was not viewed as “responsible”. In contrast, as this chapter shows, the combination of India’s hard power and soft power produced a powerful effect on American strategy in three important ways. First, India was able to obtain the “dehyphenation”<sup>2</sup> of American policy toward India and Pakistan, which it had earlier been unable to do. Second, the US went a long way in making concessions to India by means of a landmark agreement on civil nuclear trade that bypassed the constraints imposed by the nonproliferation

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<sup>1</sup> See Reeta Chowdhari Tremalay and Julian Schofield, “Institutional Causes of the Indian-Pakistan Rivalry,” in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. T.V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 225-237.

<sup>2</sup> “Dehyphenation” as policy in the context of Indo-US relations is defined later in this chapter.

regime. And third, in contrast with American reluctance to supply arms to India during the Nehru era, US-Indian defence cooperation rose sharply.

In all three cases, the impact of Indian soft power was central in explaining major policy shifts undertaken by Washington. Basically, India's democracy and its responsible behaviour were the key aspects of Indian soft power that were used to justify the transformation in US policy. Yet these soft power characteristics were hardly new: India had been a democracy for decades and had displayed responsible strategic behaviour in terms of nonproliferation and restraint vis-à-vis Pakistan for a considerable period of time. It was only *after* India had achieved recognition as an emerging power (especially after the nuclear tests of 1998) that its soft power began to exercise a high degree of influence. The first section discusses the role of India's soft power in accomplishing its preferred outcome of de-hyphenation from Pakistan or an independent approach to India in US policy. The second section shows how India's soft power of attraction influenced the US to engage with India in full civil nuclear commerce. The third section shows how India's growing defence ties with the US has been enabled by its soft power supported by a high level of hard power. The concluding section argues on the basis of the chapter's findings that effective soft power is dependent on high level of hard power. By establishing the relationship between high level of hard power and the greater effectiveness of soft power, this chapter rejects the role of the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two variables.

## **5.1 De-hyphenation**

### *5.1.1 Introduction*

The de-hyphenation from India's perspective was about changing the "American paradigm of parity" between India and Pakistan or undoing the equation between the two countries.<sup>3</sup> From the US perspective, it meant improving relations with India and

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<sup>3</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "The U.S. and the Gujral Doctrine," *The Hindu*, May 15, 1997, <http://hindunet.org/hvk/articles/0597/0244.html>.

Pakistan independently and at the same time respecting their distinct “virtues and assets”.<sup>4</sup> This was manifested through American close collaboration with Pakistan on “counterterrorism and intelligence sharing while cultivating India as a future partner” on regional and global issues.<sup>5</sup> Some American critics find practical difficulty in implementing such a policy because of security interdependence and the imbalance the US creates in a triangular relationship.<sup>6</sup> Stephen Cohen argues for redefining de-hyphenation whereby the US would seek normalisation of India-Pakistan relations through “selective engagement in regional issues”. As a result, a “strategically cooperative South Asia” would be the “best” counterbalance against China.<sup>7</sup> As we have seen in the previous chapter, the US during the Nehru period thought along this line and failed. According to Daniel Markey, “taken to extremes, de-hyphenation policy was a thoroughly unrealistic, artificial construct”. As he further points out, while “neither India nor Pakistan could ever lose sight of how U.S. relations with the other might tilt their own balance of power”, the new policy succeeded in advancing US partnership with India as well as Pakistan.<sup>8</sup> For S. Amer Latif, it produced “mixed results”.<sup>9</sup> India welcomed de-hyphenation as it “meant the end of comparisons with Pakistan and the inference that it was now paired with China”.<sup>10</sup> This has not however ended India’s concern with regard to US relations with Pakistan.<sup>11</sup> Teresita C. Schaffer identifies them succinctly. As she points out, India is concerned about US-Pakistan

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<sup>4</sup> Daniel S. Markey, *Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 182; Stephen P. Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 182; Ashley J. Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan,” *The Washington Quarterly* 31:4 (2008): 22-23.

<sup>5</sup> S. Amer Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement: Steady As They Go,” A Report of the CSIS Wadhvani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, December 2012, 36.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in the Nuclear Age* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 10. See also Joseph McMillan, Eugene B. Rumer, and Phillip C. Saunders, “Engaging Other Major Powers,” in *Strategic Challenges: America’s Global Security Agenda*, ed. Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2008), 197.

<sup>7</sup> Cohen, *Shooting For a Century*, 191-195.

<sup>8</sup> Markey, *No Exit from Pakistan*, 182.

<sup>9</sup> Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 36.

<sup>10</sup> Cohen, *Shooting For a Century*, 182.

<sup>11</sup> Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 36.

relations on three issues regardless of de-hyphenation policy.<sup>12</sup> First, US military supply to Pakistan creates tension in Indo-US relations. It was the case in the 1950s, 1980s and again after 9/11. Yet in a hyphenated format, the US offer of weapons to India did outweigh its sale of F-16s to Pakistan in 2005 even though India expressed its unhappiness. In this context, a leading Indian strategic analyst argued that “the logic of de-hyphenation sounds good in theory,” but “there is no way of ignoring the Pakistan factor in thinking about Indo-US relations”.<sup>13</sup> Second, US engagement in the bilateral dispute has evolved from conflict resolution to crisis management and has been endorsed by India. A likely active US diplomatic engagement in the India-Pakistan dispute (on Kashmir) would have a negative effect on Indo-US relations. Therefore India was concerned about President Obama’s initial musing on Kashmir and was mostly cool to Richard Holbrooke, the President’s special assistant for the region, even though Kashmir was outside his mandate. Third, both the US and India differ on how to deal with Pakistan on the issue of terrorism and its political stability. Even though they have shared interests in both the issues, they differ on policy which creates “mistrust”.

The US moved towards differentiating between India and Pakistan since the second Clinton administration, but slowly and inconsistently. First by taking a favourable position towards India during the Kargil conflict and then through his much greater focus on India during his visit to the two countries in March 2000, Clinton began this new paradigm in US approach to the region. The Bush administration followed it more forcefully while respecting Pakistan’s value as a ‘frontline’ state for fighting terrorism. While treating India as an Asian and global power and not merely a South Asian player, President Bush hastened de-hyphenation first by signing the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in January 2004 and then the civil nuclear agreement in 2005. The disparate nature of defence relations the US has sought with each country

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<sup>12</sup> See Teresita C. Schaffer, *India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 121-127.

<sup>13</sup> C. Raja Mohan, “Pak Gets F-16s Next Week,” *Express India*, October 22, 2005, <http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=57052>.

also suggests this de-hyphenation. President Barack Obama persisted with the approach of crisis management and has expanded partnership with India on regional and global issues and by implementing the nuclear deal. The US has increasingly viewed India as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific while confining its relationship with Pakistan to counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing mainly for its efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas.

This section, while attempting to trace the greater effectiveness of India's soft power in terms of the de-hyphenation policy of the US, advances the argument that with its significant growth in hard power India's soft power of attraction, rooted in its democracy and responsible strategic behaviour, became more effective.

### *5.1.2 Explaining the Policy in Terms of Indian Power*

Despite actual changes in India's economic and military power resources in the 1980s, as Selig S. Harrison notes, "most Americans, including American policy makers, are still reluctant to accept the idea that India is emerging as a major industrial and military power".<sup>14</sup> As was the case during and after the Cold War, Pakistan continued to be an important factor in US policy towards India.<sup>15</sup> In contrast to an attitude of friendship towards Pakistan in the US, India at the end of the Cold War was largely perceived as "pro-Soviet, a bit anti-United States, and having betrayed its own lofty Nehruvian - Gandhian standards on nuclear and related issues".<sup>16</sup>

During the first Clinton presidency, US policy strongly hyphenated India and Pakistan, calling into question the status of the accession of Kashmir to India, the efficacy of the

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<sup>14</sup> Selig S. Harrison, "Dialogue of the Deaf: Mutual Perceptions and Indo-American Relations," in *Conflicting Images: India and the United States*, eds. S.R. Glazer and Nathan Glazer (Glenn Dale, MD.: The Riverdale Company, 1990), 60-61.

<sup>15</sup> For the role of Pakistan factor in Indo-US relations throughout the Cold War, see Satu P. Limaye, *U.S.- Indian Relations: The Pursuit of Accommodation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 53-92.

<sup>16</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, "The United States, India, and Pakistan: Retrospect and Prospect," ACDIS Occasional Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, July 1997, <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/21/CohenOP.pdf?sequence=1>.

1972 Shimla Agreement, and raising human rights issues regarding the state.<sup>17</sup> In establishing defence relations with India, the US subsequently sought “parity” in its approach to the two South Asian rivals.<sup>18</sup> The growing defence ties did not mean that the US had decided to abandon its “traditional close cooperation” with Pakistan. But the Clinton administration felt it imperative, according to Walter Slocombe, then US Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, to “maintain balance between India and Pakistan”.<sup>19</sup>

India was viewed as belonging to the “the world’s most dangerous place” with the perceived concern about conventional and eventually a nuclear war in South Asia.<sup>20</sup> The South Asian rivals were urged to renounce their weapons and to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).<sup>21</sup>

While a few American analysts began to view India as a potential major power,<sup>22</sup> there was lingering ambivalence among others with respect to India’s power potential.<sup>23</sup> Under the suggestion<sup>24</sup> of Strobe Talbott, then Deputy Secretary of State, a task force set up by the Council on Foreign Relations recommended in January 1997 that the US should “delink” India-Pakistan from its policy and “transcend the zero-sum dynamics” and offer “a closer strategic partnership” with the former in view of its potential to become a major power. According to the report, such a partnership would

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<sup>17</sup> Jaswant Singh, *A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2000), 279 and 283.

<sup>18</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 283.

<sup>19</sup> *Asian Profile*, Vol. 24 (1996): 248.

<sup>20</sup> Cohen, “The United States, India, and Pakistan.”

<sup>21</sup> Selig H. Harrison, “The United States and South Asia: Trapped by the Past,” *Current History* 96: 614 (1997): 404.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, Henry Kissinger, “Different Histories, Different Conceptions: The New World and Our Role in International Relations,” 106th Landon Lecture, April 29, 1996, <http://www.k-state.edu/media/newsreleases/landonlect/kissingertext496.html>; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 121.

<sup>23</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 46.

<sup>24</sup> Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 40-41.

be founded on economic cooperation, shared values and interest including “regional stability across Asia”.<sup>25</sup>

The rise of China might have prompted American interest in a close partnership with India in 1997.<sup>26</sup> India’s economic growth following liberalisation in the early 1990s and its “resilient” democracy were however drawing attention of President Clinton. As Talbott notes while referring to Clinton’s first term,

...Clinton was always looking for a bigger and brighter picture of what was going on in the world, and he would often cite India—with its resilient democracy, its vibrant high-tech sector, its liberal reforms that had begun to revitalize a statist and sclerotic economy, and its huge consumer market—as a natural beneficiary of globalization and therefore potentially a much more important partner for the United States than was then the case.<sup>27</sup>

Nevertheless, as Talbott points out, “the Clinton administration paid less attention to that country during its first six years in office than the president wanted”. There were other pressing issues for the administration as well as India’s refusal to sign the NPT. Therefore all attempts failed to bring about any positive outcome in Indo-US relations.<sup>28</sup> According to Stephen Cohen, had India’s economic reforms taken place previously, it was likely that non-proliferation would not have assumed the central focus in the US approach to India.<sup>29</sup> Therefore even though India began to grow in the 1990s, it was not enough. It lacked open and tested nuclear weapons capability which would give it the required prestige of real hard power of major strategic significance.

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<sup>25</sup> Gideon Rose and Peter G. Peterson, “Task Force Report: A New U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 1997, <http://www.cfr.org/india/new-us-policy-toward-india-pakistan/p126#summary>.

<sup>26</sup> “India, Pakistan and the U.S.: Signs of A ‘New Approach’,” *Federation of American Scientists (FAS)*, October 8, 1997, [http://www.fas.org/news/india/1997/97100801\\_rmr.html](http://www.fas.org/news/india/1997/97100801_rmr.html); Manoj Joshi and Sudeep Chakravarti, “Uncle Sam’s Agenda,” *India Today*, September 29, 1997, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indo-us-relations-gujral-clinton-meet-points-to-new-us-plan-for-south-asia/1/274910.html>; “US to Initiate ‘Strategic Dialogue’ with India,” *Rediff*, <http://m.rediff.com/news/oct/15us.htm>.

<sup>27</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 24

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 24-40.

<sup>29</sup> Cohen, “The United States, India, and Pakistan.”

Following the summit in New York between Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral and President Clinton in September 1997, the Clinton administration launched a “strategic dialogue” with India.<sup>30</sup> While emphasising an independent approach to India, a senior State Department official said that such dialogue entailed “a high-level, comprehensive and forward-looking discussion” in relation to “bilateral, regional and international issues”.<sup>31</sup> For him, India was “an important regional power and an Asian power” with whom the US “ought to have a more normal sharing of views” and which had hitherto been “neglected”. Commenting on the forthcoming visits of senior administration officials to India as well as Pakistan, he said, “It is unfortunate that we have to do this pairing each time but we don’t want to end up further behind by neglecting anyone”.<sup>32</sup> According to Thomas Pickering, US Undersecretary of State, who led the American delegation during the first strategic dialogue, India was “an important country, because of its democracy, economic potential and its position in the post-Cold War world”.<sup>33</sup> Importantly, the end of the Cold War meant that non-alignment lost its old significance as a hindrance to closer Indo-US bilateral relations. Also, India’s endeavour to improve relations with its neighbours, especially Pakistan, on the basis of a “more accommodating posture” under the “Gujral doctrine” was recognised and appreciated by the Clinton administration.<sup>34</sup> An Indian analyst hypothesised that “The Gujral Doctrine may have helped crack open the American paradigm of parity”.<sup>35</sup> Importantly, Indo-US bilateral trade in 1996 nearly doubled since 1992.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, “Statement Before the House International Relations Committee,” Washington DC, October 22, 1997, <http://www.state.gov/1997-2001-NOPDFS/regions/sa/goals971022.html>.

<sup>31</sup> “US to Initiate ‘Strategic Dialogue’ with India.”

<sup>32</sup> Ludwina A. Joseph, “Bill’s Wagon Heads East,” *Outlook*, October 13, 1997, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article/Bills-Wagon-Heads-East/204388>.

<sup>33</sup> M. L. Sondhi and Prakash Nanda, *Vajpayee’s Foreign Policy: Daring the Irreversible* (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), 78.

<sup>34</sup> Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, “Excerpts from White House Press Briefings on U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan,” September 22, 1997, <http://www.state.gov/1997-2001-NOPDFS/regions/sa/970922whbrief.html>; Inderfurth, “Statement Before the House International Relations Committee,” Washington DC, October 22, 1997.

<sup>35</sup> Mohan, “The U.S. and the Gujral Doctrine.”

<sup>36</sup> Inderfurth, “Statement before the House International Relations Committee,” October 22, 1997.

Yet, while seeking a “greater engagement” with India, the Clinton administration continued to emphasise the “priority” of its non-proliferation concerns in the region.<sup>37</sup> Even while it engaged in a strategic dialogue, it imposed restrictions on five Indian scientific organisations.<sup>38</sup> Kashmir was viewed by it “as a potential flash point of global instability and argued for its resolution to the satisfaction of Pakistan, preferably with American help”.<sup>39</sup> As Daniel Twining notes, “China’s supply of advanced nuclear and missile components to Pakistan, contravening Beijing’s NPT obligations while Western powers looked the other way, reinforced Indian perceptions of the great powers’ hypocrisy and hostility to India’s legitimate security requirements”.<sup>40</sup> The search for a *modus vivendi* on nuclear issues was unending.<sup>41</sup> India was not able to import dual-use technology placed under US export control restrictions. Differences over non-proliferation, as Selig Harrison pointed out, “will poison all aspects of Indo-American relations”.<sup>42</sup> As a consequence, while the US moved towards de-hyphenation, it did so “slowly, hesitantly, and inconsistently” despite India’s progress in hard (economic) power and successful democracy.<sup>43</sup> It had to do with “the singular U.S. focus on non-proliferation in South Asia”.<sup>44</sup>

India’s overt nuclearization (the acquisition of decisive military hard power) with the 1998 nuclear tests, however, did not produce any immediate American attraction towards India, but instead brought sanctions and efforts to isolate it.<sup>45</sup> India’s rationale

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 285.

<sup>39</sup> Sondhi and Nanda, *Vajpayee’s Foreign Policy*, 78.

<sup>40</sup> Daniel Twining, “The US Engagement of India after 1991: Transformation,” in *The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses*, ed. Ian Hall (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 22.

<sup>41</sup> See Selig S. Harrison, “The United States and South Asia: Trapped by the Past,” *Current History* 96: 614 (December 1997): 401-406.

<sup>42</sup> Harrison, “The United States and South Asia,” 406.

<sup>43</sup> Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation” 22.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> James Bennet, “Nuclear Anxiety: The President; Clinton Calls Tests a ‘Terrible Mistake’ And Announces Sanctions Against India,” *The New York Times*, May 14, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/14/world/nuclear-anxiety-president-clinton-calls-tests-terrible-mistake-announces.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>. See also Baldev Raj Nayar, *India and the Major Powers after Pokhran II* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001), 47.

for the tests was “unpersuasive” for the US.<sup>46</sup> It was a “setback” for non-proliferation, peace and stability in South Asia.<sup>47</sup> It was a “terrible mistake”, for a “wonderful country” with a “vibrant democracy”, concluded President Clinton.<sup>48</sup> The US “appeared more understanding of Pakistan’s decision to test after India”.<sup>49</sup> The UN Security Council resolution 1172 led by the United States pronounced Kashmir as the “root cause” of bilateral tension between India and Pakistan, and opened the door for its “internationalisation” and intervention of the UN.<sup>50</sup> But eventually, we shall see below, India’s coming out of the nuclear closet actually helped it to establish a strategic partnership with the United States and attracted the US to de-hyphenate India from Pakistan in its policy vis-à-vis India.

Being confident of its new-found hard power, India soon reached out to the Clinton administration in defence of its 1998 nuclear tests and within a month of the nuclear tests engaged it in a dialogue. Jaswant Singh, who led India in the dialogue, noted that his task was to “remove from the American mind” their “continuing addiction to a hyphenated South Asia (India-Pakistan) policy”.<sup>51</sup> The dialogue included the issue of Jammu and Kashmir as one of the US “benchmarks”.<sup>52</sup> The US also engaged Pakistan in a similar dialogue. In his first engagement with his American counterpart, Singh complained about the hyphen in the phrase “India-Pakistan”, termed it as “a false equation”, and advised against “seeing Kashmir as a flash point”.<sup>53</sup> The US “did not

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<sup>46</sup> Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, “Testimony Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs May 13, 1998, Washington, DC, [http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy\\_remarks/1998/980513\\_inderfurth\\_india.html](http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980513_inderfurth_india.html).

<sup>47</sup> Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, “On-the-Record Briefing on India and Pakistan,” Washington, DC, May 28, 1998, [http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy\\_remarks/1998/980528\\_talbott\\_nuclear.html](http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980528_talbott_nuclear.html);

Karl F. Inderfurth, Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, “Testimony before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Washington, DC, June 3, 1998, [http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy\\_remarks/1998/980603\\_inderfurth\\_efforts.html](http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980603_inderfurth_efforts.html).

<sup>48</sup> Bennet, “Nuclear Anxiety.”

<sup>49</sup> C. Raja Mohan, *Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2006), 16.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>51</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 286.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 305.

<sup>53</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 85

move as forcefully as it should have” towards “delinkage” since the end of the Cold War despite “thinking about India more in its own right, as a major regional power with the potential of becoming a global one as well”.<sup>54</sup> In light of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, Strobe Talbott remarked that “the hyphen was not inserted between India and Pakistan by outsiders. Rather, the two countries put it there themselves”. According to him, “it symbolized the way they prosecuted their relentless and seemingly endless animosity. They were...like a pair of boxers, either throwing punches in war or, when ostensibly at peace, snarling at each other in a clinch”.<sup>55</sup>

While India invoked behaviour of restraint by proposing “non-first use agreement” and renewed commitment to nuclear arms control and disarmament post-1998 nuclear tests to emerge as a responsible power, it faced a severe test during the Kargil conflict initiated by Pakistan in 1999.<sup>56</sup> The Clinton administration took a position favourable to India.

Following their discussion in New York in September 1998 both the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif agreed to the “Lahore bus project” involving the visit by Vajpayee to Lahore from New Delhi by bus.<sup>57</sup> On February 20, 1999, Vajpayee travelled to Lahore to initiate what is called the ‘Lahore peace process’ which resulted in among others an agreement to resolve all issues including Jammu and Kashmir and agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the conventional as well as nuclear fields.<sup>58</sup> President Clinton commended this initiative.<sup>59</sup> This was viewed, Talbott noted, as showing Vajpayee’s desire “to go the extra mile for reconciliation”.<sup>60</sup> It represented “dramatic progress” on the last

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<sup>54</sup> Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation,” 22; Talbott, *Engaging India*, 85.

<sup>55</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 85

<sup>56</sup> India’s invocation of policy of restraint in greater details is discussed in the next section.

<sup>57</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 189-192.

<sup>58</sup> See Lahore Declaration, February 02, 1999, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999>.

<sup>59</sup> Statement by the President, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, February 22, 1999, [http://fas.org/news/india/1999/99022301\\_nlt.htm](http://fas.org/news/india/1999/99022301_nlt.htm).

<sup>60</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 153.

benchmark in the framework of Singh-Talbott dialogue.<sup>61</sup> In contrast to the dialogue with India, the US dialogue with Pakistan, in Talbott's view, "barely qualified as such".<sup>62</sup> Thus, while India was behaving responsibly with its diplomatic engagement with Pakistan in the wake of its nuclear tests, the latter was seen as "ruining the peace process" by initiating the Kargil conflict just three months after the Lahore Summit.<sup>63</sup>

The armed forces of both the countries engaged in fighting in late May and early June 1999 following Pakistani intrusion into the Kargil sector of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. When India came to know about it on May 3, 1999, it was "a complete and total surprise".<sup>64</sup> From the start of the conflict, the US got alarmed because of the "potential for escalation" resulting in "a danger of nuclear cataclysm".<sup>65</sup> The US had already engaged in a nuclear dialogue with India. Therefore it was the nuclear dimension of hard power that brought attention of the US decision makers to play the role of an "umpire".<sup>66</sup> Officials from the State Department, Bruce Reidel from the National Security Council and the President himself engaged in this unprecedented crisis management process. The Pentagon and Congress played "little" role in it.<sup>67</sup> The senior administration officials, Karl F. Inderfurth, then Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs and Undersecretary of State Thomas R. Pickering privately informed ambassadors of both the countries in Washington that "Pakistan should withdraw its forces back behind the Line of Control immediately".<sup>68</sup> Then followed the phone call from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Sharif, and from General Tony Zinni, commander in chief of the Central Command to Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf, but without any result, prompting the administration to make its

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>64</sup> "From Surprise to Reckoning: Kargil Committee Report," Executive Summary, <http://fas.org/news/india/2000/25indi1.htm>.

<sup>65</sup> Bruce Reidel, *American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House* (Philadelphia, PA: Center for the Advanced Study of India, 2002), 4.

<sup>66</sup> P. R. Chari, Parvaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 131-132.

<sup>67</sup> Chari, Cheema and Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, 130.

<sup>68</sup> Reidel, *American Diplomacy*, 4.

position on the crisis public.<sup>69</sup> The senior administration officials in their talks with Pakistan and Indian officials “put the blame squarely on Pakistan for instigating the crisis, while urging India not to broaden the conflict”.<sup>70</sup>

On June 2, Inderfurth made it clear to Indian Ambassador to the US Naresh Chandra that “the Line of Control has to be respected, (and) the intruders would have to first leave what they had occupied”. This, according to Jaswant Singh, then India’s Minister of External Affairs, “was perhaps the first ever articulation by the US of an unambiguous position in regard the LOC”. According to him, Inderfurth challenged Pakistan’s Ambassador Riaz Khokhar’s assertion that the LoC was unclear.<sup>71</sup> In the first week of June, then Indian Army Chief, V. P. Malik advised Vajpayee and India’s National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra against India’s public statement on restraint which prompted Mishra to give an interview and say that “not crossing the border and the LoC holds good today. But we do not know what may happen tomorrow”. Mishra in a meeting with his American counterpart, Sandy Berger on June 16, also warned of the limits of India’s restraint and the “danger of escalation”.<sup>72</sup> The National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) also recommended to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) “that the Indian military should be allowed to cross the border/Loc”.<sup>73</sup> As noted by V. P. Malik, “The middle of June was the most anxious period of the war and possibly the closest when we came to enlarging the conflict area”.<sup>74</sup> Although India’s ground forces never crossed the LoC,<sup>75</sup> according to Singh, “In our assessment, there was no question of a full-scale war, not at any stage whatsoever. This even though we had information regarding some deflative activity in Pakistan’s Tilla ranges near Jhelum, indicating that it could be operationalising its nuclear missiles. This was

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 4-5.

<sup>70</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 158.

<sup>71</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 208.

<sup>72</sup> See V. P. Malik, *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory* (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2006), 147.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Chari, Cheema and Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, 131.

treated by India as merely a desperate gamble. A nuclear angle to this conflict simply did not exist”.<sup>76</sup> As he goes on to write,

What truly was the greatest challenge to Prime Minister Vajpayee during this near sixty-day trial was his (the PM’s) continued conviction to not expand the field of combat beyond the LOC, whatever the provocation. This obviously cost India many lives because of this enormous restraint...this too, was part of Pakistan’s miscalculation that we would once again be hustled into expanding the scope of the conflict. Such an escalation, tactically advantageous, would have been a strategic error of incalculable dimensions, principally because of the nuclear status of both India and Pakistan, which for the world foremost worry. We had assessed this carefully and were clear that that was to be no internationalising of the issue....For the first time a sub continental conflict elicited from the United States a clear pronouncement of Pakistani wrongdoing. This had not been seen in 1948, not 1965, nor 1971.<sup>77</sup>

President Clinton in the middle of June “called both leaders [Vajpayee and Sharif] in mid-June and sent letters to each pressing for a Pakistani withdrawal and Indian restraint”.<sup>78</sup> It is argued that India’s threat of escalation drew the attention of the President.<sup>79</sup> According to Reidel, American intelligence assessments suggested “the danger of full-scale war becoming a real possibility”. In light dangers of escalation, Sharif “urgently requested American intervention to stop the Indian counterattack” and asked to meet Clinton.<sup>80</sup> Clinton also sent Zinni and diplomat Gib Lampher towards the end of June to Pakistan to know Washington’s preference that Pakistan should withdraw from Kargil before Sharif could meet the President. Lampher also visited New Delhi to inform it of the talks.<sup>81</sup> On 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> July, Clinton made it clear to Sharif on his appeal for American intervention to stop fighting and to resolve the Kashmir issue that Pakistan should first withdraw from the Indian side of the LoC.

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<sup>76</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 227.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 227-228.

<sup>78</sup> Reidel, *American Diplomacy*, 5.

<sup>79</sup> Chari, Cheema and Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, 133.

<sup>80</sup> Reidel, *American Diplomacy*, 6.

<sup>81</sup> Chari, Cheema and Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, 133-134.

Clinton called Vajpayee and assured him of the American “commitment to the Lahore process” and preference for seeing the resolution of the Kashmir dispute through bilateral talks.<sup>82</sup>

As Sharif came to Washington on July 4, the senior officials at the NSC and the State Department prepared two draft statements by the President after his talk with Sharif. While the first one was related to Pakistan’s decision to pull back from Kargil, the second one was related to Pakistan’s negative behaviour and the US decision to put blame on it for the crisis. US officials also learned of Pakistan’s preparation for nuclear deployment.<sup>83</sup> Berger told Clinton that “this could be the most important foreign policy meeting of his Presidency because the stakes could include nuclear war”.<sup>84</sup> Therefore unlike the Cold War period, the bilateral disputes had a nuclear dimension.

In their first meeting, Sharif appealed for American intervention on the Kashmir issue and to withdraw “with some saving of face”. Clinton stood firm to suggest American preference to “withdraw without any precondition or quid pro quo” and warned that he would issue a statement blaming Pakistan entirely for the crisis and naming Pakistan as a source of terrorism in India and Afghanistan.<sup>85</sup> Clinton also informed Vajpayee about his insistence on Pakistani withdrawal. Finally, Sharif agreed to unconditional withdrawal and restoration of the Lahore peace process.<sup>86</sup>

The US tilted towards India by (a) identifying aggression by Pakistani forces and unequivocally condemning it, and (b) containing it from its nuclear blackmail linked to Kashmir, and urging it to respect the Line of Control (LOC) and withdraw unconditionally across the line without any reward.<sup>87</sup> Allowing the US to play the role

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<sup>82</sup> Reidel, *American Diplomacy*, 7.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-12.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 12-13.

<sup>87</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 158-168; Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 208. See also Reidel, *American Diplomacy*, 16.

of a “facilitator” to defuse the crisis was a departure from India’s former preference.<sup>88</sup> This signified the evolving trust between the leadership on both the sides.<sup>89</sup>

In Kargil, India’s limited use of force, which was confined to its side of the border, gave it greater legitimacy as a responsible power. A major retaliation would have cost it “unprecedented international support”.<sup>90</sup> As Secretary Albright remarked, India “did not put a foot wrong”.<sup>91</sup> While India fought a defensive war with a caretaker government while the country awaited a democratic election, Pakistan’s aggression, though occurring under Sharif’s elected government, was initiated and controlled by the military, which subsequently carried out a coup by overthrowing him. India’s restraint was again on display during the 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar by Pakistan-based terrorists, which drew the positive attention of the US.<sup>92</sup> Although bilateral counterterrorism cooperation goes back to the pre-1998 period, it increased significantly in the wake of the hijacking.<sup>93</sup> The establishment of a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism in January 2000 marked a shift from “a previously obscure and ad hoc aspect of bilateral ties into a lead element of the haltingly expanding relationship”.<sup>94</sup>

Following the Kargil conflict, the military coup in Pakistan and the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814, as Gary Ackerman, a member of the House International Relations Committee said, “the American people understood that there was a vast difference, that there was an aggressor and a victim, that there was a perpetrator and a victim”. As he said further, “The perpetrator was violent and the victim was very restrained and responsible. The hyphen in the ‘India-Pakistan’ disappeared”. He appealed to Clinton

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<sup>88</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 170.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 169 and 175-176.

<sup>90</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 229

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.

<sup>92</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 187.

<sup>93</sup> Polly Nayak, “Prospects for US-India Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: An Historical Perspective,” in *Counter-Terrorism in South Asia* (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2011), 18.

<sup>94</sup> K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto, “India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, November 13, 2012, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42823.pdf>; Nayak, “Prospects for US-India Counter-Terrorism Cooperation,” 8.

to recognise “that India is a responsible democratic nation in the region, and one with which we can deal”.<sup>95</sup> Democratic Congressman from New Jersey, Frank Pallone suggested that Clinton should not visit Pakistan during his forthcoming visit to South Asia.<sup>96</sup> As Arthur G. Rubinoff notes, the military coup in Pakistan and in contrast India’s democratic national election in 1999 “led Congress to reauthorize the Clinton administration to lift indefinitely most remaining sanctions against New Delhi, while retaining the Glen Amendment prohibitions that were directed against Islamabad”.<sup>97</sup> The two South Asian countries were “viewed as distinctive entities in the Congressional mindset”.<sup>98</sup> Subsequently, the President visited India for five days and Pakistan for five hours, which was strongly suggestive of a “decoupling” of India and Pakistan in American policy. Even his short visit to Pakistan was “highly controversial within the Administration”.<sup>99</sup> As Reidel emphasised, “Pakistan's aggression in Kargil was the key factor, they had provoked a crisis which Clinton feared would go nuclear. India’s restraint earned much good will but Clinton knew it could not be open ended. That is why he convened the Blair House summit. Musharraf’s coup was the final element. Removing an elected PM (who had ended the Kargil crisis) gave Clinton no reason to wait for Pakistan as he moved to take US-India ties to a new level with Vajpayee”.<sup>100</sup>

Therefore nuclear India with its enhanced military hard power behaved responsibly by initiating a peace process with Pakistan and then by maintaining military restraint against serious provocation during the Kargil conflict initiated by Pakistan. India’s soft

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<sup>95</sup> A. P. Kamath, “Pakistan Doesn’t Warrant Clinton’s Visit: Ackerman,” *Rediff.com*, February 25, 2000, <http://m.rediff.com/us/2000/feb/25us.htm>.

<sup>96</sup> Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Clinton Trip Evokes Positive Reactions,” *The Hindu*, February 03, 2000, <http://www.thehindu.com/2000/02/03/stories/0303000d.htm>.

<sup>97</sup> Arthur G. Rubinoff, “From Indifference to Engagement: The Role of the U.S. Congress in Making Foreign Policy for South Asia,” in *Making US Foreign Policy Toward South Asia: Regional Imperatives and the Imperial Presidency*, eds. Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 198-199.

<sup>98</sup> Rubinoff, “From Indifference to Engagement,” 199.

<sup>99</sup> Charles Babington and Pamela Constable, “Clinton Pushes for Peace, Democracy in Pakistan,” *The Washington Post*, March 26, 2000, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/2000-03/26/108r-032600-idx.html>.

<sup>100</sup> Bruce Reidel, e-mail message to author, April 4, 2015.

power rooted in its responsible behaviour attracted unprecedentedly a favourable policy from the Clinton administration and was thus the beginning of the de-hyphenation of India from Pakistan in US policy. The bilateral Vision Statement signed during Clinton's visit to India going beyond the narrow confines of South Asia included Indo-US dialogue on Asian security.<sup>101</sup> A Congressional panel appealed to President Clinton to upgrade the bilateral relationship to "strategic partnership" and the House by a margin of 396 to 4 praised India "as 'a shining example of democracy for all of Asia to follow'".<sup>102</sup> Behind this attraction was also growth of India's hard economic power.<sup>103</sup> President Clinton and the senior members of his administration adopted Vajpayee's characterisation of India and the US as "natural allies".<sup>104</sup> As "natural allies in the cause of democracy", India as a responsible power became a cosponsor with the US in the Community for Democracies (CD) initiative,<sup>105</sup> though it remained "ambivalent" towards US agenda of democracy promotion and turned down its proposal to lead "an informal caucus of democracies" at the United Nations.<sup>106</sup> By the end of the Clinton administration, the attraction of India's democracy on the basis of shared value or value-based cooperation through the CD initiative was insufficient to overcome fully the nuclear differences between the two democracies.<sup>107</sup> The dialogue between Singh and Talbott however brought greater American appreciation of Indian security

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<sup>101</sup> "Agreed Principles: Institutional Dialogue between the United States and India," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, March 21, 2000, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/03/2000-03-21-joint-us-and-india-statement.html>.

<sup>102</sup> Rubinoff, "From Indifference to Engagement," 199-200.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>104</sup> Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "India, USA and the World: Let Us Work Together to Solve the Political-Economic Y2K Problem," New York, September 28, 1998, <http://asiasociety.org/policy/india-usa-and-world-let-us-work-together-solve-political-economic-y2k-problem>; "President Clinton's Address to Indian Joint Session of Parliament," March 22, 2000, *Press Information Bureau (PIB)*, Government of India, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/indous/indouspr8.html>; Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, "Remarks," Foreign Policy Institute, South Asia Program, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, April 27, 2000, [http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy\\_remarks/2000/000427\\_pickering\\_sa.html](http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000427_pickering_sa.html).

<sup>105</sup> Pickering, "Remarks," April 27, 2000.

<sup>106</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle with Democracy Promotion," *The Washington Quarterly* 30:3(Summer 2007): 105-107; Malini Parthasarathy, "India Declines U.S. Proposal to Head Caucus of Democracies," *The Hindu*, September 21, 2000, <http://hindu.com/thehindu/2000/09/21/stories/01210002.htm>.

<sup>107</sup> "Agreed Principles," March 21, 2000.

objectives.<sup>108</sup> Speaking on National Missile Defence in September 2000, Clinton viewed India's nuclear policy in the broader context involving China rather than his administration's previously narrow India-Pakistan framework.<sup>109</sup>

The US approached India and Pakistan more independently of each other during George W. Bush's presidency. Ashley Tellis rightly argues that while global and regional geopolitical changes as well as regional leadership contributed to dehyphenation policy, it originated "fundamentally from the new tack pursued by the United States in South Asia".<sup>110</sup> It is shown below how, under Bush, the dehyphenation proceeded at a faster pace because of India's rising hard power which enhanced its soft power of attraction.

India's unambiguous and irreversible development of overt nuclear capability signified "a dramatic change not in New Delhi's strategic capabilities, but in its strategic direction".<sup>111</sup> Before coming to power, Bush recognised this and suggested,

This coming century will see democratic India's arrival as a force in the world. A vast population...changing economy...India is now debating its future and its strategic path, and the United States must pay it more attention...we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia.<sup>112</sup>

Condoleezza Rice, who later became Bush's National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, writing in an article in *Foreign Affairs* before the election of Bush as president, was critical of Clinton's approach to India. According to her, the previous administration had a "strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and

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<sup>108</sup> Interview of the External Affairs Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, November 29, 1999, <http://mea.gov.in/interviews.htm?dtl/3912/Interview+of+the+External+Affairs+Minister+Mr+Jaswant+Singh>.

<sup>109</sup> Remarks by President Bill Clinton on National Missile Defense, September 1, 2000, [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_09/clintonnmd](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_09/clintonnmd).

<sup>110</sup> Tellis, "The Merits of Dehyphenation," 21.

<sup>111</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, "The Strategic Implications of a Nuclear India," *Orbis* 46:1(2002):14.

<sup>112</sup> George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, <http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1999/11/991119-bush-foreignpolicy.htm>.

to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states”. She emphasised that “India is an element in China’s calculation, and it should be in America’s, too”. To her, the US “should pay closer attention to India’s role in the regional balance”.<sup>113</sup> A report by RAND of more than 50 American experts in support of this dehyphenation policy suggested,

We recommend that your South Asian policy proceed from a decoupling of India and Pakistan in U.S. calculations. That is, U.S. relations with each state must be governed by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to American interests in this new era. This means recognizing that India is on its way to becoming a major Asian power and therefore warrants both a level of engagement far greater than the previous norm and an appreciation of its potential for both collaboration and resistance across a much larger canvas than simply South Asia. In the case of Pakistan, it means recognizing that this is a country in serious crisis and that it is pursuing policies that run counter to important U.S. interests. You should avoid isolating Pakistan and be prepared to assist in dampening the currently disturbing social and economic trends by reaching out to Pakistani society.<sup>114</sup>

India was seen as a player in Asian geopolitics beyond the narrow confines of South Asia which had often hyphenated it with Pakistan. The Bush administration very early into its first term thought of India as, according to Secretary of State–nominee Colin Powell,

...a country that should grow more and more focused in the lens of our foreign policy. That country is India.... We must deal more wisely with the world’s largest democracy. Soon to be the most populous country in the world, India has the potential to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its

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<sup>113</sup> Condoleezza Rice, “Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs* 79:1(2000): 56.

<sup>114</sup> Frank Carlucci, Robert E. Hunter and Zalmay Khalilzad, eds., *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 45-47.

periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavor, while not neglecting our friends in Pakistan.<sup>115</sup>

There is no doubt that India's high economic growth and prospect of such success continuing into the future had positive effect on its military modernisation. This attracted a differentiated US approach to India and Pakistan with the latter being "beset by unhealthy political, economic, and strategic trends".<sup>116</sup> While transformation of its hard power resources was drawing attention of US policymakers, India's practice of liberal values was making it more attractive. In a conversation with Robert D. Blackwill who became US ambassador to India in 2001, Bush then as Governor in Austin, Texas remarked about his "obvious and special interest in India" as "a billion people in a functioning democracy. Isn't that something? Isn't that something?"<sup>117</sup> The reference to shared political values could be found in most US official statements that elaborated the transformative approach of the new administration towards India. India continued to invoke shared values to define bilateral relationship in terms of "natural allies".<sup>118</sup>

India's positive response to US missile defence attracted the US for greater engagement on this issue.<sup>119</sup> The first major indication of the transformation of the Indo-US bilateral relationship came during the visit of India's defence minister, Jaswant Singh, to the US in April 2001. On that occasion, President Bush engaged him in a discussion on missile defence, which was one of the components of his "New Strategic Framework", later

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<sup>115</sup> "Nomination of Colin L. Powell to be Secretary of State," Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, January 17, 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg71536/pdf/CHRG-107shrg71536.pdf>.

<sup>116</sup> Carlucci, Hunter and Khalilzad, *Taking Charge*, 45.

<sup>117</sup> Robert D. Blackwill, "The Future of US-India Relations," Remarks to the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce and Indo-American Society, Mumbai, India, September 6, 2001, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/4850.htm>.

<sup>118</sup> See, for example, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of India, "India-US Relations in the Emerging Global Environment," September 22, 2003, <http://asiasociety.org/india-us-relations-emerging-global-environment>; "PM's Opening Remarks at Senate Foreign Relations Committee," November 9, 2001, *PIB*, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/1yr2001/rnov2001/09112001/r091120013.html>.

<sup>119</sup> Interview with Douglas J. Feith, October 29, 2014.

elaborated to India through his special emissary, Richard Armitage.<sup>120</sup> By giving advanced information on this major US policy initiative, the new administration expressed its willingness to “treat India respectfully as a partner and as a rising power”.<sup>121</sup> Bush also conveyed through Armitage his preference for “working closely” with India “to promote common interests in Asia and beyond”.<sup>122</sup>

India, for its part, showed it was “prepared to think differently” by reversing its earlier opposition to the American national missile defence programme.<sup>123</sup> It was “more receptive than even Washington had originally expected”.<sup>124</sup> The programme was aimed at “rogue states” and “hard cases”. Pakistan came under the latter. This suggested India’s “superiority over Pakistan”.<sup>125</sup> As Tellis notes, Pakistan was “barely mentioned” by Bush before 9/11.<sup>126</sup> India became the focus of the new administration for being a success story, economically as well as politically, being a democracy.<sup>127</sup> India’s supportive attitude towards Bush’s missile defence programme complemented the attraction based on the shared value of democracy. With its rising hard power India also expressed its willingness to play a larger geopolitical role and to cooperate with the US, and was thus considered by the Bush administration as an opportunity.<sup>128</sup> India also unprecedentedly provided naval escort to US ships in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

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<sup>120</sup> “China Not a Factor in Indo-US Ties: Jaswant,” *The Times of India*, April 13, 2001, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/37443354.cms?>; Press Release on Visit of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to New Delhi,” New Delhi, May 11, 2001, [https://www.indianembassy.org/archives\\_details.php?nid=410](https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=410); Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 329.

<sup>121</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 328-331; Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship,” *International Security* 30-4(2006):128.

<sup>122</sup> Press Release on visit of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to New Delhi, May 11, 2001.

<sup>123</sup> Malini Parthasarathy, “We Welcome India’s Thinking Differently: U.S.,” *The Hindu*, June 20, 2001, <http://www.hindu.com/2001/06/20/stories/01200001.htm>; Interview with the Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, July 24, 2000, <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?4011/Interview+with+the+Minister+of+External+Affairs+Mr+Jaswant+Singh>.

<sup>124</sup> Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties,” 128.

<sup>125</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 12.

<sup>126</sup> Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation,” 25.

<sup>127</sup> Interview with Douglas J. Feith, October 29, 2014.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*

If the Bush administration very early adopted a differentiated approach to India and Pakistan, the latter came to the centre stage in US agenda of ‘war on terror’ following the 9/11.<sup>129</sup> India’s offer of support included “intelligence on terrorist networks, over-flight rights, refuelling and repair of U.S. military aircraft, port facilities in Mumbai and Cochin for U.S. naval vessels, and search-and-rescue missions”.<sup>130</sup> Pakistan’s contiguity to Afghanistan and “deep familiarity with Taliban” influenced the Bush administration to seek cooperation from Islamabad.<sup>131</sup> As Daniel S. Markey, who served in the Bush administration noted, “Pakistan went from peripheral, near-rogue state to indispensable ‘frontline ally’ in President Bush’s new ‘Global War on Terror’”.<sup>132</sup> India remained attractive for the US for the very reasons noted earlier. As a result, the bilateral relationship, rather than returning to a familiar “zero sum triangular game”<sup>133</sup> in view of emerging strategic alignment between the US and Pakistan, was steadily transformed into a strategic partnership. The fact that no Indian was found in Al-Qaeda also provided the US opportunity to learn about how India successfully deals with its Muslim population.<sup>134</sup>

The November 2001 visit of Vajpayee to the US resulted in the willingness of the Bush administration to cooperate with India on civilian nuclear energy, thereby paving the way for further negotiation on high technology trade, civilian space and nuclear cooperation.<sup>135</sup> The crisis between India and Pakistan during 2001-2002, however, impacted the momentum of the negotiation process.<sup>136</sup> The US however treated India as a global power rather than viewing it narrowly in the South Asian context as the 2002 *National Security Strategy* of the Bush administration suggested.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 12-14.

<sup>130</sup> Kronstadt and Pinto, “India-U.S. Security Relations.”

<sup>131</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 12.

<sup>132</sup> Markey, *No Exit from Pakistan*, 181.

<sup>133</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 12.

<sup>134</sup> Interview with Douglas J. Feith, October 29, 2014.

<sup>135</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 21-22.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>137</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>.

Following the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 by alleged Pakistan-based terrorist groups, India mobilised and deployed its forces along its border with Pakistan as part of an exercise in coercive diplomacy to try and end cross-border terrorism.<sup>138</sup> Though the US, fearing the adverse effect of India's potential use of force on its campaign in Afghanistan and the risk of nuclear use, goaded India to exercise restraint,<sup>139</sup> the Bush administration applied relentless diplomatic pressure on Pakistan which compelled President Musharraf to pledge to end supporting cross-border terrorism.<sup>140</sup> Though India came close to war twice during the "Twin Peaks crisis" of 2001-2002, it held back from using force and war was avoided.<sup>141</sup> India gained from the crisis in the form of broader cooperation with the US on counterterrorism, including ground exercises and exchange of "training materials and methods".<sup>142</sup> Counterterrorism became a major topic in the meetings of the U.S.-India Defence Policy Group (DPG).<sup>143</sup>

The emergence of Pakistan to the centre stage in the US war on terror, India's decision not to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in 2003 and India's own domestic politics were among the reasons given to explain the slow transformation of the bilateral relationship.<sup>144</sup> The US however engaged India on quartet of issues under the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP): civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programs, high-technology trade, and missile defence. As "a halfway house" launched a big shift

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<sup>138</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "Diplomacy Precedes Military Response," *The Hindu*, December 15, 2001, <http://www.hindu.com/2001/12/15/stories/2001121500691100.htm>; Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 266; C. Raja Mohan, "India's Coercive Diplomacy," *The Hindu*, December 31, 2001, <http://www.hindu.com/2001/12/31/stories/2001123101351200.htm>.

<sup>139</sup> Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 122-130.

<sup>140</sup> Steve Coll, "The Stand-Off: How Jihadi Groups Helped Provoke the Twenty-First Century's First Nuclear Crisis," *The New Yorker*, February 13, 2006, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/02/13/the-stand-off>.

<sup>141</sup> Tim Sebastian, "International Mediation Does Not Work," Tim Sebastian's Interview of Brajesh Mishra, *Outlook*, November 29, 2002, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?218129>.

<sup>142</sup> Rice, *No Higher Honor*; Nayak, "Prospects for US-India Counter-terrorism Cooperation," 20-24.

<sup>143</sup> Joint Statement on U.S.-India Defense Policy Group Meeting, US Department of Defense, May 23, 2002, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3355>; Joint Statement on U.S.-India Defense Policy Group, US Department of Defense, August 08, 2003, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=5584>.

<sup>144</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 28-35.

in the relationship, though the bilateral agenda of cooperation fell short of ending India's nuclear isolation.<sup>145</sup> Such cooperation was only agreed with India not Pakistan, thereby suggesting persistence of de-hyphenation policy of the Bush presidency. Besides the NSSP, the developing Indo-US cooperation in areas such as military and counterterrorism "assuaged Indian sentiments at a time when U.S. reengagement with Pakistan was at its most intense".<sup>146</sup> Notwithstanding US failure to influence Pakistan to end terrorism against India, India remained in the global coalition against terrorism.<sup>147</sup> India through its 2004 Tsunami relief efforts along with the US and others as well as the 2004 Cope India joint air force exercise demonstrated that it was a responsible and competent strategic player enhancing its identity in the eyes of the US policymakers as a future security provider and partner in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>148</sup> Pakistan was never seen in such light by the US. Clearly, the US was now seeing India as a responsible major emerging power in the Asian landscape, in contrast with Pakistan, a much smaller and much less responsible regional power.

The second Bush administration in March 2005 announced publicly, even as it decided to resume fighter aircraft sales to Pakistan, that it would help India's growth as a major power. In making its de-hyphenation policy explicit, the U.S. showed its readiness "to discuss even more fundamental issues of defence transformation with India, including transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defence".<sup>149</sup> As Blackwill pointed out, "This is an explicit repudiation by the administration of the long-standing paradigm in which India's military power was evaluated by the United States only within the India-Pakistan context. It is a recognition that the administration understands the profound military implications of viewing India as a rising and friendly great power...the entire notion of a South Asian

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>146</sup> Tellis, "The Merits of Dehyphenation," 31.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> This aspect is discussed in more detail in the third section.

<sup>149</sup> Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations, US Department of State, March 25, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/43853.htm>.

regional military balance has lost its *raison d'être*".<sup>150</sup> Later explaining this asymmetrical approach, Condoleezza Rice, then US Secretary of State pointed out that "we have de-hyphenated the relationship". According to her, the US supports India's ambition as a global player whereas its support to Pakistan was limited "to a settled neighbourhood so that it can deal with extremism inside its own borders".<sup>151</sup>

This de-hyphenation policy was again manifested in the US decision on July 18, 2005 to reverse its three decades of non-proliferation policy and engage with India on full civil nuclear energy cooperation while allowing India to remain outside the NPT and possess nuclear weapon.<sup>152</sup> As Christine C. Fair puts it, this was the "centrepiece" of the de-hyphenation policy.<sup>153</sup> Pakistan did not merit such cooperation. As Bush pointed out, "Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and different histories. So, as we proceed forward, our strategy will take in [to] effect those well-known differences".<sup>154</sup> The Bush administration made the exception for India, making the argument that India had emerged as a responsible nuclear power unlike Pakistan.<sup>155</sup> Later explaining the basis of Bush's new approach to India, R. Nicholas Burns, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said,

We believe it is in our national interest to develop a strong, forward-looking relationship with India as the political and economic focus of the global system shifts toward Asia. The Cold War, when India was the ultimate non-aligned nation and the United States the ultimate aligned nation, is long past. It is time to shift our U.S.-India relationship to a new, strategic partnership for the decades ahead.

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<sup>150</sup> Robert D. Blackwill, "The India Imperative: A Conversation with Robert D. Blackwill," *The National Interest* 80 (Summer 2005): 11.

<sup>151</sup> Condoleezza Rice, Remarks to the National Conference of Editorial Writers, Loy Henderson Auditorium, Washington, DC, April 4, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/44283.htm>.

<sup>152</sup> The civil nuclear deal is discussed in details in the next section.

<sup>153</sup> Christine C. Fair, "Addressing Fundamental Challenges," in *The Future of Pakistan*, ed. Stephen P. Cohen (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 102.

<sup>154</sup> Remarks Following Discussions with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and an Exchange with Reporters in Islamabad, Pakistan, March 4, 2006, The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65329>.

<sup>155</sup> The soft power process concerning civil nuclear cooperation is discussed comprehensively in the next section.

India is a rising global power with a rapidly growing economy...is likely to be included among the world's five largest economies. It will soon be the world's most populous nation, and it has a demographic distribution that bequeaths it a huge, skilled and youthful workforce. India's military forces will continue to be large, capable and increasingly sophisticated...remains strongly committed to the principle of civilian control. Above all else, we know what kind of country India will be decades from now. Like the United States, India will thrive as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual democracy, characterized by individual freedom, rule of law and a constitutional government that owes its power to free and fair elections.<sup>156</sup>

Evan Feigenbaum, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs in the Bush administration, notes that during his period, the Indo-Pak de-hyphenation occurred primarily because of India's "remarkable ways of economic growth" which gave India "capacity to act, not just regionally, but globally on a variety of issues that are of primary interest to the United States".<sup>157</sup> Therefore by anticipating India as a friendly responsible power as well as a rising power in hard power terms, the US reacted positively to India. This was the case of India exercising soft power rather than hard power on the basis of anticipated reaction. Similarly, Karl F. Inderfurth and Bruce Riedel who were part of the Clinton administration point out that the US became "India stuck" partly because of its economic growth, huge, young and educated population and middle class.<sup>158</sup>

Equally important was India's success as a democracy. In emphasising India's democratic success and the values shared by the two countries have served as a bridge, Daniel Twining and Richard Fontaine argue that with India's gradual engagement with the West and rising great power ambition coupled with change in US-India relations,

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<sup>156</sup> R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, "Remarks as Prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Hearing on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, Washington, DC, November 2, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/55969.htm>.

<sup>157</sup> "Media Conference Call with Evan Feigenbaum," Council on Foreign Relations, July 16, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/india/media-conference-call-ewan-feigenbaum/p19873>.

<sup>158</sup> Karl F. Inderfurth and Bruce Riedel, "Breaking New Ground with India: Build a Valuable Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership," Opportunity 08, The Brookings Institution, April 8, 2008, [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/4/08%20india%20riedel%20opp08/pb\\_india\\_riedel](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/4/08%20india%20riedel%20opp08/pb_india_riedel).

“an agenda of values-based cooperation is realistic”.<sup>159</sup> Such cooperation does not exist between the US and Pakistan which has thus attracted a different approach to India. India’s relations with Iran and Myanmar, the two countries that had been under US sanctions surfaced “genuine differences” on cooperation based on shared values.<sup>160</sup> But such cases were “exceptions”.<sup>161</sup>

India and the US in the joint statement of July 2005 pledged to promote democracy by announcing the U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative and agreed to contribute to the U.N. Democracy Fund (UNDEF).<sup>162</sup> Despite “considerable resistance within the Indian foreign policy establishment”, India joined the UNDEF and became its second largest contributor.<sup>163</sup> India was praised for its leadership role at the UNDEF, and its contribution to the development of a democratic state of Afghanistan.<sup>164</sup> As noted in Chapter 3, India has taken various initiatives to promote democracy while rejecting an interventionist approach.

The US viewed the strategic partnership with India in light of securing a stable balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, which favoured “peace through the presence of strong democratic nations enjoying friendly relations with the United States”.<sup>165</sup> According to Burns, the US saw India in the group of Japan, Britain, France, and Australia which

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<sup>159</sup> Daniel Twining and Richard Fontaine, “The Ties that Bind? U.S.-Indian Values-Based Cooperation,” *The Washington Quarterly* 34:2 (2011): 194.

<sup>160</sup> Twining and Fontaine, “The Ties that Bind?,” 196-197.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>162</sup> Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, U.S. Department of State, July 18, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49722.htm>; “U.S.-India Global Democracy Initiative,” Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, July 18, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49722.htm>.

<sup>163</sup> Mohan, “Balancing Interests and Values,” 109. For India’s contribution to the United Nations Democracy Fund, see <http://www.un.org/democracyfund/sites/dr7.un.org.democracyfund/files/Contributions-2014.pdf>.

<sup>164</sup> President George W. Bush, “President Addresses Asia Society,” Mandarin Oriental Hotel, Washington, DC, February 22, 2006, U.S. Department of State, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/61851.htm>.

<sup>165</sup> R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “The U.S. and India: The New Strategic Partnership,” Remarks to the Asia Society, New York City, October 18, 2005, U.S. Department of State, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/55269.htm>.

were democratic countries with liberal economies.<sup>166</sup> As we shall see in the next section, the Bush administration defended the nuclear deal by citing India as a democracy. A senior official of the Bush presidency pointed out that the US did not have to worry about implementation of agreements with India since it was a democracy. Again, there was no danger of political instability in India.<sup>167</sup>

Towards the end of the Bush presidency, the attack on Mumbai by Pakistan-based terrorists in November 2008 created another opportunity to enhance bilateral counterterrorism cooperation in light of India's restraint. US officials feared Indian military action.<sup>168</sup> Instead, India embarked on a "diplomatic offensive".<sup>169</sup> Through high-level communications and visits, US officials were assured of India's restraint.<sup>170</sup> India's diplomatic offensive could not have yielded much result without the technical evidence India produced before the international community with the help of US law enforcement agencies.<sup>171</sup> Pakistan remained a strategic partner of the US as the campaign against Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan continued under the Obama Administration. Before taking up the presidency, Obama mulled over deploying a special envoy to resolve the Kashmir issue which would result in Pakistan becoming a more effective partner in American war on terror. There was a danger of re-hyphenation with Pakistan. In the end, the Administration kept Kashmir publicly out of

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<sup>166</sup> R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, "Interview by Pramit Pal Chaudhury of the Hindustan Times," U.S. Department of State, October 21, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/55508.htm>.

<sup>167</sup> Interview with Douglas J. Feith, October 29, 2014.

<sup>168</sup> Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 719; Daniel S. Markey, "Mumbai: A Battle in the War for Pakistan," Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/india/mumbai-battle-war-pakistan/p17981>; Nayak, "Prospects for US-India Counter-terrorism Cooperation," 6.

<sup>169</sup> Jyoti Malhotra, "Diplomatic Offensive against Terror Attacks," December 18, 2008, <http://www.livemint.com/2008/12/17220128/Diplomatic-offensive-against-t.html>.

<sup>170</sup> Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 719-720.

<sup>171</sup> Donald Van Duyn, Chief Intelligence Officer Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs," Washington, DC, January 8, 2009, <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-role-in-mumbai-investigation>; Pranab Dhal Samanta, "How US Leaned Heavily on Pakistan," *The Indian Express*, February 13, 2009, <http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/how-us-leaned-heavily-on-pakistan/423020/>.

the mandate of Richard Holbrooke, a special envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan. The new Administration largely continued with the de-hyphenation policy.<sup>172</sup>

The Obama Administration from its very beginning made it clear that it considers India a “global partner”, invoking shared values and making reference to “natural allies”.<sup>173</sup> Obama never raised the Kashmir dispute publicly during his trip to India in 2010 amidst violent anti-India protests in Indian-administered Kashmir. The joint statement issued emphasised eliminating terrorism including that emanating from Pakistan and agreed to enhance counterterrorism cooperation. Obama also announced US support to India as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes.<sup>174</sup>

The Obama Administration provided Indian law enforcement agencies with “unprecedented” access to Pakistani-American terrorist David Headley, who had facilitated the Mumbai attack.<sup>175</sup> The US played a leading role in the declaration of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD, an avatar of the Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT) by the U.N. Security Council as a terrorist organisation after the Mumbai attacks, placed a \$10 million bounty on its leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, and listed the JuD as a “foreign terrorist organization”.<sup>176</sup> India and the US committed to “comprehensive sharing of information on the investigations and trials relating to the November 2008 Mumbai

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<sup>172</sup> See Cohen, *Shooting For a Century*, 184.

<sup>173</sup> Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Press Roundtable With South Asian Media,” Washington, DC, May 13, 2009, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2009/124386.htm>; Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “Reflections on U.S. - India Relations,” American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, June 30, 2009, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2009/125513.htm>.

<sup>174</sup> Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 08, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india>.

<sup>175</sup> “Headley Access was Unprecedented: NSA,” *The Indian Express*, November 3, 2010, <http://www.indianexpress.com/news/headley-access-was-unprecedented-nsa/706229/>.

<sup>176</sup> Stephen Tankel, “Who is Hafiz Saeed and Why the \$10 Million Bounty?,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 5, 2012, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/05/expert-q-who-is-hafiz-saeed-and-why-10-million-bounty>.

terror attack”.<sup>177</sup> India extended “unprecedented” access to the FBI during the Mumbai investigation.<sup>178</sup> The US has also helped India by sharing experiences and practices in counterterrorism.<sup>179</sup>

If India had rushed to war in 2008, the level of Indo-US counterterrorism cooperation would not have been reached where it is today as it would have hurt American counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan and raised the spectre of nuclear war in the Indian subcontinent. This would have affected its image of a responsible power. Washington and New Delhi have an overriding harmony of interests as they both face serious terrorist threats to their open societies even if they sometimes differ on specific policies and priorities.<sup>180</sup> As a responsible power, India shares and supports US interest in defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in supporting that country’s fledgling democracy.<sup>181</sup>

Cooperation on counterterrorism and homeland security has grown with the signing of the Counter Terrorism Cooperation Initiative in 2010 and the launching of the inaugural Homeland Security Dialogue in 2011.<sup>182</sup> The joint statement between Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2009 and 2010 identified greater counterterrorism collaboration as a key component of the Indo-US global strategic partnership.<sup>183</sup> The two states have committed to intelligence and information sharing and capacity building.<sup>184</sup> Indian law enforcement officials have attended training

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<sup>177</sup> U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement, U. S. Department of State, July 19, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168745.htm>.

<sup>178</sup> Nayak, “Prospects for US-India Counter-terrorism Cooperation,” 27-28; Duyn, “Statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,” January 8, 2009.

<sup>179</sup> See Nayak, “Prospects for US-India Counter-terrorism Cooperation,” 31-32.

<sup>180</sup> Bethany Danyluk, “Perceptions and Expectations of the India-U.S. Defense Relationship,” in *India's Contemporary Security Challenges*, ed. Michael Kugelman (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 125.

<sup>181</sup> Burns, “America’s Strategic Opportunity with India.”

<sup>182</sup> Kronstadt and Pinto, “India-U.S. Security Relations.”

<sup>183</sup> Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India, November 08, 2010.

<sup>184</sup> Joint Statement on the Third U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, June 13, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/192267.htm>.

courses under the State Department's Anti-terrorism Assistance Program.<sup>185</sup> The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) has trained Indian officers through the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.<sup>186</sup> The Indian and American armies have also engaged in regular counterterrorism exercises.<sup>187</sup>

From the view of value based cooperation, and their commitment to the UNDEF, India and the US have launched an Open Government Dialogue to advance democracy.<sup>188</sup> For the Obama Administration, India's successful democracy and pluralism have served as a model in South Asia and India has remained attractive amidst uneasy democratic transitions in the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>189</sup> India and the US have also launched the "Beta Version" of the Open Government Platform.<sup>190</sup>

Though multilateral initiatives such as the UNDEF may lose political utility in future, the value agenda of the two countries is to cooperate in specific circumstances to achieve commonly desired political outcomes.<sup>191</sup> The bilateral cooperation in South Asia such as democracy promotion in Nepal was "unprecedented" and the two democracies have developed shared interest in the region.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> See, for details, Kronstadt and Pinto, "India-U.S. Security Relations."

<sup>186</sup> Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation, U.S. Department of Defense, November 2011,

[http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/20111101\\_NDAA\\_Report\\_on\\_US\\_India\\_Security\\_Cooperation.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/20111101_NDAA_Report_on_US_India_Security_Cooperation.pdf).

<sup>187</sup> "India, US Start Military Exercises in Rajasthan Desert," *The Economic Times*, March 5, 2012, [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-03-05/news/31124062\\_1\\_military-exercises-mechanised-forces-rajasthan-desert](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-03-05/news/31124062_1_military-exercises-mechanised-forces-rajasthan-desert).

<sup>188</sup> Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India, November 08, 2010.

<sup>189</sup> Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, "The Obama Administration's Priorities in South and Central Asia," Houston, TX, January 19, 2011, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2011/155002.htm>; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, "Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century," India, July 20, 2011, U.S. Department of State, <http://m.state.gov/md168840.htm>.

<sup>190</sup> Robert O. Blake, Jr., "Key Developments in South Asia," Remarks at the East-West Center, April 27, 2012, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2012/189103.htm>.

<sup>191</sup> Mohan, "Balancing Interests and Values," 110.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

Obama, after initial hesitation, expressed “the need to strengthen Indian power” for “peacefully managing the rise of China in Asia”.<sup>193</sup> During his visit to India, he reiterated American support to India’s rise.<sup>194</sup> For him, US preference was to see India engaging the east.<sup>195</sup> India and the US have committed “to work together and with others in the region [East and Southeast Asia] for the evolution of an open, balanced and inclusive architecture”.<sup>196</sup> India has responded cautiously to the US rebalance strategy.<sup>197</sup> But, as Mohan Malik argues, India’s strategic partnership with the US “is emerging as an important component of India’s strategy to balance China”.<sup>198</sup> Unlike its relationship with Pakistan, the US is making a “strategic bet” on India as a future provider of security in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>199</sup> As a result the US has sought to deepen bilateral defence ties with India. As Latif argues, while the US-India relationship is based on “common values, interests, and aspirations,” the US-Pakistan relationship is based on “mutual grudging necessity, in that both parties would prefer to not deal with one another but continue to do so out of their own, largely incongruent, respective interests”.<sup>200</sup> This tells us something about the basis of dehyphenation, but there is more to it than interests alone. India also exercises the power of attraction based first on its own rising strength and second on shared values and responsible strategic behaviour, which together strengthen its bonds with the US. Pakistan has hard power (nuclear weapons), but lacks the soft power that would make it a long-term friend.

### 5.1.3. Conclusion

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<sup>193</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, “Tour de Force, or Farce?,” *The Times of India*, November 27, 2010, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/27/tour-de-force-or-farce/40po?reloadFlag=1>.

<sup>194</sup> Remarks by the President to the Joint Session of the Indian Parliament, New Delhi, India, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 08, 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india>.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>196</sup> Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India,” November 08, 2010.

<sup>197</sup> C. Raja Mohan, “India: Between ‘Strategic Autonomy’ and ‘Geopolitical Opportunity’,” *Asia Policy* 15(January 2013): 24.

<sup>198</sup> Mohan Malik, “India Balances China,” *Asian Politics and Policy* 4: 3 (2012):358-365.

<sup>199</sup> This aspect is discussed comprehensively in the final section.

<sup>200</sup> Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 36.

The US policy of dehyphenation was rooted in India's trajectory of high economic growth following the liberalisation policies India started in the early 1990s. As a result India was viewed as a rising democratic power attracting the US to begin differentiating between India and Pakistan. But it did so hesitantly and inconsistently in most of the 1990s. India had not risen enough either economically or militarily. Therefore the nuclear tests of 1998 again put them in hyphenation as challengers to the nonproliferation regime, although briefly.

But the Clinton administration was persuaded by the Singh-Talbott talks – an important aspect of soft power highlighted by Nye – to view India differently and increasingly in terms of the China threat. This was the first step toward dehyphenation. It would not have been possible had Indian soft power as a democracy and a responsible power not been reinforced by the strategic significance of its new hard power (nuclear tests), especially after 1999 Kargil conflict. Eventually, under Bush, the dehyphenation proceeded at a faster pace recognising India's greater strategic value as an Asian and global power. The momentum towards nuclear and high technology cooperation through the NSSP and subsequently civil nuclear deal reinforced the dehyphenation. A nuclear India with a successful democracy, a growing economy and on the path of military modernisation was perceived as a strategically valuable as well as a like-minded and responsible power. As the former Republican senator Richard Lugar points out, India and Pakistan were seen as different as they presented two different pictures. Whereas India was stable, democratic, “friendly” and economically progressing with business prospects, Pakistan was “complex” with dominance of military and intelligence and was “hard to deal with”.<sup>201</sup>

The nuclear tests of 1998 were a tipping point for the effectiveness of soft power. After the initial negative reaction, the US came to recognise India as a potential major power. But its soft power was also important. If India had not behaved responsibly and maintained restraint and not been a stable democracy, the US may not have signed the

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<sup>201</sup> Interview with Richard Lugar, October 28, 2014.

nuclear deal.<sup>202</sup> As note earlier, while Indo-US cooperation can be explained through the realist logic of hard power and self interest, such interests were not always narrow but broader and in sync with the provision of global public goods. It is also true that as Burns points out, “India has not always been an easy or even compatible friend to the United States.”<sup>203</sup> Therefore shared interests do not explain why the US differentiated India and Pakistan. It had also to do with shared values. Again, structural change (or end of the Cold War) would have made India and the US closer in the first decade of the 1990s, but that did not happen. India and the US “spent the 1990s feuding over proliferation”.<sup>204</sup> India post-1998 was taken seriously as a major economic and military power, but also as a responsible power sharing both values and interests. President Obama persisted with dehyphenation recognising the distinct strategic value and power of attraction of India and Pakistan. The discussion above has therefore established the relationship between higher levels of hard power and more effectiveness of soft power and thereby rejects the null hypothesis that soft power outcomes had nothing to do with the level of hard power.

## **5.2 Civil Nuclear Cooperation**

### *5.2.1 Introduction*

The US changed its three decades of treating India’s nuclear weapons as illegitimate and gave it de facto recognition as a nuclear power by agreeing to engage in full civil nuclear cooperation in 2005. It ended India’s nuclear isolation for three decades since its 1974 nuclear tests when the US imposed sanctions. In return, India did not have to renounce its nuclear weapons as required by the NPT or seriously constrain its nuclear weapons programme. “In a stroke, Washington thereby invited India to join the ranks

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<sup>202</sup> This point is emphasised more in the next section.

<sup>203</sup> Robert Boggs and Nicholas Burns, “Friends Without Benefits: Is the U.S.-Indian Relationship Built to Last?,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2015, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142486/robert-boggs%E2%80%A8-nicholas-burns/friends-without-benefits>.

<sup>204</sup> Twining, “The US Engagement of India after 1991,” 22.

of China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom -- the victors of World War II -- as a legitimate wielder of the influence that nuclear weapons confer”, wrote Ashton B. Carter.<sup>205</sup> While the US engaged India in civil nuclear energy cooperation in the mid-1950s under the “atoms for peace” program, the two democracies developed nuclear discord because of the latter’s refusal to join the NPT and for challenging the regime through its 1974 nuclear test. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the US stopped nuclear exports to India in 1980 as required by the law. Since then the US prohibited the export of “dual-use” and “high” technology to India and promoted a sense of “nuclear apartheid” in India.<sup>206</sup>

This section concerns with how India, from the perspective of relational power analysis, was able to achieve its preferred outcome of nuclear exception from the US which had to change its domestic non-proliferation laws and persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in India’s favour despite its likely negative impact on the non-proliferation regime which has successfully limited the number of recognised Nuclear Weapon States to five since its coming into force in 1970. It advances the argument that the US previously viewed India (then a weak state) as a problem for its non-proliferation agenda in spite of its democracy and its strategic restraint. In much of the 1990s, despite India’s economic take off, its soft power was still not taken seriously vis-à-vis American nonproliferation policy. This was because its hard power (as a possessor of nuclear weapons) was downplayed since it was a covert nuclear power with limited capability. Rather, American pressure on India to freeze and roll back its covert nuclear weapons programme actually increased.

After 1998, the immediate reaction was one of frustration and disappointment, but gradually, with the Singh-Talbott talks, the American strategic view of India changed. Thereafter, the Bush administration went ahead and saw India as a major strategic player (because of its hard power), but could change its nonproliferation policy toward

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<sup>205</sup> Ashton B. Carter, “America’s New Strategic Partner?,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61730/ashton-b-carter/americas-new-strategic-partner>.

<sup>206</sup> Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” *Foreign Affairs* 77:5(1998): 41-52.

India only because India had soft power in the form of democracy and responsible behaviour. Had India not had soft power, it could not have given the administration the domestic leverage to bypass the nonproliferation regime. But, notably, this soft power was meaningful only because India had hard power in the first place, which raised India's strategic value.

### *5.2.1 Explaining the Policy in Terms of Indian Power*

India, by rejecting the strategic behaviour of the Western nuclear powers during the Cold War and pursuing a "moralistic nuclear policy" coupled with restraint, failed to attract "respect" and reward.<sup>207</sup> It could not therefore ignore nuclear weapon as a "currency" of power.<sup>208</sup> As Jaswant Singh who later led India's nuclear dialogue with the United States noted, "faced as India was with a legitimisation of nuclear weapons by the haves, by a global nuclear security paradigm from which it was excluded, trends towards disequilibrium in the balance of power in Asia, and a neighbourhood of two nuclear weapon countries acting in concert, India had to protect its future by exercising its nuclear option".<sup>209</sup> For him, India had "acted in a timely fashion to correct an imbalance and fill a potentially dangerous vacuum". He gave an assurance to the effect that India intended "to contribute to a stable balance of power in Asia".<sup>210</sup> India therefore sought to project itself through this realist attitude not as a harmful, but as a responsible "nuclear weapon state".<sup>211</sup>

As Jaswant Singh summed up India's new attitude to nuclear weapon and disarmament,

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<sup>207</sup> George Perkovich, "What Makes the Indian Bomb Tick?," in *Nuclear India in the 21st Century*, eds. D. R. Sardesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), 56.

<sup>208</sup> Jaswant Singh, *Defending India* (London: Macmillan, 1999), 327.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, 333-337.

<sup>210</sup> Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," 48.

<sup>211</sup> Press Statement by Shri Jaswant Singh, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission of India, May 18, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/prmay18-pc-98.htm>; Atal Bihari Vajpayee, "We Have Shown Them That We Mean Business," *India Today*, May 25, 1998, <http://www.india-today.com/itoday/25051998/vajint.html>.

The earliest Indian forays into the question of nuclear disarmament were admittedly more moralistic than realistic. The current disharmony...is that India has moved from being totally moralistic to being a little more realistic, while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear conclusions entirely realistically...Here is the cradle of lack of understanding about the Indian stand.<sup>212</sup>

As discussed in the earlier section, the Clinton administration found India's overt nuclearisation a challenge to non-proliferation order and regional stability. The Vajpayee government invoked India's exceptional non-proliferation record and nuclear restraint while making commitments to "strengthen" its already "effective system of export controls" as "a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons".<sup>213</sup> India was trying to persuade the international community to recognise its responsible behaviour while agreeing to strengthen its export control.<sup>214</sup> It had exceptionally demonstrated restraint for over two decades after the first nuclear test in 1974. Jaswant Singh noted that India, not being a signatory to the NPT, had abided by the "key provisions" of the NPT which were embodied in Articles I, III and VI. India's record is "impeccable" with respect to Article I by not transferring "nuclear weapons to any other country or assist[ing] any other country to acquire them". With respect to Article III, "India's exports of such materials have always been under safeguards". Finally, as Singh noted, India "is the only nuclear weapon state that remains committed to commencing negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in order to bring about a nuclear-

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<sup>212</sup> Singh, "Against Nuclear Apartheid," 47.

<sup>213</sup> See, for example, Press Statement by Shri Jaswant Singh, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission of India, May 18, 1998; "SuoMotu Statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the Indian Parliament, May 27, 1998," *Foreign Affairs Records*, 1998, Ministry of External Affairs Library, Government of India, <http://mealib.nic.in/?pdf2586?000>; "Evolution of India's Nuclear Policy: Paper Laid on the Table of the Lok Sabha," May 27, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980527-goi1.htm>; Prime Minister's Statement in Rajya Sabha Regarding UN Security Council Resolution, New Delhi, June 8, 1998, <http://fas.org/news/india/1998/06/pmjun8.htm>; Address of the Prime Minister of India to the 53rd UN General Assembly, September 24, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/09/980924-unspeech.htm>; "India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race – Jaswant," *The Hindu*, November 29, 1999, access through *Factiva*; PM's Statement in Parliament on 'Bilateral Talks with United States,' December 15, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/12/981215-parl15dec.htm>.

<sup>214</sup> Government of India Press Statement, May 11, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980511-goi.htm>.

weapons-free world, the very objective envisaged in Article VI of the NPT”.<sup>215</sup> At the same time, Singh gave assurance that India would “continue to bring about stable, genuine and lasting non-proliferation, thus leading to a nuclear-weapon-free-world”.<sup>216</sup> According to him “India’s nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness. It has not violated any international agreements, either in 1974 or 1998. This restraint is a unique example. Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or hesitancy. Restraint is valid only when it removes doubts, which is precisely what India’s tests did”.<sup>217</sup>

India also invoked its past arms control and disarmament policies.<sup>218</sup> While reiterating its commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament on the basis of its past record, India, following its nuclear tests, (a) declared a policy of “no-first-use” and “non-use against non-nuclear weapons states” and concurrently proposed a bilateral or multilateral no-first-use agreement; (b) announced a moratorium on further nuclear tests and showed preference for “de jure commitment” on it; (c) declared its intention to support multilateral negotiation on a fissile material cut-off treaty; (d) showed flexibility on CTBT; (e) called for a Nuclear Weapons Convention for a world free of nuclear weapons; (f) declared it would not engage in arms racing and chose to maintain a “minimum credible deterrent”; (h) announced it would keep its nuclear forces under a civilian-led command and control system; (i) preferred to establish confidence-building measures in the region in the conventional and nuclear domains; (j) rejected the nuclear posture of launch on warning while calling for nuclear de-alerting as a mechanism against accidental or unauthorized use; (k) pledged to test the Agni missile in a “non-provocative” and “transparent” manner and “consistent with established international norms and practices”; and (l) supported regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones, including

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<sup>215</sup> SuoMotu Statement Made in the Parliament by the Minister of External Affairs on the NPT Review Conference, May 9, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/2000/eam-9may.htm>.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid.

<sup>217</sup> Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” 51.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., 44.

the existing one in Southeast Asia.<sup>219</sup> Besides the above initiatives, India engaged the Clinton administration in an extended dialogue between Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. India did not reject its normative commitment to disarmament, but it was making a statement to the effect that it was ready to support the cause of nuclear arms control.<sup>220</sup>

Behind the dialogue, the aim was to “reconcile India’s security concerns with Washington’s nonproliferation agenda”.<sup>221</sup> According to Singh, he sought in his dialogue with Talbott “an acceptance of India’s rationale behind Pokharan II”.<sup>222</sup> For Singh, “reconciliation required the United States to accept India’s nuclear weaponry as a fact of life” or to accept “India as a major power with an internationally recognized

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<sup>219</sup> See Government of India Press Statement, May 11, 1998; “Press Statement: Planned Series of Nuclear Tests Completed,” May 13, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/prmay1198.htm>; [Excerpts]Statement in the General Debate at the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau by Smt. Vasundhara Raje, Minister of State for External Affairs of India, Cartagena De Indias, May 19, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980519-goi-nam.htm>; Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” 41-52; Address of the Prime Minister of India to the 53rd UN General Assembly, September 24, 1998; “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy,” May 27, 1998; Prime Minister’s Reply to the Discussion in Lok Sabha on Nuclear Tests, May 29, 1998, <http://fas.org/news/india/1998/05/0829059801.htm>; Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in the Indian Parliament, May 27, 1998; Prime Minister’s Statement in Rajya Sabha Regarding U.N. Security Council Resolution, June 8, 1998; Press Conference by Deputy Chairman of India’s Planning Commission,” June 9, 1998, [http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/06/19980609\\_india.html](http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/06/19980609_india.html); Official Spokespersons Statement, June 10, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/06/980611-goi.htm>; Statement by Official Spokesperson, New Delhi, June 13, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/06/980613-goi.htm>; Statement of Official Spokesman, June 29, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/06/980629-goi.htm>; Jaswant Singh, “For India, Disarmament or Equal Security,” *International Herald Tribune*, August 5, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/08/980805-jaswant.htm>; Statement by Ambassador Savitri Kunadi in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, August 6, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/08/980806-prst068.htm>; PM’s Statement in Parliament on “Bilateral Talks With United States”, December 15, 1998; Opening Remarks by National Security Adviser Mr. Brajesh Mishra at the Release of Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1999/opstm-indnucl.htm>; “India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race – Jaswant”; “Global Security: An Indian Perspective,” Presentation by Brajesh Mishra, National Defence Institute, Lisbon, April 13, 2000, <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18909/Global+Security+an+Indian+Perspective++A+Presentation+At+National+Defence+Institute+Lisbon+by+Mr+Brajesh+Mishra>; and Suo Motu Statement Made in the Parliament by the Minister of External Affairs on the NPT Review Conference, May 9, 2000.

<sup>220</sup> Atal Bihari Vajpayee, “India, USA and the World: Let Us Work Together to Solve the Political-Economic Y2K Problem,” September 28, 1998.

<sup>221</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 85-86.

<sup>222</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 274.

right to bear nuclear arms”. But for Talbott, “Washington could not grant India an exception that gave it the privileges and benefits of NPT membership”.<sup>223</sup> India had decided to “find a modus vivendi with the U.S. and with the global nuclear order” through arms control measures. Therefore it had showed flexibility on issues such as CTBT and supported FMCT.<sup>224</sup> At the beginning of the dialogue, as Talbott intended, “since India had left the land of the NPT forever, my job was to try to induce Jaswant and his government to meet us halfway, somewhere in the land of the CTBT”.<sup>225</sup> Besides this reconciliation, India also aimed “to develop greater mutual understanding so that both countries are enabled to work together in tapping the real potential of a qualitatively new relationship, essential in this post-Cold War environment”.<sup>226</sup> While recognising the fact that “the full potential” of the Indo-US relationship “has not been realized in the last 50 years”, Vajpayee pointed out that “First and foremost, it is American reluctance to accept us as a responsible member of the international community”.<sup>227</sup>

As the dialogue proceeded, the US came up with five nuclear “benchmarks”, progress on which would make President Clinton’s visit to India warmer and would help in the easing of post-1998 sanctions. The first condition was India’s signature on the CTBT. The second was “Indian cooperation in negotiating a permanent ban on the production of fissile material and, in the interim, a freeze on further production”. The third was a “strategic restraint regime” which included limiting “the development of missiles and missiles technology” as well as non-deployment of missiles “close to Pakistan and also not to mount warheads on rockets or store them nearby”.<sup>228</sup> As Singh notes, through a strategic restraint regime, the US was “addressing its concern about” India’s future Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) capability.<sup>229</sup> The fourth benchmark was the establishment of “world-class” export controls. And the final one was the resolution

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<sup>223</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 86-88.

<sup>224</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>226</sup> “India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race –Jaswant.”

<sup>227</sup> Vajpayee, “India, USA and the World.”

<sup>228</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 96.

<sup>229</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 305.

of the Kashmir issue.<sup>230</sup> As Talbott notes, “the benchmarks seemed realistic and reasonable. We were not demanding that India give up its nuclear capability and join the NPT”. These, he believed were consistent with what India had publicly stated. Therefore it was up to India to act toward “accepting the benchmarks and collecting the reward in the form of sanctions relief and a rousing presidential visit in the fall”.<sup>231</sup>

For Singh, the benchmarks appeared like “conditions” of “a list of ‘dos and don’ts’” to improve relations. On the CTBT, India preferred to move “purposefully”, yet at its own speed. According to Singh, implicit in strategic restraint was “capping of India’s nuclear capabilities, a rejection, in effect, even of ‘credible minimum deterrent’”. And it was for India to decide that.<sup>232</sup> While India found the benchmarks “unacceptable”, it had to engage the US to share its “concerns” and “to accommodate such global concerns” as it could.<sup>233</sup>

After several rounds of discussion, on November 29, 1999, Singh found them “encouraging”. As he put it, “there is recognition that India shall maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent as determined by us. There is now no longer any talk of a ‘roll-back.’ The U.S. also accepts that India’s security concerns are not geographically limited”.<sup>234</sup> Earlier in an interview in January 1999 Singh said that India had succeeded in its goal of “harmonisation” as the dialogue now entailed only four issues from its earlier number of a dozen set by the P-5 and G-8.<sup>235</sup> In order to promote regional stability and emerge as a responsible power, Vajpayee’s Lahore peace initiative also saw as noted in the earlier section India signing a Memorandum of Understanding with Pakistan on confidence building measures (CBMs), including in the nuclear domain. By referring to India’s military restraint vis-à-vis Pakistan during the Kargil War in 1999, Brajesh

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<sup>230</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 97.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> Singh, *A Call to Honour*, 305-306.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, 307.

<sup>234</sup> “India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race –Jaswant.”

<sup>235</sup> Prabhu Chawla and Raj Chengappa, “‘Jaswant Singh: ‘Let’s Not Take the Worm’s Eye View,’” *India Today*, January 11, 1999, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/i-believe-this-country-cannot-be-constructed-through-demolitions-jaswant-singh/1/252818.html>.

Mishra, India's National Security Advisor, noted that such responsible behaviour from "the largest democracy in the world" would also be adopted vis-à-vis nuclear weapons.<sup>236</sup> As noted in the earlier section, Talbott recognised India's "dramatic progress on the fifth benchmark" following India's Lahore peace initiative. Singh in an interview in November 1999 rejected expectation of India's "voluntary moratorium on production of fissile materials" and made it clear about India's "readiness to engage in multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament [CD] in Geneva for a non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty to ban future production of fissile materials for nuclear weapon purposes". Regarding export controls, he referred to India's establishment of an "inter-ministerial expert group". Singh also clarified India's official stand on minimum deterrence saying that it was "premature to talk of an Indian 'triad'" after the NSAB drafted a nuclear doctrine for India. On signing the CTBT, Singh stressed that "this could not be done in a political vacuum". "A positive environment," according to him, "had to be created".<sup>237</sup> US Senate failed to ratify the CTBT on October 13, 1999 which, according to Singh, had "a bearing on the future of this treaty". As he emphasised, "I would, therefore, consider it natural for India to also disaggregate its decision".<sup>238</sup>

India's power of persuasion was working, though gradually. The Clinton administration in October 1999 removed some sanctions, and in December 1999 decided to remove 51 Indian entities from US sanction lists.<sup>239</sup> The US also waived some sanctions imposed on India on March 16, 2000.<sup>240</sup> Talbott in an interview in January 2000 after ten rounds of talk said, "We're getting better at disagreeing without being disagreeable with each

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<sup>236</sup> Opening Remarks by National Security Adviser Mr. Brajesh Mishra at the Release of Draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999.

<sup>237</sup> "India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race –Jaswant."

<sup>238</sup> Ibid.

<sup>239</sup> Presidential Determination No. 2000-04, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, October 27, 1999, <http://fas.org:8080/news/india/1999/991027-india-wh1.htm>;  
"Commerce Department will Remove 51 Indian Entities from Sanctions List," Bureau of Export Administration, U. S. Department of Commerce, December 16, 1999, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/1999/51EntitiesRemoved.htm>.

<sup>240</sup> Presidential Determination No. 2000-18, Memorandum For the Secretary of State, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 16, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/2000/000320-india-usia1.htm>.

other. We are developing the kind of mutual confidence - on a personal level...on a Government-to-Government level...needed to work constructively on sensitive and important issues, including national security, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation". He made it clear that Clinton's impending visit to India was not "conditional" on the progress on the dialogue.<sup>241</sup> According to Talbott, the US expected from India as follows after several rounds of talks:

Setting aside our preference that India not acquire nuclear weapons, will it engage in a destabilising arms race by dint of its nuclear and missile posture? Will its approach to the question of defence posture [strategic restraint] be interpreted by others as provocative and open-ended or as consistent with a common sense definition of minimum credible deterrent? What concrete steps will India take to strengthen its already effective system of export controls? There are a series of questions, which deeply concern other states that India has not yet addressed in sufficient detail. How it addresses those questions will influence the decisions others make about their own interactions with India. Our goal is a qualitatively different and better relationship with India, not a simple return to pre-test status quo.<sup>242</sup>

On India's position on minimum nuclear deterrence, the US intended that "India does not seek an open-ended arms competition, but only the minimum necessary to ensure Indian security".<sup>243</sup> Yet "crucial technology sanctions imposed after 1974 and 1998 remained in place."<sup>244</sup> The US however acknowledged India's export controls as "effective" and "better" than Russia, China and Pakistan.<sup>245</sup> The Clinton administration did not seek to roll-back India's nuclear weapons programme, but sought to obtain from New Delhi a commitment to maintain "strategic restraint" and sign the CTBT.<sup>246</sup> So despite India's argument for the requirement for maintaining minimum nuclear

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<sup>241</sup> Strobe Talbott, "We Are for a Qualitatively Better Relationship with India," *The Hindu*, January 14, 2000, <http://www.hindu.com/2000/01/14/stories/05142523.htm>.

<sup>242</sup> Talbott, "We Are for a Qualitatively Better Relationship with India."

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 21.

<sup>245</sup> Talbott, "We Are for a Qualitatively Better Relationship with India."; Talbott, *Engaging India*, 97.

<sup>246</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 96.

deterrence rooted in restraint mechanisms and defensive posture,<sup>247</sup> the US made it clear during Vajpayee's visit to the United States in September 2000 that the achievement of the full potential of the bilateral relationship was dependent on further progress on US non-proliferation agenda.<sup>248</sup> They agreed to sustain the dialogue on non-proliferation and India's "defense posture".<sup>249</sup> As Indian strategic analyst C. Raja Mohan noted, "while they recognised the problem of leaving a billion people armed with nuclear weapons in the nuclear dog house, Talbott and his colleagues were not ready to let India into the nuclear club house".<sup>250</sup> Singh had informed Talbott following Vajpayee's visit that "India was not going to sign the CTBT".<sup>251</sup>

By the end of the Clinton administration, the attraction of India's democracy was insufficient to overcome the nuclear differences between the two democracies.<sup>252</sup> India through the dialogue was however able to exercise some soft power through attraction and persuasion. First it was able to reach out to the Clinton administration to engage in a dialogue to harmonise its security objectives with the non-proliferation agenda of the US. Through the dialogue it created some legitimacy for its nuclear tests as the US began asking for strategic restraint rather than roll back. India's proposal on non-proliferation and disarmament helped reduce the broad agenda of non-proliferation set by the P-5 and the G-8. India without its stable democracy and rising hard power would not have been persuasive and attractive enough even to engage in a nuclear dialogue in the first place. The nuclear tests "did more to bring" the two countries "together than

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<sup>247</sup> Interview of External Affairs Minister Shri Jaswant Singh with *Suddesutsche Zeitung*, Germany, September 05, 2000, <http://mea.gov.in/interviews.htm?dtl/4040/Interview+of+External+Affairs+Minister+Shri+Jaswant+Singh+with+Suddesutsche+Zeitung+Germany>; Address by Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, New York, September 7, 2000, <http://asiasociety.org/address-shri-atal-bihari-vajpayee>.

<sup>248</sup> State Department Foreign Press Center Background Briefing, "State Visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee," September 13, 2000, <http://www.fas.org/news/india/2000/india-000913.htm>.

<sup>249</sup> Joint Statement, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 15, 2000, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/09/2000-09-15-joint-statement-on-us-and-india.html>.

<sup>250</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 21.

<sup>251</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 208.

<sup>252</sup> "U.S.-India Relations: A Vision for the 21st Century," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 21, 2000, <http://clinton6.nara.gov/2000/03/2000-03-21-joint-us-and-india-statement.html>.

anything else”.<sup>253</sup> As a result of the tests, as Talbott concluded, the Indians hoped that the US would “pay them serious, sustained and respectful attention of a kind the Indians felt they had never received before”.<sup>254</sup>

As noted in the earlier section, the Bush administration had a new geopolitical approach to India attracted by its great power potential and the shared value of democracy. India was also willing to play a larger geopolitical role beyond South Asia. The Bush administration first mentioned about nuclear energy cooperation on November 10, 2001 under the agreed dialogue “that would focus on missile defence, stimulating high technology commerce, deepening civilian space cooperation and renewal of exchange on civilian nuclear energy, especially safety”.<sup>255</sup> This followed India’s “unprecedented and enthusiastic endorsement” of American missile defence.<sup>256</sup> Behind this support, there was hope that the US might reverse its “technology denial policies”, gradually accept India’s imperative for nuclear weapons, and give “a strategic dimension” to the relationship.<sup>257</sup> Foremost among Indian considerations was the “opportunity to become part of a new international nuclear order”.<sup>258</sup> In the beginning, the Bush administration, according to Talbott, “adopted a posture toward India that was not, in its essence, much different than its predecessor’s”.<sup>259</sup> Secretary of State–nominee Colin Powell in his Senate confirmation hearing said that “We have to do what we can to constrain their [Indian] nuclear program at this time”.<sup>260</sup> The US *National Security Strategy* in September 2002 also recognised “differences” regarding

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<sup>253</sup> General Joseph Ralston as quoted in Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States since 1947* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 183.

<sup>254</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 5.

<sup>255</sup> PM’S Press Statement on his Three-Nation Tour, November 13, 2001, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreng/lyr2001/rnov2001/13112001/r131120017.html>. See also Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 13.

<sup>256</sup> “New Delhi: Searching for an ‘Alliance of Interests’ with Washington,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 15, 2001, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2001/05/15/new-delhi-searching-for-alliance-of-interests-with-washington/3sjs>.

<sup>257</sup> Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties,” 132.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>259</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 210.

<sup>260</sup> “Nomination of Colin L. Powell to be Secretary of State,” January 17, 2001.

“the development of India’s nuclear and missile programs”.<sup>261</sup> Talbott argues that some senior administration officials including Powell, “pressed for what were essentially the Clinton administration’s four nonproliferation benchmarks: no more nuclear testing, a halt in the production of fissile material, strategic restraint, and stricter export controls”.<sup>262</sup> Waiving sanctions on September 22, 2001, the Bush administration made it clear that it “does not reflect a diminution of our concerns over nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia”.<sup>263</sup> According to Ambassador Blackwill, “While the intellectual basis for transforming the U.S.-Indian relationship was firmly in place in the first term, the implementation was sometimes halting because of constant bureaucratic combat”. It was between the non-proliferation “ayatollas” and the “hyphenator”. To Blackwill, “These nagging nannies were alive and well in that State Department labyrinth”.<sup>264</sup>

Following the talks in November between Bush and Vajpayee, Brajesh Mishra engaged Condoleeza Rice, his US counterpart in a discussion that is called the “Rice Mishra process” on high technology trade, civilian space and civilian nuclear cooperation.<sup>265</sup> This resulted in establishing the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in November 2002 to promote bilateral high-technology commerce.<sup>266</sup> In a supporting letter to President Bush, Senator Biden earlier noted that “India’s voluntary decision to moratorium on further testing and “positive record on export controls and chemical and biological weapons” give a “positive foundation for our talks on security and nonproliferation”.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September, 2002.

<sup>262</sup> Talbott, *Engaging India*, 212.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid.

<sup>264</sup> Blackwill, “The India Imperative,” 10.

<sup>265</sup> See Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 22.

<sup>266</sup> U.S.-India Joint Statement on High Technology Commerce, November 13, 2002, [https://www.indianembassy.org/archives\\_details.php?nid=420](https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=420).

<sup>267</sup> Letter from Senator Biden to President Bush, August 24, 2001, <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/congress1/biden/biden2.htm>.

Mishra in May 2003 while emphasising India's "responsible" non-proliferation policies argued that Indo-US bilateral cooperation on "trinity" issues -- high-technology trade, civilian nuclear cooperation and civilian space cooperation -- would take the relationship to a "qualitatively new level of partnership". He also emphasised that India "would put all nuclear power projects of foreign collaboration under safeguards".<sup>268</sup> In July 2002, he seems to have raised the issue of civil nuclear cooperation with Secretary Powell and expressed India's interest, in return, to put a number of India's power reactors under international safeguards". But Power was demurred.<sup>269</sup> In February 2003, India and the US signed a Statement of Principles for U.S.-India High-Technology Commerce to guide the work of HTCG while pledging to strengthen export controls and address non-proliferation concerns.<sup>270</sup> Colin Powell in September 2003 linked India's demand on trinity issues to US non-proliferation redlines and explained the whole negotiation progress as part of a "glide path", a means to bring an end to this discussion.<sup>271</sup> The Bush administration had by now recognised that India would not give up its nuclear weapons in a neighbourhood of two unfriendly nuclear powers, Pakistan and China, who were also seen by it with suspicion. Second, India as a nuclear power, rather than being a threat, could be beneficial to American "strategic objectives in Asia and beyond". Third, India with a tighter export control regime was beneficial to US interests rather than being a proliferation risk. On these grounds, the Bush Administration first signed the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP).<sup>272</sup> The 2005 nuclear deal was the culmination of the NSSP.

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<sup>268</sup> "India United States and the New World Order: Prospects for Cooperation," Speech by Shri Brajesh Mishra, National Security Adviser of India, Council of Foreign Relations, New York May 07, 2003, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article/the-firm-broom-of-cold-logic-/220069>.

<sup>269</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 23.

<sup>270</sup> Statement of Principles for U.S.-India High Technology Commerce, February 5, 2003, <http://www.bis.doc.gov/internationalprograms/statementprinciplesindia.htm>.

<sup>271</sup> Sridhar Krishnaswami, "U.S., India Close to Agreement on 'Trinity'", *The Hindu*, October 06, 2003, <http://www.thehindu.com/2003/10/06/stories/2003100605071100.htm>.

<sup>272</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, *India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2005/07/14/india-as-new-global-power-action-agenda-for-united-states>.

Following the visits of Steve Hadley, Deputy national Security Adviser and Kenneth I. Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce to New Delhi in September 2003 and discussion on nuclear and high technology cooperation, President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee, in a joint statement issued separately on January 12, 2004 announced the NSSP.<sup>273</sup> The NSSP marked a departure from US policy that had long treated India's nuclear programme as a "troublesome obstacle" to its non-proliferation agenda.<sup>274</sup> While agreeing to increase cooperation in areas of civilian nuclear energy, civilian space programmes, high-technology trade, and missile defence, the US asked India to bring its export controls to international standards. NSSP noted that the bilateral relationship was based on common values and interests and characterised both as partners in nonproliferation.<sup>275</sup> By accepting a non-proliferation commitment under NSSP and welcoming Bush's seven proposals related to controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), India in effect was conforming to its responsible nuclear policies and thereby behaved as a partner of the US in preventing WMD proliferation. These seven proposals on non-proliferation became the basis of the July 18 agreement on full civil nuclear cooperation agreement between India and the United States.<sup>276</sup>

The new Manmohan Singh government that came to power in May 2004 moved forward on the NSSP. The following negotiations led to the announcement of the end of "Phase One" of the NSSP in September 2004. While India signed a bilateral End Use Verification Arrangement (EUVA) in September 2004, the US removed the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) Headquarters from the Department of Commerce Entity List and modified its export licensing policies for fostering cooperation in commercial space programs and permitting "certain exports to power plants at

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<sup>273</sup> Statement on the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India, Statement by the President, January 12, 2004, U.S. Department of State Archive, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/pr/28109.htm>.

<sup>274</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, "Lost Tango in Washington," *The Indian Express*, November 15, 2004, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2004/11/15/lost-tango-in-washington/3wji>.

<sup>275</sup> Statement on the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership with India, 12, 2004.

<sup>276</sup> See, for details, C. Raja Mohan, "India's Nuclear Exceptionalism," in *Nuclear Proliferation and International Security*, eds. Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard (London: Routledge, 2007), 161-165.

safeguarded nuclear facilities”.<sup>277</sup> Despite gains for both, NSSP, according to Ashley Tellis, “remained a precarious breakthrough from the viewpoint of radically transforming U.S.-Indian relations”. Moreover, “NSSP itself reflected a degree of strategic hesitancy that is not surprising given the heated interagency debates that preceded its unveiling: In each of the four issue areas under its purview, the liberalization contemplated by the Bush administration extended only to policy change and not to amendments of domestic law or alterations in existing U.S. commitments to various international regimes”. As Tellis notes, the administration was concerned about its global nonproliferation agenda after accommodating India. Moreover, NSSP could not “provide a definitive answer” as to “Is the prospective increase in Indian power beneficial or dangerous to the United States and its global interests?” The uncertainty was rooted in “fears that New Delhi was seeking to improve relations with Washington while simultaneously trying to avoid becoming locked in its embrace”.<sup>278</sup> As he reminds us, “It is important to note that during discussions leading up to the NSSP, some entities within the inter-agency debate in Washington were willing to consider pursuing changes to US law and international regime commitments in order to accommodate India. This effort ran out of steam when New Delhi chose, for its own reasons, not to send Indian troops to assist American stabilisation efforts in Iraq”. However, he emphasised that NSSP embodied “revolutionary possibilities” for bilateral relationship.<sup>279</sup> The Bush administration unveiled civil nuclear cooperation within a year and India’s soft power of attraction, as we shall see below, had a lot to do with this.

Condoleezza Rice, the new Secretary of State visited India in March 2005 to quicken the NSSP process towards a “broader strategic relationship”, the outline of which was

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<sup>277</sup> United States - India Joint Statement on Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, Washington, DC, September 17, 2004, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/36290.htm>.

<sup>278</sup> Tellis, *India as a New Global Power*.

<sup>279</sup> Tellis, “Lost Tango in Washington.”

discussed during her trip.<sup>280</sup> As was revealed in a statement by US administration officials, it aimed at helping India to “become a major world power”. The three-track dialogue discussed during this trip included energy dialogue featuring “civil, nuclear and nuclear safety issues”. While maintaining a shared interest with India on preventing WMD proliferation, the US expected India to join the PSI.<sup>281</sup> India had thwarted WMD proliferation from North Korea on its own and showed initial willingness to join PSI.<sup>282</sup> India-US defence cooperation reached a new level with the cooperative relief efforts launched in response to the 2004 Tsunami and signing of the framework agreement on defence cooperation.<sup>283</sup> India later in May passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act in order to make its export control system “more contemporary”.<sup>284</sup> Following Rice’s visit, Saran and Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns engaged in discussions on the terms of the nuclear deal between April and July 2005. Prime Minister Singh’s visit in July 2005 coincided with the completion of the NSSP and agreement on full civil nuclear energy cooperation.<sup>285</sup>

The Manmohan Singh government had to overcome the “dissent” from the Department of Atomic energy (DAE) and the “Cold War ideologues” in the foreign policy establishment before the July 18 agreement that offered the outline of the civil-nuclear

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<sup>280</sup> Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Remarks with Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, Hyderabad House, New Delhi, March 16, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43490.htm>; Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations, March 25, 2005.

<sup>281</sup> Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations, March 25, 2005.

<sup>282</sup> See A. Vinod Kumar, “India’s Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative: Issues in Perspective,” *Strategic Analysis* 33:5(2009): 686-700; James R. Holmes, “India and the Proliferation Security Initiative: A US Perspective,” *Strategic Analysis* 31:2 (2007): 315-337.

<sup>283</sup> The next section has a detail discussion on this issue.

<sup>284</sup> Communication from the Resident Representative of India to the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding India’s Nuclear Export Policies and Practices, INFCIRC/647, International Atomic Energy Agency, June 29, 2005, <http://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/communication-resident-representative-india-international-atomic>.

<sup>285</sup> Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, July 18, 2005, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html>.

deal. They argued that such a partnership would end India's "strategic autonomy".<sup>286</sup> The Bush administration acknowledged India's nuclear status "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology," and thus agreed to work for India acquiring "the same benefits and advantages as other such states".<sup>287</sup> For full civilian nuclear cooperation, Bush committed to secure Congressional approval to change domestic laws, and change international rules in order to engage in full civil nuclear energy commerce with India. India at the same time pledged to take a range of actions including (a) separation of nuclear and civilian programmes and keeping the latter under IAEA safeguards; (b) signing additional protocol on civilian nuclear facilities; (c) maintaining a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing; (d) working with the US for a multilateral FMCT; (e) non-proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to have-nots; (f) supporting international efforts to limit the spread of WMD; (g) bringing legislation on comprehensive export control; and (h) harmonising and adhering to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines to secure nuclear materials and technology.<sup>288</sup> Speaking before the joint session of the US Congress, Prime Minister Singh invoked India's "impeccable" non-proliferation record and pledged to behave responsibly in future.<sup>289</sup>

President Bush during his visit to India in March 2006 resolved the remaining details of the nuclear deal.<sup>290</sup> The most crucial part of the discussions was on the separation of India's military and civilian nuclear reactors, which involved negotiations between August 2005 and February 2006. The negotiation on separation was not an easy process as the US initially demanded that four (contrary to India's insistence on eight) nuclear reactors, including two fast breeder research reactors, be listed under the military

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<sup>286</sup> Sanjay Baru, *The Accidental Prime Minister: The Making and Unmaking of Manmohan Singh* (Gurgaon, India: Penguin Books, 2014), 205-206.

<sup>287</sup> Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, July 18, 2005.

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>289</sup> PM's Address to Joint Session of the US Congress, 19 July 2005, [http://www.indianembassy.org/India\\_Review/2005/August2005.pdf](http://www.indianembassy.org/India_Review/2005/August2005.pdf).

<sup>290</sup> U.S.-India Joint Statement, The White House, March 2, 2006, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-5.html>.

programme out of a total of 22. President Bush never intended “to hurt India’s strategic capability”. But the US negotiating team did not accede until Bush’s arrival in India and remarked to M. K. Narayanan, then National Security Adviser, that “I want that deal”. The March 2006 joint statement accepted India’s demand, setting the stage for the remaining parts of the deal to be steered through the US Congress.<sup>291</sup>

The Bush administration negotiated the nuclear deal with India “without Congressional input”.<sup>292</sup> Following India’s separation plan, the Bush administration submitted a bill to Congress for civil nuclear cooperation with India by exempting it from Sections 123 (a), 128, and 129 of the Atomic Energy Act.<sup>293</sup> However, the bill was premised on “one-step Congressional approval process” inviting opposition which led to “a compromise two- step process” as suggested by Tom Lantos, ranking member of the House International relations Committee.<sup>294</sup> Without acting on the bill submitted by the administration, the House International Relations Committee (HIRC) and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) prepared their own bills “with more non-proliferation provisions”. Passed by these committees, the House and the Senate passed their respective bills on 26 July and 16 November. A conference bill (Hyde Act) combining the two was passed by the Congress on 8 and 9 December.<sup>295</sup> The process was not very easy, although the final passage of the Hyde Act received bipartisan support.

Congressmen from the beginning expressed their concern over “lack of consultation with the Congress” and on India’s separation plan. Some Congressmen raised their non-proliferation concerns.<sup>296</sup> As Dinshaw Mistry notes, “while opponents raised significant non-proliferation concerns, supporters highlighted the strategic desirability

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<sup>291</sup> Baru, *The Accidental Prime Minister*, 212-218.

<sup>292</sup> Rubinoff, “From Indifference to Engagement,” 208-209.

<sup>293</sup> Dinshaw Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 95.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, 96-97.

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid.*, 94.

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*, 109-110.

of the nuclear agreement”.<sup>297</sup> The non-proliferation groups included the Arms Control Association, the Stimson Center, experts from the Carnegie Endowment, the Institute for Science and International Security, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, the Federation of American Scientists and the International Panel on Fissile Materials. According Mistry, they “increased Congressional awareness of not just the main nuclear-related issues but also the issue of Iran, which resonated with both Democrats and Republicans”.<sup>298</sup>

Despite the argument by the non-proliferation community in the United States and the opposition political parties in India that the deal was unbalanced, as one Indian analyst argues, it was “a reasonable compromise that involved substantive restraints on India, in return for attractive rewards”.<sup>299</sup> Most importantly, India decided to place its civilian reactors under international safeguards. The Bush administration including President Bush engaged Congressmen to pass the legislation for civil nuclear cooperation with India.<sup>300</sup> At various stages, senior administration officials would engage the House and Senate to raise their concerns with the bills.<sup>301</sup> Secretary Rice argued that it was unwise on the part of the US to ask India for “a unilateral freeze or cap on its nuclear arsenal”, because India’s nuclear arms control cannot ignore “regional realities” i.e., the nuclear policies of China and Pakistan. Second, it was in US security and non-proliferation interest in getting India to “adopt global nonproliferation practices”.<sup>302</sup> The Bush administration also dismissed the argument that the nuclear deal would encourage an arms race in South Asia and cited the positive development in bilateral relations between India and Pakistan through the “Composite Dialogue”.<sup>303</sup> As a matter of fact, as C. Raja Mohan noted, “since 2004 more has happened between India and Pakistan

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<sup>297</sup> Ibid., 109-111.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid., 111-112.

<sup>299</sup> Mohan, “India’s Nuclear Exceptionalism,” 167.

<sup>300</sup> See Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement*, 115-116.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid., 117.

<sup>302</sup> United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and U.S.: Additional Protocol Implementation Act, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S Government Printing Office, July 20, 2006, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt288/html/CRPT-109srpt288.htm>.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

on Kashmir, on nuclear and military CBMs and in the field of economic cooperation, than in the many previous decades. Curiously, the nuclearization of the subcontinent in 1998 has had much to do with this positive development”.<sup>304</sup> The Bush administration had to overcome the non-proliferation lobby against the nuclear exception for India. And Prime Minister Singh had to overcome challenges from his own party and the Left Front before signing the 123 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation, risking even his government’s survival.<sup>305</sup> As Sanjay Baru, who served as the media adviser to Prime Minister Singh notes, “all these processes were long drawn-out and full of controversy. Naysayers on both sides tried their best, at every stage, to sabotage the deal.”<sup>306</sup> In defence of the “India exception”, the Bush administration referred to India’s past “responsible behaviour” on non-proliferation, and its commitments, including voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and engagement with the US on FMCT and new steps, such as separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities and to their being placed under International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) safeguards, which would bring it into the “non-proliferation mainstream”.<sup>307</sup> India’s responsible behaviour stood in contrast to that of Iran and North Korea and also Pakistan, “the home of the nuclear proliferation entrepreneur A. Q. Khan”.<sup>308</sup> India’s vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) against Iran’s noncompliance with its nuclear obligations was seen as “India’s coming of age as a responsible state in the global non-proliferation mainstream”. In Congressional testimony, Robert J. Einhorn, who dealt with India after its nuclear tests as Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation during the Clinton administration, recognised that “India, to its credit, has been moving into the nonproliferation “mainstream” for quite some time – in such areas as export controls, physical protection of nuclear materials, and interdictions of WMD-related

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<sup>304</sup> Mohan, “India’s Nuclear Exceptionalism,” 170.

<sup>305</sup> See Baru, *The Accidental Prime Minister*, Chapters 11 and 12. See also Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement*, Chapter 7.

<sup>306</sup> Baru, *The Accidental Prime Minister*, 219.

<sup>307</sup> Statement by Burns and Josephs at the House International Relations Committee Hearing on “The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente?,” September 8, 2005, U.S. House of Representatives Committee Hearings, [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa23323.000/hfa23323\\_of.htm](http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa23323.000/hfa23323_of.htm).

<sup>308</sup> Ibid. Condoleezza Rice, “Our Opportunity with India,” *The Washington Post*, March 13, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/12/AR2006031200978.html>; Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor*, 437.

shipments”. He also argued that India “is working hard to strengthen its controls – and it will continue to do so because it is a responsible country that recognizes that nonproliferation controls are in its own self interest”.<sup>309</sup>

Mistry argues that “stronger provisions on these issues [non-proliferation and Iran] were eventually removed from the Hyde Act because Congress conceded ground to the advocacy coalition”.<sup>310</sup> The so called “India lobby” that included the Coalition for Partnership with India comprising U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) and American business, Indian-American groups and strategic affairs experts highlighted strategic, economic and environmental gains of the nuclear deal to the members of Congress in close cooperation with the Bush administration. The American business also lobbied independently arguing for its economic benefits. Similarly the Indian-Americans independently lobbied for the nuclear deal by meeting Congressmen.<sup>311</sup> Several experts and former policymakers endorsed the nuclear deal.<sup>312</sup> In a letter to Congress to approve the nuclear deal, twenty-seven American experts and former officials invoked India’s non-proliferation record, its supportive nonproliferation posture in the case of Iranian case in the IAEA, and cited “shared democratic value”.<sup>313</sup> Indian Embassy and its lobbying firms, Barbour, Griffith, and Rogers (BGR) and Venable also sought to influence the Congress.<sup>314</sup> Except the *New York Times*, all the major dailies were in favour of the deal.<sup>315</sup> Indian officials also engaged Congressional leaders.<sup>316</sup>

Even though the Bush administration sought to address Indian concerns with the Hyde Act, they remained in place in relation to fuel supply assurances and restriction on

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<sup>309</sup> Statement by Robert J. Einhorn before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 26, 2006, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/EinhornTestimony060426.pdf>.

<sup>310</sup> Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement*, 112.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*, 112-113.

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>313</sup> Open Letter to Congress: Congress Should Enact Enabling Legislation Authorizing the Sharing of Civilian Nuclear Technology with India, [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp109&sid=cp109KDIRM&refer=&r\\_n=sr288.109&item=&&&sel=TOC\\_724948&](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp109&sid=cp109KDIRM&refer=&r_n=sr288.109&item=&&&sel=TOC_724948&).

<sup>314</sup> Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement*, 113-114.

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*, 123-124.

enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology. However it allowed civil nuclear cooperation with India.<sup>317</sup> The 123 Agreement was negotiated in 2007 “with relatively low-to-moderate non-proliferation provisions overall” in relation to issues including “terminating cooperation”, “the right to return”, fuel supply assurances”, “reprocessing consent”, “ENR technology” and “International versus domestic law”.<sup>318</sup> It is argued that US business played an important role in influencing US government on Section 123 agreement with India.<sup>319</sup> Between 2007 and 2008, India negotiated safeguard agreement with the IAEA as required by the nuclear deal and persuaded the NSG after eight meetings between 2005 and 2008 to give it waiver with “moderate non-proliferation provisions”.<sup>320</sup> John C. Rood, then Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security noted that India’s non-proliferation initiative and commitments offered “a foundation upon which we have continued to build over the past three years with the completion of India’s Separation Plan, the 123 Agreement, the India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and, most recently, the Nuclear Suppliers Group decision to allow civilian nuclear trade with India”.<sup>321</sup> With the Congressional approval, the 123 Agreement was operationalised to start civil nuclear trade in October 2008. It is argued that the Bush administration succeeded in persuading the Congress with “relatively moderate non-proliferation provisions” because it “extensively” engaged the Congress and was reinforced by India lobby and India’s own “diplomatic, commercial and export control initiatives”.<sup>322</sup> The US addressed Indian concerns over the Congressional legislation by issuing a signing statement to the effect that “the legislation makes no changes to the terms of the 123 agreement”.<sup>323</sup> On October 8,

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<sup>317</sup> Ibid., 124.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid., 129-138.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., 142.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid., Chapter 8.

<sup>321</sup> Statement of John C. Rood, Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Hearing on “The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative”, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 18, 2008, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/RoodTestimony080918p1.pdf>.

<sup>322</sup> Mistry, *The US-India Nuclear Agreement*, Chapter 9.

<sup>323</sup> “Bush Signs India-U.S. Nuclear Bill into Law,” *The Hindu*, October 10, 2008, <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/bush-signs-indiaus-nuclear-bill-into-law/article1354051.ece>.

President Bush signed the legislation and the two countries signed the nuclear cooperation agreement.

India's signing of the additional protocol with the IAEA in 2009, condemnation of North Korean nuclear tests, and complete destruction of its stockpile of chemical weapons were welcomed by the Obama Administration as a signal of a budding partnership on non-proliferation.<sup>324</sup> The US has extended fuel reprocessing rights to India to operationalise civil nuclear commerce.<sup>325</sup> Since 2010, the US has backed India's full membership in all multilateral export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.<sup>326</sup>

Apart from frequent reference to India's responsible behaviour, democracy was also cited in relation to the nuclear exception for India carved out by the Bush administration.<sup>327</sup> As Burns noted, "by reaching out to India, we have made the bet that the planet's future lies in pluralism, democracy, and market economics rather than in intolerance, despotism, and state planning".<sup>328</sup> While signing the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act (H.R. 7081) to implement the civil nuclear deal and President Bush noted that "nations that follow the path of democracy and responsible behaviour will find a friend in the United States of America".<sup>329</sup> Rice, following her visit to India in mid-March 2005 to accelerate the

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<sup>324</sup> Robert O. Blake, "Reflections on U.S. - India Relations," American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, June 30, 2009, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2009/125513.htm>.

<sup>325</sup> Rama Lakshmi and Steven Mufson, "U.S., India Reach Agreement on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/29/AR2010032901744.html>.

<sup>326</sup> Joint Statement: Fourth U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, Washington, DC, June 24, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/211084.htm>.

<sup>327</sup> Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, April 5, 2006, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt288/html/CRPT-109srpt288.htm>.

<sup>328</sup> R. Nicholas Burns, "America's Strategic Opportunity with India," *Foreign Affairs*, October 18, 2007, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/93728.htm>.

<sup>329</sup> President Bush Signs H.R. 7081, "The United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, October 8, 2008, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081008-4.html>.

process towards the civil nuclear cooperation and strategic partnership had the following to say about India: “It’s a great multiethnic democracy. I think it’s a natural friend for the United States. The Indians are emerging from a philosophy of heavy statist involvement in the economy”. So there was similarity of values. Moreover, she said that “And because our view is that democracies tend to be stabilizing in their activities and behaviors, obviously it’s a good thing that India is a democracy”.<sup>330</sup> She was obviously linking India’s behaviour to the “democratic peace” hypothesis, which is that advanced democracies do not fight each other. Gallup finds that American public opinion sees India as being same in the group as Canada, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, and Japan – all are democracies and U.S. allies.<sup>331</sup> Since Clinton’s visit, India and the US have “increasingly defined their strikingly congruent interests in ways that reflect their identities as democracies”.<sup>332</sup> As Francine R. Frankel concludes, “a coalition of democracies—the United States, India, South Korea and Japan—is solidifying to balance the expansive ambitions of China in Asia”.<sup>333</sup> According to Ashley Tellis, India as a democracy made the goal of strategic partnership “simultaneously attractive and imperative” for the Bush administration.<sup>334</sup>

It is not convincing to argue that the nuclear deal would have been possible in the absence of the rise of India’s hard power resources and the resulting Indian geopolitical “normalcy”.<sup>335</sup> As Richard Falk observes, it was “not enough” for India to be the largest democracy in the world with a billion people and “the center of a world Hindu civilization”. But in view of India’s possession of nuclear weapons, it was impossible

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<sup>330</sup> Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Interview with Al Hunt, Janine Zacharia and Matt Winkler of Bloomberg News,” Washington, DC, May 26, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/46826.htm>.

<sup>331</sup> Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/home.aspx?ref=b>. Similarly, Indian public views the US more favourably. See Pew Opinion Polls since 2006 at Pew Research Centre, [www.pewresearch.org](http://www.pewresearch.org).

<sup>332</sup> Michael J. Green and Daniel Twining, “Democracy and American Grand Strategy in Asia: The Realist Principles Behind an Enduring Idealism,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30:1 (2008): 8.

<sup>333</sup> Francine R. Frankel, “The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean,” *Journal of International Affairs* 64: 2 (2011): 14.

<sup>334</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, “Ebb and Tide: Has the US-Indian Strategic Partnership Bombed?,” *Force*, December 2011, [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/us\\_india2011.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/us_india2011.pdf).

<sup>335</sup> Richard Falk, “India’s Nuclearism and the New Shape of World Order,” The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, <http://www.oldsite.transnational.org/SAJT/forum/meet/2000/falk-India.html>.

to “think of the future of Asian security without including India as an indispensable player”.<sup>336</sup> Therefore economically weak India with nuclear ambiguity would not have attracted the US beyond South Asia for a nuclear exception.

Rice, in her defence of the nuclear deal, argued that the nuclear deal would expand the US-India strategic partnership.<sup>337</sup> According to Aston B. Carter, “A nuclear-recognition quid for a strategic-partnership quo” was “a reasonable framework for an India Deal”.<sup>338</sup> The US recognition of India as a nuclear power would only increase its capability and willingness to be an effective, beneficial, and productive strategic partner.<sup>339</sup> As a strategic partner, India could be more aligned with American interests such as preventing WMD proliferation, fighting terrorism, securing sea lanes for commerce, promoting democracy and preserving a stable balance of power in Asia.<sup>340</sup> So far, in conceiving India as a strategic partner in the long term, the results of this bet have been a “mix”.<sup>341</sup> But the point is that India’s power of attraction was also rooted in the image of emerging India as a responsible power in relation to the above goals of collective goods. Shared strategic interests as the basis of nuclear cooperation between the two countries fits well with realist analysis, but interests alone are not enough. They go much further when they are accompanied by shared values.

Blackwill argues that “the Bush Administration would not have negotiated the Civil Nuclear Agreement and the Congress would not have approved it” without the “China factor at the fore”.<sup>342</sup> According to Nicholas Burns, balancing China’s power “has been

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<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and U.S.: Additional Protocol Implementation Act, July 20, 2006.

<sup>338</sup> Prepared Statement of Hon. Ashton B. Carter, Codirector, Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, The Library of Congress, [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&item=&&sid=cp109YK8s0&&refer=&&r\\_n=sr288.109&&dbname=cp109&&sid=cp109YK8s0&&sel=TOC\\_850001&&sid=cp109YK8s0&r\\_n=sr288.109&dbname=cp109&](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&item=&&sid=cp109YK8s0&&refer=&&r_n=sr288.109&&dbname=cp109&&sid=cp109YK8s0&&sel=TOC_850001&&sid=cp109YK8s0&r_n=sr288.109&dbname=cp109&).

<sup>339</sup> Interview with Peter Lavoy, October 27, 2014.

<sup>340</sup> U.S.-India Joint Statement, March 2, 2006. See also Tellis, *India as a New Global Power*.

<sup>341</sup> Interview with Peter Lavoy, October 27, 2014.

<sup>342</sup> “Transcript: Senior Ex-US Diplomat on India-US Relations,” *Financial Times*, May 6, 2009, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1ec735fe-3a12-11de-8a2d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz35ExauiFS>.

a big idea in American foreign policy for over a decade” by aligning US “interests with a rapidly rising and democratic India”.<sup>343</sup> He points out that “in many ways, China is at the center of the new strategic cooperation between the United States and India”.<sup>344</sup> The US “stopped playing nagging nanny regarding India’s nuclear weapons program”, and announced it would assist India to become a major world power.<sup>345</sup> The argument was made by Blackwill that the US should not “check India’s missile capability in ways that could lead to China’s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India”.<sup>346</sup> The strategic partnership through the nuclear deal with India would enhance its ability to balance China’s power.<sup>347</sup> But the bottom line, according to Blackwill, was that the transformation of the relationship was based “on the core strategic principle of democratic India as a key factor in balancing the rise of Chinese power”.<sup>348</sup>

Some see “errors” in seeing India as a balancer to China in light of the uncertainty in India’s ability as well as willingness.<sup>349</sup> The US has however been “facilitating India’s rise” since the Bush administration.<sup>350</sup> US strategy is not based on containment, at least not of the kind that it had practised during the Cold War. As Walter Russell Mead argues, the US does not seek to make India an ally against China, but prefers to see it grow as a global power and “involve itself more in Asian affairs” which can make a “U.S.-China clash much less likely”.<sup>351</sup> In defence of the civil nuclear cooperation

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<sup>343</sup> Nicholas Burns, “The Promise of India,” *Boston Globe*, January 17, 2013, [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22666/promise\\_of\\_india.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22666/promise_of_india.html).

<sup>344</sup> Boggs and Burns, “Friends Without Benefits.”

<sup>345</sup> Robert D. Blackwill, “A New Deal for New Delhi,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 21, 2005, [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1403/new\\_deal\\_for\\_new\\_delhi.html](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1403/new_deal_for_new_delhi.html); Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations, March 25, 2005.

<sup>346</sup> Blackwill, “A New Deal for New Delhi.”

<sup>347</sup> George Perkovich, “Faulty Promises: The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2005, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf>.

<sup>348</sup> “Transcript: Senior ex-US diplomat on India-US relations.”

<sup>349</sup> See, for example, Perkovich, “Faulty Promises.”

<sup>350</sup> Daniel Twining, “America’s Grand Design in Asia,” *The Washington Quarterly* 30:3(2007):82-83.

<sup>351</sup> Walter Russell Mead, “Nobody Shares Pakistan’s Vision for Afghanistan,” Interview with Nirupama Subramanian, Arvind Sivaramakrishnan and Raghuvir Srinivasan, *The Hindu*, August 24, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/nobody-shares-pakistans-vision-for-afghanistan/article3813090.ece>. See also Robert D. Kaplan and Stephen S. Kaplan, “America Primed,” *The National Interest*, March-April, 2011, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/america-primed-4892>.

agreement, the senior officials of the Bush Administration expected India to support “a peaceful balance of power in Asia”.<sup>352</sup> Twenty seven American experts, some of whom had earlier served in US government, also supported the nuclear deal, citing among other reasons India’s supporting role in the Asian balance of power.<sup>353</sup> The common thread through all the arguments in favour of the nuclear deal was that, as a responsible power and a democracy, India had to be brought into the world order as a major player in order to shape a more stable world. Notably, Pakistan – which had also demonstrated its hard power, did not have the soft power image that could underline its claim to its own nuclear deal.

Rice, in her defence of the nuclear deal pointed out, “India is a rising global power and a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia. India will continue to possess sophisticated military forces that, just like our own, remain strongly committed to the principle of civilian control, and will in the future help to promote peace in Asia and across the world”.<sup>354</sup> While strategic premises of the nuclear deal include realist logic, realist analysis alone is insufficient to explain why the Bush Administration made a nuclear exception for India. As Richard Lugar, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign relations Committee said, “some analysts contend that India’s ability to act as a counterweight to China is the primary strategic benefit of the deal... I understand the impulse behind this thinking...we need more from India than security cooperation. We need a partner that sits at the intersection of several strategic regions that can be a bulwark for stability, democracy, and pluralism”.<sup>355</sup> After playing a “pivotal role”<sup>356</sup> on

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<sup>352</sup> See, for example, Statement of William J. Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, “Hearing on The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 18, 2008, <http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BurnsTestimony080918p2.pdf>. See also Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, April 5, 2006.

<sup>353</sup> “Open Letter to Congress.”

<sup>354</sup> United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and U.S.: Additional Protocol Implementation Act, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, July 20, 2006.

<sup>355</sup> Richard Lugar, “Commencement Address Today by Lugar at the U.S. Naval War College,” June 16, 2006, U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, [http://www.epw.senate.gov/hearing\\_statements.cfm?id=257222](http://www.epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=257222).

<sup>356</sup> See John T. Shaw, *Richard G. Lugar, Statesman of the Senate: Crafting Foreign Policy from Capitol Hill* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 146.

the nuclear deal, he argues that balance of power was not a “primary” factor for the nuclear deal. India got the exception because it was democracy and had great potential for economic growth. Above all India pledged not to conduct further nuclear tests and had a good non-proliferation record.<sup>357</sup> As a former senior US official has pointed out, if India had a bad non-proliferation record, had been actively producing fissile material, and been active on weapons designing and delivery systems, then it would have been difficult for the Bush administration to sell the nuclear deal to the US Congress.<sup>358</sup> Therefore the Bush administration defended the nuclear deal on the basis of India’s responsible nuclear behaviour.

Henry Kissinger notes that while democracy has not in itself elevated the Indo-US partnership, it has certainly served to “facilitate their ability to elaborate the relationship”.<sup>359</sup> Without a rising economy, India would not have financially supported the American democracy promotion agenda and, in the first place, would not have appealed the US in the way it did as discussed in the previous section. Thus democracy on its own has not caused the strategic partnership between India and the US. At the same time, India’s hard power alone would not have been as appealing as it was to the US in the absence of common democratic values and responsible nuclear strategy, at the core of which were nuclear restraint, support to nuclear arms control and nuclear CBMs with Pakistan. Therefore the Bush administration justified the nuclear deal on the basis of India’s exceptionally responsible nuclear behaviour.

The Bush administration also defended the civil nuclear deal by highlighting the trade and business opportunities it creates for the US.<sup>360</sup> It was estimated that the nuclear deal could potentially create opportunities for about “\$27 billion in investments in 18-

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<sup>357</sup> Interview with Richard Lugar, October 28, 2014.

<sup>358</sup> Interview with Peter Lavoy, October 27, 2014.

<sup>359</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, “Working with India: America and Asia Stand to Gain from This New Relationship,” *The Washington Post*, March 20, 2006, <http://www.henrykissinger.com/articles/wp032006.html>.

<sup>360</sup> See Remarks of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, April 5, 2006. See also Statement of Burns, “Hearing on The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative,” September 18, 2008.

20 nuclear plants over the next 15 years”.<sup>361</sup> According Rice, the nuclear deal would create directly 3,000 to 5,000 jobs and indirectly about 10,000 to 15,000.<sup>362</sup> India’s new economic openness created opportunities for economic development in a liberal framework.<sup>363</sup> As shown below (Figures 5.1 and 5.2), there has been an upward trajectory in both US export to and import from India. While immediate economic gains may be relatively limited, the larger strategic picture has been promising for India’s place in American grand strategy as a strong liberal power in the making. It is doubtful whether the American attitude toward India would have been optimistic had Indian economic power and potential been as insignificant as in the past. Had India not grown economically, it would not have received positive attention from the US and would likely have remained hyphenated with Pakistan.<sup>364</sup> According to Saran, then Indian foreign secretary, the “reassessment” in Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War “would not have had the same value and results if India had remained economically stagnant”.<sup>365</sup>

Figure 5. 1: US Exports to India Since 1991<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>361</sup> “Factbox-U.S.-India Nuclear Deal Business Potential,” *Reuters*, Oct 2, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/02/nuclear-india-usa-idUSSP5726420081002>.

<sup>362</sup> Mistry, *The US–India Nuclear Agreement*, 95.

<sup>363</sup> Rice, “Interview with Al Hunt, Janine Zacharia and Matt Winkler of Bloomberg News.”

<sup>364</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, “An Open Letter To Sushma Swaraj: Don’t Let Political Diffidence Constrain MEA,” *The Economic Times*, May 28, 2014, [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-28/news/50149566\\_1\\_ptas-foreign-trade-trans-pacific-partnership](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-28/news/50149566_1_ptas-foreign-trade-trans-pacific-partnership); Evan Feigenbaum, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, “The Future of U.S.-India Relations, Foreign Press Center Roundtable Briefing with Indian Media, Washington, DC, October 17, 2008, <http://2002-2009-fpc.state.gov/111202.htm>; Evan A. Feigenbaum, “India’s Rise America’s Interest: The Fate of the US-Indian Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs* 89: 2 (2010): 76.

<sup>365</sup> Foreign Secretary Mr. Shyam Saran, “Transforming India-US Relations: Building a Strategic Partnership,” Address at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 21, 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/indianfsdec21.pdf>.

<sup>366</sup> CEIC WebCDM, based on data sources of International Monetary Fund, accessed June 28, 2014.



Figure 5.2: US Imports from India Since 1991<sup>367</sup>



Finally, it is worth noting again that the influence of Indian-Americans, while significant, does not explain the effectiveness of Indian soft power. As noted in Chapter 2, the Indian-American community played a facilitating role during the nuclear deal. Their lobbying attracted the positive attention of US policymakers and India mobilised them in support of the nuclear deal. But, as Richard Lugar emphasises, they played a “secondary” role. He was never approached by any Indian-American group during the nuclear deal.<sup>368</sup> Similarly, the overall “India lobby” does not explain the effectiveness of India’s soft power while facilitating the deal in the Congress. The leadership in the US, especially President Bush and policymakers such as Secretary Rice, as discussed above, were attracted by India’s democracy and responsible behaviour. Therefore there is no evidence that rejects this study’s hypothesis and confirms the null hypothesis.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid.

<sup>368</sup> Interview with Richard Lugar, October 28, 2014.

### 5.2.3 Conclusion

As shown above, the US agreed to allow nuclear trade with India despite its refusal to sign the NPT. It also indirectly accepted India's nuclear weapons status. While there is no doubt that rise of China and the trade potential for civilian nuclear exports were significant factors, the deal would not have been possible in the absence of India's soft power. Shared political values had a lot to do with President Bush from the beginning of his administration. It was reinforced by India's responsible nuclear behaviour based on its restraint, respect for arms control, export control and disarmament. The fact of India as an emerging power, which became clear after its 1998 tests, was an important driver of US interests, which helped rethink American policy toward India. Yet, without India's strongly positive image, it is doubtful whether the nuclear deal would have even come close to being signed. On the whole, a strong India was anticipated by the US as a potential global strategic partner not so much in old balance of power terms as in terms of the broader effort to build a more stable democratic world. As Secretary Rice said, India unlike in the Cold War period was "emerging as a potentially very stabilizing and positive force in international politics" and therefore the US was "fully willing and ready to assist in that growth of India's global power and the implications of that, which we see as largely positive".<sup>369</sup>

## 5.3. Defence Cooperation

### 5.3.1 Introduction

As we have seen in the last chapter, India's weak power combined with its nonaligned posture and the factor of US alliance with Pakistan restricted the effect of its soft power, resulting in limited military aid, mostly following the 1962 India-China war. The 1970s saw India and the US estranged from each other with mutual hostility during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan with Washington sending the same aircraft carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal it had sent in support of India in 1962, but this

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<sup>369</sup> Rice, "Interview with Al Hunt."

time in support of Pakistan.<sup>370</sup> In the 1980s, there were some initiatives to boost defence sales and technology transfer, but not of great significance.<sup>371</sup> The end of the Cold War saw India and US showing intention to deepen defence cooperation. Nonetheless, divergence on non-proliferation became an impediment.

India-US defence relations consolidated with the revival of the Defence Policy Group (DPG) and the removal of U.S. sanctions after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Defence cooperation since then has involved personnel exchanges, dialogues, exercises, defence trade, training, and armament cooperation, and has reached an unprecedented level where India now conducts more exercises and exchanges with the US than with any other country.<sup>372</sup> Exercises are conducted across all the services and have grown in “size, scope and sophistication”.<sup>373</sup> In terms of “the depth and complexity” of involvement, the two navies leave behind their armies and air forces.<sup>374</sup> Defence trade has reached over \$10 billion in the last decade and India has purchased a range of defence equipment and services (see Table 5.1). The joint defence agreement signed in 2005 provided a ten-year framework to enhance military-to-military relations.<sup>375</sup> A complementary framework agreement on maritime security was signed in 2006.<sup>376</sup> The bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) signed in 2010 also includes

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<sup>370</sup> Kux, *Estranged Democracies*, 207.

<sup>371</sup> Jyotika Saksena and Suzette Grillot, “The Emergence of Indo-US Defence Cooperation: From Specific to Diffuse Reciprocity,” in *Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy*, eds. Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahlaut and Anupam Srivastava (New York: Routledge, 2011), 153-154.

<sup>372</sup> Kronstadt and Pinto, “India-U.S. Security Relations”; “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation.”

<sup>373</sup> See “Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation.” For the number of exercises, see Bethany N. Danyluk, and Juli A. MacDonald, “The U.S.-India Defense Relationship: Reassessing Perceptions and Expectations,” Prepared for Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Booz Allen Hamilton, November 2008, Appendix A.

<sup>374</sup> Kronstadt and Pinto, “India-U.S. Security Relations.” For military- to- military relations at three service levels, see Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 6-19.

<sup>375</sup> New Framework for the U.S-India Defense Relationship, June 28, 2005, The Rumsfeld Papers, <http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/3211/2005-06-28%20New%20Framework%20for%20the%20US-India%20Defense%20Relationship.pdf>.

<sup>376</sup> Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative, U.S. Department of State Washington, DC, July 18, 2005, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2005/49730.htm>; “Indo-U.S. Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation” March 02, 2006, <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6030/IndoUS+Framework+for+Maritime+Security+Cooperation>.

maritime security, involving increasing exchanges between their respective coast guards and navies to address threats such as piracy and terrorism.<sup>377</sup> The degree of change in US policy is dramatic despite the fact that India does not offer scope for an alliance or even an alliance-like commitment. Rather, India offers a strategic partnership, which is inherently limited. Indian capability is being built up rapidly as a future global power even though India is not prepared to make a major commitment on US strategic objectives vis-à-vis China.

This section shows how India's soft power of attraction based on its democracy and responsible strategic behaviour, in conjunction with its rising hard power, ended American inhibitions towards closer defence ties with India. It thereby tests the validity of the hypothesis of this study that the level of hard power determines the relative effectiveness of soft power and rejects the null hypothesis that relative effectiveness of soft power has nothing to do the level of hard power.

### *5.3.2 Explaining the Policy in Terms of Indian Power*

The Agreed Minute on Defence Relations signed during US Secretary of Defence William J. Perry's visit to India in January 1995 was made to expand defence ties with India in the post-Cold War world by building upon the so-called "Kickleigher proposals" of 1991, "the first comprehensive effort" on bilateral defence ties.<sup>378</sup> Gen. Claude Kickleigher, then Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific Command, during his visit to India proposed service-to-service exchanges and Executive Steering Groups for each of the services. It also enabled a bilateral joint army and air force training exercises in 1992 and 1993 followed by the navy-to-navy Malabar exercises in 1992, 1995 and 1996. Also, Indian para-commandoes and US Special Forces held exercises

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<sup>377</sup> "Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation."

<sup>378</sup> *Foreign Affairs Record* LXLI: 1 (January, 1995), <http://mealib.nic.in/far/1995.pdf>; Agreed Minute on Defence Relations between India and the United States, January 12, 1995, *Foreign Affairs Record*, Vol. XLI, No. 1, January, 1995, <http://mealib.nic.in/far/1995.pdf>. See also Schaffer, *India and the United States in the 21st Century*, 74.

in 1995 and 1997.<sup>379</sup> However, in terms of defence “arms/technology transfer”, Pakistan remained a “significant” element.<sup>380</sup> While non-proliferation was a constraining factor, there were “military-to-military interactions as well as some arms transfers”.<sup>381</sup> India in 1991 also for the first time ever allowed its air space to be used by the US during the Gulf War and its territory for refuelling.<sup>382</sup> India endeavoured to shed its military isolationism by engaging the navies of the regional and great powers in the Indian Ocean.<sup>383</sup> Following the Agreed Minute, the Defence Policy Group (DPG) was established which held three meetings between September 1995 and January 1998. The nuclear tests in 1998 were seen by the Clinton administration, as earlier noted, as a challenge to nonproliferation order and regional stability. As a result, sanctions imposed by it in response to the tests meant India could not receive spares for its British manufactured Sea King helicopters which were partly of US origin. The US also suspended its assistance to India’s Light Combat Aircraft programme initiated in the 1980s. The “earlier slate of cooperation was wiped clean”.<sup>384</sup> As discussed in the earlier section, the Singh-Talbott dialogue and India’s restraint during the Kargil conflict had positive effect on the bilateral relationship. It however did not change the fundamental dynamics of bilateral defence relations. However, as we have seen, after the 1998 nuclear tests, though there was initial tension between Washington and New Delhi, the relationship began to grow warm very soon. The tests had been a turning point and the US now began to see India as a significant actor on the security landscape. As was also evident, the US began to take India’s soft power more seriously, often justifying the growing relationship in terms of India’s democracy and responsible behaviour.

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<sup>379</sup> V. P Malik, “Indo-US Defense and Military Relations: From ‘Estrangement’ to ‘Strategic Partnership’,” in *US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More than Words*, eds. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Brian Shoup (London: Routledge, 2006), 83-84.

<sup>380</sup> Malik, “Indo-US Defense and Military Relations,” 85.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>382</sup> Remarks by Ambassador Ronen Sen, October 26, 2005, Occasional Paper, Number 24, December 2005, Centre for Advanced Study of India, [http://media.sas.upenn.edu/casi/docs/research/papers/Sen\\_2005.pdf](http://media.sas.upenn.edu/casi/docs/research/papers/Sen_2005.pdf).

<sup>383</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 115.

<sup>384</sup> Malik, “Indo-US Defense and Military Relations,” 87.

Bilateral defence ties took off rapidly under the Bush administration. The senior officials of the Bush administration very early into its first term recognised India's potential to maintain peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region and sought to cooperate with it on maritime security and to promote military-to-military relations. Secretary of State nominee Colin Powell, in his Senate Foreign Relations committee hearing, stated that the US needed to "deal more wisely with the world's largest democracy". India needed to be assisted "to help keep the peace in the vast Indian Ocean area and its periphery". Before his election as President, Bush spoke of "democratic India's arrival as a force in the world" and showed his concern as to ensuring that it would be "a force for stability and security in Asia". Speaking on the future of Indo-US relations, Robert Blackwill, then US ambassador to India, said in 2001:

An essential component to our regional and global efforts to promote peace will be greater collaboration between American and Indian military forces... The Bush Administration has initiated discussions with the Indian Government on peacekeeping operations, search and rescue, disaster relief... Regionally, we want to work with the Indian military services to protect energy supplies and sea-lanes, to increase naval exercises and port visits, and to unite our military efforts against terrorism and piracy...We look forward to the participation of more than 100 Indian officers in American military training courses this year...These activities create new bridges between two military cultures that honor -- first and foremost -- civilian control.<sup>385</sup>

While discussing the future defence ties between the two states, he alluded to democratic peace theory and cited the shared values of democracy and pluralism.<sup>386</sup> According to Blackwill, managing the balance of power in Asia required the US to establish military-to-military relations with countries like India that shared not only political values but also vital interests, including the fight against terrorism and

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<sup>385</sup> Blackwill, "The Future of US-India Relations," September 6, 2001.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid.

preventing the spread of WMD.<sup>387</sup> Daniel Twining, who served in the Policy Planning Staff during the Bush administration, similarly notes that Bush “assumed office with a view of India as a future world power, a frontline Asian balancer, and a pluralistic democracy with which America should naturally cooperate in world affairs”.<sup>388</sup> Recognising “India’s potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century”, the US *National Security Strategy 2002* stated,

The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies...have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean...we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.<sup>389</sup>

As noted in the earlier section, India was supportive of President Bush’s controversial national missile defence programme and was willing to play a larger geopolitical role drawing positive attention of the US. In a study on Indo-US military relationship sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment, Office of Secretary of Defense, Julie MacDonald, in 2002 wrote,

The U.S. military wants a capable partner in Asia that can take on more responsibility for low-end operations in Asia; that provides new training opportunities; and that will ultimately provide basing and access for U.S. power projection. For many, India is the most attractive partner in the region because of its strategic location and size and relative sophistication of its military.<sup>390</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> Robert D. Blackwill, “The Quality and Durability of the U.S.-India Relationship,” November 27, 2002, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/15589.htm>.

<sup>388</sup> Daniel Twining, “The US Engagement of India after 1991: Transformation,” 68.

<sup>389</sup> Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September, 2002.

<sup>389</sup> Prepared statement of Colin L. Powell, Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 17, 2001.

<sup>390</sup> Juli A. MacDonald, “Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions,” Washington, DC: Booz Allen Hamilton, October 2002, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500476.pdf>.

To accomplish such goals, the US military wanted to build military-to-military relations with India.<sup>391</sup> US civilian and military officials were “more confident” of India’s ability “to take on more of the burden for achieving mutual security goals in Asia, particularly in the maritime domain”.<sup>392</sup> This suggests that with the growth of its hard power, India’s strategic value increased in the eyes of US policymakers. India deployed its navy ships to escort high-value US ships through the Malacca Straits in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.<sup>393</sup> Such operational cooperation was unprecedented as India had always preferred to use its forces under the framework of the UN.<sup>394</sup> This was also in harmony with India’s preference for improving its Navy’s regional profile.<sup>395</sup> The Indo-US defence relationship was stimulated in July 2001 with the revival of the DPG.<sup>396</sup> During its third meeting, the two states committed “to increasing substantially the pace of the high-level policy dialogue, military-to-military exchanges and other joint activities” and also discussed missile defence.<sup>397</sup> India also signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in January 2002 leading to the US clearing “licenses for 20 weapons systems”.<sup>398</sup> Besides exercises, visits, and exchanges, there were some advances on defence sales including sale and lease of US fire-finding/weapon locating radars, fast track delivery of spares for Sea King helicopters and approval of the sale of General Electric engines and avionics for India’s light combat aircraft (LCA).<sup>399</sup> India viewed defence sales “as a way to gauge the potential for substantive future bilateral cooperation.”<sup>400</sup> Following the 9/11 attack, President Bush “waived the 1998 sanctions,

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<sup>391</sup> MacDonald, “Indo-U.S. Military Relationship.”

<sup>392</sup> Danyluk and MacDonald, *The U.S.-India Defense Relationship*, 103.

<sup>393</sup> See, for details, Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 104-105.

<sup>394</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 104.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid.

<sup>396</sup> The DPG is the apex body of dialogue mechanism for defence cooperation. It was established in 1995 but halted after India’s nuclear tests in 1998. See Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” Appendices D and E.

<sup>397</sup> Joint Statement Third Meeting of the India-US Defence Policy Group, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, December 03, 2001, <http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/6068/Joint+Statement+Third+Meeting+of+the+IndiaUS+Defence+Policy+Group>.

<sup>398</sup> Malik, “Indo-US Defense and Military Relations,” 90.

<sup>399</sup> Blackwill, “The Quality and Durability of the US-India Relationship.”

<sup>400</sup> Ibid.

and drastically trimmed the long ‘Entity List,’ which barred Americans from doing business with certain Indian companies, from over 150 Entities to less than 20”.<sup>401</sup>

India also “came close” to sending peacekeeping troops to Iraq in 2003 before eventually deciding against it.<sup>402</sup> A favourable decision by India could have helped combined operations and overall bilateral relationship with the US.<sup>403</sup> By this time, nonetheless, both the countries were conducting “at least one joint military exercise or engagement each month.”<sup>404</sup> Stephen Blank writes that “many officers in the U.S. armed forces have come to know the high quality of India’s Navy, Air Force, and Army and on these grounds recommended greater military cooperation with India.”<sup>405</sup> This is when the US was mulling over an “Asian version of Nato” with India playing a prominent role and, as Blank notes, “there is, or at least was during Vajpayee’s tenure, considerable interest in official and semi-official circles about the possibility of such an alliance”.<sup>406</sup> According to Blackwill, for promoting peace and security in Asia, the US needed to “to strengthen political, economic, and military-to-military relations with those Asian states that share our democratic values and national interests. That spells India”.<sup>407</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> Ibid.

<sup>402</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, “The Transforming U.S.-Indian Relationship and Its Significance for American Interests,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, October 16, 2006, [http://www.npolicy.org/article\\_file/The\\_Transforming\\_US-Indian\\_Relationship\\_and\\_Its\\_Significance\\_for\\_American\\_Interests.pdf](http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/The_Transforming_US-Indian_Relationship_and_Its_Significance_for_American_Interests.pdf).

<sup>403</sup> Mohan, *Impossible Allies*, 105.

<sup>404</sup> Robert D. Blackwill, “The Future of US-India Relations,” Luncheon Address Hosted by The Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, India, July 17, 2003, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/22615.htm>.

<sup>405</sup> Stephen J. Blank, *Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005), [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub626.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub626.pdf).

<sup>406</sup> C. R. Jayachandran, “India May Lead Asian Version of Nato,” *Time of India*, Jul 19, 2003, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-may-lead-Asian-version-of-Nato/articleshow/84420.cms>; Blank, *Nuclear Allies?*.

<sup>407</sup> Robert D. Blackwill, “The United States, India and Asian Security,” Presented to the Institute for Defense Analyses 5th Asian Security Conference, New Delhi, India, January 27, 2003, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/16884.htm>.

India in 2004 notably joined (outside the UN framework) the navies of the US, Australia and Japan in the Tsunami Core Group's relief efforts. On the success of the Tsunami Core Group, Marc Grossman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said that "we pulled these specific countries together simply because they were the ones with the resources and the desire to act effectively and quickly".<sup>408</sup> This Indian effort in a collective forum was an example of India's emerging role as a provider of public goods and its exercise of responsible power. Secretary Rice recognised this when she said, "There are countries like India that have emerged in recent years as major factors in the international economy, in international politics, taking on more and more global responsibilities... when we had the Tsunami cooperation ...to respond to the immediate needs of the Tsunami, India was able...to mobilize its ships and go to sea in about 48 hours. That is extraordinary and that shows that India's potential is very great to help resolve humanitarian and other needs of the world".<sup>409</sup> Military-to-military relations also contributed to successful coordination between the two navies.<sup>410</sup> The effective response by India during the Tsunami and "its performance in the bilateral COPE India Air Force exercise [in 2004] demonstrated to Americans India's potential to be a credible, reliable defence partner in the Indian Ocean region and beyond".<sup>411</sup> Indian pilots in their MiG21s during COPE India 2004 "outperformed the American pilots flying F-15s".<sup>412</sup> Besides, for 2007 Malabar Exercise "India was widely perceived as the leader of the exercise".<sup>413</sup> While the two sides have "developed a deeper mutual respect for each other's capabilities and professionalism", the Indian Navy was perceived as "quite competent in basic surface warfare operations" by the U.S. naval officials.<sup>414</sup> In term of operational cooperation, India has also joined the US in non-combatant evacuation in Lebanon in 2006 and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf

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<sup>408</sup> Marc Grossman, "The Tsunami Core Group: A Step toward a Transformed Diplomacy in Asia and Beyond," *Security Challenges* 1:1 (2005): 12.

<sup>409</sup> Joint Press Conference by External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh and US Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice, New Delhi, March 16, 2005, Embassy of India, Washington, DC, [https://www.indianembassy.org/archives\\_details.php?nid=596](https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=596).

<sup>410</sup> Latif, "US-India Military Engagement," 1.

<sup>411</sup> Danyluk and MacDonald, *The U.S.-India Defense Relationship*, iii

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>413</sup> *Ibid.*, 19-20.

<sup>414</sup> Latif, "U.S.-India Military Engagement," 13.

of Aden.<sup>415</sup> All of this created in American minds the image of India as a net security provider in Asia and therefore a responsible power.

The emergence of Pakistan as an ally in the global war on terrorism did not foreclose India's defence ties with the US due to the de-hyphenation policy of the Bush administration respecting the disparate value of the two countries (discussed above). While Pakistan's role was confined to the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, India was being perceived as a strategic player in the larger Asian and global security context. The Bush administration early in its second term announced it would augment India's power knowing its military implications.<sup>416</sup> The joint defence agreement signed in 2005 cited the two countries' "common belief in freedom, democracy and rule of law" and included shared interests from "maintaining security and stability" to fighting terrorism, preventing the spread of WMD, and protecting the global commons for the free flow of commerce.

Danyluk and MacDonald, in their interview-based study, find that to some in the US defence and military establishments, China was a major factor in driving the bilateral defence ties.<sup>417</sup> It can be argued that India's increased hard military power post-1998 persuaded the US to view India as a significant player in the Asian balance. India continued to resist becoming anything close to an ally, but its overall image was very positive, hence the US continued to have an interest in developing ties with a strong friendly India.<sup>418</sup> Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, writing in *Foreign Policy*, cited the common value of democracy and noted that the US was "making a strategic bet on India's future—that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security".<sup>419</sup> With its rising military capability and provision of public goods, including humanitarian assistance and UN peacekeeping, India has increasingly been viewed by

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<sup>415</sup> "Report to Congress on U.S.-India Security Cooperation."

<sup>416</sup> Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations," March 25, 2005.

<sup>417</sup> Danyluk and MacDonald, *The U.S.-India Defense Relationship*, 48-49.

<sup>418</sup> Interview with Douglas J. Feith, October 29, 2014.

<sup>419</sup> Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas\\_pacific\\_century?page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=full).

the US as a “net provider of security” in the Indo-Pacific.<sup>420</sup> As the 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review Report stated,

India has already established its worldwide military influence through counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts. As its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.<sup>421</sup>

The 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance stated that the US was “investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region”.<sup>422</sup> According to Leon Panetta, then US Secretary of Defence, “Defense cooperation with India is a linchpin in this strategy [of rebalance]. India is one of the largest and most dynamic countries in the region and the world, with one of the most capable militaries”.<sup>423</sup> Although India lost opportunities to work with the US on disaster relief in such cases as Bangladesh after 2007 Cyclone,<sup>424</sup> it has publicly affirmed its preference to “become a net provider of security” in its “immediate region and beyond”.<sup>425</sup> By doing so, India has come to be viewed by the US as a responsible power. According to Latif, despite knowing India’s reticence as to closer security partnership, the US is making a

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<sup>420</sup> Robert M Gates, “America’s Security Role in the Asia-Pacific,” The 8th IISS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, May 30, 2009, <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2009/plenary-session-speeches-2009/first-plenary-session/dr-robert-gates/>; Quadrennial Defence Review Report, US Department of Defence, February 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2026jan10%200700.pdf>; William J. Burns, “An Indispensable U.S. Partnership With the World’s Largest Democracy,” May 28, 2010, [http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/indispensable\\_partnership\\_india](http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/indispensable_partnership_india).

<sup>421</sup> Quadrennial Defence Review Report, February 2010.

<sup>422</sup> Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012, [http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense\\_Strategic\\_Guidance.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf).

<sup>423</sup> Leon E. Panetta, “The U.S. and India: Partners in the 21st Century,” As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta, New Delhi, India, June 06, 2012, US Department of Defense, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1682>.

<sup>424</sup> Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 3-4.

<sup>425</sup> “Indian Navy-Net Security Provider to Island Nations in IOR: Antony,” *PIB*, October 12, 2011, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=76590>; Vinay Kumar, “India Well Positioned to Become a Net Provider of Security: Manmohan Singh,” *The Hindu*, May 24, 2013, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-well-positioned-to-become-a-net-provider-of-security-manmohan-singh/article4742337.ece>.

“strategic bet” on it with the anticipation that “one day soon India will become that provider of security for which the United States and Asia have been waiting”.<sup>426</sup> Similar views were also expressed by some interviewees from American civilian and military establishment in the 2008 study by Danyluk and MacDonald.<sup>427</sup>

Indo-US defence trade expanded, as Ashton Carter, then Under Secretary of Defence, said, “from next to nothing at the turn of the century to billions of dollars today”.<sup>428</sup> In order to make defence trade “more simple, responsive, and effective”, the two countries undertook an initiative in July 2012 (under Carter and India’s then National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon) called the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTI). Under this, the two countries have sought to overcome “bureaucracies and procedures” to streamline defence trade through co-production and co-development, thereby transferring technology to India, which is India’s main objective for strengthening its indigenous defence industry.<sup>429</sup> India is now included among “a select group of favored nations” in the “Group of Eight” in relation to license exceptions under the U.S. Strategic Trade Authorization.<sup>430</sup> Following the DTI, the US has also proposed co-development in areas such as a next-generation Javelin antitank capability.<sup>431</sup> The Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation published on September 27, 2013, which was “a first-of-its-kind statement by the two governments,” talked about “achieving the full vision” of the 2005 Framework Agreement. This involved endorsing certain “principles” “with respect to defense technology transfer, trade, research, co-development and co-production for defense articles and services” and

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<sup>426</sup> S. Amer Latif, “India and the New U.S. Defense Strategy,” CISS, February 23, 2012, <http://csis.org/publication/india-and-new-us-defense-strategy>.

<sup>427</sup> Danyluk and MacDonald, *The U.S.-India Defense Relationship*, 103-105.

<sup>428</sup> Ashton B. Carter, “Super Hercules in the Himalayas,” *Foreign Policy*, November 20, 2013, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/20/super-hercules-in-the-himalayas/>.

<sup>429</sup> Remarks by Deputy Secretary Carter on the U.S.-India Defense Partnership at the Center for American Progress, September 30, 2013, U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5313>; Carter, “Super Hercules in the Himalayas.”

<sup>430</sup> Remarks by Deputy Secretary Carter on the U.S.-India Defense Partnership at the Center for American Progress, September 30, 2013.

<sup>431</sup> *Ibid.*

improving “licensing processes, and, where applicable, follow[ing] expedited license approval processes to facilitate this cooperation”. In this document, the US also reiterated its support for India’s “full membership in the four international export control regimes, which would further facilitate technology sharing”.<sup>432</sup>

The increasing number of exercises, visits and exchanges has led to “trust and mutual respect”.<sup>433</sup> The military ties over the years have increased familiarity between services, and increased interoperability in areas such as “anti-piracy, counterterrorism, and disaster relief”.<sup>434</sup> India through exercises also acquires insights into tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of US military. As Latif argues, “bilateral military engagement has produced a range of benefits, including greater mutual understanding, stronger professional relationships, and more familiarity with how each military operates.”<sup>435</sup>

Table 5.1: Some Major Conventional Weapons Supplied By the US to India, 1991-2013<sup>436</sup>

No. ordered	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of Order/ License	Year(s) of Deliveries	No. Delivered/ Produced	Comments
8	P-8A Poseidon	Anti-	(2008)	2012-2013	3	\$2 b deal (offsets 30% incl

<sup>432</sup> U.S.-India Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation, September 27, 2013, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/us-india-joint-declaration-defense-cooperation>.

<sup>433</sup> Danyluk, “Perceptions and Expectations of the India-U.S. Defense Relationship,” 120; and Carter, “Super Hercules in the Himalayas.”

<sup>434</sup> Kronstadt and Pinto, “India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement.”

<sup>435</sup> Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 4.

<sup>436</sup> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database; “Lockheed Bags Deal to Supply Laser-guided Bombs to IAF,” *The Indian Express*, April 3, 2012; Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India to Buy 6 More C-130J Transports,” *DefenseNews*, September 13, 2013, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130913/DEFREG03/309130017/India-Buy-6-More-C-130J-Transports>; Rajat Pandit, “India Close to Finalizing Apache and Chinook Chopper Deals Worth Over \$2.5 Billion,” *The Times of India*, July 8, 2014, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-close-to-finalizing-Apache-and-Chinook-chopper-deals-worth-over-2-5-billion/articleshow/37986287.cms>. The parentheses are used as the numbers are either estimates or unsure.

		submarine warfare(ASW) aircraft				production of components in India); P-8I version; delivery 2012-2015
6	C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	2013			Exceeding \$1 b deal (30% offsets including production in India of components for all future C-130J);delivery by 2016
(270)	F-125	Turbofan	(2013)			For modernization of 125 Jaguar combat aircraft; delivery 2015/2016-2023/2024; F-125IN version; selected but contract not yet signed
2	AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder	Arty locating radar	(1990)	1992	(2)	Paveway-2 version
6	LM-2500	Gas turbine	(1999)	2010-2012	6	For 3 Shivalik (Project-17) frigates produced in India; possibly from Italian production line
8	AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder	Arty locating radar	2002	2006	8	Part of \$142-190 m deal; orginally planned for 1998 but embargoed by USA after Indian nuclear tests in
4	AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder	Arty locating radar	2003	2006-2007	4	Part of \$142-190 m deal; AN/TPQ-37(V)3 version
1	Austin	Amphibious assault landing ship(AALS)	2006	2007	1	Second-hand; INR2.2 b (\$48 m) deal (incl modernization); Indian designation Jalashwa
6	S-61/H-3A Sea King	Helicopter	2006	2007	(6)	Second-hand; \$39 m deal; UH-3H version
(24)	F404	Turbofan	2007			\$100 m deal; for Tejas (LCA) combat aircraft produced in India; F-404-

						GE-F2J3 version
6	C-130J-30 Hercules	Transport aircraft	2008	2010-2011	6	\$962 m deal (incl \$596 m for aircraft and rest for special equipment; 30% offsets incl production in India of components for all future C-130J); for special forces
512	CBU-97 SFW	Guided bomb	2010	2013	(50)	\$258 m deal; CBU-105 version
(20)	RGM-84L Harpoon-2	Anti-ship MI/SSM(Surfa ce-to-surface missile)	2010	2013	(12)	\$170 m deal; AGM-84L version
10	C-17A Globemaster-3	Heavy transport air craft	2011	2013	5	\$4.1 b deal (offsets \$1.1 b); delivery 2013-2014
(32)	Mk-54 MAKO	ASW torpedo	(2011)	2013	(10)	\$86 m deal; for use on P-8I ASW aircraft
(21)	RGM-84L Harpoon-2	Anti-ship MI/SSM	2012	2013	(5)	AGM-84L version; for use on P-8I ASW aircraft
(28)	TPE-331	Turboprop	(2012)			For 14 Do-228MP MP aircraft from FRG
(542)	AGM-114K HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	(2013)			AGM-114R-3 version; for AH-64 combat helicopters; selected but not yet ordered
(812)	AGM-114L HELLFIRE	Anti-tank missile	(2013)			AGM-114L-3 version; for AH-64 combat helicopters; selected but not yet ordered
22	AH-64D Apache	Combat helicopter	(2013)			About 1.4 b deal (part of \$2.4 b deal); AH-64E version; selected but not yet ordered

(12)	AN/APG-78 Longbow	Combat heli radar	(2013)			For AH-64 combat helicopters
15	CH-47F Chinook	Helicopter	(2013)			About \$1.1 b deal (part of \$2.4 b deal); selected but not yet ordered
(245)	FIM-92 Stinger	Portable SAM	(2013)			FIM-92 Block-1 version; for AH-64 combat helicopters; selected but not yet ordered
4	P-8A Poseidon	ASW aircraft	(2013)			Selected but not yet ordered

According to an American analyst, “while bilateral military-to-military engagements appear to be plentiful, the sum total of all military engagement does not appear to be working toward a common strategic end state”. Therefore, “while the United States rhetorically bills India as a security provider, the reality is that the current state of U.S.-India ties is not yet geared toward that lofty goal”.<sup>437</sup> It is no surprise to note that “aside from the 2004 tsunami episode, instances of bilateral cooperation on operational matters have been scarce.”<sup>438</sup> In contrast to the US, it is argued, India defines “strategic partnership” more liberally.<sup>439</sup> In contrast to US expectation after 2004 for a deeper relationship, India does not seem to be very comfortable with the pace of the defence relations. While American officials have promoted bilateral ties more than their Indian counterparts by proffering vision for closer partnership, India has mainly focused on “technology acquisition” as “one of the primary metrics in judging success in bilateral defense ties”.<sup>440</sup> While India has many shared interests with the US to drive bilateral defence relations forward, it differs with the US on how to achieve them. Besides its limitations in military capability and bureaucratic shortcomings, India’s political commitment to autonomy or independence and associated nonalignment posture make

<sup>437</sup> Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 29.

<sup>438</sup> Latif, “India and the New U.S. Defense Strategy.”

<sup>439</sup> Latif, “U.S.-India Military Engagement,” 29.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid., 31.

close defence relations with the US difficult. India has been reluctant to sign what the US calls “foundational” agreements such as the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (or CISMOA) and this has constrained defence cooperation in terms of achieving interoperability.<sup>441</sup> India’s rejection of US fighter jets in a mega-deal may have cost it “a lot of goodwill” and possibly averted a “long-term supply and training relationship.”<sup>442</sup>

Despite these limits, the overall trend in defence ties remains positive with unprecedented growth in military-to-military relations that grew during the first Bush presidency overcoming the post-1998 sanctions. The de-hyphenation policy of the Bush administration ensured that Pakistan’s emergence as frontline state in war on terror was not at the cost of India. India with its rising hard power capability is today seen by the US as central to Asian and global security. Its operational cooperation and military-to-military relations have enhanced its perception as a security partner, but the extent to which the two have cooperated cannot be explained without taking into account the positive image created by India’s soft power.

### 5.3.3 Conclusion

The realist view that interests produce strategy is only partially accurate. As shown above, converging interests brought India and the US closer to each other. But the repeated stress on India as a democratic and responsible power explains why the US has stayed close to India despite the latter’s resistance to an alliance-like relationship. While balancing China and the economic inducements of military sales have advanced

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<sup>441</sup> Danyluk, “Perceptions and Expectations of the India-U.S. Defence Relationship,” 122-125.

<sup>442</sup> Fareed Zakaria, “India’s Strategic Planners Aren’t Thinking,” *CNN*, May 12, 2011, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/05/12/india%E2%80%99s-strategic-planners-aren%E2%80%99t-thinking/comment-page-5/>; Twinning, “Why isn’t India Buying American Fighter Jets?,” *Foreign Policy*, April 29, 2011, [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/29/why\\_isn\\_t\\_india\\_buying\\_american\\_fighter\\_jets](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/29/why_isn_t_india_buying_american_fighter_jets).

defence ties, the outcome would have been different if India had not possessed the soft power components of democracy and responsible strategic behaviour.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

With its rising hard power resources, India behaved responsibly and maintained restraint. Therefore a democratic India was separated from Pakistan, leading to de-hyphenation. The difference between India and Pakistan was that both acquired nuclear weapons at the same time, but it was India, as a democratic and responsible state that seemed to offer a long-term positive relationship to the US for maintaining international order. On a foundation of increasing hard power, a politically stable and democratic India demonstrated both capability and willingness to be a responsible strategic partner of the US to the mutual benefit of both as well as for global public goods. The continuity of de-hyphenation despite changing administrations (from Democratic to Republican and back to Democratic) suggests the consistent appeal of Indian soft power.

Most remarkably, India as a democratic and responsible nuclear power on the trajectory of hard power growth attracted a nuclear exception from Washington. From a realist standpoint, the common China threat brought the two countries closer together. Yet it was not such a simple story, for there were powerful interests at work in the opposite direction. From one standpoint, the future of the nuclear nonproliferation was at stake when the US offered India the nuclear deal and effectively bypassed the nonproliferation regime that it had built up. This was not the same as looking the other way, which the US had done with regard to Pakistan during the Cold War. The 1998 tests constituted open defiance of and disregard for the US as well as the nonproliferation regime. Under the circumstances, the exception that was made for India needed a justification greater than common interests (*vis-à-vis* China), especially since India was rapidly improving trade with China. That justification came in the form of India's democracy and its behaviour as a responsible power.

Finally, through its responsible strategic behaviour as a net security provider, democratic India was perceived by the US policymakers as a security partner enhancing the prospects for a stable international order. This justified the reversal of long-standing constraints which had prevented the US from providing India with advanced technology and weapons systems.

In all the three cases discussed above, soft power worked more effectively for India because it was reinforced by a high level of hard power. As Twining points out, “Converging threat perceptions and common values meant that India and the United States could forge a partnership to manage the dangers of the twenty-first century and to amplify the strengths of the world’s biggest open, pluralistic societies”.<sup>443</sup> The key point is that interests alone do not explain close strategic cooperation and understanding beyond a point. They have to be supplemented by something more in the less tangible area of norms and preferences.

It is true that India-US relations have had their problems. A number of issues have acted as obstacles to close cooperation, especially India’s preference for avoiding the appearance of an alliance in the making. However, these “ambiguities” do not result in “fundamental differences” at the functional level in relation to vital national interests. Neither country considers the other even remotely an existential threat. The relationship finds comfort in history, wherein neither country has ever raised arms against the other.<sup>444</sup> The period between 1991 and 1998 showed how limited hard military power constrained the effectiveness India’s soft power rooted in democracy. The 1998 tests were a turning point. If India had not opted for overt nuclearization, it would likely have still been trapped in hyphenated relations with Pakistan over Kashmir; its covert nuclear weapons would have remained under constant pressure from the US; and

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<sup>443</sup> Twining, “The US Engagement of India after 1991,” 23.

<sup>444</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, “What Should We Expect from India as a Strategic Partner?,” in *Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation*, ed. Henry Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 243-245; Blackwill, “The India Imperative,” 14.

defence cooperation would have remained limited. Once India had demonstrated its hard power, its strategic value to the US increased – and this value was greatly enhanced by its soft power. In short, India's soft power only became truly effective when backed by a high level of hard power.

## CHAPTER 6

### Conclusion

This chapter summarises the thesis by reviewing the findings of the study and comparing them to argue that the relative effectiveness of soft power is dependent on the levels of hard power. This thesis finds that more effective soft power depends on a higher level of soft power whereas less effective soft power derives from a low level of hard power. It also briefly provides a glimpse into the primary objective of this thesis, which is the refinement of the theoretical understanding of soft power. It concludes by offering theoretical and policy recommendations as well as prospects for future research.

Given the increasing use of the concept of soft power in the international relations literature relating to power analysis and in policy studies of various countries including India, it was imperative to address three questions in the context of India. First, what are the sources of soft power and what is its relationship with hard power? Is soft power as traditionally viewed (in ideational and cultural terms) by itself an effective form of power, i.e. does a state exercise influence on the basis of these traditionally conceived forms of soft power? The existing literature in general, including that on India, has largely defined soft power as distinct from economic and military power. The focus has largely been on non-military sources from culture to political values, foreign policy, and economic success. This conceptualization falls short of providing a useful analysis in the sense that it gives an account of potential sources of soft power, but not the actual results its application achieves and under what conditions. While some analysts have discussed the soft power aspects of India's economic and military hard power resources, they have not followed a detailed process tracing method to (a) convince us that India exercises effective soft power; and (b) give a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the real sources of India's soft power. Above all, they have

shown limited empirical evidence to suggest how and under what conditions soft power elements cause influence and thereby neglected the causal process.

Nye, who first coined the concept of soft power and systematically conceptualised it, differs with Huntington and others who claim that soft power depends on hard power, though he acknowledges the mutual relationship between them. This study advances the argument that soft power is dependent on hard power, i.e. a state needs a relatively high level of economic and military power resources to exercise more effective soft power. It investigates India's relationship with the US for an empirical test. India's relations with the United States have been central to its power and influence since 1947. Does India exercise any power vis-à-vis the preeminent power in the globe? If yes, then what are the nature and sources of that power? The history of the relationship shows that India has not attempted to use hard power against the US. But India has exercised non-coercive influence. A close look suggests that India has exercised the soft power of attraction to varying degrees at various times and on various issues. But there is a puzzle: why has India been able to exercise more effective soft power at some times and less at others? This is most evident when we ask: why has India exercised significant soft power vis-à-vis the US in the post-1998 period in comparison with the Nehru era? What explains the variation in the two periods? To arrive at an answer, this thesis asked the following questions in each of the two cases: (a) What are the sources of India's soft power vis-à-vis the US?; (b) Were they effective?; and (c) What is the observable relationship between soft and hard power?

Nye has defined soft power in a relational or causal framework. Thus soft power is defined as the ability to secure preferred outcomes vis-à-vis another state without the application of hard power. There is a difference between the soft power behaviour of attraction and persuasion, and the hard power behaviour of coercion. Viewed in this sense, any kind of elements of power can produce soft power. In particular, economic and military resources which are traditionally understood as hard power can also potentially be tools of soft power. Much depends on how they are used by states. An

important finding of this thesis is that much of India's hard power has been used in ways that emphasise its soft aspects. But with respect to both hard and soft power resources as viewed traditionally, the critical finding of this study is that the relative effectiveness of soft power is dependent on the level of hard power resources.

## 6.1 Findings

India under Prime Minister Nehru sought to project soft power from the foundation of hard power weakness or as a weak state in material power vis-à-vis the US. Independent India, with its inheritance from the Raj in terms of military resources, had the potential to play a major power role in Asia, but not the economic capability to support a strong defence capacity. Moreover, national priority demanded less diversion of resources for defence and more for economic development. The Indian leadership under Nehru had the orientation of an “unmilitary state”, to use Stephen Cohen's term.<sup>1</sup> It was possessive about its independence and, even before receiving freedom from the Raj, decided to pursue a nonaligned foreign policy. With an orientation towards nonviolence and nonalignment, India soon lost out on the US anticipation of a democratic India partnering in the fight against the Communist bloc. While the US had the top priority of fighting the menace of Communism, India stood against Western colonialism. The rise of Communism in China was viewed differently by both. For India it was nationalism, but for the US it was a communist takeover and a threat to the security of the free world. As a result, on three fundamental issues –the threat of Communism, the rise of China, and colonialism – the two democracies differed significantly. India's policy of nonalignment was not compatible with the US desire for a collective defence arrangement. It did exercise a degree of interest and influence over the US to the extent that it was a large democracy and therefore a symbol of what the US stood for in the Cold War. But as a weak state, that too, one which followed a foreign policy incompatible with that of Washington, it was not strategically interesting

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 154.

to the US. Hence its influence over the US was limited. India wanted extensive economic and military aid from the US to significantly strengthen its economic and military security, but only received enough to safeguard it from collapsing or falling into the arms of the Soviet-led Cold War camp, and not more.

As shown in Chapter 4, India first sought economic assistance and succeeded to a limited extent because of its limited soft power of attraction rooted in its adherence to Western practices of democracy. The US initially viewed India's democratic orientation favourably since it anticipated Indian support for the struggle against international Communism. India also indicated its initial preference in that direction. Such a positive perception was reinforced by India's own fight against Communism at home. Thus, India's commitment to democracy produced some attraction. But it did not produce serious influence, as a result of which India was twice denied economic assistance in the face of diverging interests until 1951. In other words, hard power weakness in conjunction with its refusal to support American Cold War strategy meant India's attractiveness as the world's largest democracy was inadequate.

The food aid of 1951 came after long delay and criticism of India's policies. The decision making process was premised on attaching strings which India did not like. However, in this case democracy started to matter, though only a little. India as a liberal democratic state was critical enough for the US to want to keep it out of the communist orbit even if it was reluctant to supportive of US policies. In Washington, there was a fear that India's weak democracy was susceptible to Communism. Ambassador Bowles in the early 1950s appealed US policymakers to provide substantial aid to India in order to saving India's democracy. But India as weak and unfavourably inclined state received only modest aid aimed at keeping it out of the Soviet Union's orbit. The subsequent growth in aid in the second Eisenhower administration, coinciding with India five-year plans and foreign exchange shortages, was also premised on saving Indian democracy from economic collapse and falling into Communist arms. President Kennedy was attracted towards India's democracy. His

initial optimism about democratic India in relation to American Cold War strategies, especially in relation to Communism in Asia, declined with India's non-commitment to the West. Therefore, the condition remained the same. In light of policy divergence and its hard power weakness, India's soft power of democracy only attracted limited aid to address its weakness.

Similarly, Washington was reluctant to provide military assistance to India when it approached the US soon after its independence. In light of its economic and military weakness, India's democracy was not on its own enough to attract the US to provide military assistance. Again, containing Communism was a major reason why the US gave limited military assistance in the form of arms sales. The likely MIG deal with the Soviet Union and its strategic consequence did motivate the US to offer limited military equipment. But India was questioned for its need to spend large sums of money on military equipment in light of its priority of economic development. In order to save India's democratic state of Communist aggression in 1962, the US provided an unprecedented level of military assistance. But it fell well short of India's expectation. Not surprisingly, the US continued to "hyphenate" India and Pakistan while offering little military assistance.

In contrast to the Nehru period, India's high economic growth in the 1990s helped position it as a major power in the making. With the Cold War behind it and with China looming as the next challenge, the US increasingly saw India as a strategic player and partner on global issues. Yet in much of the 1990s, US policy toward India remained fundamentally unchanged. India continued to be hyphenated with Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir. Its nuclear ambiguity and its status as an NPT outsider limited the appeal of its democracy and responsible non-proliferation policies and restraint. And defence cooperation remained limited. But once India came out of the nuclear closet, it did not take the US too long to initiate a substantial shift in its policies. It sought to delink its interests vis-à-vis India and Pakistan; to help India most dramatically circumvent the pressures of the nonproliferation regime by engaging in civil nuclear

cooperation while allowing it to possess nuclear weapons and not sign either the NPT or the CTBT; and to rapidly expand defence cooperation. All these dramatic changes did involve significant shifts in India's position. India was willing to build bridges with the US in unprecedented ways, for instance by accepting the US military presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. But it also remains true that India resisted – and continues to resist – a strategic resemblance that would tie it too closely to the US, particularly against China. Yet the US did not insist that India adhere to its strategic preferences. On the contrary, it justified its major initiatives with India on the grounds that India is a flourishing democracy and a responsible power contributing to global stability. In other words, India's soft power was crucial in enabling the shift.

The contrast is clear. Whereas an economically and militarily weak India produced limited soft power during the Nehru period, India post-1998 exercised far more effective soft power on the foundation of an economically and militarily strong state. The period between 1991 and 1998, in particular, shows how India's nuclear ambiguity limited its prestige of its hard power capability, which confined India's attempts to draw advantages from its new foreign policy track. Once India ended its ambiguity with the nuclear tests, it was seen as a credible Asian power. The attraction of its liberal democracy combined with military restraint and responsible policies enhanced US confidence in India as a reliable partner. India was now viewed both as a lucrative market for its weapons as well as a democratic and responsible power which contributes to building a more secure world.

## **6.2 Implications**

This thesis considers the following key question. How did India attempt to exercise power vis-à-vis the most powerful state in the international system and with what results? The study demonstrates how India exercised more effective soft power in the post-1998 period in comparison with the Nehru era. In doing so, it identifies India's

sources of soft power during both the periods investigated and shows the relationship between soft and hard power.

The congruence between dependent and independent variables has been empirically established to show how relative levels of economic and military hard power are essential to the relative effectiveness of soft power. Thus the effectiveness of the soft power element of democracy is dependent on the availability of higher levels of economic and military power. Also, India's responsible policies in terms of contributing to public goods, from balance of power in Asia to preventing WMD proliferation and protection of global commons, are based on a strong foundation of economic and military power resources. The US made major policy changes in the latter period without obtaining comparable Indian responses. This could only happen because of India's soft power was rooted in its democracy, restraint and responsible policies. In the Nehru era, if US policies were solely determined by the realist perspective of hard power concerns, then US would not have extended limited aid: why should it have diverted resources to a weak state with incompatible strategic interests? But the US extended some aid because India was a weak democracy and needed to be saved from Communism. However, it was reluctant to provide more.

The study of the post-1998 period establishes the hypothesis that India's soft power rooted in its democracy and responsible strategic behaviour was more effective when based on the foundation of a higher level of economic and military hard power. In validating this hypothesis, this thesis has also shown how the realist logic of common interest and hard power concerns do not sufficiently explain India's limited economic and military assistance during the Nehru era and its policy of de-hyphenation, a nuclear exception for India, and extensive defence cooperation in the post-1998 period. Although India-Americans and their economic successes are a source of India's soft power, this factor does not explain the effectiveness of Indian soft power. There is no evidence that public opinion has played a really major role in *shaping* policy either in the Nehru or the post-1998 eras. Therefore in establishing the relationship between

relative effectiveness of soft power with higher/lower levels of hard power, it has rejected the null hypothesis that effective soft power has nothing to do with hard power. Soft power undergirded by hard power tends to work well; soft power without a foundation in hard power does not. India's nuclear tests of 1998 worked as a tipping point.

### *6.2.1 Theory*

The thesis has significant theoretical implications. First, its central theoretical contribution lies in presenting an empirical case study of soft power in the framework of a relational or causal analysis of power. The study establishes the causal relationship between India's potential soft power and preferred outcomes vis-à-vis the US. In exploring the causal mechanism of attraction (and limitedly, persuasion), it establishes the causal relationship between variation in hard power and the degree of success attained by the exercise of soft power (the dependent variable), which varied between the two periods. Thus it fills the gap that exists conceptually and empirically in relation to how and why soft power works. It concludes that the soft power of a country can usefully be analysed only *in action* in relation to another state and not simply as an attribute. As noted in Chapter 2, the relational approach to power does not dismiss the role of power resources (or bases). While these resources are important, it is more important that these resources be seen in relation to the behaviour of another state. Otherwise soft power remains potential.

Second, the debate on the relationship between soft and hard power has mostly been at the conceptual level. This study offers an empirical analysis of their relationship and is different from those that apply the smart power framework. Hard power is coercive, whereas soft power attracts and persuades. The concept of smart power focuses on their balanced combination. However, this thesis demonstrates by means of empirical evidence that *more effective soft power is rooted in higher levels of hard power resources*. India under Nehru was a weak state when compared to the post-1998 period.

India's ability to be more effective in terms of securing its preferences is explained by that difference.

Finally, this thesis does not replace a realist approach, but supplements and refines it. It shows that soft power is an important aspect of power generally, is dependent on hard power resources, and is yet a distinct category in its own right if properly understood. Soft power cannot be separated from hard power – the two go together.

### 6.2.2 Policy

How should a state invest in soft power? Some useful policy lessons emerge from this thesis. As this study has shown, the greater effectiveness of India's soft power lies in its higher level of economic and military power. Ashley Tellis reminds us that "nations that lack material power may occasionally command attention".<sup>2</sup> Thus it is important that a country remains economically and militarily strong. Only then can its soft power be influential.

*First, power is contextual.* While power resources are important, in order to make assessments of relative power, policymakers first need to know the context in relation to their interests. They need to know the issue that concerns them and others actors who are related to the issue and their preferences. Knowing this will make it easier for them to assess whether to use soft power of attraction and percussion or hard power of coercion and inducement or both (smart power). India's pacifist foreign policy enhanced its attraction for many Afro-Asian states suffering from colonialism and racialism. At the same time, such policy was derided by major powers.

*Second, for soft power, the means of attraction (also persuasion) is vital.* This means policymakers need to focus on producing attractive behaviour and mobilising resources

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<sup>2</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, "An Open Letter to Sushma Swaraj: Don't Let Political Diffidence Constrain MEA," *The Economic Times*, May 28, 2014, [http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-28/news/50149566\\_1\\_ptas-foreign-trade-trans-pacific-partnership](http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-28/news/50149566_1_ptas-foreign-trade-trans-pacific-partnership).

to that end. These resources need not be non-military and non-economic. Hard power resources can create the behaviour of attraction, depending on the context. A state, by mobilising its defence forces for the provision of security, assistance and protection, can be viewed as a responsible power and can thus generate soft power. Similarly, a state can credibly contribute to the regional or global balance only when it has sufficient economic and military power and be viewed as responsible by contributing to the common good. But a state which utilises soft power can achieve influence at low cost. By using defence forces appropriately, one can protect the global commons and emerge as a responsible power. To that end, one needs to be economically and militarily strong. Similarly, by providing economic aid and assistance, one can generate soft power.

Mobilisation of cultural resources for attraction needs to be seen in the context of a country's other indices of power, i.e., its economic growth, political stability and military power relative to the target state. From a position of relative weakness, cultural diplomacy will not produce any soft power. Independent India, despite possessing a rich and ancient civilisation, was seen very negatively by Americans, as noted in chapter 4. The target state's perception is important. For a country like India, indiscriminate cultural promotion around the world will not give it soft power, especially in light of its present economic, political and military weakness. Culture follows material success.

*Third, economic and military resources are foundations soft power.* Economic and military power not only enable a state to protect itself and minimise its vulnerability, they also provide a foundation for soft power projection. India's limited success in soft power during the Nehru era, it has been empirically shown, was because India lacked hard power resources, which limited the effect of its democracy. As a rising economic and military major power, India has been able to attract the US for favourable policies to an unprecedented level owing to its shared value of democracy and responsible behaviour.

*Fourth, military force is foundational.* Viewed in this sense, military force has differential utility in different contexts. In addition to its most basic role in the provision of security, it is vital for the effectiveness of soft power. Its judicious use for non-coercive purposes and for responsible behaviour such as the provision of public goods can bring enormous benefit through the soft power of attraction. Policymakers have to focus on how to use military power, on which issue, and vis-à-vis whom.

### **6.3 Future Directions**

This study has empirically established the inference that more effective soft power is dependent on high hard power. In doing so, it claims the wider validity of this inference. As John Lee points out, India's soft power in Southeast Asia is not based on "the growing popularity of Bollywood movies and Indian cuisine but on the fact that a rising India (unlike China) complements rather than challenges the preferred strategic, cultural and normative regional order".<sup>3</sup>

Can this argument be generalised with reference to other individual countries or in studies across countries? As this study has argued, it is important that a state aiming for greater soft power should have higher level of hard power resources. Equally important is how one uses these resources or what its preferences on their use are. Shared values and responsible behaviour based on high hard power generates high level of soft power of attraction whereas effectiveness of soft power is low based on low level of hard power.

The other side of the relationship between soft and hard power needs also to be investigated. Can soft power resources be *undermined* by the negative or inappropriate use of hard power? As long as China fails to assuage the perceived fear of its

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<sup>3</sup> John Lee, "Unrealised Potential: India's 'Soft Power' Ambition in Asia," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4(2010): 1.

hegemonic ambition in Asia, it will be perceived as malign, not responsible. As Evelyn Goh finds, China's "persuasive influence [in Southeast Asia] is still limited in that Beijing has not fully achieved its aim of strategic assurance or pacification". As she further notes, "China's neighbors are watching in particular how Beijing tries to prevail in more serious conflicts of interest".<sup>4</sup> It is argued that China lacks restraint in South China Sea.<sup>5</sup> It would be useful to explore China's relationship with ASEAN to falsify or validate the inference that soft power is dependent on the specific ways in which hard power is exercised.

One can study the relationship between culture and soft power and its relationship with hard power. Culture creates an enabling climate for the success of soft power largely in an indirect way. While this study has excluded cultural elements of the indirect soft power relationship between India and the US, it does not dismiss the importance of culture for soft power. But it argues that culture on its own, lacking hard power, cannot become an effective basis of soft power. This too needs to be confirmed or disconfirmed through detailed comparative study. Finally, there is scope for studying how soft power contributes to hard power. The field is wide open and it is hoped that this thesis makes a significant contribution to exploring it in times to come.

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<sup>4</sup> Evelyn Goh, "The Modes of China's Influence: Cases from Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey* 54: 5 (2014): 841-848.

<sup>5</sup> Alice Ba, "Managing the South China Sea Disputes: What Can ASEAN Do?" in *Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security Dimensions of the Dispute*, eds. Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen and Gregory B. Poling (Washington, DC.: Centre For Strategic and International Studies, 2014), [http://csis.org/files/publication/140930\\_Hiebert\\_PerspectivesSouthChinaSea\\_Web.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/140930_Hiebert_PerspectivesSouthChinaSea_Web.pdf).

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