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## **A Decade of *Hallyu* Scholarship: Toward a New Direction in *Hallyu 2.0***

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“I’ve only done this for 12 years, only for Korea, not for overseas at all...I didn’t expect anything like this. So what can I say? Everything moves way too fast.”  
—Psy, *The New York Times*, October 11, 2012.

On May 22, 2013, South Korean (hereafter Korean)<sup>1</sup>-born and U.S.-educated Korean pop musician Psy (Park Jae-sang) had an interview with MTV and told that he is wrapping up the promotional run of his “Gentleman” single in order to work on his first U.S. album (Montgomery 2013). His first global-targeted single “Gentleman” has already reached the fifth position on the Billboard singles chart, number one in Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, and Korea, and topped iTunes charts in over forty countries. “Gentleman” was a follow-up single of Psy’s hugely successful “Gangnam Style” which had stormed the world in the summer of 2012 (see Hu, this volume). “Gentleman” was his first attempt to prove that he is not a mere ‘one-hit wonder’ and the penetration of the seemingly unbreakable the U.S. pop music market was not an anecdote to the U.S. pop music history as what Los del Rio, Lou Bega, and Falco have already proved.<sup>2</sup> *The Huffington Post*, right before the release of “Gentleman,” questioned: “Will the Internet’s favorite pony dancer rise above one-hit-wonder designation? Will a new “Gentleman” themed dance craze sweep the globe?” (Anon. 2013). “Gentleman” has exceeded any previous record by becoming the fastest music video to reach 300 million views on YouTube after only three weeks of its initial release. As of December 2013, the music video marked 598 million hits on YouTube, becoming the most-viewed video of 2013 (Lewis 2013). “Gentleman” is still far less than the 1.9 billion views of “Gangnam Style” but enough to be placed as one of the year’s successful pop singles.

No one, even Psy himself, expected this wild success. Psy had been a stable pop musician in the Korean pop music industry since his debut single “Bird (*Sae*)” came out in 2001. “Gangnam Style” was initially composed and produced for Korean fans only but it became a global sensation through YouTube and the social media world. Major U.S. media outlets like *Time Magazine*, CNN, *The Wall Street Journal*, and *The Atlantic* have covered how the comic and upbeat dance track took over the world. Y.C. Park, a music producer in New York, said that this is the first time a Korean song is creating a real buzz. “It’s always been the Korean media hyping up the success of Korean singers in the U.S. Honestly,” he continued, “there was never any success, but (Psy) might serve as a

turning point for K-pop to get good exposure to the masses” (Han 2012). What is most striking in the Psy phenomenon is that he has long been considered a “domestic” celebrity, and had never been promoted as an export commodity by Korean entertainment agencies (Cho 2012).

Indeed, since 2008 the Korean pop (hereafter K-pop) music industry has been pouring human and monetary capital into the U.S. popular music industry in order to gain access to the market. The female pop star BoA, who has widely been popular in Korea and Japan, made her U.S. debut in 2008 with a song “Eat You Up.” However, the single disastrously flopped in that market (Jung 2011c). Se7en, a “king of K-pop” in Korea, also tested his luck at the U.S. market, releasing the English-language single “Girls,” featuring Lil’ Kim, in March 2009. Like BoA, he returned to Korea after “record low” sales of his single. Sun Jung, following BoA and Se7en’s dramatic failures in the United States, lamented that K-pop is still marginalized in the United States despite the Korean media’s continual reports of its global success stories. Jung writes, “It is still very rare to experience Korean popular culture on an everyday basis in any single city outside Asia” (123). But the situation is rapidly changing now, and by the time this volume is in print the whole K-pop industry may require a radically adjusted statement. The turning point was generated not in the U.S. or Asia but in Paris, France, to everyone’s surprise.

Five idol groups from the Korean entertainment agency S.M. Entertainment (hereafter S.M.)—*Dong Bang Shin Ki* (aka. TVXQ), Girls’ Generation (*So Nyeo Shi Dae*, a.k.a. SNSD), Super Junior, f(x), and SHINee—held their first concert in June 2011 at *Le Zenith de Paris*, and more than 14,000 fans from across Europe gathered to rave over K-pop. The first concert sold out in just 15 minutes when online booking opened on April 26, and hundreds of French fans who failed to get the tickets responded in protest by performing a dance flash mob in front of Louvre Museum (Cha and Kim 2011). S.M. had to schedule two more concerts, responding to the unexpected, explosive demand from the fans. Lee Teuk, the leader of Super Junior, an all-male idol band, said, “I think K-pop is gaining popularity thanks to S.M.’s global system, foreign composers and choreographers, and the singers’ appearances...It was also helped by social networking sites, such as YouTube” (Jung 2011,123). In February 2012, the Korean nine-girl pop group Girls’ Generation made their official U.S. debut, after their astounding success in Japan, on the stage of CBS’s *The Late Show with David Letterman*. Girls’ Generation’s U.S.-targeted single “The Boys,” composed by American music artist Teddy Riley with a final touch of Snoop Dogg, was released simultaneously. Girls’ Generation and its agency S.M. took a different strategy this time, after their valuable “lessons” from Paris, by actively using social media such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter as their new and most powerful marketing tools.

As Noh Kwang-woo analyzed in his innovative study on the transnational circulation of Girls’ Generation through YouTube, Korean entertainment agencies like S.M., JYP Entertainment (hereafter JYPE), YG Entertainment (hereafter YG), and Cube Entertainment (hereafter Cube) have become official YouTube users, being able to showcase their content directly to individual users through their YouTube channels. Since opening in March 2006, according to Noh, S.M.’s official YouTube channel has recorded more than 502 million visitors for music video views and more than 14.8 million discrete channel visits through August 5, 2011 (Noh 2011, 58).<sup>3</sup> But Girls’ Generation, despite its enormous popularity in social media networks, failed in the end to generate enough

“hype” to penetrate the U.S. pop market while “The Boys” sold more than 400,000 copies in Korea and reached the second spot on the Oricon Weekly Album Chart in Japan with a sales record of 100,000 copies. Why did Girls’ Generation fail in North America? Perhaps, as Roald Maliangkay argues in this book, the most successful K-pop formula itself—“uniformity in physical beauty, styling, music, and performance”—was not attractive enough, or “culturally odorless” (Iwabuchi 2002) and the “*chogukjeok* (trans- or cross-national)” localization (Jung 2011) of Girls’ Generation to appeal to the local U.S. consumer market did not work with the group’s target audience. Kyung Hyun Kim aptly pointed out, “the tendency and thinking so far seems to have been that you have to erase Korean identity somehow to achieve success in the US or overseas but I think that’s been proven wrong with Psy’s success” (Bevan 2012). Psy’s unexpected craze in cyberspace (and subsequent “hype” in the material world), along with K-pop idol groups’ popularity in Europe, suggests how the current global pop market landscape is changing dramatically. Music critic Solvej Schou wrote, “You may not understand a single word of South Korean rapper Psy’s club anthem ‘Gangnam Style,’ except for the only phrase in English, ‘Hey, sexy lady!’ but it doesn’t matter. Fifty million views on YouTube, for the song’s completely wacky, catchy, dance heavy video, need no translation. The tune, Ibiza-ready with a relentless synth beat, is a worldwide hit” (Schou 2012). K-pop girl groups’ uniformity, *chogukjeok* styles, and English-language songs—strategically planned, developed, and led by Korean entertainment agencies, most representatively S.M., JYPE, and YG—were not able to garner the U.S. mainstream audiences’ attention but unexpectedly deterritorialized virtual communities in social-media networks showed their grassroots power, and pushed *Hallyu*, the Korean Wave, into the new realm of what we call in this book *Hallyu 2.0*—a term explained in the latter part of this introduction.

*Hallyu* has evolved dramatically, as we briefly sketched using the case of Psy. Academic research and writing about *Hallyu* has also been flourishing since the early 2000s, in response to the stunning receptions of Korean TV dramas, films, and K-pop in Asia, Europe, and North America. Those who first noticed *Hallyu* as an academic subject were scholars working primarily in Asia (Chua 2004 and 2008; Lee 2004; Cho 2005; Lee 2005; Shim 2005 and 2006; Yin and Liew 2005; Jung 2006; Sung 2006; Iwabuchi and Chua 2008). Hong Kong University Press, in particular, has actively been introducing a series of edited volumes and monographs on the subject, including *East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave* (2008) which is one of the first English-language works on the subject.<sup>4</sup> In Australia, *Complicated Currents: Media Flows, Soft Powers and East Asia* was published in 2010, based on an international conference held at Monash University, and the volume explores transnational production and consumption of media products in East Asia, but paying particular attention to *Hallyu*. Do Kyun Kim and Min-Sun Kim, on the other hand, edited a book in English for Seoul National University Press entitled *Hallyu: Influence of Korean Popular Culture in Asia and Beyond* (2011). Regarding the U.S. publishing market, Mark James Russell’s *Pop Goes Korea: Behind the Revolution in Movies, Music, and Internet Culture* (2008) tells a story of the rapid growth and “wild success” of Korean popular culture by providing rich and vivid case studies of online gaming, films, music, TV dramas, and animations. There is, however, still no book-length study on the latter stage of *Hallyu*, “the fourth wave” (Jung, this volume), published in English by the time we were editing this book.<sup>5</sup>

*Hallyu 2.0: Korean Wave in the Age of Social Media*, to this end, sought to comprehend and interpret the meaning of this new and powerful cultural industry in the digital era. Contributors to this book explore the ways in which Korean popular cultural products, focusing primarily on K-pop and TV dramas, have been circulated, disseminated, and consumed by audiences around the globe; how Korean popular cultural products are encountering new fans, markets, and consumers through social media networks like YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and web-based video streaming services and torrent download sites; and how we interpret, analyze, and forecast this unprecedented cultural phenomenon. The aim of this introductory chapter is, as a first step, to trace the decade of *Hallyu* scholarship produced around the globe, focusing primarily on the English-speaking academia, from North America and UK to the Asia-Pacific. This chapter will describe four distinct phases of *Hallyu* scholarship; 1) the initial stage when the scholars sought to define *Hallyu*, why and to what extent Asians are craving Korean popular cultural content, and the collective desire to utilize *Hallyu* as the nation's new engine of sustainable growth, 2) appropriating *Hallyu* as a sign of global shifts, from the cultural imperialism school's approach, to the Hollywoodization of the world, to the perspective of re-centering globalization/reverse cultural imperialism in the new millennium, 3) *Hallyu* as a dynamic inter-Asian cultural flow and, finally, 4) situating *Hallyu* in the age of social media and embracing the notion of *Hallyu 2.0*. The following section begins with the initial scholarly responses on *Hallyu* in the early 2000s.

### **What is *Hallyu*? And What Should Korea Do With It?**

Jim Dator and Yongseok Seo (2004) begin their article, "Asia is awash in a wave of popular culture products gushing out of South Korea. Youth in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan, as well as Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, are agog at the sights and sounds of H.O.T., S.E.S., Shinhwa, god, and JTL" (31). Fans, scholars, entrepreneurs, and policy makers in Korea were altogether surprised, excited, and proud of the sudden explosion of Korean "low" cultures in adjacent countries, the Korean pop music craze in China in particular. Cho Yong-sik, a staff reporter of *The Korea Herald*, wrote:

Back in 1965, the Beatles were named "members of the most excellent order of the British Empire." Today, if Korea were to award the equivalent of British knighthood to a Korean celebrity, the first person on the list would be actor-cum-singer Ahn Jae-wook, who may have accomplished something that no politician, businessman nor diplomat could ever do for a nation...Ahn now commands unrivaled popularity in China, having surpassed Leonardo DiCaprio as the most popular celebrity in a recent poll (Cited in Cho 2005, 151).

Ahn Jae-wook and other "first wave" of K-pop idol groups (Jung, this volume) such as Clon, H.O.T. and NRG as well as Korean TV dramas—particularly *What is Love* (*Sarang i mwöggillae*, 1992) and *Star in My Heart* (*Pyöl ün nae kasüm e*, 1997)—and Korean films *My Sassy Girl* (*Yöpkijögin künyö*, 2001) and *My Tutor Friend* (*Tonggap naegi kwaoe hagi*, 2003) in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, ignited the so-called Korean Wave, or *Hallyu* (*Hanliu* in Chinese romanization). The term *Hallyu* was first coined by Chinese media in 1998 to describe Chinese youths' sudden craze for Korean popular-

culture products. *Hallyu* floated to the other side of Asia as well. After its initial airing in Japan in 2003, the soap opera *Winter Sonata* (*Kyŏul yŏn'ga*, 2002) drove Japanese audiences into something of a frenzy (Chung, this volume). The unexpected hype *Winter Sonata* ignited and the subsequent “Yon-sama (Bae Yong-joon; *Pae Yong-jun*) phenomenon” among Japanese middle-aged female audiences (Jung 2006; Kim 2006; Hanaki et al 2007; Han 2008; Mori 2008; Han and Lee 2010; Tokita 2010; Lee and Ju 2011) and the critical and commercial success of Korean films — notably *Oldboy* (2003), *Memories of Murder* (*Sarin ŭi ch'uŏk*, 2003), and *Spring, Summer, Fall, Winter ... and Spring* (*Pom yŏrŭm kaŭl kyŏul kŭrigo pom*, 2003) — in the global media market in the early 2000s (Shin 2005; Jin 2006; Klein 2008; Shim 2008; Shin 2008; Choi 2010; Park 2010; Yecies 2010) transformed the direction of the Korean media industry, government policy, and academic research altogether. Seoul, all of the sudden, became a “media capital” (Curtin, 2003).

Scholars in Korea, respectively, have begun to analyze the transnational appeal of Korean popular cultural products in Asia. The early phase of *Hallyu* scholarship defined it as a regional phenomenon and maintained almost identical questions, such as “What is *Hallyu*?,” “Why are Asians consuming Korean pop songs and TV dramas?,” and simply “Why now?” The notion of “geo-linguistic region” was among the first to be adapted to answer the queries. John Sinclair (1996) argued that “geo-linguistic region” referred to “all the countries throughout the world in which the same language is spoken” and, he argued, “Just as the United States dominates the English-Speaking world, so there are other notable instances where the country with the largest number of speakers of a particular language in its domestic market is also the source of most audiovisual exports in their language” (42). Korean language was, however, not widely spoken and only ethnic Koreans could communicate with each other. The immensely popular Korean period-drama series *Jewel in the Palace* (*Tae Changgŭm*, 2003-2004) was, hence, dubbed into Mandarin in Taiwan and Cantonese in Hong Kong. Hong Kong-based TVB (Television Broadcasts Limited), the largest distributor of Chinese-language television programs in the world, even intervened to provide additional explanations in Cantonese voice-overs, which amounted to, Chua Beng Huat argued, “domesticating and localizing practices” (2011, 228-229).

“Cultural proximity,” Joseph Straubhaar’s term (1991), was considered more appropriate to decipher the phenomenon. Korea possessed, in some ways, a “cultural proximity,” which is a comparative advantage factor based on cultural similarities with other Asian countries that go beyond language, including such elements as dress, nonverbal communication, humor, religion, music, and food. Myriad scholars have argued that traditional values and Confucian ethics—such as harmony, community, strong morality, and respect for family ties—attract cultural consumers in East Asia (Jeon 2006; Shin 2006a; Shin 2006b; Hanaki et al. 2007; Jung 2009; Yun 2009). *Hallyu* in Japan is an appropriate case for this explanation. Japanese middle-aged women, Yang Jonghoe wrote, found in Korean dramas “their old-fashioned values such as respect for family and kinship networks, restrained expression of love, and pure love” (Yang 2012, 110). As *Hallyu* has swept to more remote corners of the world, however, the “Asianness” of Korean popular cultural products could no longer explain the unexpected enthusiasts of K-pop and television dramas in the world outside of Asia. Sociologist John Lie, in this regard, acutely discussed three factors that have brought K-pop to the world.

First, K-pop filled a niche between the “urbanized and sexualized” American pop music and more local, national traditions of popular music in Asia and beyond. Second, the Korean state has backed the Korean Wave and K-pop. Lastly, K-pop had high production value (Lie 2012, 355-359). As Lie pertinently argued, since the late 2000s, S.M., YG, JYPE, and other talent agencies have been manufactured collectively by artists and producers from global music industries,<sup>6</sup> and K-pop is no longer distinctively Korean or “something that can be universalized for the rest of Asia” (Oh and Park 2012, 392). K-pop became a new “export product” that follows a pattern with Korea products that have broad appeal because of “the combination of reasonable and dependable quality” (Lie, 359; Choi 2013).

### **Korea, *Hallyu*, and the World**

*Hallyu* has transformed Korea’s perspectives on the world, from the West to East. And it was at the same time that the Asian market emerged as the nation’s new engine of sustainable growth. Asia has not been regarded as the major market for Korea for many years due to its nearly exclusive alliance with the West. Asia was just an invisible, dark region for Koreans, because the major target for products has been consumers in developed countries—that is, Western markets. However, like other Asian countries such as Japan and Taiwan, Korea turned its attention to the Asian marketplace during the late 1990s, after having ignored it since the 1960s. It was at this moment that the government embraced the “Globalization” slogan as a reaction to the economic globalization process, as Samuel S. Kim has illustrated in his innovative study *Korea’s Globalization* (2000). In 2003, contrary to previous presidents’ political slogans, “Globalization” (Kim Youngsam’s *Segyehwa*) and inter-Korean issues (Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy), president Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)’s government proclaimed “an era of Northeast Asia,” and Roh himself emphasized that Korea must participate actively in the new era (Shin 2006). Roh’s policy and current trends in the Asian film marketplace have affected the nation-bound Korean film and media industries. Lee Myung-bBak (2008-2013), entrepreneur-cum-president, accentuated business effectiveness, neoliberalism, and export-driven policy that have affected every sector of Korean society. Recent discourse on the Asian cultural market, on that account, suggests that *Hallyu* should co-operate with Korea’s global corporations, IT businesses, and the government’s foreign policies to penetrate Asian markets and exploit maximum profits to build a “Global Korea” (Kim et al, 2007; Kim et al, 2009; Ryoo 2009; Joo 2011; Lie 2012; Choi 2013; Nam 2013; Lee 2013). The culture industry has, Youna Kim (2006) stated, “taken center-stage in Korea, with an increased recognition that the export of media and cultural products not only boost the economy but also promotes the nation’s image” (124). Kim Joo-sung, President of CJ Entertainment, the most influential media conglomerate in Korea, remarked:

The ultimate goal of the media business in CJ Entertainment is to produce and supply the best-quality contents in Asia, and grow to become “Asia’s number one total entertainment group.” We want to be recognized alongside the pre-existing industrial players like semiconductor, manufacturers, shipbuilding companies, and automobile manufacturers, as one of the “world’s best Korean companies” (Korean Film Council 2007: 106).

In line with this, the Korean Government established the Korea Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) in order to orchestrate all governmental and private endeavors in the making of *Hallyu*. According to the official document, KOFICE proclaims its aims and purposes:

Different countries around the world are cultivating their cultural industries competitively. They are in an intense competition to take cultural industries as the means to revive the nation's economy and to step onto the global stage. Korea, too, is focusing on the unlimited potential of its cultural industry and has recognized the cultural industry as a new growth engine (KOFICE 2008, cited in Nam 2013, 221)

Academic-industry collaboration, upon this logic, has been flourishing in Korea for the last several years. The Korean government has poured an enormous amount of research grants, fellowships, and financial supports and incentives to selective research institutes and universities. According to Choi Young-Hwa (2013), the number of new academic departments in the universities named “cultural industries,” “culture and contents,” “cinematic contents,” “digital contents,” and “digital culture and contents” have skyrocketed, from 932 in 2006 to 1,478 in 2010.<sup>7</sup> While those new and/or refurbished departments are churning out college-educated cultural workers who have been trained to produce “*Hallyu* contents,” government-funded and non-profit academic organizations have lured scholars in virtually all disciplines in Korea and even beyond.<sup>8</sup> “It is impossible to be critical,” Choi lamented, “as almost all academic disciplines in Korea have received grants from the government for researching the strategies and creating cultural contents for sustainable development of *Hallyu*” (271). *Hallyu* discourse in Korea therefore soon migrated from the initial cultural/media studies approach to the realm of economics, business, science and technology, and tourism that emphasize, Hyun Mee Kim (2005) pointed out, “the universal superiority of Korean culture or the economic effect of the phenomenon based on economism,” and there was little study of “the actual processes behind this pop culture flow in each specific locale” (184). Kyung Hyun Kim (2011) also noted that most of the essays on *Hallyu*, even in the English language ones, have placed “an excessive emphasis on data that range from numbers of foreign tourists to various annual figures from the entertainment industry” (4). Seung-Hye Sohn (2009), after analyzing more than 250 academic articles on *Hallyu* written in Korean, claimed that academic discourse in Korea has rapidly transformed to explore the possible contributions *Hallyu* can make to boost the nation's economy.

A group of scholars, however, have recently been critical of the intervention of the government in the formation of *Hallyu* and its desire to promote Korea's new international identity through cultural products (Williamson 2011). The Korean government has become “a promoter of popular culture” (Lie 359) and therefore *Hallyu* should be considered as a “cultural formation” rather than a popular “cultural trend” (Choi 2013). *Hallyu* as a “national campaign,” or “corporate-state project” is, JungBong Choi argues in this book, “helmed by a handful of entrepreneurs, mainstream media, state bureaucrats, and professional consultants, mostly based in Korea” (Choi, pages TBA). Contrary to the collective desire to comprehend and utilize *Hallyu* as the nation's new engine of growth, predominantly among scholars in Korea, the pages that follow shift the

regional entity and discuss three interlocking, but not necessarily chronological, phases of *Hallyu* discourses in the English-speaking academia.

### **Globalization, Hybridity, and *Hallyu***

Globalization and the postcolonial notion of hybridity were among the first theoretical frames that had actively been adapted to the discourses on *Hallyu* in the English-speaking academia. Having departed from the initial explanations and analyses of *Hallyu* generated in Korea and being largely based on neoliberal thinking and cultural nationalism, the first wave of *Hallyu* scholarship in English embraced the notion of globalization, hybridity, and regional/transnational/transcultural media flows of Korean cultural products, notably film, television drama, and popular music, in and beyond Asia.

The 1990s' phenomenal buzzword, "globalization," is often understood as "time-space compression" (Harvey 1990) or "complex connectivity" (Tomlinson 1999) that has accelerated the cross-border movement of capital, commodities, and people, and as a result brought the world closer than ever before. It is, more often than not, perceived as an economic experience encircling such trends as economic liberalization, deregulation, and the heightened mobility of capital, commodities, services, and labor around the world. In the field of cinema, media, and communication studies, globalization is, based on a political-economy approach, often a synonym for media-imperialism, i.e. the *Disneyization* (Wasko 2001; Bryman 2004) or *Hollywoodization* of the world (Guback 1969; Schiller 1976; Mattelart 1979; Tomlinson 1991; Miller et al, 2005). The media imperialism school's basic thesis is that, following Herbert Schiller's classic definition, "under the aegis of world system," there is only "a one-directional flow of information from core to periphery and it represents the reality of power" (Schiller 1976: 5-6). This notion of media imperialism has been criticized for its rather simplified view that the globalization process involves a cultural homogenization that is destroying the autonomy of indigenous cultures. It is, however, still a widely circulating concept, especially for countries where the Hollywood image industry dominates the local market.

Accordingly, for the 1990s' Korean society globalization was perceived as another name for American cultural imperialism. The wave of globalization during this period pressured Korean government to open the door of its film market (Yecies 2007), and it initially faced strong resistance within the domestic realm. Hyangjin Lee's *Contemporary Korean Cinema* (2001), arguably the first English-language book on Korean cinema, is the most representative in this regard. At the time she was writing the manuscript, Lee could not aware of the Korean media's global outreach on the cusp of the new millennium, and viewed the nation's cinema as prey to Hollywood's global domination, i.e. its ever-expanding capitalist mode of accumulation. The opening up of the Korean market to foreign film distribution companies in 1987, Lee argued, "worsened the already shrinking Korean film industry," Her hope lay in the young filmmakers of the 1980s, who had been armed with historical consciousness and initiated the National Film Movement (Lee 2001, 57). Kyung Hyun Kim had an almost identical concern. He claimed: "The Korean film marketplace was effectively 'liberalized' without consulting filmmakers themselves, and the national cinema now had to fight a battle to protect its backyard, with the home team advantage removed" (Kim 2001, 34).

Interestingly enough, within a decade, the whole scholarship of Korean cinema and media in Anglophone academia has thoroughly and completely transformed. Arriving after film scholars like Kim and Lee, the first wave of *Hallyu* critics were

writing their works after the *Winter Sonata* phenomenon in Japan in 2004, and the “new” Korean cinema and media had successfully defended itself from the influx of Hollywood capital, and even achieved a renaissance. Jeeyoung Shin states: “South Korean cinema has undergone remarkable growth over the past decade. By substantially improving technical and aesthetic qualities, and by responding to the sensibilities of contemporary Koreans, recent Korean films have distinguished themselves from their predecessors” (Shin 2005, 51). Various *Hallyu* scholars holding distinctly new perspectives are now arguing that the globalization itself, in the end, benefited Korean media, as the industry is now celebrating its global recognition and enjoying multiple penetrations to adjacent markets and beyond. Doobo Shim argues that the current commercial success of Korean media is “an outgrowth of Korea’s struggle for cultural continuity when confronted by the threat of global cultural domination” (Shim 2005, 31). That is, Korean media industries emulated and appropriated the American media system during the 1990s and early 2000s to survive with the mantra “Learning from Hollywood” (32) and, in that process, as Eun-Young Jung noted, “cultural hybridization has occurred as local cultural agents and actors interact and negotiate with global forms, using them as resources through which Koreans construct their own cultural spaces” (Jung 2009, 38). In other words, neoliberal policy in the end helped to build up Korean cinema and media’s global competitiveness.

Therefore, if we accept this collective assertion, *Hallyu* is a method for dismantling the whole scholarship of critical globalization studies, in collaboration with the reverse cultural imperialism school, reorienting/re-centering globalization practitioners, and cultural pluralism theoreticians who are arguing that the predominant center-periphery perspective cannot explain global media relations today and a new epoch of cultural pluralism has now arrived (Straubhar 1991; Chadha and Kavoori 2000; Park and Curran 2000; Iwabuchi 2002; Jin 2006; Curtin 2007). The *Hallyu* phenomenon, in this logic, should be seen as a way to counter the threat of the Western-dominated media market.

### ***Hallyu* as Dynamic Inter-Asian Cultural Flow**

Inspired by Hae-joang Cho (2005), Korea-based cultural critic Keehyeung Lee suggests that the *Hallyu* phenomenon be situated “in the larger context of transnational cultural formations in the making,” and is for furthering “the inter-regional cultural understanding and dialogues” (Lee 2005, 6). He understands *Hallyu* as an opportunity for building a step towards cultural regionalization (19). Lee and Cho, along with Shim (2005), and Jung (2009), are indebted to Koichi Iwabuchi and Chua Beng Huat, two prominent cultural critics on the analysis of transnational cultural flow in Asia. Singapore-based sociologist Chua has published a series of studies on East Asian popular cultural flow since 2004, when he first introduced his seminal concept of “East Asian popular culture” in an essay entitled, “Conceptualizing an East Asian Popular Culture.” He has since revised the essay continuously. In his most recent update, Chua wrote:

At least since the 1980s, regionally produced pop culture products have criss-crossed the national borders of East Asian countries and constitute a significant part of the routine consumer culture of the regional population. Side by side with American pop culture, in every major urban center in East Asia—Hong Kong, Tokyo, Seoul, Singapore, Shanghai, and Taipei—there are dense flows of pop

culture products from the same centers into one another, although the directions and volumes of flows vary unevenly among them...this thick and intensifying traffic between transnational locations—the economics of this cultural industry, the boundary crossing of products, the criss-crossing of artistes not only geographically but across different media, and the multiple media and modes of consumption of audiences in different locations—lends substance to and warrants the concept of “East Asian Popular Culture” as an object of analysis (Chua 2011, 224).

Partly inspired by Arjun Appadurai (1990), whose five “scapes”—ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, finanscape, and ideoscape—refer to the progressively more frequent movement from one location to another of people, media, information, image, ideologies, technology, financial information, and world views, Chua argues that with the apparent existence of American popular culture’s influences throughout the regions there are dense flows of cultural products from every major urban center in East Asia. Hence, recent Asian cultural productions are dealing with this new Asian generation that enjoys popular culture from other Asian countries. Iwabuchi’s argument (2004) is, from this point of view, a highly appropriate one. He states: “What has become more prominent is the emergence of popular Asianism and Asian dialogues whose main feature is not Asian values or traditional culture but capitalist consumer/popular culture,” and he rejects the idea that the “impact of West-dominated cultural globalization homogenizes Asian cultures, or indeed that Asia can simply replicate Western modernities” (Iwabuchi 2004, 2). Having focused on the significant popularities of the Japanese “trendy drama” that was ignited by 1992’s *Tokyo Love Story* in Taiwan, Singapore and Korea, Iwabuchi’s earlier work (2002) claims that Japanese soap operas that were popular in Taiwan around 2000 had a different status from Western popular culture, like the Hollywood movies that dominated the Taiwanese market back in the postwar period. He points out that Taiwanese audiences accepted Japanese popular culture as a part of Asian culture because it had had a similar experience of modernization. After the *Winter Sonata* craze in Japan—along with *Jewel in the Palace*, *Full House* (*P’ul hausŭ*, 2004) and *The 1st Shop of Coffee Prince* (*K’ŏp’i P’ŭrinsŭ 1-hojŏm*, 2007) in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore in mid-2000s—Korean television dramas have rapidly replaced Japanese and Hong Kong products and became part of the daily programming of many free-to-air and satellite television stations in East Asia and, thus, part of the routine viewing habits of their respective audiences (Chua and Iwabuchi 2008, 2). Iwabuchi, Chua, and other scholars on the inter-Asian cultural product flow have, accordingly, slowly but steadily migrated to the study of *Hallyu*.

A new group of researchers in Korea, namely the “culturalists” (Lee 2005), emerged in this circumstance, tracing and resituating the emergence of *Hallyu* as a “complex trans-border cultural phenomenon and formation in the era of poly-centered cultural production” (15). Accordingly, empirically-based research have been published in recent years, with subjects as varied as Korean TV dramas and pop music in Taiwan (Kim 2005; Sung 2006), analysis of Korean ‘trendy drama’ and its Japanese counterpart (Lee 2004 and 2010), Korean American youth’s reception of Korean TV dramas and pop culture (Park 2004), and the Chinese new generation’s consumption of Korean popular culture (Yin and Liew 2005; Pease 2006 and 2010; Maliangkay 2010). This wave of

cultural studies scholars has shown that inter-Asian cultural consumption has brought about new kinds of cross-border relationships, mutual understanding and self-reflexivity about people's own society and culture. But, once again, the whole scholarship of *Hallyu* transformed again around late 2000s as *Hallyu* entered its new and latest wave: K-pop and social media.

### ***Hallyu 2.0: the Korean Wave in the Age of Social Media***

By the late 2000s *Hallyu* discourse in the English-speaking academia had significantly been weakened. Scholars in the field of Asian studies, Communications, and Cultural studies claimed that *Hallyu*, or the Korean Wave, had already been significantly studied and written about, and even regarded that *Hallyu* is "all but dead" (Oh and Park 2012, 366). The new *Hallyu* movement, surprisingly enough, came with a catch phrase: "sorry sorry sorry" from an international hit song "Sorry Sorry" by Super Junior in 2009. As Jung suggested in this book, "While the earlier phase of *Hallyu* (from the late 1990s to mid 2000s) was driven mainly by numerous television drama hits throughout Asia and among overseas Asian communities, the latest *Hallyu* development has been led by a relatively small sector of Korean pop music known as K-pop idol bands, which have been attracting a broader range of fans around the world." (PAGE). The development of socio-technological innovations, epitomized by social media networking services and video sharing sites provided platforms to disseminate K-pop products around the world at an unprecedented pace.

K-pop idol bands such as Big Bang, 2AM, 2PM, 2NE1, Girls' Generation, SHINee, JYJ, Super Junior and Wonder Girls, with the accelerating engines of scientifically planned/managed entertainment agencies like S.M., JYPE, YG, and Cube, rapidly established their status in the global entertainment industry by adopting new digital technologies and utilizing social-media spaces. Young-min Kim, chief executive of S.M., said:

Five years ago, if we wanted to launch and promote an artist, we had to follow a traditional path and work with traditional media like TV, but these days, with the rise of Internet media like You Tube, even before our talent leaves Korea, a lot of fans have a chance to watch them (Ramstad 2011).

Fans all around world also participate in fandom activities through social media, as Jung's essay in this volume explains, using examples like K-pop flash-mob contests, K-pop cover-dance contests, and music festivals all over the world, including New York, Chicago, Milan, London, Paris, Mexico City, and Dubai. The current wave formation of *Hallyu* is "an intriguing example of how both the industry and the consumers successfully transform themselves into equally important players in the global game of social networking" (Jung, PAGE). The era of *Hallyu 2.0* began at this juncture. The term "*Hallyu 2.0*" first appeared in August 2010. NHK, FUJI TV, and Japanese newspapers named "the second invasion of *Hallyu*" after the showcase of Girls' Generation at Ariake Colosseum in Tokyo. Korean media have competitively analyzed, appropriated, and glorified the success of K-pop musicians and their new status as global pop stars ever since then. According to *MK Business News*:

The first *Hallyu* generation began with the representative drama, *Winter Sonata*. However, since the end of 2009, the *Hallyu* wave has expanded to music, musicals, and theater... The first wave was led by male stars, but the concept has expanded to now include female stars as well. The fanbase has also expanded to include all age groups as opposed to the previous fanbase of women in their 30's and 40's... The *Hallyu* wave was previously focused on just East Asia, but has now reached out into the world such as Uzbekistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Romania (Huh 2010).

While *Hallyu* 1.0 is a one-way flow of Korean pop culture from artist to fans in Asia and was ignited by the *Winter Sonata* phenomenon in Japan and the popularity of male pop stars in China (Jung 2011b; Jung and Hirata 2012), *Hallyu* 2.0 came with digital technologies. DalYong Jin, in this volume, defines *Hallyu* 2.0 by stating that it is “the combination of social media, their techniques and practices, and the uses and affordances they provide, and this new stage has been made possible because Korea has advanced its digital technologies” (Jin, pages TBA). Consuming patterns and demographic changes in its fandom, from middle-aged consumers of Korean dramas in Japan to teens and twenties in the virtual world as the core group, are indeed two distinctive departing point from the previous *Hallyu* 1.0. *Hallyu* 2.0, however, should not be defined as simply an upgraded version or replacement of the preceding *Hallyu* 1.0 nor should it contribute to the government’s new “institutional campaign” either. Instead *Hallyu* 2.0 should be understood as a new perspective of comprehending this unparalleled cultural phenomenon by scrutinizing the ways in which Korean popular-cultural products are embracing new fans, markets, and consumers and how we interpret, analyze, and forecast the novel phase of *Hallyu* in the age of social media and participatory media cultures. Our volume, however, does not claim to be comprehensive. In particular, film, online gaming and gambling, and fashion and lifestyle remain under-explored, compared to our extensive coverage of K-pop and TV dramas. The limitation this book has is reflected in the broader field of *Hallyu* studies. We hope that forthcoming articles, monographs, and edited volumes fill the void and enrich this ever-growing field of *Hallyu* 2.0.

### **Themes and Essays**

The chapters in this book are arranged into four thematically linked sections. Essays in the first part of the book explore new perspectives on *Hallyu* 2.0 by setting the agendas, theorizing the concept, problematizing the role of the state, and the multi-facet meanings of consuming and disseminating Korean popular cultural products. JungBong Choi defines *Hallyu* as the phenomenal success of Korean cultures in overseas market, then discusses two manifestations of *Hallyu*: as a transnational cultural phenomenon and as a national-institutional campaign. Concerning *Hallyu* as a transnational cultural phenomenon, Choi looks into the “productive” role played by what has been normally referred to as consumers (or audiences, fans, users, so on) vis-à-vis that of content producers based in Korea. He draws on various cases that demonstrate how the growing creative control of fans, enthusiasts, and users correlates with the pervasive use of social media. Choi then moves to discuss the other *Hallyu*, the national-institutional campaign. As this introduction has already discussed extensively, *Hallyu* has been strategically produced and reproduced, as it is strongly supported from diverse government organizations, large corporations, mainstream media, state bureaucrats, professional

consultants, and the academic world, mostly based in Korea. Choi boldly argues, “*Hallyu* is less a unified phenomenon than a meeting of two distinct waves: one risen by people outside Korea, the other by powerful institutions in Korea with a nation-wide consensus. One is a labor of individual passion, while the other principally of collective, social desire. One seems innocuous, the other inexorable” (pages TBA). Dal Yong Jin’s chapter, on the other hand, provides an innovative perspective that asks why we need to emphasize *Hallyu* 2.0 in the context of creative industries, particularly intellectual property (IP) rights. By mapping out the issues of IP rights in conjunction with the rapid growth of social-network services and smartphones, Jin discusses whether Korea has developed its strength in the global market in the context of the *Hallyu* 2.0 phenomenon. He raises the question of why IP rights should be a major consideration in order to shift the emphasis primarily from the flow of cultural products to the inclusion of the significance of platforms and intellectual property. Throughout the chapter, Jin claims that we need to extend our scope to new areas, not only cultural flows, but also institutional and historical issues in order to fully grasp the new Korean Wave – *Hallyu* 2.0.

Essays in the second part bring the readers into the realm of K-pop. Each essay takes different accounts that situate K-pop in new academic arenas—historicizing the wave(s) of K-pop, collective fan movements against the powerful and tyrannical entertainment agencies, and the packaging of K-pop idol groups. Doobo Shim (2010) cautiously noted that “the glory days of the Korean drama may have passed.” He, nevertheless, continued, “audiences gradually search for sources of entertainment other than television dramas” (130). As most of our contributors have expressed throughout the volume, K-pop is currently the single most important driving force of *Hallyu* 2.0. Eun-Young Jung’s chapter serves as the guiding post to map out and historicize this global phenomenon. She impeccably surveys multiple waves of K-pop, from the pre-social media explosion era of the late 1990s and early 2000s to the current *Hallyu* K-pop (her term), and explores how the K-pop music industry, K-pop idols, and those idols’ transnational fans have successfully deployed social media and accelerated the transnational K-pop presence, placing it under a bright spotlight in the contemporary transnational popular culture scene. Roald Maliangkay and Seung-Ah Lee analyze the heart of K-pop system: Korean boy and girl bands and their manufacturer - the entertainment agencies like S.M., YG, and JYPE. Roald Maliangkay provides a fresh perspective on the formation of Korean all-girl groups that has proven to be the most successful K-pop formula: summed up as uniformity in physical beauty, styling, music, and performance. Throughout the essay, Maliangkay analyzes how all-girl acts have been packaged over the years in order to target specific audiences and meet their expectations, and deliberates how bands manage to compete in an arguably conformist environment. In his conclusion, Maliangkay states, “I expect that as K-pop further develops, a greater number of female idols will seek ownership of their work and by doing so actually resist the hegemony, much like the boy band JYJ has done in recent years.” (PAGE). Seung-Ah Lee’s chapter begins right at this point. As a veteran practitioner and a noted fan of JYJ (Jaejoong, Yoochun, and Junsu) who has already written numerous essays on the subject in Korea, Lee, with an insider’s perspective, discusses the all-male idol group JYJ, and unveils the hidden, ugly face of entertainment agency S.M., a powerful industrial machine that maintains complete control over the products it manufactures—the dancing

and singing teenage boys and girls who are carefully marketed as “idol groups.” Myriad scholars have admitted that K-pop has a high production value and praised Korea’s unique system of producing idol bands but the dark side of the system has rarely been studied. Lee’s highly informative chapter, in view of this, will give the readers a new perspective on the K-pop industry. Throughout this vividly written chronology of JYJ and fan’s trajectories, Lee views the JYJ fandom as an emerging social movement, paying particular attention to the way the JYJ fandom troubles a clear distinction between mainstream popular culture and counterculture.

The third group of essays, Korean TV drama and social media, takes a broader view of the cultural-textual-industrial geography of *Hallyu*, focusing on the anatomy of the interactive nature of Korean television drama production, the textual and meta-textual spaces of *Hallyu*, and the history of consumption and distribution of Korean TV dramas in the U.S. Youjeong Oh’s chapter introduces the reader deep inside the *Hallyu* factory: Korea’s primetime television drama production scenes. Having conducted in-depth ethnographic research of *DC Inside*, one of the biggest online communities in Korea, and the creative personnel in the Korean TV drama production, Oh examines the live production system, which is a unique norm in the Korean drama industry, and the rise of social media that has fostered the practices of discursive consumption of Korean TV dramas. Under the live production system in Korea, two episodes are produced weekly for the following week’s broadcasting and that entails interesting twists; while the last-minute production imposes immense workload to workers, and thus rests on labor exploitation, it also carries room for audience participation in the making of dramas. Therefore viewers/fans of Korean TV dramas actively share the experiences of drama watching, discuss stories and characters, and suggest hoped-for plots and endings. More interestingly, unlike the U.S. media industry, the fan’s responses actually affected the production of TV dramas. Due to the practices of live production, Oh’s innovative study reveals that “Korean drama producers actually change ongoing narratives in response to viewer ratings and reactions to previous episodes” (pages TBA). Michelle Cho examines the recent cycle of Korean TV dramas that narrate about the mass media, culture industries, celebrity-construction, pop idols and publicity. In other words, metatextuality has become a fixture in Korean popular culture, particularly films and TV dramas such as *Rough Cut* (*Yŏnghwa nŭn yŏnghwa ta*, 2008), *200 Pounds Beauty* (*Minyŏ nŭn koerowŏ*, 2006), *Worlds Within* (*Kŭdŭl i sanŭn sesang; a.k.a. The World That They Live In*, 2008), *You’re Beautiful* (*Minam Isineyo*, 2009), *Dream High* (*Tŭrim hai*, 2011), and *The King of Dramas* (*Dŭrama ũi chewang*, 2012). Having analyzed two recent Korean TV dramas, *Oh! My Lady* (*O! Mai leidi*, 2010) and *The Greatest Love* (*Ch’oego ũi Sarang*, 2011) that dramatize *Hallyu* idol celebrity culture, Cho carefully investigates social media’s disciplinary power and regimes of self-representation and the ways in which two TV dramas above incorporate fan dynamics and the demands on the star as a commodified body into their narratives. Cho argues, “Korean TV drama’s current obsession with metatextuality suggests that media consumption remains a dynamic and contested arena for the construction of models of public participation and social relations, rather than a monolithic apparatus for shaping consumer behavior” (pages TBA). While Oh and Cho delineate the domestic and virtual realm of Korean TV production and consumption, Sangjoon Lee invites us to the U.S. media industry. Lee traces the history of Korean television dramas’ distribution, circulation, and consumption in the United State, from

Korean-language television stations and video rental stores exclusively for Korean diasporas, to YouTube, Hulu, and the first legitimate video-streaming website DramaFever. Lee argues that before the new millennium Korean television dramas had only been distributed, circulated, and consumed by Korean immigrants (mostly first-generation) and students studying abroad (*yuhaksaeng*) until *Hallyu* arrived at America's two coasts with the help of digital technologies. In the second half of the chapter, Lee examines DramaFever, Viki, Crunchyroll and many other legitimate/illegitimate video streaming websites that have actively been distributing Korean TV dramas in the U.S.

The final set of essays begin with Hye Seung Chung. Instead of accounting for the economic and cultural impact of the so-called "Yon-sama craze" in Japan, which generated an estimated USD 3 billion profit, Chung pays critical attention to a patriarchal, xenophobic backlash against the Korean Wave in Japan. By meticulously analyzing TV Tokyo's *Nerima Daikon Brothers*, an adult-themed musical anime program aired in early 2006, Chung explores the darker flipside of the Yon-sama phenomenon in Japan which otherwise improved images of Korea and, by extension, Zainichi Koreans among the Japanese populace. While concluding with the show's reception in the U.S. through YouTube, Hulu, and Netflix, Chung wrote, "its [*Nerima Daikon Brothers*] potential to disseminate distorted images of monstrous Koreans to a new generation of YouTube users worldwide suggests that a major critical intervention is needed to guide informed consumption of this and other cyber popular culture texts suffused with regressive racial content." (PAGES) Irina Lyan and Alon Levkowitz brings us to the global reception of Korean popular cultural products. Their chapter is written based on data they scrupulously acquired through electronic survey deployment, content analysis, and interviews. As discussed earlier in this introduction, the notion of cultural proximity does not explain the global phenomenon of *Hallyu*. Traditional values and Confucian ethics have been implicated to explain the cultural consumers of Korean popular cultural products in East Asia. However, as Lyan and Levkowitz argue, these explanations cannot elucidate the Israeli case study "where Korean culture is perceived as exotic, distant, and different" (pages TBA). The main argument of their essay is that the Korean culture audiences in Israel are not just passive recipients in a one-way process, but rather cultural agents that shape and construct "Koreanness" in adjustment to the local environment. Finally, Brian Hu examines the Psy phenomenon. In this boldly titled chapter, "R.I.P. Gangnam Style," Hu proclaims that "Gangnam Style" happened. Past tense. Many contributors in this volume discuss, to some extent, what has been called "Psy phenomenon" but Hu's chapter has successfully achieved the length and breadth of the phenomenon without losing the critical perspectives. While *Hallyu* as a national-institutional campaign (Choi, this volume) has been celebrating Psy's huge success in the U.S. and its impact on the nation's economy, the U.S. mainstream media had repeatedly declared the death (or near-death) of "Gangnam Style." Why? In the U.S. cultural industry, Hu argues, Psy is another example of what Sue Collins has called "dispensable celebrity" as what Lou Bega, Falco, and Los del Rio had proved earlier (see endnote 1). Hu sharply observes that the American entertainment media industry has a reputable history of making Asians invisible in the mainstream media and woven into the hierarchies of the celebrity world where "real celebrity" rules the system while "dispensable celebrity" like Psy is marginalized when staged with "real race" American celebrities. Even Asian American critics who suspect that Psy's mainstream popularity

stems from a racial stereotype of Asian masculinity, consider Psy is “not just one in a rotating door of dispensable celebrities, but also the latest in the rotating door of stereotypical Asians” (pages TBA). However, Hu suggests us to reconsider the “death” of “Gangnam Style.” By delineating a parody wedding video of a couple Stephani Nguyen and Jeremy Ueno, two Asian Americans living in San Francisco, Hu shows that bride, groom, and their friends, in their parody video, celebrate the moment by showing the vivacity and true friendships instead of stereotypical representations of Asian American, “‘Gangnam Style’’s fleetingness” Hu wrote, “gave many of those who mimicked Psy’s original video a vernacular with which to memorialize the present – to celebrate it, laugh at it, and then let it go so as to clear the way for the future” (pages TBA).

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## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> Because the chapters in this volume explore a cultural phenomenon pertaining to the country known formally as the Republic of Korea, within this volume the terms "Korea" and "South Korea" both refer to this nation. ☺

<sup>2</sup> Lou Bega, an Italian/Ugandan artist from Germany released an international hit single "Mambo No.5" (1999) which reached number one in the US although no official singles was issued. Both Nena and Falco are German-language pop artists whose singles, "99 Luftballons" (1984) and "Rock Me Amadeus" (1986) marked the second place and topped the Billboard Hot 100 charts respectively. Falco became the first German-speaking artist ever to top the US pop chart. Los del Rio is probably the most similar case to the Psy phenomenon. This Spanish music duo shook the world with one of the hottest

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dance crazes of the 1990s, “Macarena” (1994). Kyu Sakamoto’s “Sukiyaki” (1963) is still the only Asian pop song ever to top the Billboard chart.

<sup>3</sup> It has reached 1.4 billion visitors as of February 2014.

<sup>4</sup> See Iwabuchi 2004; Iwabuchi et al. 2004; Berry et al. 2009; Chua 2012; and Jung 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Two edited volumes on the subject are scheduled to be released in 2014. Kyung Hyun Kim and Youngmin Choe’s *The Korean Popular Culture Reader* (Duke University Press, 2014) and Youna Kim’s *The Korean Wave: Korean Media Go Global* (Routledge 2014).

<sup>6</sup> Seung-Ah Lee showed a dark side of the Korean entertainment agencies by analyzing S.M. entertainment and the JYJ fandom. See her chapter in this volume.

<sup>7</sup> Those new or reshaped departments, many of them previously called “communication and culture” or “broadcast and media,” attract young high school graduates by advertising that, “the students are equipped with both the practical and creative skills necessary to work and flourish in this field and a full understanding of humanity as well as culture content subjects are included in the completed degree program.” From the official webpage of Hanyang University’s Department of Culture and Contents. Accessed at <http://www.hanyang.ac.kr/user/structureDirectEng.action?structureSeq=395>

<sup>8</sup> As an apparent example, on March 11, 2013, World Association for *Hallyu* Studies (WAHS), housed in Korea University, one of the most prestigious universities in Korea, was inaugurated and promulgated that the association is dedicated “to advancing *Hallyu* Studies as a multidisciplinary body of knowledge and profession serving the public good.” According to the publicity material, members of WAHS will explore such diverse academic disciplines as Humanities and Social Sciences, Medical science, *Hallyu* Policy and Management, Sports Science, Entertainment Business, Tourism, Textile/Fashion, Beauty, and Food, and will collaborate with its twelve regional offices in the US (East and West), Canada, Argentina, Europe, Middle East (Israel), Oceania, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan.